

## CHAPTER 7

### A Tale of Two Elections: What the Leaders' Rhetoric from the 2000 Elections Reveals about Canadian-American Cultural Differences

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**I**N *HERE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE NEW AMERICAN CONTINENT*, Anthony DePalma argues that the concepts of “here” and “there,” used to underscore the separateness and distinctiveness of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, have diminishing relevance and resonance in the new North America being forged by free trade. “From 1993 to 2000,” he writes, “North America evolved from being defined solely as three separate nations divided by two borders on one continent to being recognized as a community of shared interest, common dreams, and coordinated responses to problems that have no regard for borders.”<sup>1</sup> Economic integration, he argues, has provided the main catalyst for more sweeping integration that ultimately, DePalma foresees, will produce a shared North American identity. This identity will not sweep aside national or regional identities, but will exist alongside them and, inevitably, dull the edge of national difference.

DePalma does not argue that full political integration is in the cards—at least not anytime soon. But he does argue that the cultural consequences flowing from the accelerated movement of goods and services, investment, and people across the borders that separate the United States from its northern and southern neighbors are already evident. He seems to be right, although the stubborn weight of history, psychological needs, insecurities and emotions, and self-interest on the part of those whose status, livelihoods, and/or power depends on separateness and difference, often obscures and operates to deny the process that DePalma maintains is already well advanced.

Is it true that the political culture of English Canada is significantly different from that of the United States? Did the rhetoric of party leaders in the 2000 Canadian and American election campaigns corroborate the conventional wisdom concerning Can-Am cultural differences? Although the rhetoric and messages of the Mexican parties and their leaders in that country's 2000 election campaign will not be examined here, if DePalma is correct, one would expect to find increasing convergence—particularly as the Mexican middle class grows in size and the roots of North American integration sink more deeply into Mexican society—between the messages used to connect with voters in Mexico and those characteristic of election campaigns in the United States and Canada.

## POLITICAL CULTURE AND ELECTION RHETORIC

Seymour Martin Lipset has more than once remarked that, for students of comparative politics, Canada and the United States represent the closest thing to a laboratory for the testing of theories as one is likely to find in the messy, uncontrolled world of social behavior.<sup>2</sup> Two societies linked by shared histories, cultures, languages, and economic markets, whose border has been among the world's most open and whose similarities gener-

ally are more apparent to non-North Americans than their differences. And yet, of course, there are differences, the sort and magnitude of which have inspired disagreement for over two hundred years.

For half a century, Lipset's work has been at the center of the perennial debate over the ways and degree to which the political cultures of English Canada and the United States differ.<sup>3</sup> He is associated with the view that there are historically rooted differences between the two societies that are both persistent and significant. Lipset's earlier emphasis on Can-Am differences has, however, been qualified in more recent years by his belief—a belief shared by virtually everyone—that the Charter era in Canadian politics has been characterized by a significant shift toward a more American style of politics, evident in the far greater role that rights discourse and policy strategies that rely on the courts and other judicial tribunals have assumed since 1982. He has also argued that the electoral successes over the last several decades of Canada's chief left-wing party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), may have been wrongly interpreted as proof of considerably greater popular support for socialist values in Canada than in the United States. Institutional differences affecting the respective party systems of the two countries may well be more important than culture, he argues. The values represented by the NDP in Canada, Lipset says, both exist and have been influential on the left of the Democratic Party in the United States.

Leaving aside the important question that Lipset and others have raised about the degree to which such differences as the greater reliance on state enterprise in Canada or the higher levels of taxation and public spending in Canada can be explained by institutional and other factors that are not purely or primarily attitudinal, the differences between the political culture maps of Canada and the United States are neither as clear as some suggest nor consistent with the conventional wisdom, at least as this ex-

ists on the Canadian side of the border. That “wisdom” includes the three following assumptions: that Canada is a more compassionate society than the United States; that collectivist values occupy a more secure place in the Canadian political culture; and that there is a greater range of politically significant ideological expression in Canada than in the United States.<sup>4</sup>

In order to test various claims about the cultural differences between Canada and the United States, researchers have relied on a wide range of evidence, from polling data to such indirect measures of attitudes as policies, literature, crime statistics, and various forms of social behavior. There is as little agreement over the validity of the measures used to test arguments about Can-Am political cultural differences as there is over the nature of these putative differences. These disagreements will not be put to rest here. Instead, it is suggested that the examination of the political discourse of election campaigns, when parties and candidates are required by circumstances to market themselves to voters and, in doing so, both to associate themselves in citizens’ minds with values and positions that significant groups of electors wish to see reflected in public life and to differentiate themselves from the competition, provides a good but neglected testing ground for arguments about Canadian-American differences.

Actions and the institutional embodiments of choices are certainly important. But it is a great mistake to ignore the words and symbols that are used to advocate and justify these choices. The carefully selected and laundered phrases that emerge from the arts of the pollster, focus group analyst, and professional speechwriter, no less than words created directly from the pen of a Lincoln or Laurier, constitute a sort of connective tissue of ideas and symbols between citizens and those who govern them (or aspire to). The craft of creating this connective tissue has changed dramatically, but the essential function of these ideas and symbols remains the

same. And no less than in the days of Lincoln and Laurier, a Bush or Chrétien cannot afford to communicate in words and symbols that do not resonate sympathetically with a significant number of voters.

It is probably reasonable to predict that history will not remember either the 2000 presidential campaign in the United States or the 2000 general election in Canada as being of more than average importance. The prolonged aftermath of the 2000 American election has been excluded since only campaigns are being considered. Rather, I am speaking of the campaigns. In the case of Canada there was no big, dramatic issue that ripped apart the body politic, as the proposed Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement had in the 1988 Canadian election campaigns. Indeed, it was widely believed that the 2000 election was called by the Liberal government for no better reason than to take advantage of the Liberal Party's favorable standing in the polls and the fact that the main opposition party, the Canadian Alliance, had a new and rather untested leader, Stockwell Day, who appeared vulnerable on a number of fronts. Thus, the elections of 2000 provide a good occasion for comparing the rhetoric of leaders across the border.


In order to compare the political cultures of English Canada and the United States, the major speeches, campaign websites, party platforms, and leaders' debates from the 2000 Canadian and American election campaigns have been examined. For Canada the public pronouncements of Jean Chrétien (Liberal), Stockwell Day (Alliance), Alexa McDonough (NDP), and Joe Clark (Conservative) were reviewed. Gilles Duceppe, leader of the Bloc Québécois, on the grounds that his Quebec-based, sovereigntist party—the BQ only runs candidates in Quebec and is committed to the principle of independence for Quebec—was excluded. For the United States, the campaigns of George W. Bush (Republican), Al Gore (Democrat), and Ralph Nader (Green) were re-

viewed. Even though Nader won only a small fraction of the popular vote and no seats in America's Electoral College, his candidacy was far more significant than his numbers on election day might suggest. Major speeches and public pronouncements of the party leaders were trolled to determine whether the conventional wisdom concerning Can-Am political cultural differences was corroborated in the 2000 Canadian and American election campaigns. (See appendix for list of documents and public statements used.)

To distill the thousands upon thousands of words uttered by and on behalf of the three main presidential candidates and the four leaders of the main parties that contested seats in English Canada, their messages and meanings were organized along two axes. The first involves market values orientation, or what might be described as the degree of confidence in markets and outcomes that relies on unregulated personal choices. The second involves social values orientation, or what might be characterized as the degree of commitment to traditional values and institutions, particularly those based on religion and the traditional family. Figure 7.1 illustrates these dimensions. The estimation of where each leader's political rhetoric is situated on this map is not obvious and incontestable. Instead, this mapping exercise is to be a modest attempt at thinking systematically about Canadian-American cultural differences as these are reflected in election campaigns in the two countries.

### **MAPPING THE LEADERS' RHETORIC: THE 2000 CANADIAN ELECTION**

The 2000 election was Jean Chrétien's to lose. As the leader of Canada's governing party, with a small majority in the Canadian House of Commons, Chrétien could have continued in office for another year and a half before facing the electorate. His decision

**Figure 7.1. Mapping the Party Leaders' Rhetoric**

to call an election was generally and probably correctly viewed as a rather cynical attempt to secure a stronger majority at a time when the major opposition party, the Reform Party, had recently transformed itself into the Canadian Alliance, under a new and untested leader who appeared vulnerable on certain issues, and when support for separatism in Quebec—and therefore, presumably, for the Bloc Québécois—appeared to be soft. The possibility that the prime minister wished to stifle rumblings in his party about his leadership by calling and winning a third election cannot be ruled out. Reasons of electoral expediency and personal ambition aside, there was no crisis, issue, or set of circumstances that compelled the election call.

When there is no obvious issue in Canadian electoral politics, the pseudo-issue of leadership often substitutes for more substantive matters. But even with a well-liked leader—and Chrétien’s “just folks” style, “*le petit gars de Shawinigan*,” as he has always liked to describe himself, made him generally popular with Canadians—no party can entirely avoid addressing campaign issues that the media and the other parties place on the table. Instead of waiting for their opponents and critics to define the issues, the Liberals did what one would expect Canada’s most successful political party to do. They went on the offensive, attempting to shape the campaign discourse around issues on which they believed themselves to be strong and the Alliance vulnerable. They did this by showcasing the third rail of Canadian politics, public health care.

From the opening salvos of press releases and public statements by Chrétien on the day the election was called, through the televised leaders’ debates and the hours of paid political advertising, health care was the Liberals’ preferred issue. The Chrétien/Liberal message was that the Liberal Party was committed to the protection of medicare and Ottawa’s role in enforcing national standards in health care. “A new Liberal government will defend and vigorously uphold the values of medicare to ensure that all Canadians continue to have full and equal access to high quality health care.”<sup>5</sup> This promise was accompanied by some of the most negative advertising ever seen in Canadian electoral politics, accusing the Alliance and its leader Stockwell Day of hiding their true agenda for health care, which the Liberals claimed was medicare’s transformation into a two-tiered, American-style system with quality care for the affluent and inferior care for the rest of the population.

The core values and unifying themes of the Chrétien/Liberal message in the 2000 election campaign were the following: Canada’s system of publicly-paid universal health care, and Ottawa’s role in providing financing and maintaining national



standards, must be protected; the nation should reinvest part of the budget surpluses that began to accumulate in the mid-1990s in the maintenance and expansion of social programs; the federal government should cooperate with provincial governments, including maintaining Ottawa's commitment to the interregional redistribution of wealth; and all Canadians deserve good government.

In fairness to the Liberals, it must be said that the party produced a wide-ranging platform, most notably in its campaign document, *Opportunity for All: The Liberal Plan for the Future of Canada*. The Liberal Plan was solidly in the Canadian tradition of brokerage politics, promising something for almost everyone in a sweeping catalogue of promises that ranged from investment in innovation to the enhancement of women's safety. But on the campaign trail, in the English-language televised debates and in their advertising, the Liberals emphasized the medicare issue above all others, linking it to the Chrétien/Liberal attacks on the credibility and alleged hidden agenda of the Alliance Party and its leader Stockwell Day.

When former president George H. W. Bush squared off against Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election, Seymour Martin Lipset remarked that Canada had three center-left parties, all of them to the left of the Dukakis Democrats. His point was that, despite their differences on the issue of free trade, Canada's three main political parties shared a commitment to the principles of the welfare state, official bilingualism and multiculturalism, and were broadly similar in their views on constitutional reform (the Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP had unanimously supported the failed Meech Lake Accord in the House of Commons). The spectrum of policy and ideological divergence among Canada's chief national parties was, Lipset argued, comparatively narrow and in many ways offered Canadian

voters a narrower spectrum of choices than their American counterparts experienced.

In the 2000 Canadian election this was true with a vengeance. Whereas the free trade issue had provided voters with at least the appearance of a real choice in 1988, issue-oriented product differentiation among the main parties and their leaders was almost absent from the 2000 campaign. Moreover, in terms of what the 2000 campaign revealed about the ideas, images, and symbols that Canada's national political parties use to evoke sympathetic responses among voters, the conclusion to be drawn is substantially identical to that which Lipset drew in 1988. Canada's chief political parties occupy a relatively narrow space on the idea/value spectrum, preferring to compete with one another in terms of leadership and the credibility of their promises, rather than offering voters significantly different sets of values and beliefs. Their refusal to engage in a battle over fundamental principles invites, of course, the sort of negative advertising that was so prominent a feature of the 2000 Canadian election that Jean Chrétien felt compelled to offer post-victory regrets for the tone of the campaign.

Health care has emerged in recent years as the valence issue par excellence of Canadian politics. Every party and its leader strive to be associated in the minds of voters with protection of medicare and the preservation of Canada from the putative evils of American-style health care. Just as the free trade issue in 1988 was about Canada's relationship to the United States, the health care issue evokes longstanding fears and emotions about Can-Am relations. When Alan Rock was Liberal minister of health he seemed incapable of criticizing health care reforms undertaken by the Conservative governments of Alberta and Ontario and the policy proposals of the Reform Party without using the derisive labels "American-style" and "two-tiered" health care. In the vocabulary of Canadian politics, "two-tiered health care" is understood to

mean a system characterized by gross inequality between the rich and the rest of the population, as is believed to be characteristic of American health care, but also, and more controversially, levels of health care for those who are not rich that are far inferior to what all Canadians experience under their publicly-financed system of medicare. No Canadian political party wishes to be associated with such negative baggage, and all strove mightily in the 2000 campaign to convince voters that they represented the most credible defender of the values that Canadians tend to associate with the health care system.

When Canadians are asked to identify those features of their society that distinguish Canada from the United States, health care is invariably one of the first differences they mention. Encouraged by their politicians and opinion-leaders to believe that the different health care systems of Canada and the United States reflect significant cultural differences—Canadians portrayed as being more compassionate, egalitarian, and communitarian than their meaner-spirited, competitive, and individualist neighbors to the south—Canadians tend to react with Pavlovian alacrity to any suggestion that one of the chief embodiments of these putative differences and, as such, a bulwark for the defense of Canada's independent identity, may be under threat.

I would argue that the special place that the health care issue occupies in Canadian politics has had major consequences for the Canadian party system and Canadian political discourse. Chief among these is the deformation of the Canadian right and the narrowing of the range of rhetoric that party leaders use in competing for votes. By this I mean that it is extremely difficult in Canadian politics to talk about health care reform in any language that carries the suggestion of competition, privatization, and different standards for different income cohorts or that in any way suggests that Canadian health care should adopt elements of the American model. Talk of greater provincial auton-

omy in health care quickly becomes interpreted by critics as camouflage for the importation of two-tiered health care. Even the Canadian Alliance, Canada's only national right-of-center party, adopts the protective covering of the status quo rhetoric on medicare. Perhaps the most memorable moment during the terribly dismal English-language televised leaders' debates in 2000 came when Alliance leader Stockwell Day displayed a handwritten sign reading "No 2-tier health care" and then, in a gesture quite probably borrowed from Al Gore's combative challenge to Bush in the second presidential debate, left his lectern and approached Jean Chrétien, insisting that the Liberal leader either accuse Day of lying on health care or apologize for Liberal ads claiming that Day supported an American-style, two-tiered health system.

For his part, Day accused the Liberal leader of "ripping into health care" and, in language that was redolent of the Canadian left's desire to entrench a guarantee of universal, publicly-funded health care in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, called for "legislated funding levels for health care." More spending on health was part of the Day/Alliance campaign rhetoric, as it was for all of the parties and their leaders. The third rail of Canadian politics was too hot for the Alliance to touch, as ideologically conservative parties in power in Alberta and Ontario have also discovered. Because the health care issue and the leaders' credibility on this issue were central to the 2000 Canadian campaign, this ensured that voters were offered relatively little choice in the values expressed by the parties and their leaders, all of whom clustered around the politically safe commitment to a non-American, universal, publicly financed system of medicare with increased spending levels.

An observer of the 2000 Canadian election campaign, and particularly of the leaders' debates and the war of televised advertising that took place, could have been excused for wondering

whether Canada truly had a right-of-center party. The prominence of the health care issue and the party leaders' unanimous efforts to associate themselves in the minds of voters with what might be described as a "Canada Health Act plus more dollars" policy, prevented the emergence of a competitive and diverse market of policy ideas and associated values on this issue. This stood in sharp contrast to the American presidential campaign, where the rhetoric of Bush and Gore on Social Security reform and, to a more muted degree, education presented voters with fairly clear, ideologically distinctive choices.

Critics of the Canadian Alliance, including the leaders of the other national parties, were quick to dismiss the Day/Alliance commitment to the Canada Health Act—at one point in the leaders' debate Day actually said that he stood by all five principles of the CHA and would add a sixth, legislated funding levels—and increased public spending on medicare as phony camouflage for Alliance's "hidden agenda." They, not Day and the Alliance, argued that voters in fact did have an ideological choice when it came to health care and, more generally, the nature of Canadian society. But my point is not to determine whether the Day/Alliance rhetoric was dishonest, but to examine the symbols, beliefs, and values that Day and the Alliance, and the other parties and their leaders, used in order to evoke a sympathetic response among Canadian voters. Judged against the language the Day/Alliance campaign used to present itself to voters and attack its opponents, the rhetoric of Canada's only right-of-center party was barely distinguishable from that of the centrist Chrétien/Liberal and Clark/Conservative campaigns. The right could not find a clear and confident voice in the 2000 election campaign largely because of its vulnerability to the third rail of Canadian politics.

Of course the 2000 Canadian election was not entirely about health care and the party leaders' respective credibility on this

most crucial of valence issues in Canadian politics. The NDP attempted to focus voters' attention on the issue of the growing federal budget surplus and whether it would be reinvested in social programs or used to finance a tax cut for corporations and the affluent. The McDonough/NDP rhetoric was quite similar to that of Nader and the Green Party on many fronts, based on the idea of a conflict pitting powerful corporations against working people and families. The Day/Alliance rhetoric attempted to steer the campaign discourse toward the ideologically conservative issues of tax cuts and limited government, and the populist theme of greater citizen participation in governance. The social conservatism generally thought to be characteristic of Day and his party was muted, taking the form of carefully coded messages about tougher law enforcement, reform of the juvenile justice system, and support for the family. The Clark/Conservative rhetoric was as middle-of-the-road as that of the Liberal Party, as was to be expected of a leader and a party that seemed convinced they could recapture their past status as the other big brokerage party, competing with the Liberals in the broad center lane of the Canadian political highway. The Clark/Conservative preoccupation with discrediting Day and the Alliance on the right, and criticizing Chrétien's leadership and integrity and the performance of the liberal government on issues that had little or no ideological resonance, ensured that the Clark/Conservative message offered Canadian voters almost nothing that, in ideological terms, was distinguishable from the Chrétien/Liberal message.


The core values and unifying themes expressed in the rhetoric of the Day/Alliance, Clark/Conservative, and McDonough/NDP messages in the 2000 campaign are identified in table 7.1. The candidates' positions are then mapped according to the combination of market and social value orientations in figure 7.2.

TABLE 7.1.

Core Values and Unifying Themes in the Chrétien/Liberal, Day/Alliance, Clark/Conservative, and McDonough/NDP Campaigns, 2000

<b>Chrétien</b>	<b>Day</b>	<b>Clark</b>	<b>McDonough</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>publicly-paid universal health care must be protected from American-style reforms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>limited government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>leadership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>people and working families vs. the powerful (banks, oil, etc.)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>part of budget surpluses must be reinvested in social programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>protect and reinvest in health care</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>restore integrity in government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>fair trade, not free trade</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>cooperate with provincial governments, including Ottawa's role in the inter-regional redistribution of wealth</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>restore eroded Canadian democracy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>protect and reinvest in health care</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>health care system is catastrophically underfunded</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>good government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>increase opportunities for citizen participation in governance</li> <li>respect provincial rights and equality of provinces</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>social justice</li> <li>increased government role in economic regulation</li> <li>the environment must be a priority when making policy choice</li> </ul>

**Figure 7.2. American Presidential Candidates' Political Rhetoric**



**MAPPING THE LEADERS' RHETORIC:  
THE 2000 UNITED STATES ELECTION**

As the presidential candidate of the incumbent party, under whose watch the American economy had experienced an unprecedented period of impressive growth, Al Gore's position might have appeared an enviable one. Under Bill Clinton the Democratic Party had presided over large budget surpluses and had moved to the center of the political spectrum, supporting welfare reform. Issues that had previously tended to work to the advantage of Republicans—law and order, public finances, the state of the economy—became areas where the Democrats could claim suc-



cess. Not everyone within the Democratic fold was happy with this shift to the center, but it certainly seemed to undercut what the Republicans were used to thinking of as their issue agenda.

In these circumstances the Gore campaign packaged its candidate and his message in a language that sought to retain and expand the centrist space the party occupied under Clinton, while at the same time invoking symbols and associations preferred by elements of the party and the electorate more sympathetic to communitarian and liberal values. This is a line that any serious Democratic presidential candidate must walk, but it was made more than usually difficult by the Nader candidacy on the left.

The core values and unifying themes of the Gore 2000 campaign included the following: powerful interests threaten the people's interests; the policies put in place since FDR's New Deal must be protected; government needs to be reformed, but it is not the enemy of the people; the litmus test of what government does should be its impact on families, particularly working families; and equality of opportunity is possible in America, but requires positive action on the part of government (through affirmative action, social programs that target the least advantaged, public education, and so on).

This was a very centrist message, but one that remained firmly committed to the values and policies of the New Deal Democratic Party. Of course the term "welfare state" has never been fashionable in American politics and was entirely absent from Gore's campaign rhetoric, as it was from that of Bush and Nader too. Gore's use of the terms "families" and "working families" was a politically safe, if somewhat elliptical way, of packaging the positive or welfare state in a way that was expected to generate a sympathetic response with the electorate.

The rhetorical hinge of Gore's campaign was the term "family." Family, working families, middle-class families—these words punctuated virtually all of Gore's speeches, providing an anchor for his

message and policy proposals. The word “family” or “families” is used forty-six times in his acceptance speech at the Democratic Party’s nominating convention. It is used ten times in Gore’s relatively short introduction of Joseph Lieberman as his running mate (and then another twelve times by Lieberman in his acceptance speech). Family, especially working families, became a sort of Gore mantra on the 2000 campaign trail. This was not merely an attempt to consolidate the suburban support of the party of the so-called “soccer moms.” Family, working families, and middle-class families were terms used by the Gore campaign in association with traditional Democratic policies and positions. Protection of the environment, reform of health care and Social Security, investment in education, tax cuts, and regulating the television, film, music, and tobacco industries were all packaged as family issues. The Gore/Democrat rhetoric attempted to establish an associational bridge between families, the positive state, and the time-honored tradition of the powerful versus the people.

Although many criticized the Gore candidacy as being too similar in its message and policies to the Republican candidacy of George W. Bush, this was simply not the case at the level of political rhetoric. The Gore rhetoric remained faithful to the values of the New Democratic Party, including the implicit idea that government action is necessary to ensure equality, freedom, and economic prosperity. But in a political culture in which mistrust of government is strong, the defense of the positive state cannot be as simple as this. It must be communicated in terms of symbols and beliefs that have a deep positive resonance. The “people versus the powerful” is a safe rhetorical formula with a long history in American politics. Gore played on this theme at almost every public speaking opportunity.

On the social-conservatism/liberalism scale, Gore’s message was firmly on the liberal side, despite abundant references to God and family in virtually all of his major public addresses. His defense of

affirmative action and *Roe v. Wade* on abortion—key litmus tests when it comes to matters of morality and justice in America—was unequivocal. In these respects the Gore/Democratic message was certainly as center-left as that of Canada's Liberal Party and Progressive Conservative Party.

At first blush, the Bush 2000 campaign was somewhat disorienting. The official campaign platform, *A Vision for America*, included a long shopping list of priorities and promises. But three of the first given on the list were issues normally thought of as Democratic ones. Education, Social Security, and Medicare—key components of the positive state—were included in the top five (first, third, and fifth, respectively). Taxes and national defense, issues generally thought of as Republican ones, rounded out the Bush/Republican top five.

On closer inspection, however, the way in which these issues were framed—if not the prominence given to them—was very much in the modern-day tradition of conservative Republicanism. The public rhetoric used by candidate Bush was deeply skeptical of government and strongly supportive of markets and individual choice in economic matters and of socially conservative values in matters of morality and the nature of the good society. If “families” was the Gore mantra in the 2000 campaign, “responsibility” was the Bush mantra. Whereas Gore's preferred rhetorical formula pitted the people against the powerful, Bush's implied that the real enemy of the people's interests was the government, Washington, and all those who did not trust the people to make their own choices about their children's education, their Social Security investments, their Medicare, and their tax surplus.

The core values and unifying themes of the Bush-Republican message in 2000 were the following: individuals and families should be provided with as much opportunity as possible to make their own choices about the disposal of their incomes and the education of their children; government is too large and too intru-

sive; the state's role in the provision of social services is not an adequate substitute for the involvement of churches and other faith-based groups for persons in need; policies should aim to encourage individual responsibility and reinforce the development of personal character; markets and competition do a better job than regulators and legislative controls in ensuring economic growth and widespread prosperity; freedom does not require that government do more than ensure educational opportunities and provide some other minimal support for a level playing field—it is compromised by the “soft bigotry” of affirmative action, quotas, and policies that categorize citizens on the basis of ascriptive characteristics.

This may sound like a very familiar message, and in some ways the Bush rhetoric was vintage Republicanism. However, they were packaged in a rhetoric that was reassuringly familiar but also intended to appeal to the huge centrist-independent segment of the electorate. “Compassionate conservatism,” “armies of compassion,” and “no child left behind” were among the terms Bush favored in describing his vision of an alternative to what these terms implicitly criticized, i.e., the big government, bureaucratic nanny-state preferred by liberals. The rhetoric of compassionate conservatism drew upon communitarian principles. Far from being a radically individualistic message, it emphasized the importance of communities, associations, and churches at the same time as it involved a reduced role for state agencies. Some will call this a phony or at least unrealistic communitarianism in contemporary America, but if the rhetoric is taken at face value—as I argue it should be, given that the point here is to understand what messages, symbols, and images evoke positive responses among Americans—it is clearly communitarianism in a way that seeks to locate the inspiration of and responsibility for compassion and caring outside the state.

The Bush/Republican message in the 2000 campaign was clearly on the individual side of the individualism/collectivism scale. But

to be successful across the diverse constituencies that make up the American electorate, the conservative message must blend rhetorical elements that include personal choice, accountability (as in educational standards and testing), skepticism about government, and faith in the wisdom and goodness of the people. The Bush campaign did this with some success. This was best illustrated in the case of Social Security reform, the supposed “third rail” of American politics. By promising to protect Americans’ old age income security by giving them more personal choice in the investment of “their money,” the Bush rhetoric cleverly linked the values of compassion—caring for the retirement incomes of Americans—with those of personal choice and faith in the superior wisdom of the people over government when it comes to how to spend the people’s money. The rhetoric was solidly conservative, but resonated more broadly with the electorate because it also evoked what I would characterize as a widespread communitarian spirit among Americans, but one whose link to the state is weaker than in Canada.

For much of the 2000 campaign, Ralph Nader and the Green Party stood at between 6 and 8 percent in public opinion polls. This dissipated by election day to a mere 2.74 percent—still enough for many Democrats to blame the Greens’ candidate, Ralph Nader, for costing them the White House in a tight race. I would argue that the respectable poll numbers that Nader’s Green Party maintained through much of the campaign accurately reflected the not insignificant support that existed, and continues to exist, in American society for the values championed by Nader.

The Green Party’s 2000 campaign platform was significantly different from that of the two major parties. Democracy, social justice and equal opportunity, and environmental sustainability were the first three themes of the platform. When the Green platform finally turned to the economy, a priority in the other parties’ platforms, the issue is framed in the context of economic sustainabil-

ity. The values expressed in this document are ones that any Green or socialist party in Western Europe would find congenial. At the same time, however, these values are set in a context of historical allusions and evocative symbols that are firmly rooted in American culture.

The core values and unifying themes of the Nader/Green message in 2000 were the following: people must be provided with the means to wrest control of their lives, communities, and culture from the corporate elite; capitalism, and in particular the globalizing version of capitalism that has gained such momentum in recent decades, is fundamentally opposed to the values of a humane, compassionate, and democratic society in which social justice and protection of the environment are genuine priorities; trade liberalization, and the limits on national sovereignty that accompany the growing importance of the World Trade Organization and the rest of the international apparatus for the implementation and enforcement of global trade rules, represent the same threat to democracy and rights that other forms of tyranny and concentrated power represented in the past; the major parties and their candidates are stooges of the big corporate interests, a subservience that is guaranteed by a structurally corrupt system of campaign financing; Western Europe represents a model that the United States should emulate in matters of social policy; and the entire culture has become corporatized to such an invasive degree that only radical political and economic change can reverse this tide.

On the face of it, this may sound like a rather un-American message. It certainly is an undeniably radical message—who else talked about “corporate crime” and “corporate welfare” in 2000? At the same time, however, it is a message that Nader and the Green Party communicated in a language that was safely within the familiar comfort zone of the American political tradition—an absolute requirement if Nader expected to get onto CNN’s *Larry*

*King Live* and the evening news broadcasts of the major television networks. Nader's acceptance speech at the Green Party's presidential nominating convention was masterful in weaving trenchant criticism into the familiar language of American populism, democratic ideals, and renewal.

More generally, the Nader/Green rhetoric relied heavily on references to "the people," "citizens," and community-level organization and popular movements. Unlike the major-party candidates, Nader's rhetoric did not rely on the terms "family/families," "working-class families," or "middle-class families." Nor did it rely on either a statist-collectivist or class-conflict language more familiar in European democracies. True to the longstanding tradition of American progressivism, the Nader/Green message was communicated in the language of conflict, but this was conflict between the "corporations" and the "people," between "citizens" and the "corporatists" (i.e., defenders of corporate power), and "concentrations of power" that threatened citizens' rights and well-being. The problem was framed in a recognizably American way and the proposed solutions relied on citizen action, community organization, and popular involvement rather than statist solutions of public ownership and dirigiste economics.

The Nader/Green message was situated toward the communitarian end of the communitarian-individualism scale, and toward the liberal end of the social conservatism-liberalism scale. Although packaged in language that was firmly within the American political tradition, the content of this message was certainly as collectivist as that of Canada's NDP and every bit as sympathetic to the social democratic vision of that party.


The core values and unifying themes expressed in the three American presidential campaigns are summarized in table 7.2. And as before, the candidates' positions are mapped according to the combination of market and social value orientations in figure 7.3.

TABLE 7.2.

Core Values and Unifying Themes in the Bush/Republican,  
Gore/Democrat, and Nader/Green Campaigns, 2000


Bush	Gore	Nader
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• individuals and families should be provided with as much opportunity as possible to make their own choices about the disposal of their incomes and the education of their children</li> <li>• government is too large and too intrusive</li> <li>• the state's role in the provision of social services is not an adequate substitute for the involvement of churches and other faith-based groups for persons in need</li> <li>• policies should aim to encourage individual responsibility and reinforce the development of personal character</li> <li>• markets and competition do a better job than regulators and legislative controls in ensuring economic growth and widespread prosperity</li> <li>• freedom and equality are compromised by the "soft bigotry" of affirmative action, quotas, and all policies that categorize citizens on the basis of ascriptive characteristics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• powerful interests threaten the people's interests</li> <li>• the policies put in place since FDR's New Deal must be protected</li> <li>• government needs to be reformed, but it is not the enemy of the people</li> <li>• the litmus test of what government does should be its impact on families, particularly working families</li> <li>• equality of opportunity requires positive action by government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• people must be provided with the means to wrest control of their lives, communities, and culture from the corporate elite</li> <li>• capitalist globalization is fundamentally at odds with democracy, social justice, and protection of the environment</li> <li>• trade liberalization and such organizations as the WTO represent a new form of corporate tyranny</li> <li>• the major parties are stooges of big business; their subservience is guaranteed by a structurally corrupt system of campaign finance</li> <li>• Western Europe represents a model that the United States should emulate in matters of social policy</li> </ul>



**Figure 7.3. Canadian Party Leaders' Political Rhetoric**

### CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that the Bush/Republican message was clearly more individualistic on the market values orientation axis than those of either Gore or Nader, and more individualistic than those of any of the Canadian party leaders. On the social values orientation axis, the Bush/Republican message was clearly more conservative than those of his American rivals, and even more socially conservative than the Day/Alliance message in Canada. The Gore/Democrat message was about as center-left on both the market values and social values axes as the campaign messages of the Chrétien/Liberals and Clark/Conserva-

**Figure 7.4. American and Canadian Political Rhetoric**

tives in Canada. On the left of the spectrum, the Nader/Green message was certainly as collectivist as that of Canada's NDP and its leader, Alexa McDonough, and every bit as sympathetic to the social democratic, statist program advocated by Canada's left-wing party. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 are merged in figure 7.4 so that the relative positions of the candidates in terms of market and social value orientations can be easily compared.

Mapping the rhetoric of the Canadian leaders and their parties on the same ideological grid used to plot the respective positions of the American presidential candidates, the range of ideological discourse is somewhat narrower, and there is a clear clustering of rhetoric toward the center-left of the ideological spectrum. The

health care issue, in particular, operates to dissuade Canadian parties and leaders from using the language and symbols of individualism in selling themselves to voters. There is no evidence, based on the words and symbols that the parties and leaders used to sell themselves to the electorate, that the range of politically significant ideological expression in Canada was greater than in the United States. On the contrary, Lipset's observation about the tendency of Canada's main national parties to occupy the same center-left space appeared to be confirmed by the 2000 campaign.

This examination of the rhetoric relied on by the parties and leaders in the 2000 Canadian and American election campaigns began by identifying three widespread assumptions about the differences between Canadian and American political culture. None of the three is strongly supported by the evidence examined in the preceding pages. It may be that Canada is a more compassionate society than the United States—whatever one means by compassionate, and I fear that some merely assume that a greater state role is necessarily and by itself evidence of greater compassion—but the rhetoric of Canadian party leaders in 2000 was not more compassionate than that of the three contenders for the U.S. presidency. Nor is there strong evidence that collectivist values occupy a more secure place in the Canadian political culture, at least if the rhetoric of parties and leaders is a valid measure. The Gore/Democratic message was certainly as collectivist as that of the Chrétien Liberals and the Clark Conservatives. The McDonough/NDP message was no more collectivist than that of Nader and the Green Party in the U.S. Finally, there is no evidence to support the claim that there is a greater range of politically significant ideological expression in Canada than in the United States. On the contrary, based on the rhetoric of the parties and their leaders, it appears that the range of ideological expression is broader in American electoral politics than in Canada. In other words, American voters are offered a broader range of choice and

more clearly distinguishable choices than voters in English Canada.

In this era of ever-increasing economic integration between the world's two largest trading partners—integration that is reinforced and deepened by the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA and which has acquired greater comprehensiveness along defense and security fronts in this post-September 11 world—many question the ability of English Canada to maintain policies and political values that distinguish it from the United States. As the 2000 Canadian election campaign showed, any suggestions that Canada is becoming or could become “Americanized” is certain to sound alarm bells. Moreover, no Canadian party wishes to be associated with policies that may be portrayed as moving Canada closer to the status of the fifty-first state. Canadian elections continue to be opportunities for political leaders and their parties to proclaim loudly Canada's distinctiveness and resolve to chart its own political course, independent of its great neighbor to the south. The reality of increasing interdependence between Canada and the United States belies these proclamations and, in the end, may undermine the cultural and political foundations upon which they rest.

## APPENDIX

### Documents and Public Statements Used in the Analysis

#### *Canada*

##### *Chrétien and the Liberal Party*

- *Opportunity for All: The Liberal Plan for the Future of Canada* (Official campaign platform of the Liberal Party)
- Daily campaign bulletins from the Liberal Party between October 22 and November 25, 2000
- Leaders' debate (November 9, 2000)

##### *Day and the Canadian Alliance*

- "Ready to Go! Ready to Govern!" (Speech delivered by Stockwell Day in Saskatoon, September 6, 2000)
- "The Next Step Towards a Stronger Economy" (Speech delivered by Day to Nepean Chamber of Commerce, Nepean, Ontario, June 7, 2000)
- "Renewing Canadian Democracy" (Speech delivered by Day in Toronto, June 19, 2000)
- "Canadian Values" (Speech delivered by Day at Owen Sound Legion Hall, Owen Sound, Ontario, June 5, 2000)

- *Your Principles* (Policy platform of the Canadian Alliance, January 2000)
- Leaders' debate (Toronto, Ontario, November 9, 2000)

*McDonough and the NDP*

- "The NDP Commitment to Canadians" (Official party platform, released October 30, 2000)
- Daily campaign bulletins between October 31 and November 26, 2000
- Leaders' debate (Toronto, Ontario, November 9, 2000)

*Clark and the Progressive Conservative Party*

- "Campaign platform" (downloaded from official PC Party website, November 2000)
- "Strengthening Canada's Communities" (official PC Party website, November 2000)
- Leaders' debate (Toronto, Ontario, November 9, 2000).

*United States*

*Bush and the Republican Party*

- "A Vision for America" (This was located at the George W. Bush for President Official Website, under "Issues")
- "A Period of Consequences" (Speech delivered by G. W. Bush at The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, September 23, 1999)
- "Agenda for the Greatest Generation" (Speech delivered by Bush at Langhorne, Pennsylvania, October 12, 2000)
- "No Child Left Behind" (Speech delivered by Bush to the Latin Business Association, Los Angeles, September 2, 1999)
- "Acceptance Speech" (Delivered at the Republican Convention, Philadelphia, August 3, 2000)
- Presidential Debates (held on October 3, 11, and 17, 2000), Boston, Mass., Winston-Salem, N.C., and St. Louis, Mo., respectively.

*Gore and the Democratic Party*

- “Issues (at the official campaign website for Al Gore)
- “Address to the American Legion National Convention” (Speech delivered by Al Gore at Anaheim, California, September 8, 1999)
- “A Vision for Leadership in the Twenty-first Century” (Speech delivered by Gore at Davenport, Iowa, January 3, 2000)
- “Gore Introduces Lieberman as Running Mate” (Speech given by Gore in Carthage, Tennessee, August 8, 2000)
- “Acceptance Speech” (Delivered by Gore in Los Angeles, at the Democratic Convention, August 17, 2000)
- Presidential Debates (held on October 3, 11, and 17, 2000), Boston, Mass., Winston-Salem, N.C., and St. Louis, Mo., respectively.

*Nader and the Green Party*

- Green Party Platform (ratified at the party’s national convention, Denver, Colorado in June 2000)
- “Issue Summaries” (found at the official Nader campaign website, [www.greenparties.org](http://www.greenparties.org))
- “Acceptance Speech” (delivered by Nader in Denver, Colorado, June 25, 2000)

## Notes

### CHAPTER 1

1. Press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. Fox speech at The Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
4. Transcript of the presidential debate on October 4, 2000.
5. Miami, Fla., August 25, 2000.
6. Ibid.
7. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 10, 2000.
8. On January 11, 2001, a disgruntled and sorely disappointed Lucien Bouchard resigned as premier of Quebec, saying he had failed to keep his promise to make Quebec independent.
9. From an address to the National Policy Research Conference in Ottawa on November 30, 2000.

### CHAPTER 2

1. Enrique Krauze, *La Presidencia Imperial: Ascenso y Caída del Sistema Político Mexicano, 1940–1996* (Mexico City: Tusquets Editores, 1997).
2. These figures were taken from “México Social,” edited regularly by the Banco Nacional de México, and the electoral database at the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, CIDAC.
3. A brief review of these three main parties’ histories and programs can be found in Mónica Serrano, ed., *Governing Mexico: Political*



- Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
4. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).
  5. Volker G. Lehr, "Modernización y movilización electoral, 1964–1976: Un estudio ecológico," *Estudios Políticos* 4, no. 1 (1985): 54–61, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
  6. Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
  7. Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, "Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: Construction of Partisan Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 34–48.
  8. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
  9. Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
  10. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).

11. The empirical evidence for this chapter comes from a collection of surveys conducted in Mexico between 1990 and 2002. A list of the surveys includes: 1) The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey*'s second, third, and fourth waves, administered in 1990, 1996/7, and in 2000, respectively, to slightly over 1,500 respondents in each wave. The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey* were conducted in 1990, 1996/7, and 2000 among 1,531, 1,511, and 1535 Mexican adults, respectively. They are part of the ICPSR archives, at the University of Michigan. The fourth-wave survey was conducted in February 2000, sponsored by Grupo Reforma, and conducted by the Departments of Survey Research at newspapers *Reforma*, *El Norte*, *Mural*, and *Palabra*. 2) A national exit poll administered to over 3,000 voters as they left their corresponding polling places in the 2000 elections. I compare these results with those from a national exit poll conducted in the 1997 elections. The 1997 exit poll was sponsored by the Partido Acción Nacional and conducted by *Arcop*, on July 6, 1997, among 3,452 voters. The 2000 exit poll was sponsored by Grupo Reforma and conducted on July 2, 2000, among 3,377 voters by newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. 3) Four national pre-election polls conducted between April and June 2000 and pooled into one single database. The national pre-election polls were conducted in early April, early May, late May, and mid-June, 2000, by the newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. Each survey had slightly over 1,500 respondents (with the exception of the April one, which had slightly over 1,600) from all thirty-two federal entities. For the analysis in this chapter, the four polls were pooled into a single database of 6,289 cases. All the surveys listed here are national representative samples of Mexican adults or voters, and were conducted face-to-face in the respondents' homes or as they left their polling places, in the case of the exit polls.
12. Between one-fourth and one-third of Mexican respondents, depending on the survey, do not place themselves on the left-right

scale. In this analysis, I assigned an average placement to those who did not originally place themselves on the scale. The general averages fell between categories six and seven on a ten-point scale.

13. The original measure is a ten-point self-placement scale.
14. Alejandro Moreno, "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa." *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
15. The shift to the right probably reflects the influence of the PRI's also historic primary to select its presidential candidate. The 2000 survey was conducted in February, four and a half months before the presidential election and with campaigns officially running, but, most importantly, three months after the PRI primary of November, 1999, and after Fox and others had started to advertise widely on television. Very intense negative campaigning and mudslinging characterized the primary contest, but it boosted voter interest in the PRI.
16. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, England, 1998).
17. According to Moreno (1999b), the liberal-fundamentalist dimension is empirically observable in many Latin American countries, and it provides a useful tool to analyze party competition across the region.
18. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
19. Empirically, these dimensions result from a theoretically-guided principal components factor analysis based on the Mexican sam-

- ples of the 1997 and 2000 *World Values Surveys* pooled into one single dataset.
20. Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
  21. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (February 2000): 19–51.
  22. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 1 (1999a): 45–81.
  23. Moreno, 1999a.
  24. The model is based on a multinomial logit regression that uses vote choice as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables that have been of theoretical and empirical relevance in the literature of Mexican voting behavior. The model is then applied to the different types of survey data (exit polls and pre-election polls). The vote for PAN or Fox is taken as a basis for comparison in the results shown in the tables. See for example Domínguez and McCann 1995; Magaloni 1997; Buendía 1997; Magaloni and Moreno, 2003.

25. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
26. The official vote for Congress in 2000 is not broken down by party in the case of the Alliance for Mexico (PRD) and the Alliance for Change (PAN), but opinion polls showed that support for the Green party alone was about 2 to 4 percent.
27. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
28. Alejandro Moreno, "The Effects of Negative Campaigns on Mexican Voters," in *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election*, ed. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson.
29. Alejandro Moreno and Roy Pierce, "The Impact of the PRI Primary of November 1999 on the Mexican Presidential Election of July 2000," unpublished manuscript.
30. Alejandro Moreno, "Mesa 1: Encuestas preelectorales, serie incluyendo últimas encuestas (Estimación de los votantes probables)," in *El papel de las encuestas en las elecciones federales: Memoria del taller Sumiya 2000*. Federal Elections Institute (IFE), Mexican Association of Research Agencies (AMAI), and Colegio Nacional de Actuarios, 2000, and Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, "Cómo llegó: La debacle y el triunfo". *Reforma*, December 1, 2001.

### CHAPTER 3

1. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, *The Perfect Tie* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). See also John C. Green and

- Rick Farmer, *The State of the Parties*, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
2. Larry J. Sabato, *Overtime* (New York: Longman, 2002).
  3. Ibid.
  4. John C. Green et al., "Murphy Brown Revisited: The Social Issues in the 1992 Election," in *Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the Future of American Politics*, ed. Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 43–66.
  5. These data were made available by the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research. All analysis and interpretation are solely the responsibility of the authors.
  6. These data come from a poll by the Gallup Organization, May 18–May 21, 2000 (N=1,011). Data provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
  7. David K. Ryden, "Out of the Shadows, but Still in the Dark? The Courts and Political Parties," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 79–94.
  8. Gerald M. Pomper, "Parliamentary Government in the United States: A New Regime for a New Country," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 267–86.

#### CHAPTER 4

1. The Canadian Election Study is based on a rolling cross-section survey of 3,651 interviews conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University and Jolicoeur & Associés. It follows in the tradition of previous Canadian election studies conducted in 1979, 1984, 1988, 1993, and 1997.
2. Blais et al., *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002), 13.

3. Mordecai Richler, "More Proof That Pundits Can't Be Trusted," *National Post*, December 2, 2000, A18.
4. Conrad Black, "The Most Boring Election in History." *Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 2000, A22.
5. Peter Gzowski, "Where Do They Stand? How Would We Know?" *Globe and Mail*, November 11, 2000, A13.
6. Statistics Canada. <http://www.statcan.ca/>.
7. Ibid.
8. Blais et al., *Anatomy*.
9. Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
10. Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
11. Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder, "Issue Frames and Group Centrism in American Public Opinion," *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 1055–78.
12. Doris Graber, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide* (New York: Longman, 1984).
13. Milton Lodge, Marco Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 309–26.
14. Diana C. Mutz, "Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries," *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 4 (November 1995): 1015–42.
15. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 35.
16. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 73.
17. Barry Cooper, *Sins of Omission: Shaping the News at CBC TV* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 1.
18. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 40.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Hartley and Josephine Mazzuca, "Fewer Canadians

- Favour Legalized Abortion under Any Circumstance,” *The Gallup Poll* (Toronto: Gallup Canada, December 12, 2001).
21. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 145.
  22. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 175.
  23. Lydia Miljan and Barry Cooper, *Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003) 92.
  24. Reginald Bibby, *Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada* (Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1993).
  25. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 71.
  26. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 80 n. 12.

## CHAPTER 5

1. A feat not accomplished since Mackenzie King had won three in a row in 1935, 1940, and 1945.
2. Robert A. Young, *The Struggle for Quebec* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 87.
3. Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
4. The referendum question asked voters whether they agreed “Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership.”
5. Voter turnout was an astonishing—by Canadian standards, at any rate—93.5 percent. See Québec, Directeur-général des élections, <http://www.dgeq.qc.ca/information/>.
6. The amendment of section 93 was not implemented until after the 1997 federal election, which returned the Liberals to power.
7. Formerly a political scientist at the Université de Montréal, Dion was elevated to the cabinet, along with Pierre Pettigrew, in January 1996. Dion, Allan Rock, and Marcel Massé were members of a special cabinet committee charged with elaborating a strat-



- egy for dealing with the Quebec question in early 1996. See Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 102.
8. Ibid.
  9. A third question asked the Court whether international or Canadian law would have precedence in the event of a conflict between them. For more on the Supreme Court reference see Young, *The Struggle for Quebec*, 108–9, and David Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999).
  10. In March 1997 Duceppe replaced Michel Gauthier as leader of the Bloc Québécois. Gauthier had succeeded Lucien Bouchard when the latter resigned in January 1996 to become leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec.
  11. Thus the third question put before the Court, namely whether international or Canadian law would take precedence in the event of a conflict between them, was moot.
  12. Supreme Court of Canada, *Reference Re the Secession of Quebec*, para. 138. The entire judgment is reprinted in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 14–71. The cited passage is on page 64.
  13. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 151, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69.
  14. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 153, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69–70.
  15. Canada, House of Commons, 2d session, 36th Parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999.
  16. *Clarity Act*, s. 1(4)(b).
  17. Bill C-20 does not spell out what exactly constitutes a “clear majority,” stating only that the size of the majority, along with the percentage of eligible voters and other relevant matters, will be taken into account by the House of Commons. *Clarity Act*, s. 2(2).
  18. Canada, House of Commons, 2d Session, 36th Parliament, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, *Evidence*, February 23, 2000. Online at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/CLAR/Meetings/Evidence/clarev08-e.htm>.

19. In a survey conducted between May 1 and May 8, 2000, Ekos Research Associates, Inc., found that Joe Clark had fairly high levels of trust among voters, was better known and had more widely acceptable platform ideas than his Canadian Alliance counterparts (either Preston Manning or Stockwell Day), but that his positioning on the Clarity Bill was unpopular. The sample size was 3,530 and the margin of error +/- 1.6 percent, 19 times out of 20. See "The Political Landscape: Continued Liberal Dominance, Resurgent CA, Conservatives Fading." This and other surveys can be accessed in the Ekos archives available on the Web. <http://www.ekos.ca/media>.
20. Québec, Assemblée nationale, First session, 36th legislature, December 15, 1999.
21. *An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State*, ch. 1, art. 2 and 3 (emphasis added).
22. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "Fin de siècle: Fin de la souveraineté? Quebeckers think the unthinkable," December 14, 1999. The sample consisted of 803 respondents in Quebec and 2204 Canadians outside Quebec. Margins of error were +/- 3.5 percent in Quebec and +/- 2.1 percent in the rest of the country, 19 times out of 20. The study is available online at the Ekos webpage (see note 19 above).
23. Tammy McNamee, "The Clarity Bill: Examining Liberal Party Hegemony in the Transitional Party System" (M.A. major research paper, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), 55. McNamee cites an editorial, "The Centre Stops Being Soft" in *The Economist*, December 18, 1999, which argues along similar lines.
24. Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 91. As a result of the vote, Bouchard walked out of the convention and rumors spread that he was considering resigning as party leader. Bouchard stayed put, of course, and he gradually asserted control over the party apparatus (if not over the most militant advocates of independence, *les purs et*

- durs*): over 90 percent of delegates supported his leadership at the PQ convention in May 2000.
25. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "The Quebec Political Landscape," March 5, 1999. Sample size was 1,006 in Quebec and 1871 in ROC.
  26. Angus Reid Group, "Issues and Attitudes in a 1998 Post-Election Quebec," December 1, 1998. Sample size was 1,000 and the margin of error was +/- 3.1 percent, 19 times out of 20. The survey was accessed online at <http://www.angusreid.com>.
  27. Bloc Québécois, *Le Québec gagne à voter Bloc* (Montreal, 2000; English version). Accessed online at <http://www.blocquebecois.org>. Sovereignty is mentioned only once, at the beginning of the pamphlet, in an excerpt from the BQ's declaration of principles. The thrust of the document concerns the Bloc's role in defending Quebec's interests within the federal system and in holding the federal Liberals accountable, just as an opposition party should do. For an insightful analysis of the 2000 federal election campaign, and the relatively minor role played by the issue of sovereignty, see Stephen Clarkson, "The Liberal Threepeat: The Multi-System Party in the Multi-Party System," in *The Canadian General Election of 2000*, ed. Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2001), 13–57.
  28. Claire Durand, a sociologist at the Université de Montréal, argues that pollsters systematically underestimate Liberal support in Quebec, perhaps (though this is only speculative) because respondents in surveys are reluctant to admit to supporting the federalist party. In 2000, the underestimation of Liberal support, when all polls were averaged together, was approximately 4 percent. See Durand's paper, "Electoral Surveys in the 2000 Canadian Campaign: How Did They Really Fare?" <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/socio/durandc/menurecherche.htm>, n.d.
  29. André Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," in Pammett and Dornan, *Canadian General Election of 2000*, 139–40.

30. The three defectors were André Harvey in Chicoutimi, David Price in Compton-Stanstead, and Diane St.-Jacques in Shefford.
31. In spite of this pronounced decline, Quebec still had the third-highest turnout among the provinces and territories in the 2000 election. Only Prince Edward Island (72.7 percent) and New Brunswick (67.7) registered higher turnout rates. I have calculated Quebec turnout rates from raw data supplied by Elections Canada. There is a very slight difference (one-tenth of one percent) between the figures for Quebec voter turnout reported in the *Official Voting Results* for the 37th General Election and those calculated from the raw data.
32. Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," 141.
33. Édith Brochu and Louis Massicotte, "Élections fédérales de novembre: Coup de loupe sur un scrutin," *Le Devoir*, February 26, 2002, A7.
34. Don Macpherson, "The Evil of Two Lessers: Neither Liberals nor the Bloc Can Hold Heads High as Apathy Ruled in Quebec," *Montreal Gazette*, November 29, 2000.
35. Michaud made his remarks—inter alia, he claimed that Jews feel that they are the only people to have suffered in the history of humanity—in a radio interview in early December and repeated them in testimony before the Estates-General on the Situation and Future of the French Language in Quebec. I have written in greater detail about the Michaud Affair in "Sclerosis or a Clean Bill of Health? Diagnosing Quebec's Party System in the 21st Century," in *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2004).
36. Québec, Premier ministre, "Allocution à l'occasion de la démission du premier ministre du Québec," January 11, 2001. Available at the website of the Association internationale des études québécoises. <http://www.aieq.qc.ca/bouchard.htm>.
37. This remark was actually made before Landry officially became leader of the PQ, in January 2001, at a party caucus meeting.

- Landry's outburst was occasioned by the federal government's offer of an \$18 million subsidy to the province for the renovation of the Aquarium de Québec. One of the strings attached to this money, however, was that the Canadian flag (the "bits of red rag" in question) be allowed to fly and bilingual signs be posted at the renovated site. This offer prompted Landry's crude metaphor.
38. The data on "Referendum Voting Intentions" are available at Léger Marketing's website, <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was generally close to 1,000, and the surveys were conducted approximately 10 or so times each year. The margin of error for a sample this size is +/-3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
  39. Léger Marketing, "Opinions of Quebecers toward Provincial Politics and More Particularly the ADQ," May 2002. <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was 1,001, with a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
  40. Léger Marketing finds that the ADQ and the Quebec Liberals are running neck and neck, with 35 percent of voters saying that they would vote Liberal if a provincial election were to be held and 32 percent supporting the ADQ (the PQ stands at 26 percent). See "Opinions of Quebecers Toward Provincial Politics," May 2002.
  41. See Lisée's book, *Sortie de secours* (Montreal: Boréal, 2000). For commentary on the Lisée proposal, see Gordon Gibson, "Will Separatists Settle for a Half a Loaf?" *National Post*, January 18, 2001. Online at <http://www.vigile.net/01-1/gibson.html>. See also Alexander Panetta, "PQ Strongly Considers Referendum to Ask Ottawa for More Cash: Landry," *Montreal Gazette*, June 4, 2002.
  42. Québec, Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec, *Le français, une langue pour tout le monde* (Québec, 2001), 12 (my translation).
  43. Shawn McCarthy, "Shut Down Campaign, PM Orders Martin," *Globe and Mail*, May 31, 2002, A1.

## CHAPTER 6

1. Matthew Stevenson, "Canada's Other Brain Drain: The Continuing Exodus from Quebec," *Political Options/Options Politiques* (October 2000): 63–66, page 64, [www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf](http://www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf).
2. Richard Rodriguez, *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* (New York: Viking, 2002) 94, 103, 105, and 108.
3. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 110.
4. "Carnaval Celebrants Grin and Bare It Despite S.F. Fog," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, B1.
5. Robert E. Chenard, "Historical Perspective on Waterville's 19C Franco-Americans," <http://members.mint.net/frenchcx/frcanwtv/htm>.
6. Roger Roy, "An Analysis of the Assimilation of French-Canadian Language and Culture into American Language and Culture: How French-Canadian Became Franco-American and then Became Invisible" (Graduate research essay for EDU 690 Social Context of Higher Education, University of Maine).
7. Juliana L'Hereux, "North American French as an Academic Subject." [www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm](http://www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm).
8. Ilan Stavans, "Spanglish: Tickling the Tongue," *World Literature Today* 74.3 (Summer 2000): 555.
9. "Tom, Tom and Julia . . . The Names Say It All," *Globe and Mail*, February 6, 2000, R2.
10. Neva Chonin, "Morissette Does Her Own Thing," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 7, 2002, D3.
11. Neva Chonin, "Furtado in Control at Warfield," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 16, 2002, D1.
12. Paula Martinac, *k.d. lang* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1997), 89.
13. Quoted in David Bennahum, ed., *In her own words: k.d. lang* (New York: Omnibus, 1995), 18.

14. Bennahum, *In her own words*, 7.
15. "Celine's New Album," *Globe and Mail*. February 7, 2002, R2.
16. Tim Goodman, "Families, Frisco Formulas for Fall," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, D1.
17. Jonathan Curiel, "Lack of TV Diversity Hit," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 15, 2002, A2.
18. Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
19. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 117.
20. Andrew Mollison, "Researchers Attack Bush's Education Reforms," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 16, 2002, A4.
21. Ibid.
22. Mary Jordan, "Fewer Migrants Caught on Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A14.
23. "INS Unveils New Plan, Devices for Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A9.
24. Quoted in Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
25. "More People Say That They're Just 'Americans,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 8, 2002, A8.
26. Anthony Walton, rev. of *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* by Richard Rodriguez, *New York Times Book Review*, April 7, 2002, 7.
27. Rodriguez, *Brown*, xii.
28. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 164.

## CHAPTER 7

1. Anthony DePalma, *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 354.
2. Seymour M. Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee, 1989).
3. Seymour M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and*

- Persistence in Social Structures* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988).
4. James Laxer, *Discovering America: Travels in the Land of Guns, God, and Corporate Gurus* (New York: New Press, 2001). See also, Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1996).
  5. For a fuller description of this analysis, see Stephen Brooks, "A Tale of Two Elections: What the Leaders' Rhetoric from the 2000 Election Tells Us about Can-Am Political Culture Differences" (paper delivered at the Biennial Meeting of the Canadian Studies in the United States, San Antonio, Tex., November 2001). Readers may also contact the author at [brooks3@uwindsor.ca](mailto:brooks3@uwindsor.ca).

## CHAPTER 8

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2. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, chapters 8 and 9.
3. Fair, <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/>.
4. Mark J. Kasoff and Christine Drennen, eds., *Canada: A Fractured Political Landscape*, Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 1994.
5. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, 79.
6. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
7. *Globe and Mail*, April 29, 2002.
8. United Press International, September 10, 2001.
9. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
10. Earl H. Fry and Jared Bybee, *NAFTA 2002: A Cost/Benefit Analy-*



- sis for the United States, Canada and Mexico* (Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, Orono, 2002).
11. Nick Schultz, "Canadian Energy Policy and Trade with the United States," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
  12. Michel Tremblay, "Hydro-Québec and TransÉnergie: Continuity in a Changing Environment," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
  13. *Wall Street Journal*, April 24, 2002.
  14. *AuCanada*, "Bruising Battle over Tomatoes," Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 2002.
  15. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
  16. *Globe and Mail*, May 22, 2002.
  17. *Globe and Mail*, April 25, 2002; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, *Economic Trends*, May 2002.
  18. *Globe and Mail*, March 6, 2002.

## CHAPTER 9

1. Jorge Castañeda, "El nuevo activismo internacional mexicano," *Reforma*, September 23, 2001a, Section Enfoque 15–17; "Los ejes de la política exterior," *Nexos* 23 no. 288 (December 2001b) 66–74; and "El factor externo y consolidación de la democracia en México," *Reforma*, February 24, 2002, 10A.
2. For Castañeda's critical view on U.S.-Mexican relations before becoming minister of foreign affairs, see Castañeda, 1996.
3. Robert Pastor has made an effort to articulate a greater post-NAFTA vision for North America. He advocates institutional deepening, among other things, in order to deal with continental problems that hitherto were handled under national or bilateral agendas. However, Pastor's position does not represent the official positions of any NAFTA members. See Robert Pastor, *Toward a North American Community* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

4. For a comprehensive view of migratory problems between Mexico and the U.S. see SRE, 1997.
5. George Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/), 2002a.
6. "Estrategia nacional para la seguridad del territorio nacional. Resumen ejecutivo," Office of the Press Secretary, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html). 2002; and George Bush, "Securing the Homeland and Strengthening the Nation," [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/), 2002b.
7. Eduardo Sojo, et al., "Sociedad para la Prosperidad: Reporte a los Presidentes Vicente Fox y George Bush," Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002, electronic copy.
8. A declaration was released from a top official of that ministry, suggesting that Mexico was considering bringing the case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, but eventually did not.
9. Mr. Castañeda's most recent address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, condemning any unilateral action against Iraq in the global war against terrorism, suggests that Mexico is heading in that direction. See *Reforma*, September 14, 2002.

## CHAPTER 10

1. Alvaro Artiga, *La Política y los Sistemas de Partidos en Centroamérica*, (San Salvador: 2000).
2. Manuel Orozco, *International Norms and Mobilization of Democracy*, (London: Ashgate, 2002).
3. Graeme Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000).
4. "Alemán llama a Ortega a concertar pacto de gobernabilidad en Nicaragua," *La Prensa* (Honduras), November 23, 1996, <http://www.laprensahn.com/caarc/9611/c23002.htm>.

5. Both had resigned from their positions; their continuation was not desired by the new members. Moreover, they were not interested in supporting the new establishment.
6. "Desconfianza impera en el ámbito pre-electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana*, July 28, 2000.
7. The extent of corruption in Aleman's government is the subject of another paper. However, suffice it to say that in 1999 the comptroller had identified a number of anomalies and abuses of government resources on behalf of the president. The most public case was the use of resources to build infrastructure at the president's farm, La Chilamapa, the construction of a special road leading to the president's home, and a number of contracts. His wealth was estimated to have increased by millions of dollars. *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000.
8. "A Society Scandalized," *Envio* (June 2000).
9. "The Air is Thick with Electoral Fraud," *Envio* (July 2000).
10. "Indeciso proceso electoral en marcha," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), April 28, 2000.
11. "Entre Partidos te veas: candente ambiente pre electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), August 18, 2000.
12. "Renuncia evidencia lucha por el poder" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), May 26, 2000.
13. "Contraloría va contra Solórzano," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 11, 2000.
14. Consuelo Sandoval and Nidia Ruiz López, "Solórzano sorprende a políticos," *La Prensa* (Managua), March 17, 2001.
15. "No tengo la alternativa ideal," *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000. In late March 2001 Daniel Ortega announced the endorsement of Jarquín and the alliance with the Christian Way.
16. "Presidente Alemán admite desgaste," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 19, 2000.

17. "Renuncian candidatos conservadores," *La Prensa*, July 17, 2001.
18. A poll showed that Ortega had the lead in the election with 31 percent. Shortly after this poll, he endorsed the alliance with the Christian Way. "Encuesta nacional de CINCO: Ningún ganador a la vista," *Confidencial*, 233, March 18–24, 2001.
19. "Milagro Electoral de Enrique Bolaños," interview with Victor Borge (Borge y Asociados) by Adolfo Pastran, August 9, 2001.
20. John Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1998), 174.
21. Edelberto Torres Rivas, *Costa Rica crisis y desafíos* (San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones [DEI], 1987).
22. Eliana Franco and Carlos Sojo, *Gobierno, Empresarios y políticas de ajuste* (San José: FLACSO, 1992).
23. "Pactos, descrédito, inestabilidad" *La Nación* (San José) 1995.
24. "Modelo económico impulsa crecimiento con pobreza," *Inforpress Centroamericana*, December 1, 2000.
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26. "Complicado panorama para elecciones," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala) June 22, 2001.
27. INCEP, *Reporte Político/Panorama Centroamericano No. 171: Llegaron las internas partidarias para designación de candidatos*, Guatemala, June 2001, 5.
28. *Inforpress*, June 2001.
29. IDESPO, *La población costarricense del gran area metropolitana frente a su participación ciudadana y sus valores políticos*, Heredia: IDESPO, May 23, 2001.
30. Juan Manuel Villasuso, Jenny Díaz, and Laura Chinchilla, *Gobernabilidad democrática y seguridad ciudadana: El Caso de Costa Rica* (Managua: CRIES, 2000).
31. Florisabel Rodríguez (Director of Procesos), interview by author, March 22, 2002.

32. Jorge Rovira Mas, *La democracia de Costa Rica ante el siglo XXI*, San José: FLACSO, 2000.
33. Carlos Sojo (director of FLASCO), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 21, 2000.
34. Cecilia Cortes (Director of Funpadem), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 23, 2002.
35. Rodríguez interview.
36. "Liberales aceptan inscribir a Maduro," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Honduras), March 2, 2001.

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