A Tale of Two Fallibilists: On an Argument for Infallibilism

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Fall 9-1-2012

Abstract

Dylan Dodd (2011) offers a simple, yet forceful, argument for infallibilism. The argument relies upon two assumptions concerning the relationship between knowledge, epistemic possibility, and epistemic probability. We argue below that by endorsing a particular conception of epistemic possibility, a fallibilist can both plausibly reject one of Dodd's assumptions and mirror the infallibilist's explanation of the linguistic data. In fact, such a fallibilist may even be able to offer a more comprehensive explanation than the infallibilist. Our discussion is of interest due in part to the fact that many fallibilists have rejected the conception of epistemic possibility employed in our response to Dodd.

Publication Title

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Volume

1

Issue

3

First Page

195

Last Page

199

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