University Research
Saving The Debate: Why Psychological Accounts Of Personhood Ought Not Accept A Univocal Biological Definition And Criterion Of Death
Academic department
Department of Philosophy
Description
In 2019, David Hershenov argued for a set of three connected claims in this journal [1]. First, any psychological account of what it is to be a human person (i.e. a view denying that human persons are identical to human animals), need not and in fact should not formulate a definition of death distinct from the merely biological definitions of death typically offered for human animals [2–4]. Second, a distinct criterion for the deaths of human persons and human animals is also unnecessary as a biological criterion is capable of playing the role for both. Finally, accepting distinct conditions for ceasing to exist is sufficient to ground distinct accounts of the deaths of human persons and human animals. If Hershenov is correct, what appear to be important and significant disagreements in bieothics (e.g., whole brain theorists vs. higher brain theorists; animalists vs. psychological essentialists) are otiose. Hershenov’s arguments are thus worth examining. I argue in what follows that only the third claim withstands critical scrutiny.
Publisher name
Springer
Document Type
Letter to the Editor
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) Link
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-025-09718-1
Publication Date
10-6-2025
Publication Title
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
Volume
46
First Page
335
Last Page
338
Recommended Citation
Buford, Christopher, "Saving The Debate: Why Psychological Accounts Of Personhood Ought Not Accept A Univocal Biological Definition And Criterion Of Death" (2025). University Research. 30.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/university_research/30
Creative Commons License
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