

## CHAPTER 5

# Quebec and the Canadian Federal Election of 2000: Putting the Sovereignty Movement on the Ropes?

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FOR THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN QUEBEC, the outcome of the November 2000 Canadian federal election marked another bitterly disappointing setback on the road to sovereignty. Not only did Jean Chrétien—an object of intense loathing among the Quebec nationalist intelligentsia—succeed in winning his third consecutive majority, he did so while increasing the Liberal Party's share of both votes and seats in the province of Quebec.<sup>1</sup> For the second consecutive election, the Bloc Québécois (BQ) and its sovereignty option failed to generate much enthusiasm among Quebec's voters. Worse still, less than two months after the federal election, Premier Lucien Bouchard resigned as leader of the provincial Parti Québécois (PQ) and premier of Quebec, citing his inability to reinvigorate the independence movement as the principal reason for his departure from political life. Bouchard's successor, Bernard Landry, while more popular among the militant faction of the Parti Québécois (*les purs et durs*) than the erstwhile

comrade-in-arms Brian Mulroney had ever been, has failed to breathe new life into the sovereignty project. He now finds himself at the helm of an increasingly unpopular governing party which risks being annihilated at the polls in the next provincial election.

What was the impact of the 2000 federal election on the Quebec “problem?” The central question posed in the analysis is whether the Liberals’ 2000 “three-peat” foreshadows the inevitable collapse of the sovereignty project. Predictions about the future of Québécois nationalism are notoriously risky. Only fifteen years ago, in the mid-1980s, it appeared to many observers that Quebec’s nationalist movement was on the ropes when a re-nascent Robert Bourassa and his Quebec Liberal Party defeated the Parti Québécois in the 1985 provincial election. In the span of five years, however, the independence movement in the province re-emerged stronger than ever, revitalized by the death of René Lévesque in 1987, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on the language of commercial signs in Quebec in 1988, and the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990. It may well turn out that the PQ’s current travails are merely temporary, and that the party and the movement need only find a dynamic new leader in order to recapture their former dynamism. As I argue here, however, a more plausible view is that the Quebec independence movement now faces a number of significant, and perhaps insuperable, social and political hurdles.

My analysis proceeds in three stages. In the next section, the backdrop to the 2000 federal election campaign is sketched, focusing in particular on the Chrétien government’s two-pronged strategy for meeting the challenge of Québécois nationalism in the wake of the 1995 referendum on sovereignty. Plan A consisted of measures “to accommodate Quebec in the constitution and to meet some of the province’s traditional demands,” while Plan B involved an attempt to clarify “the process and the implications of

Quebec secession, and [to challenge] the sovereigntists' assumptions about these matters."<sup>2</sup> Simplifying somewhat, Plan A is the carrot and Plan B the stick in the federal government's strategic repertoire for responding to the challenge of the Quebec independence movement. The sovereigntists' inability to mobilize voters against Plan B, which they denounced as an anti-democratic assault on the right of the Québécois to self-determination, provided Jean Chrétien and the Liberals with a considerable strategic advantage during the election campaign. In the second section of the chapter, I examine the actual election results in 2000 to assess differing explanations of the outcome. Finally, I explore the obstacles now confronting the sovereignty movement in Quebec and the likelihood that they will be overcome. In conclusion, the current situation may be optimal for the Liberal Party of Canada, the "natural governing party" of the country, but it does not necessarily represent the ideal solution to the Quebec problem.<sup>3</sup>

### **BACKDROP TO THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTION: THE SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT STALLS**

Throughout its second mandate (1997–2000), the Chrétien government's political agenda was dominated by the need to formulate a response to the threat of Quebec secession. In the historic referendum on sovereignty-partnership held on October 30, 1995,<sup>4</sup> the NO side had emerged with a perilously narrow victory, winning 50.6 percent of the vote to the YES side's 49.4 percent.<sup>5</sup> Prime Minister Chrétien was personally vilified in the media and by many in the opposition parties for having failed to take the sovereigntist camp seriously at the outset of the referendum campaign, and for abandoning his "don't-worry-be-happy" strategy only when it was almost too late. Immediately after the referendum, therefore, the Chrétien government moved to mollify its critics by seeking to accommodate some of Quebec's historic de-

mands. It passed legislation that committed the House of Commons to recognize Quebec as a distinct society; it also gave Quebec, along with four other regions, a veto over certain types of constitutional amendments. The Liberals transferred significant powers over job training to the province of Quebec, and they amended section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, at Quebec's request, to enable the province to create language-based school boards rather than confessional ones.<sup>6</sup> These measures, which together constituted the Chrétien government's Plan A, were designed to demonstrate the flexibility of the existing federal system and to prove to Québécois that their unique contribution to the development of Canada was appreciated by Ottawa—without, of course, giving the other provinces any hint that Quebec was somehow more special than they were.

At the same time that the Liberals were putting in place the elements of Plan A, they began to formulate a parallel strategy designed to deprive the sovereigntists of their exclusive control over the timing and mechanics of a future referendum. Partly the brainchild of the new minister of intergovernmental affairs in the Chrétien cabinet, Stéphane Dion,<sup>7</sup> and partly an echo of the hard line on Quebec that the Reform Party and Preston Manning had consistently advocated, Plan B was intended to “raise doubts among the Quebec electorate about the ease of secession by challenging the sovereigntists and putting them on the defensive.”<sup>8</sup> In September 1996, the Chrétien government used its reference power to ask the Supreme Court of Canada to determine whether Quebec had the right to secede from Canada unilaterally under either the Canadian Constitution or international law.<sup>9</sup> This bold gesture was not without its critics in the media, in the opposition parties, and within the Liberal party itself; many feared that this legal strategy would inflame nationalist opinion in Quebec, provide the Parti Québécois with yet another example of the humiliation of the Quebec people, and thereby aid the sovereigntist cause.

The Supreme Court of Canada had not yet heard the legal arguments in the reference case by the time voters went to the polls in the 36th general election on June 2, 1997. Although the Liberals barely managed to hold onto their majority, winning just 155 seats in the 301-seat House of Commons, the results in Quebec were more encouraging, as they increased their share of the popular vote from 33 percent to 37 percent and their seats from 19 to 26 (see table 5.1). While national unity had been a dominant theme in the election campaign, the Bloc Québécois could credibly attribute its disappointing performance—it lost eleven percentage points in the popular vote and ten seats—to an inept campaign organization and the inexperienced leadership of Gilles Duceppe rather than to any popular rejection of its sovereignty option.<sup>10</sup>

TABLE 5.1.

Federal Election Results in Quebec, 1988–2000

Party	Election							
	1988		1993		1997		2000	
	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#
Lib	30	12	33	19	37	26	44	36
PC	53	63	14	1	22	5	6	1
BQ	—	—	49	54	38	44	40	38
Reform/CA	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
NDP	14	—	2	—	2	—	2	—
Other	3	—	3	1	1	—	2	—

% rounded to the nearest whole number

# : number of seats in the 75-seat National Assembly

Sources:

Tony Coulson, "Statistical Appendices: Canadian Federal Election Results, 1925–1993," in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, ed. A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon, 2d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Nelson, 1996), tables B-20, B-21.

Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, *Official Voting Results*, Thirty-sixth General Election 1997, tables 7, 9; Thirty-seventh General Election 2000, table K.

The Chrétien government finalized Plan B after the 1997 federal election. In August 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision on the constitutionality of a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec. In what was widely hailed as a masterful, politically astute judgment, the Court ruled that such a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec would contravene both Canadian and international law.<sup>11</sup> Particularly damaging to the sovereigntists' legal case was the Court's finding that the right to self-determination under international law existed only:

... in situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development. . . . Such exceptional circumstances are manifestly inapplicable to Quebec under existing conditions.<sup>12</sup>

Sovereigntists could take solace in one aspect of the Court's decision, however. The justices argued that Canada would have a clear duty to negotiate with Quebec in the event of a "clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada."<sup>13</sup> Here, the Court tacitly recognized that secessions are political as much as they are legal phenomena, something that many federalists, including Jean Chrétien and his close advisors, had been completely unwilling to acknowledge. Lobbing the ball deliberately back to the politicians, the Supreme Court justices wrote that "it will be for the political actors to determine what constitutes 'a clear majority on a clear question' in the circumstances under which a future referendum vote may be taken."<sup>14</sup>

Slightly more than a year after the Supreme Court handed down its decision on secession, the Chrétien government moved to meet the challenge posed by the justices. In December 1999,

Stéphane Dion, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, tabled in the House of Commons Bill C-20, An Act to Give Effect to the Requirement for Clarity as Set Out in the Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference.<sup>15</sup> This piece of legislation stipulates that the House of Commons will scrutinize any future referendum question on the secession of a province within thirty days of being tabled in the provincial legislature, in order to determine its clarity. The bill excludes as unclear any question that focuses merely on a mandate to negotiate secession or that “envisages other possibilities in addition to the secession of the province from Canada, such as economic or political arrangements with Canada, that obscure a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada.”<sup>16</sup> Thus both the 1980 and 1995 referendum questions in Quebec would have been rejected under the terms of the Clarity Act as unclear, since the first merely asked for a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association, while the second referred to Quebec’s formal offer of economic partnership to Canada.<sup>17</sup>

After lengthy debate in both the House of Commons and the Senate, the Clarity Act was finally passed and received royal assent on June 29, 2000, less than four months before Jean Chrétien issued his election call. Not surprisingly, sovereigntists were outraged by the Clarity Act and denounced it as a Soviet-style atrocity aimed at crushing not only the natural right of Québécois to self-determination but democracy itself. Some federal opposition party leaders were also openly critical of the law. Joe Clark of the Progressive Conservative Party, for instance, dismissed the legislation as Jean Chrétien’s feeble attempt to compensate for his failings during the referendum campaign of 1995: “It is a classic case of a general fighting the last war.” Clark anticipated some of the Senate’s concerns about the bill, wondering why it conferred the power to vet referendum questions solely on the House of Com-

mons, instead of sharing it with other key political actors—the Senate, Aboriginals, and the provinces, for example. He also attacked the rigidity of the legislation, which “limits dangerously the capacity of a future prime minister to protect our country against secession. It ties the hands of Canada and takes away the flexibility upon which Macdonald, Laurier, Mackenzie King and other prime ministers relied to keep this country together.”<sup>18</sup>

Joe Clark paid a political price for his opposition to the Clarity Bill, as many members of his own party and a clear majority of English Canadians appeared to support the basic principles embodied in the legislation.<sup>19</sup> Nor were the sovereigntists able to mobilize public opinion in Quebec against what they viewed as Ottawa’s anti-democratic assault on the province’s right to determine its own fate. Within days of the introduction of the Clarity Act, the Quebec government responded with its own legislation, Bill 99, An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State.<sup>20</sup> This bill, which is currently the target of a legal challenge by the Equality Party in Quebec, affirmed that the “Québec people has the inalienable right to freely decide the political regime and legal status of Quebec” and that “the Québec people, acting through its own political institutions, shall determine *alone* the mode of exercise of [that] right.”<sup>21</sup> However, the PQ and the Bloc failed utterly to generate anything resembling a groundswell of public opinion against the federal law or in support of the Quebec legislation. In fact, Bill 99 and Bill C-20 were greeted either by equanimity or indifference in Quebec. According to a survey conducted by Ekos Research Associates, Inc., the fears of Joe Clark, Jean Charest, and others that the federal government’s Clarity Act would reinvigorate the sovereignty movement were unfounded: the short-term impact of the debate over the legislation (and its provincial counterpart, Bill 99) was “indiscernible” in Quebec, the authors of the study found. “Overall, the sovereignty movement remains mired



in near record low levels of support . . . [T]here is no evidence of any rebound in sovereigntist fortunes [from the passage of the law].”<sup>22</sup>

Thus by the time Jean Chrétien called a general election for November 27, 2000, the federal government, for arguably the first time since the birth of the Quebec independence movement in the early 1960s, had wrested control over the political and constitutional agenda from the advocates of sovereignty.<sup>23</sup> Plan B and the Clarity Act played a key role in this reversal of fortunes. In addition, the proponents of Quebec independence were forced to cope with a number of internal problems after the 1995 referendum. As many observers had predicted, Lucien Bouchard’s luster had dimmed somewhat after he left the federal political arena to assume the leadership of the Parti Québécois government in January 1996. Bouchard’s search for the “winning conditions” that would guarantee a sovereigntist victory in a future referendum was sidetracked almost immediately by the day-to-day demands of provincial administration. Premier Bouchard alienated some of the most committed partisans of independence in his quest to balance the provincial budget (becoming one of the last provinces to do so) by slashing government spending after 1996. Labor unions, women’s groups, and various community organizations, all strong supporters of the PQ’s vision of an independent, *social democratic* Quebec, grew increasingly restive under Bouchard’s leadership. Partly because of his policies of fiscal restraint, and partly because of doubts about the strength of his commitment to sovereignty, only 76.7 percent of the delegates to the biennial convention of the Parti Québécois in November 1996 endorsed Bouchard’s leadership.<sup>24</sup>

In the 1998 provincial election, Bouchard was unable to improve on the performance of his predecessor, Jacques Parizeau. The PQ and the Liberals won about the same percentage of the popular vote (43 percent), but thanks to huge Liberal majorities in

the predominantly Anglophone ridings of West Island Montreal, the PQ secured a comfortable majority in the National Assembly (seventy-six seats versus forty-eight for the Liberals). Opinion polls at the time of the PQ victory indicated that Quebec voters, like their counterparts in the rest of Canada, were suffering from severe constitutional fatigue. In a survey released in March 1999, Ekos Research Associates, Inc., asked voters whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that "I am sick and tired of all this talk about the Quebec sovereignty issue." In Quebec, 62 percent of respondents agreed, while 76 percent in the rest of Canada did so.<sup>25</sup> An Angus Reid Group survey conducted in December 1998 found that 71 percent of respondents believed that the PQ should not hold another referendum on sovereignty during its mandate. This majority was constant across all age brackets and party affiliations (even 55 percent of PQ supporters felt that the Bouchard government ought not to hold another referendum in the next five years). The survey also showed that voters were pessimistic about Bouchard's intentions: 64 percent of those surveyed believed that Bouchard would start to work immediately after the election to establish the winning conditions necessary for a referendum on sovereignty, rather than attempting to work to improve Quebec's position within the Canadian federal system (which 73 percent of respondents wanted Bouchard to do).<sup>26</sup>

In summary, after nearly winning the referendum on sovereignty-partnership in October 1995, the sovereignty movement in Quebec stalled. By the time the federal election was called in October 2000, sovereigntists were divided and demoralized. Indeed, sovereignty is barely mentioned at all in the Bloc Québécois's election manifesto in 2000.<sup>27</sup> The timing of the election also favored the federal Liberal Party rather than the sovereigntists: the recent death (on September 28, 2000) of former prime minister Pierre Trudeau allowed Jean Chrétien to launch his re-election bid in the slipstream of nostalgia and euphoria generated by Trudeau's passing. The extra-

ordinary outpouring of emotion for Pierre Trudeau prompted Chrétien to wrap himself in the mantle of defender of the “Trudeau vision” of compassionate liberalism, a legacy that was threatened by the extremism of Stockwell Day and the Canadian Alliance. Chrétien and his advisors believed that this strategy of contrasting Liberal (read Canadian) values with the alleged extremism of the Alliance would play especially well in Quebec, the province that historically has been most committed to collectivism and most supportive of government’s role in social and economic life.

Despite some misgivings within his own caucus about the wisdom of calling an early election (barely three and a half years into the government’s mandate) for a second time in a row, Jean Chrétien’s political instincts were vindicated on November 27, 2000, when the Liberals cruised to a convincing election victory. The Liberals enjoyed their best showing in Quebec since 1980. Let us next examine various explanations of the Liberals’ success in 2000.

### EXPLAINING THE 2000 ELECTION OUTCOME IN QUEBEC

As the data in table 5.1 indicate, the Bloc Québécois managed to increase its share of the popular vote slightly in 2000, winning 40 percent as opposed to 38 percent in the 1997 federal election, but its share of the seats in Quebec dropped from forty-four to thirty-eight. The Liberals exceeded many observers’ expectations, winning 44 percent of the vote (37 percent in 1997) and thirty-six seats (twenty-six in 1997), while support for the Progressive Conservatives plummeted from 22 percent and five seats in 1997 to a mere 6 percent and one seat in 2000.<sup>28</sup> Of the ten seats that the Liberals picked up in the 2000 election, seven came from the BQ and three from the Conservatives. The Bloc also took one seat from the PCs.

A number of factors can be cited to explain these election results. First, during the federal campaign the Bloc Québécois became a lightning rod for voter unhappiness with the PQ government of Lucien Bouchard and its policy of forced municipal amalgamations in Quebec City and the island of Montreal. The Bloc lost three seats to the Liberals in the Quebec region—Québec-East, Louis-Hébert, and Portneuf—where voters were angry with the forced mergers. In all three the Liberals' margin of victory was less than 3,000 votes (and a mere 647 votes in Québec-East); the BQ might well have been able to retain these seats had disgruntled voters not used the Bloc as a proxy for the Parti Québécois.<sup>29</sup>

Secondly, the Liberals benefited disproportionately from the collapse of the Conservative vote. In 1997, the PCs won five seats and placed second in ten others in Quebec, taking 22 percent of the popular vote (811,410 votes). In 2000, the Conservatives retained only one seat, placed second in three others, and won just under 6 percent of the popular vote (192,153 votes). In fact, the Canadian Alliance outpolled the Conservatives in Quebec by almost 21,000 votes, even though they did not come close to winning a seat. The Liberals picked up three seats from the Tories in 2000—Chicoutimi, Compton-Stanstead, and Shefford. The latter two ridings are in the Eastern Townships near the U.S. border, close to former federal Conservative leader Jean Charest's old riding of Sherbrooke, which was won by the Bloc Québécois in a 1998 by-election after Charest left federal politics to become leader of the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP). All three Liberal gains came in ridings where sitting Conservative MPs defected to the governing party just prior to the election and were re-elected under their new party label.<sup>30</sup> André Bachand was the lone Conservative incumbent to win re-election, by a mere 363 votes, in Richmond-Arthabaska (also in the Eastern Townships and bordering the riding of Sherbrooke). These results appear to confirm

that much of the Conservatives' electoral success in Quebec in 1997 was attributable to Jean Charest's personal appeal. With Joe Clark as federal Tory leader, the overwhelming majority of the party's supporters drifted to the Liberals rather than to the BQ.

Thirdly, the sharp drop in voter turnout affected the outcome of the 2000 election in Quebec, though perhaps not quite in the way that some observers initially believed. Nationwide, voter turnout in 2000 declined to a historic low of 61.2 percent (67 percent of registered voters turned out in the 1997 election, one of the lowest levels of the twentieth century). The biggest decline in turnout, 9.1 percentage points, from 73.1 percent in 1997 to 64 percent in 2000, occurred in Quebec.<sup>31</sup> Immediately after the election, some researchers and media commentators contended that the decline in turnout was possibly greater among Bloc Québécois supporters than it was among other partisans, reflecting the demobilization and demoralization of the sovereignty forces noted earlier. André Bernard, for instance, observed that "on November 27, 2000, the turnout was much lower than in 1997; the Bloc Québécois received approximately 18,000 fewer votes than in 1997."<sup>32</sup>

An analysis of voter turnout data from the 1997 and 2000 federal elections, however, quickly disproves this hypothesis: the greatest declines in turnout occurred in the predominantly Anglophone ridings of West Island Montreal. Mount Royal, for instance, experienced the sharpest decline in turnout in the province—18.8 percentage points between 1997 and 2000. This was also the riding with the least competitive race in the province: the Liberal candidate, well-known constitutional lawyer and human rights activist Irwin Cotler, won over 80 percent of the vote in 2000, while the second-place candidate, a Conservative, managed to obtain just 6 percent of the popular vote. Similar trends were evident in Westmount (drop of 16 percentage points in turnout; Liberal Lucienne Robillard won 60 percent of the

vote), Notre-Dame-de-Grâce (drop of 15 percentage points in turnout; Liberal Marlene Jennings won over 60 percent of the vote) and St. Laurent (decline in turnout of 14 percentage points, Liberal Stéphane Dion won 74 percent of the vote).

In their careful analysis of the impact of voter turnout on the federal election in Quebec, Édith Brochu and Louis Massicotte find that on the whole the decline in turnout in ridings held by the Bloc Québécois was “unremarkable,” except in sovereigntist strongholds such as Hochelaga and Laurier-St.-Marie, where the races were not competitive. They conclude that the most important feature of the 2000 election results in Quebec was the pronounced demobilization of Anglophone voters in safe Liberal seats. Indirectly, this demobilization reflected the sagging fortunes of the independence movement in the province: Anglophone voters, feeling that the threat of separatism was less acute in 2000 than it had been in 1997, could safely decide to stay home rather than go to the polls.<sup>33</sup>

In summary, the implications of the 2000 federal election were quite grim for the sovereignty movement in Quebec. Despite running a competent campaign—in stark contrast to their near disastrous effort in 1997—Gilles Duceppe and the Bloc Québécois were unable to make any gains among the “soft nationalists” who had voted for the Progressive Conservatives when Jean Charest was party leader. The Bloc had essentially stagnated, as had the Parti Québécois in the 1998 provincial election. Don Macpherson, the insightful columnist for the *Montreal Gazette*, concluded after the election that the “Bloc looks increasingly like the Creditiste Party in the 1960s—an anti-Liberal protest rump that rushed in to fill a vacuum left by a Conservative collapse, then gradually lost its purpose and its relevance and, after several elections, eventually faded away into history.”<sup>34</sup> How valid is Macpherson’s conclusion? Is the Bloc Québécois, and the independence movement as a whole, on the ropes?

## **REPERCUSSIONS OF THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT**

Less than two months after the federal election, on January 11, 2001, Premier Lucien Bouchard unexpectedly announced his resignation as leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec. The proximate cause of Bouchard's departure was the Michaud Affair, a bitter internal party dispute over how to respond to some highly publicized anti-Semitic remarks made by Yves Michaud, former Delegate-General of Quebec in France (1979-84) and well-known PQ gadfly.<sup>35</sup> In his resignation speech, Bouchard claimed that the Michaud Affair was not a cause of his resignation, but that he did not have the stomach for any more discussions about either the Holocaust or ethnic voting patterns in the province. The fundamental reason for his departure, Bouchard stated, was that

je reconnais que mes efforts pour relancer rapidement le débat sur la question nationale sont restés vains. Il n'a donc pas été possible d'engager une démarche référendaire à l'intérieur de l'échéancier rapproché que nous aurions souhaité. De même les Québécois sont-ils restés étonnamment impassibles devant les offensives fédérales comme l'union sociale, le programme de bourses millénaire, la création de chaires universitaires de recherche, l'adoption de la loi C-20, laquelle vise à rien moins que de restreindre notre capacité de choisir notre avenir politique.<sup>36</sup>

Bouchard's successor as PQ leader and premier was Bernard Landry, who had been minister of finance in Bouchard's cabinet. Landry, like Jacques Parizeau, is associated with the business-friendly wing of the PQ; both are hardliners on the issue of sovereignty. After assuming the leadership of the PQ, Landry played to *les purs et durs* in the party with a series of inflammatory comments about Canada and the federal system, the most notorious being his

remark that Quebec would not “sell itself on the street for some bits of red rag.”<sup>37</sup> Landry’s aggressive posturing appears not to have had much of an impact on public opinion on the sovereignty issue. Survey data published by Léger Marketing indicate that support for sovereignty-association in Quebec has averaged about 44 percent over the last three years (1999–2001). Average annual support for the YES option reached its peak in 1996 (51 percent), and has declined slowly since then, stabilizing in the low- to mid-40s, notwithstanding Landry’s incendiary rhetoric.<sup>38</sup> At the same time, support for the PQ government is in free fall, with over 70 percent of voters indicating that it is time for a change in government.<sup>39</sup> Interestingly, voter support in May and June 2002 seems to be coalescing behind a third party, the *Action démocratique du Québec* (ADQ)—which currently has but two members in the National Assembly—rather than the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP).<sup>40</sup> This perhaps reflects an attitude of “a plague on both their houses” among Quebec’s voters, who are tired of the neverending constitutional wrangle and the apparent paucity of new and creative ideas on offer from the rival PQ and QLP.

Can it be concluded, then, that the sovereignty movement in Quebec is moribund, or at least on the ropes? Recent history teaches us to beware of such simplistic inferences. At best, we can say that most voters in Quebec (and, arguably, in Canada as a whole) are increasingly unhappy with the partisan choices confronting them, are fed up with constitutional politics, and are casting about for a viable political alternative. Things can change quickly in politics, and the Quebec electorate’s infatuation with the ADQ may well be short-lived, especially as voters learn more about its unorthodox program, which grafts a desire for renewed federalism onto a package of right-wing economic proposals reminiscent of the Canadian Alliance’s platform. Thus, the natural cycle of party fortunes in a first-past-the-post electoral system might well work in favor of the PQ and the Bloc in the not-too-



distant future (and given the current difficulties of the federal Liberals—discussed further below—the Bloc’s prospects have improved markedly in recent weeks).

There are, however, some substantial obstacles to the viability of the sovereignty project in the long term. In recent years, proponents of sovereignty have been casting about for a winning strategy that would avoid the trap laid for them by the federal Clarity Act—namely, a referendum on a clear question on Quebec independence *tout court*, which they would almost certainly lose. One alternative, proposed by Jean-François Lisée, a former advisor to both Jacques Parizeau and Lucien Bouchard, is to hold a referendum on extracting additional powers or resources from Ottawa.<sup>41</sup> The logic behind this proposal appears to be that a groundswell of public support for sovereignty would emerge in the wake of Ottawa’s inevitable rejection of Quebec’s demand for more. It must be said, however, that this strategy represents a dramatic scaling back of the sovereigntist dream, and it is difficult to believe that nationalist voters would be energized by what would likely be a very dry, technical debate. Instead of Daniel Johnson’s ringing cry of “Equality or Independence” during the 1960s, voters would confront the much more mundane slogan, “Give us tax points, or give us sovereignty.” All flippancy aside, it is unclear that this strategy for a referendum on decentralization would accomplish anything more than the traditional channels of federal-provincial diplomacy, where Quebec could potentially ally itself with other powerful, disgruntled advocates of decentralization like Alberta and Ontario. And the risks involved—losing yet another referendum—are much greater than those inherent in executive federalism.

Another strategy for re-energizing the sovereignty movement has been proposed by a number of Quebec intellectuals, and constitutes one of the main recommendations of the report of the Estates-General on the French language: the idea of a separate

Quebec citizenship. According to the Estates-General, the notion of Quebec citizenship is born out of the need for social cohesion; it is necessary “because we live in a period of great change and an era of confusion about language and belonging.”<sup>42</sup> Some sovereigntists hope that a distinct Quebec citizenship, perhaps embodied in a “civic contract,” will eventually forge a single identity (*Québécois*) out of the multiple identities (*Canadian, Québécois, immigrant*) that currently exist. Not surprisingly, representatives of a number of immigrant groups in Quebec have rejected this proposal as a nonstarter, one that is completely out of touch with the realities of an increasingly interdependent world.

## CONCLUSION

The sovereignty movement in Quebec thus finds itself in perhaps the most difficult situation it has ever confronted. The generation that gave birth to the Parti Québécois is aging and, if Lisée’s book, *Sortie de secours*, is any indication, it is demoralized as well. Young Francophones in Quebec, who are more likely to support the idea of sovereignty than their older counterparts, and who are most likely to have the single, unconflicted identity cherished by nationalists, are also less involved in traditional partisan politics than any other generation. At the same time, Quebec has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, and thus will need to rely increasingly on immigration simply to replace the current population. As a society, then, Quebec will necessarily become more diverse, and the notion of a single, unambiguous *Québécois* identity will have less purchase over the entire population. In this rapidly changing social and political matrix, the dream of sovereignty appears to be less attainable than ever before.

Coming as it did just four months after the Chrétien government adopted the Clarity Act, the 2000 federal election indicated that the new rules of the constitutional game had had a profound

effect on the balance of power between federalists and sovereigntists in Quebec. The sovereigntists' inability to cultivate a voter backlash against Ottawa's alleged infringement of the province's democratic rights provided Jean Chrétien and the federal Liberal Party with an important strategic advantage during the election campaign. The results of the election—significant Liberal gains at the expense of both the Bloc Québécois and the Progressive Conservatives—were deeply disappointing to the sovereigntist camp. Lucien Bouchard's resignation as leader of the PQ and premier of Quebec was at least partly attributable to this election outcome.

After exploring the political context of the 2000 federal election, a number of possible explanations can be assessed. Although such short-term factors as the backlash in the Quebec City region against the PQ's policy of forced municipal mergers had an impact on the results, the outcome also reflected a deeper demobilization and demoralization of the sovereigntist forces in Quebec. This demobilization, then, is likely to be exacerbated by a number of long-term demographic and political trends—the aging of the *péquist* generation, for example, and the unavoidable reliance on increased immigration in the future simply to replace the population—making the dream of sovereignty more remote than ever before.

For those who believe in a united Canada, does this represent the best of all possible outcomes for the country? Sadly, recent events have indicated that while the 2000 federal election result might have represented an optimal outcome for the Liberal Party of Canada, it did not provide the ideal solution to the “Quebec problem.” The pathetic spectacle of the Chrétien government's pork-barreling in Quebec, the funneling of millions of dollars in advertising contracts to friends of the Liberal Party under the guise of preserving national unity, suggests that the absence of a credible opposition to the “government party” has fueled a pathological hubris in the current administration. In the prime minister's

own words: "Perhaps there were a few million dollars that might have been stolen in the process, but how many millions of millions of dollars have we saved because we have re-established the stability of Canada by keeping it a united country?"<sup>43</sup> This is about as effective an indictment of the current Liberal government's approach to the Quebec problem as is imaginable. The sovereignty movement may well be on the ropes, but as members of the PQ and the Bloc tirelessly point out, federalism as embodied in the policies of the current Liberal administration is equally bankrupt.

## Notes

### CHAPTER 1

1. Press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. Fox speech at The Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
4. Transcript of the presidential debate on October 4, 2000.
5. Miami, Fla., August 25, 2000.
6. Ibid.
7. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 10, 2000.
8. On January 11, 2001, a disgruntled and sorely disappointed Lucien Bouchard resigned as premier of Quebec, saying he had failed to keep his promise to make Quebec independent.
9. From an address to the National Policy Research Conference in Ottawa on November 30, 2000.

### CHAPTER 2

1. Enrique Krauze, *La Presidencia Imperial: Ascenso y Caída del Sistema Político Mexicano, 1940–1996* (Mexico City: Tusquets Editores, 1997).
2. These figures were taken from “México Social,” edited regularly by the Banco Nacional de México, and the electoral database at the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, CIDAC.
3. A brief review of these three main parties’ histories and programs can be found in Mónica Serrano, ed., *Governing Mexico: Political*

- Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
4. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).
  5. Volker G. Lehr, "Modernización y movilización electoral, 1964–1976: Un estudio ecológico," *Estudios Políticos* 4, no. 1 (1985): 54–61, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
  6. Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
  7. Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, "Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: Construction of Partisan Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 34–48.
  8. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
  9. Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
  10. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).

11. The empirical evidence for this chapter comes from a collection of surveys conducted in Mexico between 1990 and 2002. A list of the surveys includes: 1) The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey*'s second, third, and fourth waves, administered in 1990, 1996/7, and in 2000, respectively, to slightly over 1,500 respondents in each wave. The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey* were conducted in 1990, 1996/7, and 2000 among 1,531, 1,511, and 1535 Mexican adults, respectively. They are part of the ICPSR archives, at the University of Michigan. The fourth-wave survey was conducted in February 2000, sponsored by Grupo Reforma, and conducted by the Departments of Survey Research at newspapers *Reforma*, *El Norte*, *Mural*, and *Palabra*. 2) A national exit poll administered to over 3,000 voters as they left their corresponding polling places in the 2000 elections. I compare these results with those from a national exit poll conducted in the 1997 elections. The 1997 exit poll was sponsored by the Partido Acción Nacional and conducted by *Arcop*, on July 6, 1997, among 3,452 voters. The 2000 exit poll was sponsored by Grupo Reforma and conducted on July 2, 2000, among 3,377 voters by newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. 3) Four national pre-election polls conducted between April and June 2000 and pooled into one single database. The national pre-election polls were conducted in early April, early May, late May, and mid-June, 2000, by the newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. Each survey had slightly over 1,500 respondents (with the exception of the April one, which had slightly over 1,600) from all thirty-two federal entities. For the analysis in this chapter, the four polls were pooled into a single database of 6,289 cases. All the surveys listed here are national representative samples of Mexican adults or voters, and were conducted face-to-face in the respondents' homes or as they left their polling places, in the case of the exit polls.
12. Between one-fourth and one-third of Mexican respondents, depending on the survey, do not place themselves on the left-right

scale. In this analysis, I assigned an average placement to those who did not originally place themselves on the scale. The general averages fell between categories six and seven on a ten-point scale.

13. The original measure is a ten-point self-placement scale.
14. Alejandro Moreno, "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa." *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
15. The shift to the right probably reflects the influence of the PRI's also historic primary to select its presidential candidate. The 2000 survey was conducted in February, four and a half months before the presidential election and with campaigns officially running, but, most importantly, three months after the PRI primary of November, 1999, and after Fox and others had started to advertise widely on television. Very intense negative campaigning and mudslinging characterized the primary contest, but it boosted voter interest in the PRI.
16. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, England, 1998).
17. According to Moreno (1999b), the liberal-fundamentalist dimension is empirically observable in many Latin American countries, and it provides a useful tool to analyze party competition across the region.
18. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
19. Empirically, these dimensions result from a theoretically-guided principal components factor analysis based on the Mexican sam-



- ples of the 1997 and 2000 *World Values Surveys* pooled into one single dataset.
20. Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
  21. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (February 2000): 19–51.
  22. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 1 (1999a): 45–81.
  23. Moreno, 1999a.
  24. The model is based on a multinomial logit regression that uses vote choice as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables that have been of theoretical and empirical relevance in the literature of Mexican voting behavior. The model is then applied to the different types of survey data (exit polls and pre-election polls). The vote for PAN or Fox is taken as a basis for comparison in the results shown in the tables. See for example Domínguez and McCann 1995; Magaloni 1997; Buendía 1997; Magaloni and Moreno, 2003.

25. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
26. The official vote for Congress in 2000 is not broken down by party in the case of the Alliance for Mexico (PRD) and the Alliance for Change (PAN), but opinion polls showed that support for the Green party alone was about 2 to 4 percent.
27. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
28. Alejandro Moreno, "The Effects of Negative Campaigns on Mexican Voters," in *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election*, ed. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson.
29. Alejandro Moreno and Roy Pierce, "The Impact of the PRI Primary of November 1999 on the Mexican Presidential Election of July 2000," unpublished manuscript.
30. Alejandro Moreno, "Mesa 1: Encuestas preelectorales, serie incluyendo últimas encuestas (Estimación de los votantes probables)," in *El papel de las encuestas en las elecciones federales: Memoria del taller Sumiya 2000*. Federal Elections Institute (IFE), Mexican Association of Research Agencies (AMAI), and Colegio Nacional de Actuarios, 2000, and Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, "Cómo llegó: La debacle y el triunfo". *Reforma*, December 1, 2001.

### CHAPTER 3

1. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, *The Perfect Tie* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). See also John C. Green and

- Rick Farmer, *The State of the Parties*, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
2. Larry J. Sabato, *Overtime* (New York: Longman, 2002).
  3. Ibid.
  4. John C. Green et al., "Murphy Brown Revisited: The Social Issues in the 1992 Election," in *Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the Future of American Politics*, ed. Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 43–66.
  5. These data were made available by the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research. All analysis and interpretation are solely the responsibility of the authors.
  6. These data come from a poll by the Gallup Organization, May 18–May 21, 2000 (N=1,011). Data provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
  7. David K. Ryden, "Out of the Shadows, but Still in the Dark? The Courts and Political Parties," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 79–94.
  8. Gerald M. Pomper, "Parliamentary Government in the United States: A New Regime for a New Country," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 267–86.

#### CHAPTER 4

1. The Canadian Election Study is based on a rolling cross-section survey of 3,651 interviews conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University and Jolicoeur & Associés. It follows in the tradition of previous Canadian election studies conducted in 1979, 1984, 1988, 1993, and 1997.
2. Blais et al., *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002), 13.

3. Mordecai Richler, "More Proof That Pundits Can't Be Trusted," *National Post*, December 2, 2000, A18.
4. Conrad Black, "The Most Boring Election in History." *Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 2000, A22.
5. Peter Gzowski, "Where Do They Stand? How Would We Know?" *Globe and Mail*, November 11, 2000, A13.
6. Statistics Canada. <http://www.statcan.ca/>.
7. Ibid.
8. Blais et al., *Anatomy*.
9. Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
10. Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
11. Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder, "Issue Frames and Group Centrism in American Public Opinion," *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 1055–78.
12. Doris Graber, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide* (New York: Longman, 1984).
13. Milton Lodge, Marco Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 309–26.
14. Diana C. Mutz, "Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries," *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 4 (November 1995): 1015–42.
15. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 35.
16. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 73.
17. Barry Cooper, *Sins of Omission: Shaping the News at CBC TV* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 1.
18. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 40.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Hartley and Josephine Mazzuca, "Fewer Canadians

- Favour Legalized Abortion under Any Circumstance,” *The Gallup Poll* (Toronto: Gallup Canada, December 12, 2001).
21. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 145.
  22. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 175.
  23. Lydia Miljan and Barry Cooper, *Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003) 92.
  24. Reginald Bibby, *Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada* (Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1993).
  25. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 71.
  26. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 80 n. 12.

## CHAPTER 5

1. A feat not accomplished since Mackenzie King had won three in a row in 1935, 1940, and 1945.
2. Robert A. Young, *The Struggle for Quebec* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 87.
3. Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
4. The referendum question asked voters whether they agreed “Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership.”
5. Voter turnout was an astonishing—by Canadian standards, at any rate—93.5 percent. See Québec, Directeur-général des élections, <http://www.dgeq.qc.ca/information/>.
6. The amendment of section 93 was not implemented until after the 1997 federal election, which returned the Liberals to power.
7. Formerly a political scientist at the Université de Montréal, Dion was elevated to the cabinet, along with Pierre Pettigrew, in January 1996. Dion, Allan Rock, and Marcel Massé were members of a special cabinet committee charged with elaborating a strat-

- egy for dealing with the Quebec question in early 1996. See Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 102.
8. Ibid.
  9. A third question asked the Court whether international or Canadian law would have precedence in the event of a conflict between them. For more on the Supreme Court reference see Young, *The Struggle for Quebec*, 108–9, and David Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999).
  10. In March 1997 Duceppe replaced Michel Gauthier as leader of the Bloc Québécois. Gauthier had succeeded Lucien Bouchard when the latter resigned in January 1996 to become leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec.
  11. Thus the third question put before the Court, namely whether international or Canadian law would take precedence in the event of a conflict between them, was moot.
  12. Supreme Court of Canada, *Reference Re the Secession of Quebec*, para. 138. The entire judgment is reprinted in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 14–71. The cited passage is on page 64.
  13. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 151, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69.
  14. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 153, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69–70.
  15. Canada, House of Commons, 2d session, 36th Parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999.
  16. *Clarity Act*, s. 1(4)(b).
  17. Bill C-20 does not spell out what exactly constitutes a “clear majority,” stating only that the size of the majority, along with the percentage of eligible voters and other relevant matters, will be taken into account by the House of Commons. *Clarity Act*, s. 2(2).
  18. Canada, House of Commons, 2d Session, 36th Parliament, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, *Evidence*, February 23, 2000. Online at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/CLAR/Meetings/Evidence/clarev08-e.htm>.

19. In a survey conducted between May 1 and May 8, 2000, Ekos Research Associates, Inc., found that Joe Clark had fairly high levels of trust among voters, was better known and had more widely acceptable platform ideas than his Canadian Alliance counterparts (either Preston Manning or Stockwell Day), but that his positioning on the Clarity Bill was unpopular. The sample size was 3,530 and the margin of error +/- 1.6 percent, 19 times out of 20. See "The Political Landscape: Continued Liberal Dominance, Resurgent CA, Conservatives Fading." This and other surveys can be accessed in the Ekos archives available on the Web. <http://www.ekos.ca/media>.
20. Québec, Assemblée nationale, First session, 36th legislature, December 15, 1999.
21. *An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State*, ch. 1, art. 2 and 3 (emphasis added).
22. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "Fin de siècle: Fin de la souveraineté? Quebeckers think the unthinkable," December 14, 1999. The sample consisted of 803 respondents in Quebec and 2204 Canadians outside Quebec. Margins of error were +/- 3.5 percent in Quebec and +/- 2.1 percent in the rest of the country, 19 times out of 20. The study is available online at the Ekos webpage (see note 19 above).
23. Tammy McNamee, "The Clarity Bill: Examining Liberal Party Hegemony in the Transitional Party System" (M.A. major research paper, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), 55. McNamee cites an editorial, "The Centre Stops Being Soft" in *The Economist*, December 18, 1999, which argues along similar lines.
24. Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 91. As a result of the vote, Bouchard walked out of the convention and rumors spread that he was considering resigning as party leader. Bouchard stayed put, of course, and he gradually asserted control over the party apparatus (if not over the most militant advocates of independence, *les purs et*

- durs*): over 90 percent of delegates supported his leadership at the PQ convention in May 2000.
25. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "The Quebec Political Landscape," March 5, 1999. Sample size was 1,006 in Quebec and 1871 in ROC.
  26. Angus Reid Group, "Issues and Attitudes in a 1998 Post-Election Quebec," December 1, 1998. Sample size was 1,000 and the margin of error was +/- 3.1 percent, 19 times out of 20. The survey was accessed online at <http://www.angusreid.com>.
  27. Bloc Québécois, *Le Québec gagne à voter Bloc* (Montreal, 2000; English version). Accessed online at <http://www.blocquebecois.org>. Sovereignty is mentioned only once, at the beginning of the pamphlet, in an excerpt from the BQ's declaration of principles. The thrust of the document concerns the Bloc's role in defending Quebec's interests within the federal system and in holding the federal Liberals accountable, just as an opposition party should do. For an insightful analysis of the 2000 federal election campaign, and the relatively minor role played by the issue of sovereignty, see Stephen Clarkson, "The Liberal Threepeat: The Multi-System Party in the Multi-Party System," in *The Canadian General Election of 2000*, ed. Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2001), 13–57.
  28. Claire Durand, a sociologist at the Université de Montréal, argues that pollsters systematically underestimate Liberal support in Quebec, perhaps (though this is only speculative) because respondents in surveys are reluctant to admit to supporting the federalist party. In 2000, the underestimation of Liberal support, when all polls were averaged together, was approximately 4 percent. See Durand's paper, "Electoral Surveys in the 2000 Canadian Campaign: How Did They Really Fare?" <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/socio/durandc/menurecherche.htm>, n.d.
  29. André Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," in Pammett and Dornan, *Canadian General Election of 2000*, 139–40.



30. The three defectors were André Harvey in Chicoutimi, David Price in Compton-Stanstead, and Diane St.-Jacques in Shefford.
31. In spite of this pronounced decline, Quebec still had the third-highest turnout among the provinces and territories in the 2000 election. Only Prince Edward Island (72.7 percent) and New Brunswick (67.7) registered higher turnout rates. I have calculated Quebec turnout rates from raw data supplied by Elections Canada. There is a very slight difference (one-tenth of one percent) between the figures for Quebec voter turnout reported in the *Official Voting Results* for the 37th General Election and those calculated from the raw data.
32. Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," 141.
33. Édith Brochu and Louis Massicotte, "Élections fédérales de novembre: Coup de loupe sur un scrutin," *Le Devoir*, February 26, 2002, A7.
34. Don Macpherson, "The Evil of Two Lessers: Neither Liberals nor the Bloc Can Hold Heads High as Apathy Ruled in Quebec," *Montreal Gazette*, November 29, 2000.
35. Michaud made his remarks—inter alia, he claimed that Jews feel that they are the only people to have suffered in the history of humanity—in a radio interview in early December and repeated them in testimony before the Estates-General on the Situation and Future of the French Language in Quebec. I have written in greater detail about the Michaud Affair in "Sclerosis or a Clean Bill of Health? Diagnosing Quebec's Party System in the 21st Century," in *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2004).
36. Québec, Premier ministre, "Allocution à l'occasion de la démission du premier ministre du Québec," January 11, 2001. Available at the website of the Association internationale des études québécoises. <http://www.aieq.qc.ca/bouchard.htm>.
37. This remark was actually made before Landry officially became leader of the PQ, in January 2001, at a party caucus meeting.

- Landry's outburst was occasioned by the federal government's offer of an \$18 million subsidy to the province for the renovation of the Aquarium de Québec. One of the strings attached to this money, however, was that the Canadian flag (the "bits of red rag" in question) be allowed to fly and bilingual signs be posted at the renovated site. This offer prompted Landry's crude metaphor.
38. The data on "Referendum Voting Intentions" are available at Léger Marketing's website, <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was generally close to 1,000, and the surveys were conducted approximately 10 or so times each year. The margin of error for a sample this size is +/-3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
  39. Léger Marketing, "Opinions of Quebecers toward Provincial Politics and More Particularly the ADQ," May 2002. <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was 1,001, with a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
  40. Léger Marketing finds that the ADQ and the Quebec Liberals are running neck and neck, with 35 percent of voters saying that they would vote Liberal if a provincial election were to be held and 32 percent supporting the ADQ (the PQ stands at 26 percent). See "Opinions of Quebecers Toward Provincial Politics," May 2002.
  41. See Lisée's book, *Sortie de secours* (Montreal: Boréal, 2000). For commentary on the Lisée proposal, see Gordon Gibson, "Will Separatists Settle for a Half a Loaf?" *National Post*, January 18, 2001. Online at <http://www.vigile.net/01-1/gibson.html>. See also Alexander Panetta, "PQ Strongly Considers Referendum to Ask Ottawa for More Cash: Landry," *Montreal Gazette*, June 4, 2002.
  42. Québec, Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec, *Le français, une langue pour tout le monde* (Québec, 2001), 12 (my translation).
  43. Shawn McCarthy, "Shut Down Campaign, PM Orders Martin," *Globe and Mail*, May 31, 2002, A1.

CHAPTER 6

1. Matthew Stevenson, "Canada's Other Brain Drain: The Continuing Exodus from Quebec," *Political Options/Options Politiques* (October 2000): 63–66, page 64, [www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf](http://www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf).
2. Richard Rodriguez, *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* (New York: Viking, 2002) 94, 103, 105, and 108.
3. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 110.
4. "Carnaval Celebrants Grin and Bare It Despite S.F. Fog," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, B1.
5. Robert E. Chenard, "Historical Perspective on Waterville's 19C Franco-Americans," <http://members.mint.net/frenchcx/frcanwtv/htm>.
6. Roger Roy, "An Analysis of the Assimilation of French-Canadian Language and Culture into American Language and Culture: How French-Canadian Became Franco-American and then Became Invisible" (Graduate research essay for EDU 690 Social Context of Higher Education, University of Maine).
7. Juliana L'Hereux, "North American French as an Academic Subject." [www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm](http://www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm).
8. Ilan Stavans, "Spanglish: Tickling the Tongue," *World Literature Today* 74.3 (Summer 2000): 555.
9. "Tom, Tom and Julia . . . The Names Say It All," *Globe and Mail*, February 6, 2000, R2.
10. Neva Chonin, "Morissette Does Her Own Thing," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 7, 2002, D3.
11. Neva Chonin, "Furtado in Control at Warfield," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 16, 2002, D1.
12. Paula Martinac, *k.d. lang* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1997), 89.
13. Quoted in David Bennahum, ed., *In her own words: k.d. lang* (New York: Omnibus, 1995), 18.

14. Bennahum, *In her own words*, 7.
15. "Celine's New Album," *Globe and Mail*. February 7, 2002, R2.
16. Tim Goodman, "Families, Frisco Formulas for Fall," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, D1.
17. Jonathan Curiel, "Lack of TV Diversity Hit," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 15, 2002, A2.
18. Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
19. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 117.
20. Andrew Mollison, "Researchers Attack Bush's Education Reforms," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 16, 2002, A4.
21. Ibid.
22. Mary Jordan, "Fewer Migrants Caught on Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A14.
23. "INS Unveils New Plan, Devices for Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A9.
24. Quoted in Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
25. "More People Say That They're Just 'Americans,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 8, 2002, A8.
26. Anthony Walton, rev. of *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* by Richard Rodriguez, *New York Times Book Review*, April 7, 2002, 7.
27. Rodriguez, *Brown*, xii.
28. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 164.

## CHAPTER 7

1. Anthony DePalma, *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 354.
2. Seymour M. Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee, 1989).
3. Seymour M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and*

*Persistence in Social Structures* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988).

4. James Laxer, *Discovering America: Travels in the Land of Guns, God, and Corporate Gurus* (New York: New Press, 2001). See also, Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1996).
5. For a fuller description of this analysis, see Stephen Brooks, "A Tale of Two Elections: What the Leaders' Rhetoric from the 2000 Election Tells Us about Can-Am Political Culture Differences" (paper delivered at the Biennial Meeting of the Canadian Studies in the United States, San Antonio, Tex., November 2001). Readers may also contact the author at [brooks3@uwindsor.ca](mailto:brooks3@uwindsor.ca).

## CHAPTER 8

1. Ray C. Fair, <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/>. Randall L. Jones Jr., *Who Will Be in the White House: Predicting Presidential Elections* (New York: Longman, 2002), and James E. Campbell and James C. Garand, eds., *Before the Vote: Forecasting American Election Politics* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2000).
2. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, chapters 8 and 9.
3. Fair, <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/>.
4. Mark J. Kasoff and Christine Drennen, eds., *Canada: A Fractured Political Landscape*, Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 1994.
5. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, 79.
6. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
7. *Globe and Mail*, April 29, 2002.
8. United Press International, September 10, 2001.
9. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
10. Earl H. Fry and Jared Bybee, *NAFTA 2002: A Cost/Benefit Analy-*

- sis for the United States, Canada and Mexico* (Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, Orono, 2002).
11. Nick Schultz, "Canadian Energy Policy and Trade with the United States," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
  12. Michel Tremblay, "Hydro-Québec and TransÉnergie: Continuity in a Changing Environment," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
  13. *Wall Street Journal*, April 24, 2002.
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## CHAPTER 9

1. Jorge Castañeda, "El nuevo activismo internacional mexicano," *Reforma*, September 23, 2001a, Section Enfoque 15–17; "Los ejes de la política exterior," *Nexos* 23 no. 288 (December 2001b) 66–74; and "El factor externo y consolidación de la democracia en México," *Reforma*, February 24, 2002, 10A.
2. For Castañeda's critical view on U.S.-Mexican relations before becoming minister of foreign affairs, see Castañeda, 1996.
3. Robert Pastor has made an effort to articulate a greater post-NAFTA vision for North America. He advocates institutional deepening, among other things, in order to deal with continental problems that hitherto were handled under national or bilateral agendas. However, Pastor's position does not represent the official positions of any NAFTA members. See Robert Pastor, *Toward a North American Community* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

4. For a comprehensive view of migratory problems between Mexico and the U.S. see SRE, 1997.
5. George Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/), 2002a.
6. “Estrategia nacional para la seguridad del territorio nacional. Resumen ejecutivo,” Office of the Press Secretary, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html). 2002; and George Bush, “Securing the Homeland and Strengthening the Nation,” [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/), 2002b.
7. Eduardo Sojo, et al., “Sociedad para la Prosperidad: Reporte a los Presidentes Vicente Fox y George Bush,” Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002, electronic copy.
8. A declaration was released from a top official of that ministry, suggesting that Mexico was considering bringing the case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, but eventually did not.
9. Mr. Castañeda’s most recent address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, condemning any unilateral action against Iraq in the global war against terrorism, suggests that Mexico is heading in that direction. See *Reforma*, September 14, 2002.

## CHAPTER 10

1. Alvaro Artiga, *La Política y los Sistemas de Partidos en Centroamérica*, (San Salvador: 2000).
2. Manuel Orozco, *International Norms and Mobilization of Democracy*, (London: Ashgate, 2002).
3. Graeme Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000).
4. “Aleman llama a Ortega a concertar pacto de gobernabilidad en Nicaragua,” *La Prensa* (Honduras), November 23, 1996, <http://www.laprensahn.com/caarc/9611/c23002.htm>.

5. Both had resigned from their positions; their continuation was not desired by the new members. Moreover, they were not interested in supporting the new establishment.
6. "Desconfianza impera en el ámbito pre-electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana*, July 28, 2000.
7. The extent of corruption in Aleman's government is the subject of another paper. However, suffice it to say that in 1999 the comptroller had identified a number of anomalies and abuses of government resources on behalf of the president. The most public case was the use of resources to build infrastructure at the president's farm, La Chilamapa, the construction of a special road leading to the president's home, and a number of contracts. His wealth was estimated to have increased by millions of dollars. *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000.
8. "A Society Scandalized," *Envio* (June 2000).
9. "The Air is Thick with Electoral Fraud," *Envio* (July 2000).
10. "Indeciso proceso electoral en marcha," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), April 28, 2000.
11. "Entre Partidos te veas: candente ambiente pre electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), August 18, 2000.
12. "Renuncia evidencia lucha por el poder" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), May 26, 2000.
13. "Contraloría va contra Solórzano," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 11, 2000.
14. Consuelo Sandoval and Nidia Ruiz López, "Solórzano sorprende a políticos," *La Prensa* (Managua), March 17, 2001.
15. "No tengo la alternativa ideal," *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000. In late March 2001 Daniel Ortega announced the endorsement of Jarquín and the alliance with the Christian Way.
16. "Presidente Alemán admite desgaste," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 19, 2000.



17. "Renuncian candidatos conservadores," *La Prensa*, July 17, 2001.
18. A poll showed that Ortega had the lead in the election with 31 percent. Shortly after this poll, he endorsed the alliance with the Christian Way. "Encuesta nacional de CINCO: Ningún ganador a la vista," *Confidencial*, 233, March 18–24, 2001.
19. "Milagro Electoral de Enrique Bolaños," interview with Victor Borge (Borge y Asociados) by Adolfo Pastran, August 9, 2001.
20. John Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1998), 174.
21. Edelberto Torres Rivas, *Costa Rica crisis y desafíos* (San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones [DEI], 1987).
22. Eliana Franco and Carlos Sojo, *Gobierno, Empresarios y políticas de ajuste* (San José: FLACSO, 1992).
23. "Pactos, descrédito, inestabilidad" *La Nación* (San José) 1995.
24. "Modelo económico impulsa crecimiento con pobreza," *Inforpress Centroamericana*, December 1, 2000.
25. Araya joined the party very young, was president of the youth movement, legislator, minister, and president of the party.
26. "Complicado panorama para elecciones," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala) June 22, 2001.
27. INCEP, *Reporte Político/Panorama Centroamericano No. 171: Llegaron las internas partidarias para designación de candidatos*, Guatemala, June 2001, 5.
28. *Inforpress*, June 2001.
29. IDESPO, *La población costarricense del gran area metropolitana frente a su participación ciudadana y sus valores políticos*, Heredia: IDESPO, May 23, 2001.
30. Juan Manuel Villasuso, Jenny Díaz, and Laura Chinchilla, *Gobernabilidad democrática y seguridad ciudadana: El Caso de Costa Rica* (Managua: CRIES, 2000).
31. Florisabel Rodríguez (Director of Procesos), interview by author, March 22, 2002.

32. Jorge Rovira Mas, *La democracia de Costa Rica ante el siglo XXI*, San José: FLACSO, 2000.
33. Carlos Sojo (director of FLASCO), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 21, 2000.
34. Cecilia Cortes (Director of Funpadem), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 23, 2002.
35. Rodríguez interview.
36. "Liberales aceptan inscribir a Maduro," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Honduras), March 2, 2001.

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