The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning From Ohio's Struggle to Reform Its Disciplinary System
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1999
Abstract
This article critiques the lawyer self-regulation model by analyzing Ohio’s efforts to reform its attorney disciplinary system. It argues that self-regulation—where lawyers investigate, prosecute, and judge allegations of misconduct against fellow attorneys—often prioritizes professional protectionism over public accountability. Using Ohio as a case study, the article documents systemic delays, lack of transparency, leniency in sanctions, and resistance to meaningful reform. The author contends that such deficiencies undermine public trust in the legal profession and calls for increased lay participation, structural independence, and public oversight in the disciplinary process. The article offers specific recommendations for reform, including procedural transparency, greater enforcement authority, and external checks to ensure that disciplinary systems serve the public interest rather than the profession’s internal culture.
Publication Title
University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume
68
First Page
65
Recommended Citation
Sahl, John P., "The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning From Ohio's Struggle to Reform Its Disciplinary System" (1999). Akron Law Faculty Publications. 441.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications/441
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