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RESULT INEQUALITY IN FAMILY LAW

Margaret F. Brinig*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The neoclassical economics system assumes that individuals, acting on the basis of rational self-interest, will acquire the “perfect” knowledge needed to make decisions, that individuals will respond rationally to changes in “price,” that distributional consequences can be ignored in setting laws since losses can be made up through taxes and transfer payments, and that it is enough that parties theoretically could compensate third parties for their losses out of the gains from choices they make.\(^1\) None of these assumptions holds particularly true in the complex systems of families, as the data will show.

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1. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria were suggested in 1939 by Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939) and J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939). While it is accepted by many legal academics, see Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979), it is criticized by the Austrian school of economics. See, e.g., Edward Stringham, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of Central Planning, 4 Q.J. AUST. ECON. 41 (2001).
Turning to the legal side, the Constitution, especially since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, constrains lawmakers to treat every person equally. Despite claims during the 1970s that inequalities in results produced by facially neutral statutes violated the Constitution, the Supreme Court has upheld legislation that permits unequal funding levels for public education\(^2\) or that allows family size caps on welfare payments.\(^3\) In a free market economy, wealth can purchase better education or legal services so long as the basic rights guaranteed to all are available. Thus, just as the basic right of voting cannot be relegated to those who can pay a poll tax,\(^4\) access to divorce cannot be based on payment of a filing fee,\(^5\) nor may the ability to marry be conditioned on payment of previously ordered child support.\(^6\)

Of course, public policy about family law, public assistance, and education has changed over forty years. Importantly, there is a recognition that while basic rights to control and direct the upbringing of children belong to their fit parents,\(^7\) when parents’ and children’s interests conflict (or the child’s and one parent’s conflicts with the other’s), the children’s must triumph.\(^8\) Of the many recent changes in family law, one of the most contentious\(^9\) is the legislative insistence that custody be shared between separating parents.\(^10\)

Family demographics have changed as well, from a dominant model of two-parent, married, intact families to a substantial number of children being raised by never-married or divorced parents. For some

\(^2\) San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (involving an unsuccessful challenge to Texas’ school funding system based on local property taxes, since the students were not absolutely deprived of the desired benefit, stating that “[a]t least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages”).


\(^7\) See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding that an unwed mother could determine visitation rights of children’s paternal grandparents after his death, stating that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”).

\(^8\) See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12, 15 (2004) (determining that there was no standing for a noncustodial father who lacked legal custody to attack constitutionality of “under God” provision of Pledge of Allegiance on behalf of his daughter). “What makes this case different is that Newdow’s standing derives entirely from his relationship with his daughter . . . the interests of this parent and this child are not parallel, and indeed, are potentially in conflict.” Id.


\(^10\) Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Closing the Gap: Research, Policy, Practice and Shared Parenting, 52 FAM. Ct. REV. 152, 156-57 (2014).
subpopulations, non-married families are the norm. Further, the children raised by single parents are disadvantaged compared to others, though whether as an outgrowth of poverty or the lack of influence of the noncustodial parent is debated. Over the last half-century, social scientists have recognized that both poverty and household patterns replicate over generations.

June Carbone and Naomi Cahn argued recently that marriage works well for couples at the upper third of income levels, poorly for those in the middle class, and is not attempted by most in the bottom third. They argue that the significant benefits gained by marriage, including stability, should not be abandoned (as is suggested by some), but that the economy will need restructuring before many in the lower classes do take on marriage. This seems particularly true for families of color.

While society may tolerate inequality among adults, if law itself causes replication of unfavorable outcomes for children, this is a great cause for concern. While academics have observed that shared custody tends to be more prevalent for wealthy couples, and that mediation leads to shared custody more often than does the traditional legal process, little research has been done on the impact of shared custody on domestic violence, on the impact of shared parenting on poverty,
or on racial or ethnic disparities in custody patterns. This Article attempts to answer some of these questions, concluding that the actual picture of family dissolution and its aftermath diverges dramatically based on income, marital status, and race. Further, children of divorce tend to delay marriage longer, marry less often, and divorce more frequently than children of intact families. The conclusion is that current law in fact drives some of the least attractive aspects of the picture of family dissolution, and that replication into future generations suggests that some changes need to be made immediately.

This Article evaluates data from Arizona, where there is a statutory presumption of shared parenting or equal parenting time for all separating couples, and data from Indiana, where the state’s guidelines suggest “meaningful contact” with both parents, based on the age of the child. The data I examine suggests that requiring equal parenting time for all couples leads to inequality based on income, marital status, race and ethnicity, and in instances of domestic violence. I, therefore,
conclude that the state guidelines regarding parenting time should not impose equal parenting time in all situations, but should consider variations on any equal parenting presumption in at least the following situations: (1) cases involving the potential for domestic violence; (2) cases in which family incomes are in the lower half of family incomes; and (3) cases involving the breakup of unmarried, cohabitating couples. Additionally, the data suggest that child support guidelines should consider issues including duplication of resources in the shared parenting environment and the higher cost of raising children in two homes (and should ameliorate the disparity in living standards in the two homes). Further, the data suggest that policymakers should consider promoting childcare services and other in-kind services that promote contact with the noncustodial parent, in appropriate cases.

Part II of this Article provides a short introduction to shared parenting policies from the 1980s to the present, the policies that have animated the move to equal sharing of parenting time, how states have varied in their approach to shared parenting time, and what we have yet to learn about shared parenting. Part III discusses how I selected Arizona and Indiana as the basis for the data in this article and what data I obtained and used in this study. Part III also presents the results I obtained regarding inequality in the shared parenting context based on income, marital status, race and ethnicity, and situations involving domestic violence. Part IV provides conclusions regarding when policymakers should think twice before creating a presumption of shared parenting and regarding changes in child support guidelines when shared parenting is implemented.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW REGARDING FAMILY DISSOLUTION AND THE SHARED PARENTING OPTION

Shared parenting, though it appeared on the legislative scene in the early 1980s, has enjoyed a renaissance since the turn of the century.
Since then, another round of joint custody presumption initiatives has been fomented by father’s rights groups, who have gained ground in some legislatures, notably in Arkansas,26 Arizona,27 Iowa,28 New Mexico29 and Wisconsin,30 as well as internationally.31 Because both parents, at least in theory, win32 and because judges need not make difficult binary custody determinations, shared parenting presumptions have been seen as vindicating parental rights, forcing parents to cooperate in the reconstituted family,33 and ensuring children the two-

DEMOGRAPHY 1381 (2014) (“These changes have accelerated markedly . . . between 1988 and 2008 . . . .”).


27. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015).

28. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).

29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015).


31. How often it is actually used, and remains viable for parents, is another matter. For a chart illustrating the incidence of joint custody internationally, see Belinda Fehlberg et al., Caring for Children after Parental Separation: Would Legislation for Shared Parenting Help Children? Family Policy Briefing, 7 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY AND INTERVENTION 1, 4 (May 2011), available at http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/files/Would%20legislation%20for%20shared%20parenting%20time%20help%20children%29OXLAP%20FPB%2007.pdf, (indicating 3.1% in the U.K. to 28% in Sweden). For some U.S. state experiences, see supra notes 26-30. There is a presumption, since 2006, in Australia that the best interests of the child is to have equal shared parenting responsibility, under the Family Law Act 1975 (Act No. 53, 1975) § 61DA (Austl.), and that the court must consider whether, if reasonably practicable and in the best interests of the child, to spend equal time, or failing that, significant and substantial time, with each parent. Section 65DAA defined as time allowing each parent to be involved in the child’s daily routine and significant events. Family Law Act 1975 (Act No. 53, 1975) § 65DAA(3).

One recent British study found no evidence of parental alienation, but found some evidence of children deciding themselves, for their own reasons, not to have contact with their parents. JANE FORTIN, JOAN HUNT & LESLEY SCANLAN, TAKING A LONGER VIEW OF CONTACT: THE PERSPECTIVES OF YOUNG ADULTS WHO EXPERIENCED PARENTAL SEPARATION IN THEIR YOUTH 1, 58-60 (Nov. 2012), www.sussex.ac.uk/law/research/centreforresponsibilities/takingalongerviewofcontact [hereinafter NUFFIELD REPORT] (three hundred ninety-eight adults 18-35 years old, interviewed by telephone, with fifty whose parents separated after the law changed in 1989 and who had contact with the non-custodial parent, having face to face in-depth interviews).


33. For some generally favorable consideration of the idea in principle, see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393 (1998). More recently, see ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION (Guilford Press, 2d ed. 2012).
parent influence so many lack at parental dissolution. The shared, or

34. See, e.g., Pruett & DiFonzio, supra note 10, at 159:
Research has led to widespread agreement among professionals that children generally have improved prospects after separation and divorce when they have healthy, loving relationships with two parents before and after separation and divorce. Research has also
soundly established that the multiple changes in home, school, neighborhood, and so on that often accompany separation and divorce are difficult for children and that continuity and consistency—especially in quality parenting and parent-child relationships—support child adaptation. In particular, studies have focused on the importance of children of their fathers staying involved after separation, as fathers are more likely than mothers to spend less time with or withdraw from their children after separation.

For a recently adopted statute favoring both parenting plans and joint custody, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02(B) (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015) (“Consistent with the child’s best interests . . . the court shall adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time.”); see also Fla. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (c) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 First Reg. Sess. and Special A Sess. of the 24th Legis.) (establishing for the statute as a whole, a presumption of substantial time with each as being in child’s best interests; section (3) establishes factors governing parenting plan); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring courts to establish joint custody implementation order except for good cause shown, and provides that “to the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody of the children should be shared equally”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015) (establishing a presumption that joint custody is in the child’s best interests but then sets forth factors and requires parenting plan; no specific time sharing arrangement required though time with each is to be “significant”).

A recent attempt to enact a very strong presumption of joint custody, Senate Bill 1218, passed the legislature but was vetoed by Minnesota’s governor. In 2014, section 518.17, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Statutes was amended to provide that there would be no presumption for or against joint physical custody except in cases of domestic abuse. A strong shared custody presumption in Michigan under House Bill 4120 progressed as far as the Committee on Judiciary. See Darrick Scott-Farnsworth, Michigan 2013-2014 HB 4120 Equal Parenting Rights Bill, EQUAL PARENTAL RIGHTS BLOG (Jan. 29, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://parentalrightsequality.blogspot.com/2013/01/michigan-2013-14-hb-4120-equal.html; MI. 2013-2014 EQUAL PARENTING BILL HB 4120 (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). In 2005, an equal time provision was introduced but died in committee in California. See DOCUMENTS, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?bill_number=ab_1307&sess=0506&house=B&author=dynally (click on the hyperlink “Assembly Committee– 05/02/2005”), See also W. VA. SB 438 (http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2009_SESSIONS/RS/Bills/sb438%20intr.htm) (2009), discussed in Alison Knezevich, Sweeping Child-Custody Changes Proposed, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Mar. 16, 2009), https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-20002902.html (requiring court to order joint custody unless contrary to child’s interest). While Maine and Iowa have very strong presumptions, at least Iowa’s Supreme Court has decided that consistent with “best interests,” the legislature could not have enacted a joint physical custody presumption. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, §1653(2)(A) (2009) (when parents agree to share parental rights); IOWA CODE § 598.41(1)(a) (2013); In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2007). For discussion, see IOWA FATHERS, http://www.iowafathers.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). The politics and public choice considerations for most of this legislation is discussed in Scott & Emery, supra note 9.

In Great Britain, an equal custody bill was also defeated. See Tim Shipman, Fathers Lose Bid for Equal Custody Rights after Review of Family Law, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 2, 2011, 2:32 PM); see generally Alexander Masardo, Managing Shared Residence in Britain and France: Questioning a
alternating, custody rule—particularly in its strong form, the equal custody rule—has been a particular darling of interest groups concerned about the too real plight of noncustodial parents, especially fathers. As a “rights-based” approach, it has also gleaned support from some civil libertarians, and, early on, “sameness” feminists. On a slightly less exalted plain, because child support guidelines shift once a child spends

Default ‘Primary Carer’ Model, 21 SOC. POL’Y REV 197 (Kirsten Rummery, Ian Greener & Chris Holden eds., 2009). For research justifying the bill’s defeat, see NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 31, at xviii.

In Australia, the measure achieved more success with 2006 legislation including the introduction of a presumption in favor of “equal shared parental responsibility,” Family Law Act 1975 (Act No. 53, 1975) § 61DA(1), with a nexus between the application of the presumption and considerations in relation to time arrangements. Family Law Act § 65DAA. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence satisfying a court that it would not be in a child’s best interests for both parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. Family Law Act § 61DA(4), and it is not applicable where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in child abuse or family violence.

Family Law Act § 61DA(2). Where orders for shared parental responsibility are made pursuant to Family Law Act § 61DA(1), the courts are obliged to consider whether making orders for children to spend equal or substantial and significant time with each parent would be reasonably practicable and in the child’s best interests. Family Law Act § 65DAA. For a discussion, see Ruth Weston et al., Shared Care Time: An Increasingly Common Arrangement, 88 FAM. MATTERS (2011), available at http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fm2011/fm88/fm88f.html. For a discussion of the need to consult children, see PATRICK PARKINSON & JUDY CASHMORE, THE VOICE OF A CHILD IN FAMILY LAW DISPUTES (2009) (suggesting that there are both pros and cons of involving children directly and that in any event they should not be understood to make the decision).

For a discussion of these and other Western European jurisdictions’ custody rules, see PATRICK PARKINSON, FAMILY LAW AND THE INDESSOLUBILITY OF PARENTHOOD 45-56 (2011).

35. See, e.g., FATHERS AND DADS FOR EQUAL CUSTODY RIGHTS, http://www.fathersrights.org (last visited Dec. 6, 2015). One interesting statistic is that shared custody families more often involve boys than girls. Sons are slightly more likely than daughters to be living in a shared parenting family. Heather Juby, Celine Bourdais & Nicole Gratton, Sharing Roles, Sharing Custody, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 157 (2005); Ed Spruijt & Vincent Duindam, Joint Physical Custody In The Netherlands And The Well Being Of Children, 51 J. DIV. & REMARRIAGE 65, 72 (2010) (19% of the boys and 15% of the girls of 3,561 Dutch children surveyed lived in shared custody households); Melli & Brown, supra note 14, at 238 (of 598 surveyed families, 35.7% of the mother custody families had only girls, compared to 30.9% of the shared placement families).


some amount of time (typically a quarter to a third) with each parent, wealthier noncustodial parents are particularly attracted to larger and especially equal parenting time shares.  

Some states (among them the populous states of Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington) do not


Legislation skewed toward awards of joint custody increases the ability of the parent requesting joint custody to engage in this type of extortion. David Chambers has noted that “a parent who is not really interested in having joint custody may use the threat of demanding it as a tool to induce the other parent to make concessions on issues of property division and child support.”

Arizona’s tables for parenting time credit begin at four days, with a 0.012 reduction, but do not become substantial percentages until 130 days (or about 35% of the time).

39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 First Reg. Sess. and Special A Sess. of the 24th Legis.). The statute provides in paragraph (1)(a):

- Notwithstanding the variance limitations of this section, the trier of fact shall order payment of child support which varies from the guideline amount as provided in paragraph (11)(b) whenever any of the children are required by court order or mediation agreement to spend a substantial amount of time with either parent. This requirement applies to any living arrangement, whether temporary or permanent.

The state does have a shared custody presumption, FLA. STAT. ANN § 61.3(2)(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 First Reg. Sess. and Special A Sess. of the 24th Legis.), but still requires a best interests determination by the court even if there is agreement. Sparks v. Sparks, 75 So. 3d 861, 862 (Fla. App. 2011).

40. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/505 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-487 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.) (providing for specific percentages of supporting party’s net income based on number of children, to be varied only if inappropriate after considering the best interests of the child in light of various relevant factors (not including shared custody)). Illinois law contains no statutory presumption of equal parenting time even where the parents are awarded joint legal custody. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/602.1(d) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-487 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“Nothing within this section shall imply or presume that joint custody shall necessarily mean equal parenting time.”).

41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 208 § 28 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 136 of the 2015 First Ann. Sess.) (allowing rebuttal of presumptive guideline amounts if unjust or inappropriate under the circumstances and written findings of the specific facts of the case justifying departure from the guidelines). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 208 § 31 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 136 of the 2015 First Ann. Sess.) provides that “physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure a child frequent and continued contact with both parents.”

42. 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4322 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 61) (“There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or expedited process, that the amount of the award which would result from the application of such guideline is the correct amount of support to be awarded. A written finding or specific finding on the record that the application of the guideline would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case shall be sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case” if based upon “the reasonable needs of the child or spouse seeking support and the ability of the obligor to provide support, with primary emphasis on the net incomes and earning capacities of the parties, with allowable deviations for unusual needs, extraordinary expenses and other factors, such as the parties’ assets, as warrant special attention.”).

Since 2010, Pennsylvania’s custody law provides that “it is public policy of this Commonwealth,
have an offset for shared parenting time. Others, such as Arizona,\textsuperscript{45} when in the best interest of the child, to assure a reasonable and continuing contact of the child with both parents after a separation or dissolution of the marriage and the sharing of the rights and responsibilities of child rearing by both parents and continuing contact of the child or children with grandparents when a parent is deceased, divorced or separated.” However, shared parenting is just one of the options listed in 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5323 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 61).

43. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.121 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legis.). (Section 154.123 does allow, in subsection (b)(4), variance based on “the amount of time of possession of and access to a child.”) The state does presume that shared parenting is in the child’s best interests. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legis.), for the “public policy of this state” consists of “(1) assuring that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child; (2) providing a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and (3) encouraging parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.”

44. Section 26.19.001 of the Washington Revised Code includes in the legislative intent and finding “[r]educing the adversarial nature of the proceedings by increasing voluntary settlements as a result of the greater predictability achieved by a uniform statewide child support schedule.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.001(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. and the 2015 First, Second, and Third Special Sess.).

The statute provides that “[t]he court shall make residential provisions for each child which encourage each parent to maintain a loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child, consistent with the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic circumstances.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.187(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. and the 2015 First, Second, and Third Special Sess.). Further,

The court may order that a child frequently alternate his or her residence between the household of the parents for brief and substantially equal intervals of time if such provision is in the best interests of the child. In determining whether such an arrangement is in the best interests of the child, the court may consider the parties geographic proximity to the extent necessary to ensure the ability to share performance of the parenting functions.” §§ 26.09.187(3)(a)-(b). A 2009 Washington State study found that “46 percent of children of divorce, statewide, are ordered to spend a minimum of 35 percent parenting time with their biological fathers.” Bill Harrington, Giving Parents Equal Parenting Time by Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 25, 2009, 4:13 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2008786615_opinh26harrington.html.

45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015). Section (D)(8) provides that “[t]he duration of parenting time and related expenses” shall be one of the criteria. While Schedule A to the child support guidelines subtracts some percentage from the amount otherwise owed for various levels of parenting days (computed in six hour increments) up to 48.6% (for 182 days), Schedule B, in effect when custody is shared equally, subtracts the lower earning parent’s total amount due from the higher, and then divides the difference in two. If $2000 per month is owed, and only one parent has any earnings at all, this means the parent who would otherwise pay $2000 only pays $1000. Thus the biggest disadvantage is to lower earning parents when incomes are the most disparate. Further, while many states multiply the amount owed in order to recognize the duplicate fixed expenses when children are living in two households, Arizona uses the same total child support amount whether all overnights are with one parent or whether 50% of the time is spent in each parent’s household. See Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Child Support Guidelines: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 45 FAM. L.Q. 135 (2011). This means that the baseline amount available in shared parenting situations is lower.
Joint Parenting Laws Make Any Difference?


Joint Parenting Laws Make Any Difference?

While Oregon law is complex and requires parenting plans, joint custody is preferred under §107.101.

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Michigan, Oregon, and Virginia do allow for offset.
No one has looked to date at the comparable percentages of custody awarded to or bargained for by each parent. This Article does not do so, except to note that custody is shared far more equally in Arizona, where shared parenting dramatically affects child support, than in Indiana.

Nor does this Article take on the contentious issue of whether substantially shared parenting post-dissolution is beneficial for children. Clearly, parents are enormously invested in their children. It may be slightly less obvious that loss of custody involves real harm (not just pretended or imagined harm) to them. As two-parent families with loving parents are theoretically best for children, continuing relationships with two nurturing parents (biological or adoptive) who no longer live together is typically the second-best solution.

At this point, professionals contest more than just percentages. Some claim that “relationship” equals “parenting time,” and

49. Section 20-108.2(G)(3)(c) of the Virginia Code provides for different calculations when a party has custody or visitation of a child or children for more than ninety days of the year. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (G)(3)(c) (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). Custody shares are determined by dividing the number of days by 365. Shared support need means the presumptive guideline amount of needed support for the shared children using the schedule for the combined gross income of the parents and the number of shared children, multiplied by 1.4. The mother would then pay the shared support need times the father’s custody share plus the healthcare and childcare paid by mother times her income share. Subtracting the smaller from the larger may offset the two.

Section 20-108.1 provides that the guideline amounts may be rebutted by subdivision (2) arrangements regarding custody of the children, including the cost of visitation travel. Section 20-124.2(B) provides:

In determining custody, the court shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. The court shall assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents, when appropriate, and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of rearing their children. As between the parents, there shall be no presumption or inference of law in favor of either. The court shall give due regard to the primacy of the parent-child relationship but may upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be served thereby award custody or visitation to any other person with a legitimate interest. The court may award joint custody or sole custody.

50. Brinig & Nock, supra note 19, at 54 (concluding noncustodial fathers, holding constant other factors, have a real and significant increase in depressive symptoms following a custody order giving it to the mother).

51. See, e.g., Fehlberg et al., supra note 31 (“This paper starts from the viewpoint that evidence fully supports the benefit to children of having a meaningful relationship with both parents after separation.”).

“nurturing” necessarily involves overnight stays. Some claim the confusion caused by moving between two households outweighs the benefit, at least for some.53 There is debate about whether the “continuing relationship” with two nurturing parents trumps or is trumped by the child’s need for continuity and stability.54 Experts do not agree whether exceptions to alternating custody need to be made when it’s impracticable (say, for a nursing or infant child,55 or one with disabilities, or when a parent is in the military, or lives too far away, or both are poor).56

Differences in gender regarding parenting57 and in the stability of marriage versus cohabitation58 remain even in Nordic countries with parent-child contact and children’s well-being, finding that quality of contact is more important than frequency of contact).


54. One common place for this debate to play out is in “move away” cases. See, for example, the rule enunciated in a California case, In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).


See also ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION 118-19 (Guilford Press, 2010)

56. See, for example, Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 201, 212-13 (1998):

Further, joint custody is a more expensive proposition than sole custody. Joint custodians are each required to maintain suitable housing for children, with extra clothing and toys. It has been estimated that these expenditures constitute from one-fourth to one-third of the total child-related expenditures. Initially, there is the question of whether the costs associated with joint custody make such arrangements feasible for low-income families. One study noted that joint custody is not spreading very quickly to lower socio-economic populations. Reviewing the literature, one is left with the feeling that joint custody is an upper-middle class phenomenon.


In all four cases, mothers continue to take more leave than fathers. The difference is greatest in Denmark, where statistics from 2010 and 2011 show that Danish fathers on average only took 7.2 per cent of the Parental leave period, followed by Norway, where fathers accounted for 18 per cent of Parental leave days taken in 2011, and Sweden, where fathers take about just under a quarter of all days (24 per cent) in 2011. The greatest share of paid leave taken by men, 33 per cent, is in Iceland, with its 3+3+3 leave scheme; mothers take both their individual entitlement and the greater part of the family entitlement.

58. See Kathleen Kiernan, Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 98 POPULATION TRENDS 11 (1999); JOHN HOLMES & KATHLEEN KIERNEN, FRAGILE FAMILIES IN THE
substantial public support for childrearing by both parents, whether married or not. Similarly, it is quite well demonstrated that some dissolving families experience domestic violence either before parents separate or on a continuing basis. The proportion is disputed but seems to be higher among those who never married than the married. When children are exposed to violence, no one doubts that they are harmed.

Psychologists and sociologists write that families with a high degree of visible conflict are those in which children might even do better if their parents divorce than if they stay together.

III. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF INEQUALITIES

A. Collecting the Data

In this Article, I examine shared parenting in Arizona and Indiana. When I set about looking for particular jurisdictions in which to study the effect of preferences for shared parenting and child support laws, I had several criteria. First, I looked for a “modern” statute, that is, one that thought about post-separation parental roles in terms of parenting time. Second and relatedly, I wanted a state that for some time had parenting guidelines propounded by the judiciary to give additional guidance to judges making parenting time decisions. Third, I preferred to analyze states that had comparable child support guidelines, especially in

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60. See, e.g., Amanda Berger, et. al., Relationship Violence Among Young Adult Couples, CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF 3-4 (2012), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Child_Trends-2012_06_01_RB_CoupleViolence.pdf (noting the highest level of domestic violence among cohabiting couples and the lowest among married couples, with 45% of married couples and 52% of cohabiting couples experiencing any type of violence; 8% of married couples and 15% of cohabiting couples reported a resulting injury; discussing Spain and Great Britain as well).

61. See, e.g., PAUL A. AMATO AND ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (Harvard University Press, 1997) (suggesting children are only better off if their parents had a highly conflictual marriage before divorce (30% of the time)). More recently, see EMERY, supra note 55 at 100 (“Hundreds of studies show that parental conflict is toxic for children in divorce.”).

62. For some examples, see Alan Booth & Paul R. Amato, Parental Predivorce Relations and Offspring PostDivorce Well-Being, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 197, 210 (2001).
the way they treated substantially shared parenting. Fourth, given the first criteria, I looked for states with substantial experience with shared parenting, that is, states likely to be above average in shared parenting awards, since this would minimize a selection effect into shared custody. And last, I needed states that would allow me remote access to electronic records. This required that the counties involved at least keep electronic records of not only judicial activity (or minute entries), but also scanned documents such as pleadings, reports, motions, and decisions and orders of judges, mediators, and so forth. The two states I ultimately chose were Arizona and Indiana.

There are two kinds of court data involved in the study. The first is publicly available online and is simply a listing of transactions with the clerk’s office dealing with the file. The most important for analysis purposes is a subgrouping within the publically available file, a listing of the (minute) time scheduled with the judge or other decision-maker. This enables calculation of the relative litigiousness of the parents.

The second kind of data was obtained after receiving Institutional Review Board approval and with assurances that individual records would be kept confidential. The data comprise the actual documents, such as pleadings and other motions, letters, reports, and orders, involved with each file selected above. These documents contain a host of information. Some documents are routine or appear in every case involving children. Such documents include affidavits of service of process, orders to complete parenting time education classes (and certifications when classes were attended), and motions and orders dealing with continuances of various trial dates. Some documents were quite routine but did not appear in every case, including motions and orders for return of evidence, cash receipts, calculations of arrearages by the Department of Economic Security (since the final numbers would always be found elsewhere), and orders of publication when respondents could not be located. The information I coded came from complaints and answers (or motions and responses), reports by child coordinators or of drug testing, completed parental worksheets for child support, parenting plans (joint or sole custody), and final dissolution orders (or orders

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dealing with motions or protective orders).

The complaint typically included names and birth dates of parents and any children, the date of marriage (if the parties were married), addresses, occupations of the parents, what property was owned by the couple and how the petitioner wanted it split, what parenting time was asked for, and whether spousal support or child support was sought. The complaint also indicated which party was bringing the action (father or, at least nominally, in the case of Title IVD support, mother) and whether there had been or currently was domestic violence. The answer corroborated or sometimes corrected the details found in the complaint, asking for the same or different things.

The child support worksheets at the time of the dissolution or other order identified which parent was the primary custodial parent, the amount of each parent’s monthly income, whether or not either was responsible for additional or court ordered support for another child, whether the child was over 12 or had extraordinary expenses, who was ordered to pay child support, what the parenting time of the payor parent was (calculated by totaling the number of days or partial days), and whether the amount was adjusted because it exceeded the amount needed for self-support (in 2008, $775 monthly).

Some cases involved temporary motions for support, requests for custody evaluations or mediation, discovery motions (which I usually ignored unless the total number of these was very large), actions involving protective orders and, if requested, the results of protective order hearings, and motions post dissolution (or order) to increase or decrease child support or parenting time or to enforce either. The motions were accompanied by supporting reasons, which were frequently referred to by the court in resolving them. The divorce decrees or parenting orders incorporated any agreements of the parties, which sometimes were attached and sometimes separately filed. These usually included parenting plans and sometimes included property settlement agreements. The stand-alone support orders included reasons for deviating from the amounts calculated on the worksheet (the state child support guideline amounts) and sometimes employer information (which was also sometimes included in a separate document). All of these alleged or found facts were carefully coded.

1. Arizona and Presumptive Shared Parenting

The Arizona law in place at the beginning of my study was typical
of the laws in many states “friendly” to shared parenting. The state progressively moved in 2010 and again in 2012 toward mandating equal parenting time for all separating couples. Arizona, as a whole, even in 2007, had more equal parenting than most other jurisdictions. Maricopa County, the most populous county in the state, led the way,

64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25–403.01 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015), Sole and joint custody:
   A. In awarding child custody, the court may order sole custody or joint custody. This section does not create a presumption in favor of one custody arrangement over another. The court in determining custody shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent’s sex.
   B. The court may issue an order for joint custody over the objection of one of the parents if the court makes specific written findings of why the order is in the child’s best interests. In determining whether joint custody is in the child’s best interests, the court shall consider the factors prescribed in section 25–403, subsection A and all of the following:
      1. The agreement or lack of an agreement by the parents regarding joint custody.
      2. Whether a parent’s lack of agreement is unreasonable or is influenced by an issue not related to the best interests of the child.
      3. The past, present and future abilities of the parents to cooperate in decision-making about the child to the extent required by the order of joint custody.
      4. Whether the joint custody arrangement is logistically possible.
   C. The court may issue an order for joint custody of a child if both parents agree and submit a written parenting plan and the court finds such an order is in the best interests of the child. The court may order joint legal custody without ordering joint physical custody.


67. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25–403.02 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the First. Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015) now includes in part:
   B. Consistent with the child’s best interests in § 25–403 and §§ 25–403.03, 25–403.04 and 25–403.05, the court shall adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time. The court shall not prefer a parent’s proposed plan because of the parent’s or child’s gender.

and it still drives the state-level results.\textsuperscript{69} In other words, by imitating others, the majority of couples in Arizona not having trial-determined custody outcomes, chose some degree of shared parenting. Indeed, the most frequently occurring single outcome following family dissolution in Arizona, other than no overnights at all, was equal or nearly equal parenting time.\textsuperscript{70} Figure 1 reveals these outcomes, and it also shows peaks or concentrations at various other points, though these may be due to incentives driven by the shared custody deductions of the child support system.

\textbf{Figure 1: Maricopa County Parenting Time (482 Cases: Pooling)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{ParentingTimeChart.png}
\caption{Maricopa County Parenting Time (482 Cases: Pooling)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{69}. Because Maricopa’s population is so much larger than any other county in the state, its custody numbers drive the state averages. Pima’s (and presumably other counties’) are skewed to the left, the lower amounts. Pima’s totals were slightly different (added up to only 91%) because of a large number of cases in which no parenting time reduction was ordered. These do not show up on the figure (which begins at 4-20 days).

\textsuperscript{70}. The various spikes in the figure correspond, by definition, to frequently occurring parenting patterns. While the 182-day pattern is obvious (though it may be through alternating weeks or seasons, or 2-2-5-5 day patterns), the spike around 60 days accounts for traditional custody arrangements (every other weekend (52 days) plus one week during the summer (4.75 additional days)). The 104-day pattern is for one parent to have the children during the school week with the other living with them on weekends (or, in long distance situations, one having most of summer vacation plus the longer breaks during the school year).
The Court Administrator in Maricopa County, Arizona sent me the complete list of intake files from eight weeks in January-February, April, and September of 2008. These identified not only file names and the type of action involved, but also the names of parties, their addresses (where available), their counsel (or whether, like most couples, they were self-representing, or “pro per” as it is called there), and very often their dates of birth. From these I randomly selected files representing specific types of actions, with the following results:

**Table 1. Types of Cases, Maricopa County, Arizona**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Case</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution with Children</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution without Children</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Separation</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custody</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Order</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the legal separations eventually were changed by one of the spouses to a final dissolution. The one protective order case was not analyzed further, though there were protective orders that were part of

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71. Please note that while I selected files randomly, I did not attempt to match the actual proportion of files in the sample. Thus while my contrasts within and between groups does not present statistical issues, I am sure that it is not representative of all the cases involving children decided in Maricopa, for instance. The sample underrepresented the population of divorces with children among this group (62.6% compared with 73% in the intake weeks represented), slightly underrepresented the unmarried custody cases (7.37% compared to 9.7% in the intake weeks represented) and substantially overrepresented the establishment of support group (27.7% compared to 17% in the weeks intake represented).
each of the other types of cases. Some of these cases were dismissed at various points and for various reasons. Seventeen couples reconciled and voluntarily dismissed the actions. A perhaps overlapping group of 28 couples had their cases dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute. A third group of 16 couples involved absent parents or children and therefore a lack of jurisdiction to decide custody and/or support issues. All these were dropped from further analysis.

The Arizona child support guidelines explicitly defined and still define how to count days or partial days for parenting time. Once the total is determined, a table in the guidelines reveals what percentage of the obligation should be reduced to obtain preliminary child support owed. For example, the traditional, or “basic,” parenting plan would be for the child to spend every other weekend plus one evening during the week plus split holidays plus two weeks in the summer with the non-primary parent. While many parents use a software calculator (obtainable as a free download) for this, the plan would include 52 (for the weekends) + 3 (12 x .25, for one mid-week evening a week) + 5 (for holidays) + 12 (for summer, two weeks less the weekend already counted) = 72 days, or a 10.5% reduction in the support that would otherwise have been awarded. A separate table known as Appendix B equates the total support obligation borne (or imputed) to each parent when parenting time is equal.

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74 Id. at 11.
75 Id. at Appendix A. The simplest way of thinking about this is to subtract the smaller amount due from each parent from the larger one and divide by 2.
I replicated the Maricopa process, including the relative proportion of case types, first in Pima County, Arizona, and then in Indiana.

2. Indiana’s Approach to Shared Parenting

Obtaining the Indiana records required me to gain a court order from the Indiana Supreme Court, and I used five counties scattered around the state to permit consideration of different demographics: urban and rural, prosperous and poor, racially diverse and not. I utilized the same months from 2008 obtained from Arizona, including smaller numbers of unmarried couples. The state demographics, as shown in Table 2, are not dissimilar:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arizona</th>
<th>Indiana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic population</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black population</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19% (27.6 in Marion and 25.3 in Lake Counties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Already Divorced</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td>$55,862</td>
<td>$42,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76. The counties are Lake (Gary and Crown Point), Marion (Indianapolis), Monroe (Bloomington), Posey (Evansville) and St. Joseph (South Bend).
However, while both states have both child custody and child support guidelines, Indiana’s guidelines differ from Arizona’s, suggesting meaningful contact with both parents based upon the age of the child rather than “maximum contact with both.” The difference is not semantic only: there is far less equally shared parenting time among divorcing Indiana couples, and the bulk of parenting days in Indiana are in the 20-128 days per year range, (mean 72.47 days) as opposed to 47-163 days (mean 105 days) for comparable divorcing parents in Arizona.

Child support when there is shared parenting is computed differently as well. In Arizona, the base amount is typically reduced by a “parenting time deduction” ranging from 1% to 48.6%. In Indiana, the base amount is first multiplied by 1.4, and then the reductions credit only the variable as opposed to the fixed costs of parenting. Further, a finding of domestic violence in Arizona means a presumption against shared legal custody (decision-making), while in Indiana, and most other states, it would preclude shared physical custody (parenting time).
Descriptive statistics from the most often utilized subsets (divorces with children) from the two states follow in Table 3.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Arizona and Indiana Divorces with Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arizona</th>
<th></th>
<th>Indiana</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N AZ/IN</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint legal custody</td>
<td>685/310</td>
<td>.540</td>
<td>.4987</td>
<td>.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly gross income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income mother</td>
<td>608/225</td>
<td>$2450.2878</td>
<td>1961.72416</td>
<td>$2068.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly gross income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income father</td>
<td>609/225</td>
<td>$4071.5681</td>
<td>3602.57535</td>
<td>$2498.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spousal support to mother—amount</td>
<td>101/12</td>
<td>$1271.3129</td>
<td>1228.81647</td>
<td>$261.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days of parenting time</td>
<td>567/203</td>
<td>105.002</td>
<td>57.9731</td>
<td>74.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator involved</td>
<td>685/310</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.4340</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution after default</td>
<td>685/310</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>.4870</td>
<td>.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution by consent decree</td>
<td>685/310</td>
<td>.336</td>
<td>.4726</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution after trial</td>
<td>685/310</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.3489</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-order protective order</td>
<td>685/310</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.2579</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further, to the extent that racial and cultural groups, or lower income families, are disadvantaged by particular parenting arrangements, the exacerbation of income inequalities might present a major problem, both currently and critically a generation down the line.\textsuperscript{77} This type of systemic risk is what some of the results in both states seem to portend.\textsuperscript{78}

**B. Assessing the Results: Income-Generated Inequality**

Even a preliminary examination of these 2008 and later court documents reveals at least two very large groupings. The first shows a world involving divorcing, relatively wealthy parents, with the mother’s income at or higher than 50% of the couples in the study ($2081.66 a month). For these wealthier once-married parents, in Arizona, 25% indicate that they have equal custody, and the average parenting time adjustment\textsuperscript{79} exceeds 116 days a year, or 31.7% of the total time.\textsuperscript{80} The norm for these parents is clearly to share custody, and, in those cases equaling or exceeding the median income of mothers,\textsuperscript{81} substantial parenting time is quite routine. The marriages usually dissolve by consent decree, so that 43.9% had agreed-upon orders that both

\textsuperscript{77} For a discussion of this problem in the context of marriage, see CARBONE & CAHIN, supra note 11.

\textsuperscript{78} Depending upon the success of shared parenting, there may be a risk from its underuse by less advantaged or cultural minority families. That is, if children of separating parents do much better when their parents share parenting, whole groups of children are at risk. On the other hand, if income inequality between parents presents special problems for equal-parenting separated couples because of faulty assumptions behind the child support guidelines, there could be another unhappy systemic effect that would only be worth the cost if the benefits of co-parenting outweighed the documented risks of growing up (at least partially) in poverty. As far as I know, no research has been done on growing up in two households, one of which is far poorer than the other. This result was certainly not the goal of the child support guidelines and in some jurisdictions (Canada, for example) is expressly what is being avoided by very generous awards to the lower income parent. See Allen & Brinig, supra note 45, at 146-47.

\textsuperscript{79} More than 94% of the child support worksheets indicated such an adjustment.

\textsuperscript{80} In other states favoring shared parenting, anything over 25% would count as substantial sharing. See, e.g., MINN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(g) (West, Westlaw through end of 2015 First Special Sess.) (“In the absence of other evidence, there is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is entitled to receive at least 25 percent of the parenting time for the child.”). There were several reasons to consider the income of mothers rather than fathers. First, in cases with very low maternal income and high paternal income, it would be unusual not to have a primary caretaker. Second, I knew that maternal, but not paternal, income was related to parenting time. Third, using the total child support amount would be misleading because there were frequently deductions from income for other children supported by mothers and/or fathers. The gross income figures eliminated this concern.
dissolved the marriage and set custody. They did not often have post-
decree court modifications—74.8% had one or no appearances.\textsuperscript{82}

For less wealthy, married Arizona parents (those with less than the
median mother’s income), only 16.8% featured equal custody, and the
average amount of parenting time enjoyed by the parent without primary
custody is just over 93 days, or 25.4% of the time (with a reduction in
child support of 26.1%). The pattern of divorce was different as well,
reversing the practice of the wealthier parents. The predominating
dissolution (45%) was by default.\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3}
\caption{Parenting Time Versus Income in Indiana.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{82} The corresponding number for the lower income married couples was 81.3%, though the
single most litigious, with 25 court entries following dissolution, was in this group.

\textsuperscript{83} Default dissolutions occur when the other party is served but does not contest, or is
reached only by publication. In default dissolutions, the petitioner is granted whatever was
established in the complaint (or has been agreed to previously by the other). Consent dissolutions
constituted only 25%, and dissolutions by decree again were slightly less than 14%.
Figure 4: Parenting Time, High- and Low-Income Fathers, Arizona

![Graph showing the relationship between parenting time and whether the father is low-income.]

Table 4: Arizona Income and Dissolution Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Default</th>
<th>Consent</th>
<th>Trial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decree</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>685</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What we cannot know from the data (and would probably take ethnographic research) is whether the disparity of custody outcomes based upon wealth, marital status, or ethnicity stems from a lack of education about the benefits of shared parenting or a parenting plan, a lack of expertise in filling out the forms (since most were dissolution decrees), failure to undergo a bargaining process, or simply the infeasibility of frequent overnight stays at the second parent’s home.

C. Marital Status Inequality

The difference becomes yet starker for unmarried parents. Again, there are two groups. One involves actions to establish support, which are usually (though not always) initiated by the state to collect arrearages or reimbursement for public assistance. In these cases, the median (and mode, or most frequently recurring amount) mother’s income was $1196 per month, not coincidentally that attributable to minimum wage (the figure utilized to calculate TANF, or public assistance). Only 3 or 2% of these couples, indicated equal parenting. Further, only 34% of these couples indicated any parenting time adjustment to child support at all (meaning that many were zeros in Figure 1), and the average amount for this third was 77 days only, or slightly more than 20% of the time (justifying a reduction of 10.5% in child support).

The other unmarried group involved actions for custody, parenting time, and support. Fathers most often brought these suits, and many had established paternity through the hospital’s paternity program and had been listed on the child’s birth certificate. While they were not wealthy—the mother’s median income was $1500 a month—more than 71% of the parents had an adjustment for parenting time on the worksheets, and parenting time averaged 101 days (both figures higher than those for the lower-income, married parents). These are, by definition, involved or at least motivated fathers, and at least some

84. Both Supreme Court cases and recent federal legislation suggest that if the opportunity was made readily available, it would be “grasped” by what would otherwise be noncustodial parents. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie. Id. Stacy Brustin, Child Support: Shifting the Financial Burden in Low-Income Families, 20 GEO. J. ON POV. L. & POL’Y 1 (2012); SUPPORTING AT-RISK CHILDREN ACT, S. 1870, 113th Cong. (2013).

85. In the figures reported for marital status, the data comes from Maricopa County only.
indicated long-standing relationships, one even of 12 years. While they were not divorcing, and so were not filing the associated forms, they were active following initial custody decrees, with more than half having two or more court appearances and one “outlier” boasting, if that is the right word, 33 court appearances. As Pruett and DiFonzo summarize the literature, they express concern about applying studies of formerly-married parents to this group of never-married parents, who may be quite different.86

Cohabiting relationships are far more likely than married relationships to break up even when couples have children.87 Research has revealed that African-American fathers are more involved in paternal childcare than European-American fathers.88 The larger the share of childcare that is performed by the father when the couple resides together, the greater his engagement post separation, though none of the other traditional values affected engagement.89

86. Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 10, at 155-56, 162, 166.
D. Inequality of Race and Ethnicity

African-American fathers are more likely to be involved with parenting than other fathers. Research has revealed that African-American fathers are more involved in paternal child-care than European-American fathers. Linda Laughlin et al. found that African-American fathers were 1.18 times more likely to have frequent contact with their children following separation than European-American fathers, while Hispanic fathers were 0.63 times as likely as European-American fathers. Kidane and Vargas show, with recent time diary data, that Hispanic fathers, whether never married or nonmarried, do significantly less “primary” childcare with children, and African-American fathers do more primary childcare than do non-Hispanic Whites.

91. Laughlin et al., supra note 89, at 241.
92. Daniel Kidane & Andres J. Vargas, The Quality of Time Spent with Children among
To the extent that that value of meaningful contact with both parents is important, it is not being shared by parents of Hispanic origin. Table 5 indicates that this difference (in parenting days) persists even when income is included in simple regression analysis and is nearly as strong as the income effect I have discussed previously.

While there were not enough Hispanics in the Indiana sample to make such a claim, and race could not usually be known directly from the data in the file, inferences could be drawn to the extent that the census tract in which a spouse lived was largely nonwhite. The parenting days were different: the probably nonwhite noncustodial parents had a mean of 64.74 days compared to 76.47 days for those who were probably whites, though this did not reach statistical significance.

Solangel Maldonado’s work indicates that African American fathers may substitute goods for child support, and also that they may do significant childcare following separation. To the extent they do so, they may be in arrears on their child support. Further recent federal legislation designed to promote collection of child support especially by public assistance authorities may create the perverse incentives for

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93. We identified as Hispanic those cases in which one or the other of the parents still had homes in Mexico, was currently living there, or had married there. In others, the divorce records had forms answered in Spanish, or featured hearings requiring a Spanish language interpreter. In some of those with protective orders or bench warrants, the assailant or victim was identified as Hispanic in police reports. Finally, in some we followed Census methods, using the probabilities from the list of most common Hispanic surnames weighted by the Hispanic percentage population in the census tract.

94. In the Maricopa divorce sample, 14% had equal custody compared to nearly 20% for the non-Hispanic sample. Even for the non-equal parenting plans, the Hispanic numbers were far (and statistically significantly) lower: 95.53 days compared to 115.28 for non-Hispanics.

95. The exceptions were when the parties self-identified in the pleadings or when there were warrants issued for protective orders or delinquent child support.

96. My cutoff was that the white population had to be 38% or less of the total.

97. Maldonado, supra note 18.

98. The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, S.B. 1870, 113th Cong. (2013) provides:

SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING OFFERING OF VOLUNTARY PARENTING TIME ARRANGEMENTS.
(a) Findings.—The Congress finds as follows:
(1) The separation of a child from a parent does not end the financial or other responsibilities of the parent toward the child.
mothers who do not want formal orders entered against their children’s fathers that will simply reimburse TANF payments and may subject them to claims for custody. It may also exacerbate inequality, since non-TANF (relatively “wealthy”) unwed mothers will perhaps not ask for child support and therefore won’t have to have visitation orders.

(2) Increased parental access and visitation not only improve parent-child relationships and outcomes for children, but also have been demonstrated to result in improved child support collections, which creates a double win for children—a more engaged parent and improved financial security.

(b) Sense Of The Congress.—It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) establishing parenting time arrangements when obtaining child support orders is an important goal which should be accompanied by strong family violence safeguards; and
(2) States should use existing funding sources to support the establishment of parenting time arrangements, including child support incentives, Access and Visitation Grants, and Healthy Marriage Promotion and Responsible Fatherhood Grants.

The legislation that was enacted is not as strong as DHS 2015, the Administration’s fatherhood and child support budget proposals: The budget includes a set of proposals to encourage states to pay child support collections to families rather than retaining those payments. This effort includes a proposal to encourage states to provide all current monthly child support collections to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients. Recognizing that healthy families need more than just financial support alone, the proposal requires states to include provisions in initial child support orders addressing parenting time responsibilities, to increase resources to support and facilitate non-custodial parents’ access to and visitation with their children, and to implement domestic violence safeguards. See Testimony, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (March 12, 2014) (statement by Kathleen Sebelius), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2014/03/20140312b.html.
Table 5. Days of Parenting Time for Hispanic and non-Hispanic Residents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>106.492 (5.168)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.606</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Either has Hispanic surname</td>
<td>-18.509 (6.955)</td>
<td>-.155</td>
<td>-2.661</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s gross income</td>
<td>.003 (.001)</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>2.714</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. Inequality: Domestic Violence

In a simple binomial regression for the Arizona divorces, the more equal the parenting time (by the number of days of adjustment in child support), the more likely there was to be a post-order protective order request, holding constant median household income in the census tract.
and whether or not the parties were represented. Table 6 shows the correlation results with their significant coefficient (at $p < .023$). The results for Indiana are not displayed, since they were not statistically significant, likely because either (1) prior domestic violence legally contraindicates shared parenting in that state; or (2) perhaps Indiana does a better job of screening for it.

What conclusions can be drawn from the fact that the decree type differs by income? The default decree is awarded to a plaintiff who has served the defendant but who does not answer the pleadings. While they may have some agreement (and typically have already divided the property), the parenting arrangement is determined entirely by the plaintiff. (In Arizona, a number of easily available forms are typically used, giving various possible custody arrangements). In Indiana, the default divorce is associated with a far lower (and statistically significant) number of parenting days: 51 days for default decrees and 85.5 days average for others (trial and consent decrees), and much more sole decision-making (sole legal custody): 36.7% versus 65.6%. The results in Indiana are strikingly similar: for parenting days, default decrees had 89.6 days compared to 114.5 for other types of dissolutions; for joint legal custody, 37.9% compared to 64.1%. Mothers filed for divorce in 70% of the default cases in Arizona and 80% in Indiana. This means that fathers had less decision-making and were entitled to less contact with their children, exactly the results that programs like the Administration’s Fatherhood Initiative seek to achieve.

Table 6: Correlation Between Parenting Time and Post-Decree Domestic Violence in Arizona

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation Arizona Parenting Time and Post-Decree Protective Orders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Days of parenting time for noncustodial parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additionally, in the Arizona custody context, the kind of troubling outcomes over time discussed by Carbone and Cahn may well be what eventuates with the latest version of the state’s custody statute. This statute requires the judge to order a parenting plan that maximizes the parenting time for both parents. In order to deviate from the statute, the judge would presumably have to list specific reasons under the other sections (such as substance abuse) that such an order is not appropriate.\(^9\)

While Arizona law restricts joint legal decision-making (joint legal custody) in cases of domestic violence, a finding that domestic violence occurred does not necessarily affect the decision that the parties should share parenting time. A decision affecting parenting time would require a high cost—in terms of court time, legal fees, missed work and emotional energy,\(^10\) and additional hearings. It would also require a finding that substantial parenting time would endanger the child.\(^11\) In modern pluralistic families, a variety of parenting arrangements better accommodates.

IV. CONCLUSION

The data show that a decision to implement shared parenting can be particularly troublesome (and unstable) in cases involving indications of domestic violence and/or substance abuse as well as in cases involving the lower half of family incomes. The data also reveal the disparities among the increasing number of unmarried couples affected by custody and child support orders. The sum of these findings suggests that the way shared parenting has been implemented by presumption in Arizona has led to many mistakes. Further, because shared or equal parenting is being forced on some families, despite domestic violence issues, and on couples who are deeply conflicted to the point they cannot co-parent
effectively, some children are being exposed to exactly the drawn-out situation psychologists feel is most likely to harm them.

Signs that courts were dealing with the less favorable of these types of families might indicate that, absent an agreement, a court should not award equal or even substantially shared parenting. A number of prior studies, most notably the recent one done by Melli and Brown in Wisconsin, indicate that equal or substantially shared parenting is most common in wealthy couples. On the contrary, many jurisdictions disallow substantial custody to be awarded to the perpetrator of domestic violence, while most place substantial restrictions or supervision requirements on parents who abuse substances or whose mental illness may endanger them or the child. Even many advocates of shared parenting in general hesitate to endorse it when children are infants. These exceptions should be considered and dealt with overtly in child custody or shared parenting guidelines implemented by states.

Other policy suggestions arising from the data include that child support guidelines should take the duplication of resources into account.

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103. Melli & Brown, supra note 14; BARTFIELD, supra note 68. See also Reynolds et al., supra note 15.

104. There is also evidence that parents with substantially higher education may favor equal or joint parenting, though this characteristic is highly correlated with income.


107. See Pruett & DiFonzio, supra note 10, at 163:

Embedded within the shared parenting research is a hotbed of controversy on the question of overnights for fathers with very young children who do not primarily reside with them. As indicated, early paternal involvement serves as a protective factor for later father-child relationships. Yet the primacy of attachment research paradigms for mapping the pathway to healthy development has led to dyadic considerations of security and stability that have, until very recently, excluded the father or other caregiver. The emphasis on assisting parents through a conflict-laden transition, while their children’s brains and minds are developing rapidly and in need of consistent nurturance and support in order to develop physiological and biological regulation and trust in the world around them, can pit the uncoupling family’s dynamics in direct opposition to the child’s capacities and needs.

See also Jennifer E. McIntosh, Marsha Kline Pruett & Joan B. Kelly, Parental Separation and Overnight Care of Young Children, Part II: Putting Theory into Practice, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 256 (2014) (suggesting that for young children the decision needs to be individualized); INDIANA Parenting Time Guidelines, INDIANA RULES OF COURT, (2013), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/parenting/parenting.pdf. Some of the debate among researchers seems to emanate from differences in their belief in attachment theory.
Some states do this easily with multipliers. Child support orders in cases in which both parents have high levels of responsibility for the children should also reflect the increased costs of raising the children in two homes and should minimize significant disparities in the children’s living standards in the two homes. The alternative is to directly account for fixed and variable costs. Statutes that do not take these differences into account create perverse incentives, especially for wealthy fathers with homemaker wives. The findings here suggest that lower resourced counties like Pima, with Tucson, which are in the bottom five urban areas nationally, may not be able to make good determinations regarding domestic violence or adequate provisions for victims’ safety. At least in such places, if federal or state funds are not provided for better screening, it should be easier to rebut presumptions in favor of shared parenting.

Less direct suggestions include support of and encouragement of childcare or other in-kind provision of services that will promote cooperation and contact, where appropriate, in low-income families, in lieu of some or all portions of the child support award. Finally, this paper provides more evidence for strengthening neighborhood social capital, particularly in urban central cities.

108.  See, e.g., Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (if parenting time over 90 days); California, CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(g) (Deering, LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.).


110.  Illinois just differentiates from its percentage of income for payor parent formula on a case-by-case basis, 750 ILCS § 505(a)(3), while New York continues to use the pro-rate share generally devoted to child support (17% for one child, 25% for two, etc.).

111.  See generally MARGARET F. BRING & NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, LOST CLASSROOM, LOST COMMUNITY: CATHOLIC SCHOOLS’ IMPORTANCE IN URBAN AMERICA (2014) (finding when neighborhood institutions like Catholic schools close, social capital declines, eventually causing increased crime).