Document Type
Article
Abstract
On the heels of the Learning Resources v. Trump decision, this Essay argues that agency theory provides an important framework for understanding the major questions doctrine. This perspective has received little attention in legal scholarship. The Essay casts the major questions doctrine in a new light by framing it as a constraint on the president acting as Congress’s agent. By highlighting this bridge between private-law agency principles and public law, the piece offers two novel insights. First, it reconceptualizes the relationship between the major questions and nondelegation doctrines: the former addresses the unfaithful execution of Congress’s directives by the executive as agent, while the latter concerns adequate specificity from Congress as the principal. Second, it highlights how this aspect of the major questions doctrine encourages continuity across presidential administrations by emphasizing faithful execution of the law.
Recommended Citation
Matthew Collins, The President as Agent: Reframing the Major Questions Doctrine, 18 ConLawNOW 1 (2026)