A Global Pandemic Remedy to Vaccine Nationalism
Abstract
Recognizing the need for flexibility in times of emergency and building upon knowledge gained from existing international and domestic compulsory licensing laws, we propose a global, centralized scheme to provide access to vaccines during pandemics. In many ways our proposal mirrors some of the World Health Organization's (WHO) COVID-19 vaccine initiatives but consolidates and expands them into a much more efficacious form. Under the proposed model, the WHO's declaration of a pandemic would trigger a global procurement and distribution scheme for vaccines. The proposed scheme would be mandatory and would require that all countries operate as one buyer vis-a-vis vaccine developers. A single buyer scheme provides buyers with significant economic leverage, allowing them not only to negotiate vaccine pricing and distribution from a better bargaining position but also to discourage defection. This procurement scheme would be supported by the power to issue global compulsory licenses of patent, trade secret, regulatory data, and other assets necessary for vaccine production to become effective if and when consensual negotiations with vaccine developers fail. The success of such a global procurement initiative, especially at times of emergency where each country is tempted to defect and take a nationalistic approach, depends on mandatory global participation and a firm commitment to the scheme.