Abstract
Part II makes the conceptual case for viewing the trust as an elective cost-externalization device. Part III offers the spendthrift trust as the archetypal model for purposes of our analysis, briefly describes the spendthrift trust, and explores its consequences to outsiders to the trust deal. Part IV offers some reasons why the elective externalities of trusts persist. Part V first examines and rejects a couple of approaches to minimizing the externalized costs of trusts that rely on the “bundle of sticks” approach to property interests. It then moves beyond the bundle of sticks approach, settling on a solution based on priority rules borrowed from legal accidents theory. The conclusion follows in Part VI.
Recommended Citation
Schenkel, Kent D.
(2012)
"Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts,"
Akron Law Review: Vol. 45:
Iss.
1, Article 2.
Available at:
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/2