On Special Relativity and Temporal Illusions

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Spring 4-1-2015

Abstract

According to metaphysical tensism, there is an objective, albeit ever changing, present moment corresponding to our phenomenal experiences (Ludlow in "Philosophy of Language," 'Oxford Handbook on Tense and Aspect'. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Brogaard and Marlow in 'Analysis' 73(4):635-642, 2013). One of the principle objections to metaphysical tensism has been Einstein's argument from special relativity, which says that given that the speed of light is constant, there is no absolute simultaneity defined in terms of observations of light rays (Einstein in 'Ann Phys' 17:891-921, 1905). In a recent paper, Brogaard and Marlow ('Analysis' 73(4):635-642, 2013) argue that this objection fails. We argue that Brogaard and Marlow's argument fails to show that special relativity does not pose a threat to metaphysical tensism.

Publication Title

Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy

Volume

80

Issue

2

First Page

433

Last Page

436

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS