Abstract
Debate over imposing term limits on U.S. Supreme Court Justices has intensified in recent years, with proposals emphasizing potential benefits for judicial independence, ideological balance, and the confirmation process. Yet, much of the scholarly and political discourse has overlooked a significant and underexamined consequence: the post-judicial careers of justices whose service ends well before traditional retirement age. This Article addresses that gap by analyzing the strong likelihood—based on historical patterns from other courts without life tenure—that former Justices would reenter the legal profession, particularly in highly compensated private practice roles. We argue that this prospect raises profound ethical, institutional, and political concerns, including risks of undue influence, erosion of public trust, and concentration of Supreme Court advocacy in a small number of elite firms. Drawing on empirical data from state supreme courts, bankruptcy courts, and the Delaware Court of Chancery, we demonstrate that judges forced from the bench before the end of their working lives overwhelmingly seek lucrative legal positions, and that these moves can create conflicts of interest and distort legal markets. The Article further evaluates potential safeguards—such as minimum appointment ages, enhanced retirement compensation, and post-service “cooling-off” periods—and considers their constitutional, practical, and policy implications. While agnostic on the ultimate merits of Supreme Court term limits, we conclude that any reform must anticipate and mitigate the systemic risks posed by a revolving door between the nation’s highest court and the private sector.
Recommended Citation
Broyde, Michael J. and Hall, Hayden H.
(2026)
"Do We Really Want Retired U.S. Supreme Court Justices Practicing Law? A Public Policy Critique to U.S.Supreme Court Term Limits,"
Akron Law Review: Vol. 59:
Iss.
2, Article 1.
Available at:
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol59/iss2/1