

CHAPTER 4

Distracted Voters: Media Coverage of the 2000 Canadian Federal Election Campaign

Lydia Miljan

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These small advances, one could argue, illustrate how little campaign or media influences formed and changed public opinion in English Canada in 2000. That is not to say that the campaign or the media did not matter; they simply did not change opinions during the election period. In fact, this chapter will argue that the media mattered in two important ways: first, it reinforced already

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held views on the opposition parties with seemingly secondary issues; and second, its emphasis on another important election diffused interest and coverage on the Canadian contest.

There are many assessments of the 2000 Canadian federal election. Most notably, the Canadian Election Study (CES) provides excellent statistical detail of voter dynamics, and in particular, the Liberal victory.¹ This discussion differs in that it concentrates on how media reports of issues outside the Canadian election also impacted the vote, and how the controversies of the campaign and influenced the official opposition's performance.

MEDIA AND ELECTIONS

The democracy literature argues that elections matter because they provide citizens with a direct say in the direction and tone of government. Media attention to elections makes a difference because the news media are the primary way in which citizens receive political and campaign information. As a consequence, what the news media say about candidates, campaigns, and parties can have a profound impact on the outcome of elections. Or so we are led to believe. But what if there were an election and no one paid attention? In a sense that is exactly what happened in the 2000 Canadian federal election campaign.

By several accounts, the 2000 election was unexciting. The CES addressed this issue when it examined the voter turnout. "A key question here is whether the low turnout simply reflected the fact that it was a 'boring' election or whether the low level turnout was attributable to deeper, structural factors."² Editorial writers discussed this view at some length at the time of the election. "Canadians showed their disgust," wrote Mordecai Richler in the *National Post*, "with a boring and ill-mannered campaign, and the inadequate choices available to them, only 63 percent of them going to the polls, a modern-day low."³ Newspaper baron Conrad

Black lamented the Canadian political scene in the *Wall Street Journal*: “Americans who are concerned by their prolonged electoral controversy can take comfort from the fact we have just had one of the dreariest elections in the history of serious democratic countries. Five unbelievably unexciting political leaders, most of them heading parties that have no real reason to exist, avoided most serious issues and waged a campaign consisting largely of defamation.”⁴ Not only was the campaign considered lackluster, the election itself was deemed unnecessary by many. The election was called three years and four months into the Liberal government’s mandate—a mandate that technically did not have to end for nearly two more years. Peter Gzowski complained in the *Globe and Mail*, “If health care is, as everyone keeps telling us, the defining issue of this unnecessary and frustrating election campaign, you’d think that four hours of debate among the leaders—counting the stilted session in French—would at least leave us clear about what each party is proposing.”⁵

To understand media dynamics and coverage of the three elections held on the North American continent in 2000, we conducted a content analysis of national media news. The study is based on stories appearing in the two national Canadian newspapers, the *Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*. We also examine stories appearing on the flagship national television news programs of the publicly owned Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) as well as the privately owned CTV. Additional detailed analysis of television news is taken and compared with the CES content analysis of television news. These media were selected because they represent not only the major national media that exist in Canada, but also they have wide audience appeal and are tracked by politicians as well as political and business elites.

To be frank, the American campaign of 2000 was similarly denounced as being uninspired—at least until election night, when the whole world became enthralled with the contested outcome.

Neither the Canadian nor American election *campaigns* were as interesting or exciting as the Mexican election held that same year in which the seventy-one-year ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was ousted from office with the election of Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN). Despite this historical event, major national Canadian media paid very little attention to the campaign in Mexico. The *Globe and Mail* supplied only 23 stories, while the *National Post* offered its readers 33 stories on the election. National television news gave it even less attention, with only 7 stories on CBC and 3 on CTV national newscasts for the July contest. In contrast, during the Canadian election campaign alone, the *Globe and Mail* provided 211, the *National Post* 257, CBC 36, and CTV 45 stories on the American choice.

The lack of interest or enthusiasm for an election is not a predictor for the amount of press attention paid to it. Nor, does it seem, is excitement in an election necessarily sufficient for coverage of a campaign. The Canadian election received the normal amount of attention and focus one would expect in a national race. Could, as the authors of the CES suggest, the excitement and interest of the public have an impact on the outcome of the race, or indeed, whether people voted at all? That is certainly the theme of previous election studies and partly explains why so many political scientists study not only the dynamics of the campaign but also pay special attention to the media messages delivered directly by the parties and candidates, as well as those mediated by the news media. Clearly, television has been the most influential element of the media. One of the reasons for this privileged position is its accessibility. No special skills are required to operate television technology. Audience literacy or education is no barrier to entry. As the price of television sets has fallen, income has ceased to prevent people watching. As a consequence, television has permeated most every home in the nation. Nearly 84 percent of the Canadian population had access to cable or satellite services in

2000.⁶ While English-Canadian viewers tend to rely on American programming for entertainment, they prefer Canadian news and public affairs programming. Seventy-three percent of Anglophone news and public affairs viewing time is spent watching Canadian programming.⁷ Over one-half of Canadians used television news as their primary source of information on the election campaign while 23 percent mentioned newspapers as their primary source.⁸

But how exactly does television, or any other medium, influence election outcomes? The answer lies in the “agenda-setting” theory. The argument is that even though the media might not have a direct effect on elections—telling audiences who to vote for—they nevertheless set the public agenda and influence what people talk about by giving primacy to some issues over others. This effect was said to be most pronounced on unsophisticated audiences or undecided voters. Yet, when what people actually learn from news was examined, it was found to have limited impact. The public often fails to recollect basic political facts, to recognize ideological leanings, or to recall candidate characteristics or names. As a result, the media have been blamed for having produced an uninformed citizenry, from which the conclusion was drawn that citizens were minimally influenced by media messages, or perhaps not at all.

Much of the literature on communication effects, especially TV, has been influenced by social psychological research. This research indicates that people use short cuts to form opinions on complex public policy issues. In a 1991 book, Samuel Popkin disputes the assertion that the citizenry is unshackled by arguing that members of the public do reason about candidates, parties, and issues.⁹ While the voter may not recall every policy detail, the seemingly trivial aspects of electoral politics resonate with what he labeled “low-information rationality.” Low-information rationality is a way to describe the public’s intuitions and how they mesh detailed media information as well as political campaign advertis-

ing with their own experiences. Even though television and newspaper coverage of election campaigns may emphasize trivial components of the campaign, Popkin argued, they nevertheless influence the voter's decision.

A couple of Canadian examples from previous federal election campaigns illustrate Popkin's point. During the 1997 campaign, journalists covering his photo ops frequently ridiculed Gilles Duceppe, leader of the Bloc Québécois Party. In one case, a particularly unflattering picture of him wearing a plastic hygiene hat that looked like a shower cap was shown coast to coast when he visited a local cheese factory. The *Toronto Star's* Robert McKenzie, in 1997, used that event to summarize the Bloc Québécois' election performance. The image was so powerful it was used to undermine the credibility of Mr. Duceppe for several years thereafter. In one sense, news clips and pictures showing Gilles Duceppe wearing a plastic cap at a cheese factory may be seen as detracting from the real issues of the campaign. Even so, it is as close to dogma as one ever finds in political campaigns: do not let the candidate be photographed in any kind of funny-looking hat. It happened to Michael Dukakis when he was photographed in a tanker's helmet during the presidential campaign against George H. W. Bush. Similarly, a photograph of Jean Chrétien wearing a UN infantry helmet *backwards* has been shown time and again to convey a powerful and critical image of his government's defense policy. In all these instances, the ridiculous image signalled to the public that the leader was unable to make prudent decisions.

A third and equally memorable example took place during the 2000 federal election when Stockwell Day stood by Niagara Falls and indicated that, like the water in the Niagara River, Canadians were heading south to the U.S. The river in fact flows north. Day's failure to grasp the direction the Niagara River flows was not just a mistake about Canadian geography. It indicated to Ontario voters that he knew little about what it means to live in Ontario,

which carried the implication that he did not care much about the province either. The actual direction that the Niagara River flows was probably a surprise to most Canadians living outside the region, since the general direction of Great Lakes drainage flows from west to east. Indeed, to many Canadians living west of the Ontario border, criticizing Day on such a matter may simply have suggested that the “eastern” media was being unfair to Day, much as Bloquiste voters in Quebec may have detected an anti-separatist (and indeed anti-Quebec) attitude in the ridiculing of Duceppe. For Ontario voters, however, Day’s mistake showed that he was not one of them and that any Alliance appeal to that province would take much more care and preparation. The rationality communicated by Duceppe’s picture and Day’s confusion over geography may have been low-level, but it was still rational, and it mattered a great deal.

THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE 2000 CAMPAIGN

As embarrassing and irritating as this kind of coverage might have been for Alliance supporters, it did not seem to have a profound impact on the ultimate vote for the Alliance Party. Rolling cross-section poll results from the CES illustrate that the “low information” gleaned from these events did not detract from their support. Nevertheless, it did not help it much either, and what is probably more accurate is that it reinforced already held beliefs about the Alliance Party and its leader as being a western protest party. When we examine the election campaign through this lens, we can see how the media coverage, rather than providing defining moments or critical events in which the vote changed, provided coverage that reinforced existing beliefs and patterns. The election campaign showed a remarkable consistency in voter support, but then the media coverage was also quite consistent in its tone and direction.

Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, in *News That Matters*, argue that what they call the “priming” of issues shapes public understanding of what issues are important and how to judge them.¹⁰ The term “priming” is used to describe the way a news item is emphasized at the expense of other issues or events. More recently, Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder found that the “framing” of issues molded public understanding of the causes of problems and of the merits of alternative solutions.¹¹ The term “framing” describes the context in which an issue is placed and the image through which it is diffused. Doris Graber showed that very often TV audiences forget the factual basis for their conclusions about a candidate.¹² “Media facts,” she said, are converted “into politically significant feelings and attitudes,” but the facts themselves are forgotten. Others have argued that campaign events do not matter very much at all and that what counts is the *type* of information the public receives during a campaign,¹³ particularly horse-race coverage—who is ahead, who is falling behind, who is about to make a stretch run—could influence the campaign contributions candidates receive for their electoral bid.¹⁴ All of these considerations also look like low-level rationality.

The assumption underlying most of the research dealing with media effects is that, by focusing attention on one thing rather than another, the media (and especially television) influence *what* audiences think about and also *how* they think about these issues. The assumption is reasonable enough insofar as events do not appear with an attached index number indicating their importance. In short, media selection of some events as being more important than others directs public attention and, one could argue, public resources, away from some problems and toward others. In other words, the importance of the media resides not just in the measurable and direct influence it has on the public but also in the influence politicians and groups believe it has.

Therefore, the way in which the leaders were portrayed may have had an impact on their vote share. What journalists do on a day-to-day basis is put stories in context, or frames. What parties try to do is ensure that the frame used for their candidate or policy benefits them. Often, to do this, they try to place “their” issues at the front of the agenda. According to Blais and his associates, part of the success of the parties is their ability to get the media to focus on the issues that “were on top of their own agendas.”¹⁵ As they note, the strong issue for the Liberals was health care, while it was a weak issue for the Alliance Party. For the Alliance, their strength lay in the issues of public finances. Television coverage focused primarily on health care, and secondarily on fiscal matters. However, the way in which the leaders were portrayed on the issues may have influenced how the public perceived them to stand on the issues.

It has been suggested that the way television spotlighted the religious beliefs of Stockwell Day had a deleterious effect on the party. In particular, the national broadcaster produced a documentary aired on November 15 that emphasized the religious beliefs of Stockwell Day, labeled *Fundamental Day*. This story examined his fundamentalist Christian beliefs and spotlighted his conviction of a literal reading of the Bible. One of the stories recounted in the documentary was a speech Stockwell gave to a group of students, ostensibly on evolution. Among other things, Day said in the speech that there is as much evidence “for creationism as there is for evolution.” This story was then covered in newspapers across the country. When the CES team examined this question specifically, they found that it did not significantly affect the final outcome of the election. Immediately after the *Fundamental Day* report, ratings of Day did go down by “six points and Alliance vote intentions declined by five points.” They note that the effect “seems to have been temporary. Day’s ratings increased by five points in the last days of the campaign and vote in-

tentions rose by two points.”¹⁶ Although his approval ratings did not seem to remain in decline as a result of this story, they did not improve much either.

To expect immediate as well as long-term effects of such a story might be overreaching. A number of other features of television news need to be emphasized to suggest its enhanced importance. The argument has often been made that television matters because it provides visual images as well as words. The issue is, unquestionably, complex, but in the view expressed here it is not so much the images as their accessibility that counts.¹⁷ Audiences may well believe what they see, but they also see what they are told. Thus, when television stories are repeated in newspapers, magazines, and on radio, they become part of a widespread common stock of knowledge that is bound to influence the behavior of citizens. While the *Fundamental Day* story broke on television, it became a much bigger story in the subsequent days in newspaper editorials and open-line talk shows across the country.

Does that mean, as the researchers of the CES suggest, that the focus on religion had no impact on the Alliance vote? Probably not. When we examine the overall approval ratings of all the parties we find that very little happened during the campaign to change voters' views on the parties. What we can say, at least for this election, is that campaign coverage of “low-information rationality” reinforced existing beliefs, and sometimes concerns, about the various leaders and platforms. Let us examine the Alliance campaign in some more detail. According to the rolling cross-section poll of the Canadian Election Study, support for the Alliance was at 27 percent at the start of the campaign; by campaign's end it dropped to 25 percent, exactly what it had been in September, prior to the campaign's beginning. It should be noted that the 25 percent figure was the highest support the Alliance had since its inception up until the election writ was dropped. That is not to say that there was no movement for the Alliance

during the campaign. There was; however, it was quite small and never rose above 31 percent. In fact, the Alliance reached that mark shortly after the campaign began, only to see it evaporate soon after. If anything, the CES shows that support for the Alliance hovered in a fairly narrow band of 6 percentage points ranging between 25 and 31 percent.

In this respect it can be argued that voters had pretty much made up their minds about what they thought of the Alliance and Stockwell Day *before* the election. In many regards, so too had the media. Their role in keeping that support consistent for the Alliance by running certain kinds of stories that kept already held beliefs, and sometimes, fears, reinforced those views.


The other issue that was linked very strongly to religion was that of abortion. The *Fundamental Day* story certainly linked it, as did other news accounts. When we examine television attention to the election in its entirety we see that the issue of abortion was the focus of only 3 percent of television news stories.¹⁸ If, however, we treat the abortion issue as something subtler, as an issue that provides the public with a shortcut to process information, or as a frame for bigger issues, we can see that the issue could have far greater implications. The above statistics represented the amount of attention abortion received as a percentage of total issue mentions. In other words, any given story can mention a variety of issues and as such all those issues will compete for public attention. So a story ostensibly focusing on fiscal issues will have a high number of mentions of fiscal issues, but if in passing the journalist or commentator mentions abortion once, it will not have a high count. As a result, the overall attention to abortion will be considered quite low. But what if issues such as abortion are more salient to voters and simply count more in this “low-information rationality” way? In that instance we would like to know how many stories overall mentioned abortion. When we calculate coverage this way we find that stories that mentioned abortion com-

prised 11 percent of the *Globe and Mail*, 6 percent of the *National Post*, 8 percent of CBC, and 7 percent of CTV election coverage.

Religion and racism—two issues that also made the Alliance controversial—did not warrant as much media attention as abortion. Religion alone comprised 2 percent of the *Globe*, 3 percent of the *Post*, and 5 percent each of CBC and CTV attention. Racism was mentioned in 2 percent of the *Globe*, 4 percent of the *Post*, less than 1 percent of CBC, and 4 percent of CTV stories. However, combined, these three controversial topics were mentioned by 15 percent of the *Globe*, 12 percent of the *Post*, 13 percent of CBC, and 16 percent of CTV stories. Considering that the top stories on television news for the campaign were health care at 22 percent and public finances at 16 percent, we can see that the issues that hurt the Alliance were at a constant ebb in the news coverage. True, not all these stories were mentioned all the time. The racism story really emerged around November 14 and subsided by November 20. The religion issue also emerged around that time and peaked around November 18. But religion was a story that never went away. The story was mentioned throughout the campaign. The abortion story had even more consistency and when we track the story over time we find that between the four major media outlets in the country, the abortion issue was mentioned every day of the campaign except November 12.

In contrast, the ethics issue, where the Liberals were vulnerable, comprised 12 percent of televisions' total attention to the election.¹⁹ This coverage, however, was the dominant theme in those stories and did not fester throughout the campaign. So while it comprised 12 percent of overall television attention, only 3 percent of CBC and 4 percent of CTV stories on the election mentioned the issue. As for the newspapers, only 2 percent of the *Globe's* and 4 percent of the *Post's* stories on the Canadian election campaign addressed the Liberal scandals and controversies. As can be seen in figure 4.1, the volume of stories mentioning re-

Figure 4.1. Mentions of Issues That Were Harmful to the Alliance and Liberal Parties



ligion, abortion, and racism—issues on which the Alliance was vulnerable—greatly exceeded the number of stories that mentioned the Grand-mère and HRDC scandals—issues that could harm the Liberals.

Abortion and religion provided a potent recipe for keeping the Alliance's low information messages always highlighted. In fact, the two were explicitly linked in seven *Globe and Mail*, five *National Post*, and four stories each in the national television news broadcasts. This combination then had a double impact. Stories that never mentioned abortion, but cued audiences about religious beliefs, could have had the frame of abortion in the background. The same held for religious stories. So even when abortion was not the main issue, it could have easily reinforced opinions on the issue as background low information that provided powerful reminders to judge the Alliance and Day.

The abortion story coupled with Stockwell Day's beliefs tied into the Alliance platform's pledge to put direct democracy in ac-

tion. Critics charged that, according to the party, if 300,000 Canadians signed a petition calling for a direct vote on abortion, or any other issue, the Alliance would put the question to a vote. To illustrate how easy it would be to get 300,000 people to sign such a petition, the comedy satire program *This Hour Has 22 Minutes* asked Canadians to sign an Internet petition requiring Stockwell Day to change his name to Doris Day. The stunt ridiculed the Alliance leader, at the same time confirming Day's opponents' worst fears that it would be exceptionally easy to reach the 300,000 level on the abortion issue. Considering that the majority of Canadians support the right to have an abortion, this issue did not help the Alliance. According to the CES, 75 percent of Canadians think it should be "easy" or "very easy" to obtain an abortion. Other surveys worded somewhat differently put abortion proponents at the 84 percent level.²⁰ The CES authors note that abortion was an issue that could potentially have hurt the Alliance. They found that while "views on abortion did not have an independent effect on vote choice," pro-choice voters were less likely to vote Alliance. In English-speaking Canada, "only 26 percent of those who said it should be easy to get an abortion opted for the Alliance, compared with 45 percent of pro-life respondents."²¹

Again, according to the CES, abortion in and of itself does not explain the vote, but social conservatism does. Social conservatism is partly tied to religious beliefs. Those who are socially conservative tend to be less concerned about mixing religion and politics. The real story in this election was not how the Alliance failed to make progress into the Canadian heartland, or indeed, how the Liberals managed a third consecutive majority, but how the media used religion as a subtle way to reinforce Canadians' fears about Stockwell Day. The point about this issue is really how cleverly the media used "low-information rationality" to keep voters convinced of the danger of the Alliance Party. The CES argues, in contrast, that blaming the media might be misleading.²²

The study's authors theorize that if the story had an impact, we would have seen Day's approval ratings decline over time. Since this did not happen, they conclude that we cannot blame the media. This assumption is false if we consider the pre-existing attitudes of the public and the role of low-information rationality. If, as we suggest, people already had set views about Stockwell Day and religion, media attention to it does not necessarily have to result in increased negativity. All that the media had to do was keep the issue in people's minds. The assumption that increased media attention to an issue results in a greater number of people feeling strongly toward the leader is not necessarily the case. What is important here is that opinions do not necessarily have to change. It is not as though journalists said that religion is bad. Stockwell Day was not attacked specifically for his religion, but circuitously through questions posed about whether he could ignore his religious convictions when governing.

Interestingly, no other leader's personal beliefs were framed in the same manner. No one made mention of Jean Chrétien's or Conservative leader Joe Clark's Catholicism. These two leaders were exempt from this type of scrutiny because they had secularized their political beliefs. A clue to the media's distrust of Day had more to do with their own religious creeds than that of the political leader. A 1996 survey of Canadian journalists found that 42 percent indicated that they belonged to a religious denomination. This was substantially fewer than the general population's religious membership of 61 percent. Similarly 32 percent of the journalists said they definitely believed in God, compared with 66 percent of the general population. Of the Catholic journalists, 62 percent did not attend mass on a regular basis.²³ This too was higher than Catholics in the general population, where 49 percent of Catholics in English-speaking Canada attended church two or more times a month, compared to 38 percent of the Catholic journalists.²⁴

Given the fact that abortion and religion comprised such a relatively small proportion of the overall attention to the election, there is no reason to suspect that it would be a constant element in the campaign. This story really illustrates the role journalists play in keeping issues alive, and if not at the forefront of the news, at the back of people's minds. While the story itself does not appear to have affected the vote directly, its indirect effect at keeping the ratings of Day and the Alliance constant is clear.

Religion and abortion made the 2000 election campaign unique by Canadian standards. Canadians are used to talking about fiscal issues during elections, or even social programs and leadership. Moral and religious issues simply have not been as prominent in Canadian electoral politics as they have been in the United States.

THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN ELECTION

The 2000 campaign also differed from previous elections in that there was no defining moment in which the media would frame subsequent election stories. For example, in 1993, Kim Campbell's infamous statement that an election was not the appropriate time to debate complex public policy issues such as health care set the frame for other statements made by Campbell and made her stories part of the "gaffe watch."


Ever since the Nixon/Kennedy debate, when Richard Nixon quipped that he lost the election because of his makeup man, journalists have looked to the debate to provide the defining moment. In Canadian history, the quintessential defining moment came in the 1984 debate when Brian Mulroney challenged then Prime Minister John Turner's acceptance of his predecessor's patronage appointments. In fact, these defining moments, or "knockout punches," are rare in election debates. The debate itself has become routine for politicians in that they prepare days in advance

with coaches and advisors trying to ensure that they are not “scored” against. Nonetheless, the media as well as academics still place importance on the event and the analysis of campaign dynamics.

In the 2000 election, the leader judged as having the best performance was Joe Clark, the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party. While initial television reports declared no winner, several pundits, as well as the CES survey respondents, gave their nod to the Conservative leader. Forty-four percent of those interviewed after the English debate who had seen it thought that Clark had performed the best; 17 percent chose Day, 10 percent Chrétien, and 19 percent could not name a winner.²⁵ Joe Clark sustained a post-debate bounce of four percentage points, six percentage points among those who watched the English debate. The party’s support also rose from 6 to 8 percent. The surge in support for Clark and the Conservatives lasted only a few days and did not sustain him through election night. Interestingly, only 36 percent of Canadians watched the English-language leaders’ debate.²⁶

One reason for the relatively small bounce and its short duration could lie in the fact that interest in the Canadian election waned at the time of the debates. No doubt this argument sounds farfetched. After all, the media were focused on the debates and primed audiences to tune into the debate and their analyses. CTV’s anchor Lloyd Robertson urged Canadians to tune into their coverage throughout the week, culminating in his closing remarks on November 8: “And tomorrow night, here on CTV, the English-language debate, during which we’ll be conducting an instant poll with your responses to the leaders’ performances.” How could attention and interest wane with such promotion? The answer lies in the fact that a far more compelling story was evolving that sidelined the debate. That story was, of course, the American election night results. As fate would have it, the French-language debates were held on November 8, 2000, the day after the U.S. election.

Figure 4.2. Canadian National Media Attention to Canada/U.S. Elections over the Length of the Canadian Election Campaign



By the time of the English-language debate the next day, the entire world was captivated by the race for the White House. When we examine the debate week, we find there were more stories on the American election than the Canadian one in the *Globe and Mail* and on CTV News. The *National Post* provided twelve more stories on the Canadian election compared with the American, while the CBC gave the Canadian election three more stories than the U.S. election. When Canadian national media stories are tracked over time, U.S. election stories eclipsed Canadian stories.

Given these circumstances, it would be surprising for the leaders' debate to have a lasting impact. Coupled with the immediate explosion of stories and interest in the U.S. presidential results was the fact that the American election uncertainty continued well after the results of the Canadian election were known. Even outside of the week of the American election itself, the Canadian national media were quite diligent reporting on the U.S. campaign throughout October and November 2000. Hardly a day

went by without at least one or two stories in the Canadian national media reporting on the U.S. race. This contrasts starkly with the Mexican campaign, held earlier in the year, to which the Canadian media gave only passing mention.

The Canadian media gave the U.S. election not only significant attention but prominent placement as well. During the Canadian election campaign period, stories about the U.S. election comprised 30 percent of the *Globe* and 30 percent of the *Post's* front-page election stories. On television, the U.S. election led off 18 percent of CBC and 21 percent of CTV news broadcasts during the Canadian election campaign.

At the height of the coverage, which coincided with the French-language debate, the U.S. election was featured even more prominently. On November 8, the top four stories of the CBC's *National* were devoted to the U.S. electoral ambiguity. Only after the first commercial break did the national broadcaster report on the French-language leaders' debates. The next day, the night of the English-language debate, CBC did lead with four stories on the event, but only after its host, Peter Mansbridge, promised coverage of the U.S. affair. "Good evening," began Mansbridge. "There's political drama on both sides of the border tonight as the elections in Canada and the United States continue to dominate the news. The U.S. presidential contest is still missing a winner. We'll bring you up to date on that story a little later. But first, of course, the campaign here and tonight's English-language debate."

CONCLUSION

Canadian elections do have significant events and these do influence voters. In some respects, the 2000 election was not significantly different from previous contests. Where this election differed was in the measurement of the effects. We often assume that for the media to have an impact, we need to measure change

in opinion. What this election showed is that the media can be equally as powerful in reinforcing and maintaining existing ideas about the parties and their leaders. In 2000, the media focused on Stockwell Day and suggested questions about religion and politics; they focused less on the scandals and controversies surrounding the Liberal government's running of the HRDC.

This subtext tells only part of the story in the Canadian election in 2000. Apart from focusing on low-information cues, the media, like the public, were distracted from the Canadian election at a critical point in the campaign. While so often we expect leaders' debates to be pivotal points in the campaign, this simply did not materialize in 2000. Part of the problem lay in the fact that a far more interesting electoral event occurred in the United States. In many respects, the outcome of the U.S. election made for a more compelling story. Canadian attention to the American election campaign might have captivated Canadian interest to the extent that the 2000 Canadian campaign really did not matter, and that Canadians voted according to how they felt about the parties prior to the election.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. Press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. Fox speech at The Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
4. Transcript of the presidential debate on October 4, 2000.
5. Miami, Fla., August 25, 2000.
6. Ibid.
7. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 10, 2000.
8. On January 11, 2001, a disgruntled and sorely disappointed Lucien Bouchard resigned as premier of Quebec, saying he had failed to keep his promise to make Quebec independent.
9. From an address to the National Policy Research Conference in Ottawa on November 30, 2000.

CHAPTER 2

1. Enrique Krauze, *La Presidencia Imperial: Ascenso y Caída del Sistema Político Mexicano, 1940–1996* (Mexico City: Tusquets Editores, 1997).
2. These figures were taken from “México Social,” edited regularly by the Banco Nacional de México, and the electoral database at the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, CIDAC.
3. A brief review of these three main parties’ histories and programs can be found in Mónica Serrano, ed., *Governing Mexico: Political*

- Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
4. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).
 5. Volker G. Lehr, "Modernización y movilización electoral, 1964–1976: Un estudio ecológico," *Estudios Políticos* 4, no. 1 (1985): 54–61, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
 6. Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
 7. Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, "Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: Construction of Partisan Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 34–48.
 8. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
 9. Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
 10. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).

11. The empirical evidence for this chapter comes from a collection of surveys conducted in Mexico between 1990 and 2002. A list of the surveys includes: 1) The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey*'s second, third, and fourth waves, administered in 1990, 1996/7, and in 2000, respectively, to slightly over 1,500 respondents in each wave. The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey* were conducted in 1990, 1996/7, and 2000 among 1,531, 1,511, and 1535 Mexican adults, respectively. They are part of the ICPSR archives, at the University of Michigan. The fourth-wave survey was conducted in February 2000, sponsored by Grupo Reforma, and conducted by the Departments of Survey Research at newspapers *Reforma*, *El Norte*, *Mural*, and *Palabra*. 2) A national exit poll administered to over 3,000 voters as they left their corresponding polling places in the 2000 elections. I compare these results with those from a national exit poll conducted in the 1997 elections. The 1997 exit poll was sponsored by the Partido Acción Nacional and conducted by *Arcop*, on July 6, 1997, among 3,452 voters. The 2000 exit poll was sponsored by Grupo Reforma and conducted on July 2, 2000, among 3,377 voters by newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. 3) Four national pre-election polls conducted between April and June 2000 and pooled into one single database. The national pre-election polls were conducted in early April, early May, late May, and mid-June, 2000, by the newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. Each survey had slightly over 1,500 respondents (with the exception of the April one, which had slightly over 1,600) from all thirty-two federal entities. For the analysis in this chapter, the four polls were pooled into a single database of 6,289 cases. All the surveys listed here are national representative samples of Mexican adults or voters, and were conducted face-to-face in the respondents' homes or as they left their polling places, in the case of the exit polls.
12. Between one-fourth and one-third of Mexican respondents, depending on the survey, do not place themselves on the left-right

scale. In this analysis, I assigned an average placement to those who did not originally place themselves on the scale. The general averages fell between categories six and seven on a ten-point scale.

13. The original measure is a ten-point self-placement scale.
14. Alejandro Moreno, "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa." *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
15. The shift to the right probably reflects the influence of the PRI's also historic primary to select its presidential candidate. The 2000 survey was conducted in February, four and a half months before the presidential election and with campaigns officially running, but, most importantly, three months after the PRI primary of November, 1999, and after Fox and others had started to advertise widely on television. Very intense negative campaigning and mudslinging characterized the primary contest, but it boosted voter interest in the PRI.
16. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, England, 1998).
17. According to Moreno (1999b), the liberal-fundamentalist dimension is empirically observable in many Latin American countries, and it provides a useful tool to analyze party competition across the region.
18. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
19. Empirically, these dimensions result from a theoretically-guided principal components factor analysis based on the Mexican sam-

- ples of the 1997 and 2000 *World Values Surveys* pooled into one single dataset.
20. Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
 21. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (February 2000): 19–51.
 22. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 1 (1999a): 45–81.
 23. Moreno, 1999a.
 24. The model is based on a multinomial logit regression that uses vote choice as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables that have been of theoretical and empirical relevance in the literature of Mexican voting behavior. The model is then applied to the different types of survey data (exit polls and pre-election polls). The vote for PAN or Fox is taken as a basis for comparison in the results shown in the tables. See for example Domínguez and McCann 1995; Magaloni 1997; Buendía 1997; Magaloni and Moreno, 2003.

25. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
26. The official vote for Congress in 2000 is not broken down by party in the case of the Alliance for Mexico (PRD) and the Alliance for Change (PAN), but opinion polls showed that support for the Green party alone was about 2 to 4 percent.
27. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
28. Alejandro Moreno, "The Effects of Negative Campaigns on Mexican Voters," in *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election*, ed. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson.
29. Alejandro Moreno and Roy Pierce, "The Impact of the PRI Primary of November 1999 on the Mexican Presidential Election of July 2000," unpublished manuscript.
30. Alejandro Moreno, "Mesa 1: Encuestas preelectorales, serie incluyendo últimas encuestas (Estimación de los votantes probables)," in *El papel de las encuestas en las elecciones federales: Memoria del taller Sumiya 2000*. Federal Elections Institute (IFE), Mexican Association of Research Agencies (AMAI), and Colegio Nacional de Actuarios, 2000, and Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, "Cómo llegó: La debacle y el triunfo". *Reforma*, December 1, 2001.

CHAPTER 3

1. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, *The Perfect Tie* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). See also John C. Green and

- Rick Farmer, *The State of the Parties*, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
2. Larry J. Sabato, *Overtime* (New York: Longman, 2002).
 3. Ibid.
 4. John C. Green et al., "Murphy Brown Revisited: The Social Issues in the 1992 Election," in *Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the Future of American Politics*, ed. Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 43–66.
 5. These data were made available by the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research. All analysis and interpretation are solely the responsibility of the authors.
 6. These data come from a poll by the Gallup Organization, May 18–May 21, 2000 (N=1,011). Data provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
 7. David K. Ryden, "Out of the Shadows, but Still in the Dark? The Courts and Political Parties," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 79–94.
 8. Gerald M. Pomper, "Parliamentary Government in the United States: A New Regime for a New Country," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 267–86.

CHAPTER 4

1. The Canadian Election Study is based on a rolling cross-section survey of 3,651 interviews conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University and Jolicoeur & Associés. It follows in the tradition of previous Canadian election studies conducted in 1979, 1984, 1988, 1993, and 1997.
2. Blais et al., *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002), 13.

3. Mordecai Richler, "More Proof That Pundits Can't Be Trusted," *National Post*, December 2, 2000, A18.
4. Conrad Black, "The Most Boring Election in History." *Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 2000, A22.
5. Peter Gzowski, "Where Do They Stand? How Would We Know?" *Globe and Mail*, November 11, 2000, A13.
6. Statistics Canada. <http://www.statcan.ca/>.
7. Ibid.
8. Blais et al., *Anatomy*.
9. Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
10. Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
11. Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder, "Issue Frames and Group Centrism in American Public Opinion," *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 1055–78.
12. Doris Graber, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide* (New York: Longman, 1984).
13. Milton Lodge, Marco Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 309–26.
14. Diana C. Mutz, "Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries," *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 4 (November 1995): 1015–42.
15. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 35.
16. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 73.
17. Barry Cooper, *Sins of Omission: Shaping the News at CBC TV* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 1.
18. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 40.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Hartley and Josephine Mazzuca, "Fewer Canadians

- Favour Legalized Abortion under Any Circumstance,” *The Gallup Poll* (Toronto: Gallup Canada, December 12, 2001).
21. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 145.
 22. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 175.
 23. Lydia Miljan and Barry Cooper, *Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003) 92.
 24. Reginald Bibby, *Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada* (Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1993).
 25. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 71.
 26. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 80 n. 12.

CHAPTER 5

1. A feat not accomplished since Mackenzie King had won three in a row in 1935, 1940, and 1945.
2. Robert A. Young, *The Struggle for Quebec* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 87.
3. Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
4. The referendum question asked voters whether they agreed “Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership.”
5. Voter turnout was an astonishing—by Canadian standards, at any rate—93.5 percent. See Québec, Directeur-général des élections, <http://www.dgeq.qc.ca/information/>.
6. The amendment of section 93 was not implemented until after the 1997 federal election, which returned the Liberals to power.
7. Formerly a political scientist at the Université de Montréal, Dion was elevated to the cabinet, along with Pierre Pettigrew, in January 1996. Dion, Allan Rock, and Marcel Massé were members of a special cabinet committee charged with elaborating a strat-

- egy for dealing with the Quebec question in early 1996. See Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 102.
8. Ibid.
 9. A third question asked the Court whether international or Canadian law would have precedence in the event of a conflict between them. For more on the Supreme Court reference see Young, *The Struggle for Quebec*, 108–9, and David Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999).
 10. In March 1997 Duceppe replaced Michel Gauthier as leader of the Bloc Québécois. Gauthier had succeeded Lucien Bouchard when the latter resigned in January 1996 to become leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec.
 11. Thus the third question put before the Court, namely whether international or Canadian law would take precedence in the event of a conflict between them, was moot.
 12. Supreme Court of Canada, *Reference Re the Secession of Quebec*, para. 138. The entire judgment is reprinted in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 14–71. The cited passage is on page 64.
 13. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 151, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69.
 14. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 153, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69–70.
 15. Canada, House of Commons, 2d session, 36th Parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999.
 16. *Clarity Act*, s. 1(4)(b).
 17. Bill C-20 does not spell out what exactly constitutes a “clear majority,” stating only that the size of the majority, along with the percentage of eligible voters and other relevant matters, will be taken into account by the House of Commons. *Clarity Act*, s. 2(2).
 18. Canada, House of Commons, 2d Session, 36th Parliament, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, *Evidence*, February 23, 2000. Online at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/CLAR/Meetings/Evidence/clarev08-e.htm>.

19. In a survey conducted between May 1 and May 8, 2000, Ekos Research Associates, Inc., found that Joe Clark had fairly high levels of trust among voters, was better known and had more widely acceptable platform ideas than his Canadian Alliance counterparts (either Preston Manning or Stockwell Day), but that his positioning on the Clarity Bill was unpopular. The sample size was 3,530 and the margin of error +/- 1.6 percent, 19 times out of 20. See "The Political Landscape: Continued Liberal Dominance, Resurgent CA, Conservatives Fading." This and other surveys can be accessed in the Ekos archives available on the Web. <http://www.ekos.ca/media>.
20. Québec, Assemblée nationale, First session, 36th legislature, December 15, 1999.
21. *An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State*, ch. 1, art. 2 and 3 (emphasis added).
22. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "Fin de siècle: Fin de la souveraineté? Quebeckers think the unthinkable," December 14, 1999. The sample consisted of 803 respondents in Quebec and 2204 Canadians outside Quebec. Margins of error were +/- 3.5 percent in Quebec and +/- 2.1 percent in the rest of the country, 19 times out of 20. The study is available online at the Ekos webpage (see note 19 above).
23. Tammy McNamee, "The Clarity Bill: Examining Liberal Party Hegemony in the Transitional Party System" (M.A. major research paper, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), 55. McNamee cites an editorial, "The Centre Stops Being Soft" in *The Economist*, December 18, 1999, which argues along similar lines.
24. Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 91. As a result of the vote, Bouchard walked out of the convention and rumors spread that he was considering resigning as party leader. Bouchard stayed put, of course, and he gradually asserted control over the party apparatus (if not over the most militant advocates of independence, *les purs et*

- durs*): over 90 percent of delegates supported his leadership at the PQ convention in May 2000.
25. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "The Quebec Political Landscape," March 5, 1999. Sample size was 1,006 in Quebec and 1871 in ROC.
 26. Angus Reid Group, "Issues and Attitudes in a 1998 Post-Election Quebec," December 1, 1998. Sample size was 1,000 and the margin of error was +/- 3.1 percent, 19 times out of 20. The survey was accessed online at <http://www.angusreid.com>.
 27. Bloc Québécois, *Le Québec gagne à voter Bloc* (Montreal, 2000; English version). Accessed online at <http://www.blocquebecois.org>. Sovereignty is mentioned only once, at the beginning of the pamphlet, in an excerpt from the BQ's declaration of principles. The thrust of the document concerns the Bloc's role in defending Quebec's interests within the federal system and in holding the federal Liberals accountable, just as an opposition party should do. For an insightful analysis of the 2000 federal election campaign, and the relatively minor role played by the issue of sovereignty, see Stephen Clarkson, "The Liberal Threepeat: The Multi-System Party in the Multi-Party System," in *The Canadian General Election of 2000*, ed. Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2001), 13–57.
 28. Claire Durand, a sociologist at the Université de Montréal, argues that pollsters systematically underestimate Liberal support in Quebec, perhaps (though this is only speculative) because respondents in surveys are reluctant to admit to supporting the federalist party. In 2000, the underestimation of Liberal support, when all polls were averaged together, was approximately 4 percent. See Durand's paper, "Electoral Surveys in the 2000 Canadian Campaign: How Did They Really Fare?" <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/socio/durandc/menurecherche.htm>, n.d.
 29. André Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," in Pammett and Dornan, *Canadian General Election of 2000*, 139–40.

30. The three defectors were André Harvey in Chicoutimi, David Price in Compton-Stanstead, and Diane St.-Jacques in Shefford.
31. In spite of this pronounced decline, Quebec still had the third-highest turnout among the provinces and territories in the 2000 election. Only Prince Edward Island (72.7 percent) and New Brunswick (67.7) registered higher turnout rates. I have calculated Quebec turnout rates from raw data supplied by Elections Canada. There is a very slight difference (one-tenth of one percent) between the figures for Quebec voter turnout reported in the *Official Voting Results* for the 37th General Election and those calculated from the raw data.
32. Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," 141.
33. Édith Brochu and Louis Massicotte, "Élections fédérales de novembre: Coup de loupe sur un scrutin," *Le Devoir*, February 26, 2002, A7.
34. Don Macpherson, "The Evil of Two Lessers: Neither Liberals nor the Bloc Can Hold Heads High as Apathy Ruled in Quebec," *Montreal Gazette*, November 29, 2000.
35. Michaud made his remarks—inter alia, he claimed that Jews feel that they are the only people to have suffered in the history of humanity—in a radio interview in early December and repeated them in testimony before the Estates-General on the Situation and Future of the French Language in Quebec. I have written in greater detail about the Michaud Affair in "Sclerosis or a Clean Bill of Health? Diagnosing Quebec's Party System in the 21st Century," in *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2004).
36. Québec, Premier ministre, "Allocution à l'occasion de la démission du premier ministre du Québec," January 11, 2001. Available at the website of the Association internationale des études québécoises. <http://www.aieq.qc.ca/bouchard.htm>.
37. This remark was actually made before Landry officially became leader of the PQ, in January 2001, at a party caucus meeting.

- Landry's outburst was occasioned by the federal government's offer of an \$18 million subsidy to the province for the renovation of the Aquarium de Québec. One of the strings attached to this money, however, was that the Canadian flag (the "bits of red rag" in question) be allowed to fly and bilingual signs be posted at the renovated site. This offer prompted Landry's crude metaphor.
38. The data on "Referendum Voting Intentions" are available at Léger Marketing's website, <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was generally close to 1,000, and the surveys were conducted approximately 10 or so times each year. The margin of error for a sample this size is +/-3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
 39. Léger Marketing, "Opinions of Quebecers toward Provincial Politics and More Particularly the ADQ," May 2002. <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was 1,001, with a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
 40. Léger Marketing finds that the ADQ and the Quebec Liberals are running neck and neck, with 35 percent of voters saying that they would vote Liberal if a provincial election were to be held and 32 percent supporting the ADQ (the PQ stands at 26 percent). See "Opinions of Quebecers Toward Provincial Politics," May 2002.
 41. See Lisée's book, *Sortie de secours* (Montreal: Boréal, 2000). For commentary on the Lisée proposal, see Gordon Gibson, "Will Separatists Settle for a Half a Loaf?" *National Post*, January 18, 2001. Online at <http://www.vigile.net/01-1/gibson.html>. See also Alexander Panetta, "PQ Strongly Considers Referendum to Ask Ottawa for More Cash: Landry," *Montreal Gazette*, June 4, 2002.
 42. Québec, Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec, *Le français, une langue pour tout le monde* (Québec, 2001), 12 (my translation).
 43. Shawn McCarthy, "Shut Down Campaign, PM Orders Martin," *Globe and Mail*, May 31, 2002, A1.

CHAPTER 6

1. Matthew Stevenson, "Canada's Other Brain Drain: The Continuing Exodus from Quebec," *Political Options/Options Politiques* (October 2000): 63–66, page 64, www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf.
2. Richard Rodriguez, *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* (New York: Viking, 2002) 94, 103, 105, and 108.
3. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 110.
4. "Carnaval Celebrants Grin and Bare It Despite S.F. Fog," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, B1.
5. Robert E. Chenard, "Historical Perspective on Waterville's 19C Franco-Americans," <http://members.mint.net/frenchcx/frcanwtv/htm>.
6. Roger Roy, "An Analysis of the Assimilation of French-Canadian Language and Culture into American Language and Culture: How French-Canadian Became Franco-American and then Became Invisible" (Graduate research essay for EDU 690 Social Context of Higher Education, University of Maine).
7. Juliana L'Hereux, "North American French as an Academic Subject." www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm.
8. Ilan Stavans, "Spanglish: Tickling the Tongue," *World Literature Today* 74.3 (Summer 2000): 555.
9. "Tom, Tom and Julia . . . The Names Say It All," *Globe and Mail*, February 6, 2000, R2.
10. Neva Chonin, "Morissette Does Her Own Thing," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 7, 2002, D3.
11. Neva Chonin, "Furtado in Control at Warfield," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 16, 2002, D1.
12. Paula Martinac, *k.d. lang* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1997), 89.
13. Quoted in David Bennahum, ed., *In her own words: k.d. lang* (New York: Omnibus, 1995), 18.

14. Bennahum, *In her own words*, 7.
15. "Celine's New Album," *Globe and Mail*. February 7, 2002, R2.
16. Tim Goodman, "Families, Frisco Formulas for Fall," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, D1.
17. Jonathan Curiel, "Lack of TV Diversity Hit," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 15, 2002, A2.
18. Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
19. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 117.
20. Andrew Mollison, "Researchers Attack Bush's Education Reforms," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 16, 2002, A4.
21. Ibid.
22. Mary Jordan, "Fewer Migrants Caught on Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A14.
23. "INS Unveils New Plan, Devices for Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A9.
24. Quoted in Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
25. "More People Say That They're Just 'Americans,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 8, 2002, A8.
26. Anthony Walton, rev. of *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* by Richard Rodriguez, *New York Times Book Review*, April 7, 2002, 7.
27. Rodriguez, *Brown*, xii.
28. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 164.

CHAPTER 7

1. Anthony DePalma, *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 354.
2. Seymour M. Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee, 1989).
3. Seymour M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and*

- Persistence in Social Structures* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988).
4. James Laxer, *Discovering America: Travels in the Land of Guns, God, and Corporate Gurus* (New York: New Press, 2001). See also, Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1996).
 5. For a fuller description of this analysis, see Stephen Brooks, "A Tale of Two Elections: What the Leaders' Rhetoric from the 2000 Election Tells Us about Can-Am Political Culture Differences" (paper delivered at the Biennial Meeting of the Canadian Studies in the United States, San Antonio, Tex., November 2001). Readers may also contact the author at brooks3@uwindsor.ca.

CHAPTER 8

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3. Fair, <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/>.
4. Mark J. Kasoff and Christine Drennen, eds., *Canada: A Fractured Political Landscape*, Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 1994.
5. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, 79.
6. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
7. *Globe and Mail*, April 29, 2002.
8. United Press International, September 10, 2001.
9. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
10. Earl H. Fry and Jared Bybee, *NAFTA 2002: A Cost/Benefit Analy-*

- sis for the United States, Canada and Mexico* (Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, Orono, 2002).
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 12. Michel Tremblay, "Hydro-Québec and TransÉnergie: Continuity in a Changing Environment," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
 13. *Wall Street Journal*, April 24, 2002.
 14. *AuCanada*, "Bruising Battle over Tomatoes," Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 2002.
 15. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
 16. *Globe and Mail*, May 22, 2002.
 17. *Globe and Mail*, April 25, 2002; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, *Economic Trends*, May 2002.
 18. *Globe and Mail*, March 6, 2002.

CHAPTER 9

1. Jorge Castañeda, "El nuevo activismo internacional mexicano," *Reforma*, September 23, 2001a, Section Enfoque 15–17; "Los ejes de la política exterior," *Nexos* 23 no. 288 (December 2001b) 66–74; and "El factor externo y consolidación de la democracia en México," *Reforma*, February 24, 2002, 10A.
2. For Castañeda's critical view on U.S.-Mexican relations before becoming minister of foreign affairs, see Castañeda, 1996.
3. Robert Pastor has made an effort to articulate a greater post-NAFTA vision for North America. He advocates institutional deepening, among other things, in order to deal with continental problems that hitherto were handled under national or bilateral agendas. However, Pastor's position does not represent the official positions of any NAFTA members. See Robert Pastor, *Toward a North American Community* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

4. For a comprehensive view of migratory problems between Mexico and the U.S. see SRE, 1997.
5. George Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/, 2002a.
6. “Estrategia nacional para la seguridad del territorio nacional. Resumen ejecutivo,” Office of the Press Secretary, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html. 2002; and George Bush, “Securing the Homeland and Strengthening the Nation,” www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/, 2002b.
7. Eduardo Sojo, et al., “Sociedad para la Prosperidad: Reporte a los Presidentes Vicente Fox y George Bush,” Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002, electronic copy.
8. A declaration was released from a top official of that ministry, suggesting that Mexico was considering bringing the case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, but eventually did not.
9. Mr. Castañeda’s most recent address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, condemning any unilateral action against Iraq in the global war against terrorism, suggests that Mexico is heading in that direction. See *Reforma*, September 14, 2002.

CHAPTER 10

1. Alvaro Artiga, *La Política y los Sistemas de Partidos en Centroamérica*, (San Salvador: 2000).
2. Manuel Orozco, *International Norms and Mobilization of Democracy*, (London: Ashgate, 2002).
3. Graeme Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000).
4. “Alemán llama a Ortega a concertar pacto de gobernabilidad en Nicaragua,” *La Prensa* (Honduras), November 23, 1996, <http://www.laprensahn.com/caarc/9611/c23002.htm>.

5. Both had resigned from their positions; their continuation was not desired by the new members. Moreover, they were not interested in supporting the new establishment.
6. "Desconfianza impera en el ámbito pre-electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana*, July 28, 2000.
7. The extent of corruption in Aleman's government is the subject of another paper. However, suffice it to say that in 1999 the comptroller had identified a number of anomalies and abuses of government resources on behalf of the president. The most public case was the use of resources to build infrastructure at the president's farm, La Chilamapa, the construction of a special road leading to the president's home, and a number of contracts. His wealth was estimated to have increased by millions of dollars. *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000.
8. "A Society Scandalized," *Envio* (June 2000).
9. "The Air is Thick with Electoral Fraud," *Envio* (July 2000).
10. "Indeciso proceso electoral en marcha," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), April 28, 2000.
11. "Entre Partidos te veas: candente ambiente pre electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), August 18, 2000.
12. "Renuncia evidencia lucha por el poder" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), May 26, 2000.
13. "Contraloría va contra Solórzano," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 11, 2000.
14. Consuelo Sandoval and Nidia Ruiz López, "Solórzano sorprende a políticos," *La Prensa* (Managua), March 17, 2001.
15. "No tengo la alternativa ideal," *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000. In late March 2001 Daniel Ortega announced the endorsement of Jarquín and the alliance with the Christian Way.
16. "Presidente Alemán admite desgaste," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 19, 2000.

17. "Renuncian candidatos conservadores," *La Prensa*, July 17, 2001.
18. A poll showed that Ortega had the lead in the election with 31 percent. Shortly after this poll, he endorsed the alliance with the Christian Way. "Encuesta nacional de CINCO: Ningún ganador a la vista," *Confidencial*, 233, March 18–24, 2001.
19. "Milagro Electoral de Enrique Bolaños," interview with Victor Borge (Borge y Asociados) by Adolfo Pastran, August 9, 2001.
20. John Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1998), 174.
21. Edelberto Torres Rivas, *Costa Rica crisis y desafíos* (San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones [DEI], 1987).
22. Eliana Franco and Carlos Sojo, *Gobierno, Empresarios y políticas de ajuste* (San José: FLACSO, 1992).
23. "Pactos, descrédito, inestabilidad" *La Nación* (San José) 1995.
24. "Modelo económico impulsa crecimiento con pobreza," *Inforpress Centroamericana*, December 1, 2000.
25. Araya joined the party very young, was president of the youth movement, legislator, minister, and president of the party.
26. "Complicado panorama para elecciones," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala) June 22, 2001.
27. INCEP, *Reporte Político/Panorama Centroamericano No. 171: Llegaron las internas partidarias para designación de candidatos*, Guatemala, June 2001, 5.
28. *Inforpress*, June 2001.
29. IDESPO, *La población costarricense del gran area metropolitana frente a su participación ciudadana y sus valores políticos*, Heredia: IDESPO, May 23, 2001.
30. Juan Manuel Villasuso, Jenny Díaz, and Laura Chinchilla, *Gobernabilidad democrática y seguridad ciudadana: El Caso de Costa Rica* (Managua: CRIES, 2000).
31. Florisabel Rodríguez (Director of Procesos), interview by author, March 22, 2002.

32. Jorge Rovira Mas, *La democracia de Costa Rica ante el siglo XXI*, San José: FLACSO, 2000.
33. Carlos Sojo (director of FLASCO), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 21, 2000.
34. Cecilia Cortes (Director of Funpadem), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 23, 2002.
35. Rodríguez interview.
36. "Liberales aceptan inscribir a Maduro," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Honduras), March 2, 2001.

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