Memory, Quasi-Memory, and Pseudo-Quasi-Memory

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Fall 9-1-2009

Abstract

Bishop Butler objected to Locke's theory of personal identity on the grounds that memory presupposes personal identity. Most of those sympathetic with Locke's account have accepted Butler's criticism, and have sought to devise a theory of personal identity in the spirit of Locke's that avoids Butler's circularity objection. John McDowell has argued that even the more recent accounts of personal identity are vulnerable to the kind of objection Butler raised against Locke's own account. I criticize McDowell's stance, drawing on a distinction introduced by Annalisa Coliva between two types of immunity to error through misidentification.

Publication Title

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volume

87

Issue

3

First Page

465

Last Page

478

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