

## CHAPTER 3

# A Contest of Surprises: The 2000 Election in the United States

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THE 2000 ELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES can be fairly described as a “contest of surprises,” in two senses of the phrase. First, the closeness of the vote (and disputes over counting the ballots) might have been surprising in any event, but they were stunning in light of pre-election expectations. For instance, it was widely believed that the strong economy would allow Vice President Al Gore to extend the Democratic Party’s hold on the White House. Furthermore, it was also believed that both moral and foreign policy issues would work to the advantage of the Democrats, giving the Republicans little leverage against President Clinton’s popular record. Behind these expectations was a series of assumptions about the political and demographic factors at work in the electorate.

Because few of these pre-election expectations were borne out, many observers believed that the election would undermine citizens’ faith in the government. This fear points to the second sense in which the election was a “contest of surprises”: it is a

contest as to which of the unanticipated results was *most* surprising. While we will leave it to the readers to make their own judgments, we conclude that the results were not so surprising as to endanger the legitimacy of the American regime. Indeed, the following catalogue of surprises suggests that the 2000 results are well accounted for by three things: a high degree of partisan unity among voters; the offsetting impact of economic, moral, and foreign policy issues; and the great demographic diversity of the American electorate.

### THE FIRST SURPRISE: A VERY CLOSE VOTE

The 2000 election has been fittingly described as the “perfect tie” and it is worth reviewing just how close the election was.<sup>1</sup> In formal terms, George W. Bush became the forty-third president because he obtained 271 votes in the Electoral College, one more than required by the U.S. Constitution; Al Gore received 267, for a difference of four electoral votes. Bush’s total included the electoral votes from Florida, where he had a 537-vote margin out of 5.8 million ballots cast. The U.S. Supreme Court allowed this thin margin to stand when it decided *Bush v. Gore* by a five to four vote.

Bush did not win a popular vote plurality, obtaining just 47.9 percent of the total vote, while Gore obtained 48.4 percent, for a margin of about 500,000 of 105 million cast. Gore’s small plurality was a two-fold surprise. Pre-election predictions assumed a much larger margin for Gore, and in the last days of the campaign, most observers concluded that Gore might well lose the popular vote, but win the Electoral College.<sup>2</sup> The small level of support for minor parties was sufficient to deny anyone a majority, including Ralph Nader’s 2.9 percent for the Green Party and the one percent of all other minor parties combined (principally Pat Buchanan of

the Reform Party, Harry Browne of the Libertarians, and John Hagelin of the Natural Law Party).

All told, Bush's 47.9 percent exceeded his father's losing 37.7 percent of the popular vote in 1992—but did not match his father's winning of 53.8 percent in 1988. Gore's 48.4 percent was slightly lower than the Clinton-Gore 49.2 percent in 1996, but higher than the Clinton-Gore winning margin of 43.3 percent in 1992 and the Dukakis losing vote of 46.2 percent in 1988. It is worth noting that the minor party vote of about four percent was small compared to recent elections, especially Ross Perot's 1992 (19 percent) and 1996 (8 percent) performances. Voter turnout in 2000 was low, with just 51.2 percent of the eligible voters casting a ballot. This figure was slightly higher than in 1996 (48.9 percent) and 1988 (50.3 percent), but far lower than the 55.2 percent in 1992, when Perot first appeared on the ballot.

The close 2000 vote extended to other contests as well. The Republicans held on to control of the House of Representatives by just five seats out of 435. Meanwhile, the Democrats gained five seats in the Senate, producing an unprecedented 50-50 tie. Vice President Dick Cheney's tie-breaking vote allowed the Republicans to organize the body—until Jim Jeffords of Vermont became an independent in 2001, giving control to the Democrats. Similarly slim margins were recorded in numerous state and local elections.

One reason for the close vote is that the major parties nominated well-known, centrist candidates, who united their respective partisans and competed effectively for independents. Table 3.1 reports the degree to which each party's voters were united, based on the Voter News Service Exit Poll. (For purposes of reference, the percentage of the reported vote is listed across the top of the table; it differs slightly from the official vote tallies reported above.)

TABLE 3.1.

## The 2000 Presidential Vote and Political Factors

	<i>Gore</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Nader</i>	<i>Other</i>	<b>ALL</b>
<b>ALL</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.1 =100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Party Identification</b>					
<i>Democrat</i>	86	11	2	1 =100%	<b>39</b>
<i>Independent, other</i>	45	47	6	2	<b>26</b>
<i>Republican</i>	8	91	1	*	<b>35</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>1996 Presidential Vote</b>					
<i>Clinton</i>	82	15	2	1 =100%	<b>44</b>
<i>Dole</i>	13	85	1	1	<b>35</b>
<i>Perot, others</i>	27	60	10	4	<b>9</b>
<i>New 2000 voter</i>	44	52	3	1	<b>12</b>
					<b>100%</b>
% rounded to nearest whole number * less than 1 percent Source: 2000 VNS National Exit Poll (N=13,259)					

As the first entry in table 3.1 shows, Gore received some 86 percent of self-identified Democratic voters, which make up 39 percent of the electorate. Bush received 91 percent of the 35 percent of the electorate that self-identified as Republicans. Although few partisans defected to either side, Bush fared slightly better in this regard. Also, Bush won a slim plurality of the 26 percent of the electorate who claimed to be independents or identified with a minor party. Nader did especially well with the latter and drew twice as many votes from self-identified Democrats as Republicans. Nader might well have cost Gore several key states, including Florida and New Hampshire. But other minor party candidates, such as Pat Buchanan, might have cost Bush states as well, such as New Mexico, Iowa, and Wisconsin.

Thus, Bush was able to pull nearly even with Gore in the popular vote by uniting Republicans, attracting independents, and minimizing minor party defections. Evidence of this success can be seen in the relationship of the reported 1996 vote and the 2000 choice (the second entry on table 3.1). Gore obtained 82 percent of those who said they voted for Clinton (and Gore) in 1996. Likewise, Bush obtained 85 percent of the reported Dole voters. However, Bush also received three-fifths of the 1996 minor party voters, mostly Perot's backers, while Gore got just a little more than one-quarter. Bush also received a majority of the new presidential voters (those who claimed not to have cast a ballot in 1996).

By itself, this high degree of party unity should not have been all that surprising, but many analysts failed to anticipate it, assuming that the issue mix would allow Gore to win strong support beyond core Democratic constituencies.

### THE BIG SURPRISE: ECONOMIC ISSUES

Many observers believed that Al Gore would win the 2000 election handily because of the strong economy. Certainly, there were potent examples from past campaigns, including the first President Bush's come-from-behind victory in the 1988 election. Academics contributed to this expectation with a series of well-publicized press reports of mathematical models that predicted a significant Gore win.<sup>3</sup> Although Gore did indeed win the two-party vote, the strong economy did not generate the kind of widespread support for the incumbent party most observers anticipated.

Table 3.2 looks at economic matters and the 2000 presidential vote. The first entry is a powerful predictor of election outcomes: overall, is the country on the "right track" or the "wrong track"? In line with the strong economy, two-thirds of the electorate chose the "right track" option, and Gore won three-fifths of these voters. In contrast, Bush won almost three-quarters of the one-

third of the electorate that chose the “wrong track” option. Here is one place where the minor party candidates may have hurt Bush in the close contest, siphoning off some economic discontent.

TABLE 3.2.

## The 2000 Presidential Vote and Economic Issues

	<i>Gore</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Nader</i>	<i>Other</i>	<b>ALL</b>
<b>ALL</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.1 =100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Overall, the country is:</b>					
<i>On the right track</i>	61	36	2	1 =100%	<b>67</b>
<i>On the wrong track</i>	20	74	4	2	<b>33</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Economic conditions:</b>					
<i>Excellent</i>	70	26	2	1 = 100%	<b>20</b>
<i>Good</i>	45	52	3	1	<b>66</b>
<i>Not so good/poor</i>	33	62	3	2	<b>14</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>The government should:</b>					
<i>Do more</i>	74	23	3	1 =100%	<b>45</b>
<i>Do less</i>	25	71	2	2	<b>55</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Issue priorities:</b>					
<i>Health care</i>	64	33	3	*	<b>8</b>
<i>Economy, jobs</i>	60	39	1	1	<b>18</b>
<i>Medicare</i>	60	39	1	*	<b>7</b>
<i>Social Security</i>	58	40	1	1	<b>14</b>
<i>Education</i>	52	44	3	1	<b>15</b>
<i>Other issues</i>	43	51	4	2	<b>13</b>
<i>World affairs</i>	40	54	4	2	<b>13</b>
<i>Taxes</i>	17	80	2	1	<b>14</b>
					<b>100%</b>

% rounded to nearest whole number

\* less than 1 percent

Source: 2000 VNS National Exit Poll (N=13,259)

Historically, “right track” responses are closely connected to the performance of the economy. The next entry in table 3.2 addressed the state of the economy directly. One-fifth of the electorate rated the economy as “excellent,” and it strongly backed Gore. In contrast, the one-sixth of the electorate who thought the economy was poor or very poor strongly backed Bush. However, the two-thirds of voters who regarded the economy as “good” voted for Bush and not Gore. Taken together, these figures suggest two conclusions: the strong economy helped Gore, but the anticipated level of voter support did not materialize.

Economic concerns extend beyond the performance of the economy to government policies designed to enhance economic well-being. The next entry in table 3.2 summarizes this matter by asking if the government should “do more” or “do less” in domestic policy. The results present a stark pattern: almost three-quarters of those who wanted the government to “do more” supported Gore and nearly as many of those who wanted the government to “do less” backed Bush. Note, however, that a majority of the electorate preferred the latter. Thus, on the question of government activism, Bush edged out Gore.

The final entry in table 3.2 lists issues that voters reported as salient when they cast their ballots. This list must be viewed with some caution because the options were preselected, and thus may not capture the voters’ most pressing concerns. Indeed, the “other issues” entry reflects individuals who did not pick one of the options offered, presumably because other matters had higher priority.

Gore did quite well among voters who were concerned with traditional social welfare policies, receiving nearly two-thirds of those who stressed health care, and about three-fifths of those who focused on the economy (and jobs) and programs for the elderly (Medicare and Social Security). However, one-third and two-fifths of these citizens voted for Bush. An even better example of

Bush's success in this regard was education, a traditional Democratic issue where Gore received only a slim majority. Although Bush won a slight majority of the "other" responses, and a majority of voters concerned with world affairs (a point we will return to presently), the only issue he won decisively was taxes, receiving eight of ten ballots from the one-sixth of the electorate who chose this priority. On balance, then, Gore benefited from economic and social welfare issues, but Bush did well enough on these issues and other matters to break even at the polls.

### THE CONTINUING SURPRISE: MORAL ISSUES

Many analysts also expected that moral issues would not play a significant role in the 2000 campaign. For one thing, the Monica Lewinsky scandal did not lead to the removal of President Clinton from office, to the great dismay of social conservatives. And some of the chief advocates of moral conservatism, such as the Christian Coalition, were in disarray. However, pundits regularly underestimate the impact of moral questions on politics and 2000 was no exception.<sup>4</sup> Although the impact of moral issues on elections should surprise no one, it continues to upset the conventional wisdom.

Table 3.3 looks at moral issues and the 2000 presidential vote. The first entry is parallel to the first entry in table 3.2: in moral terms, is the country on the "right" or "wrong" track? Almost the opposite pattern appears, with only two-fifths believing that the country was on the "right track" morally and three-fifths claiming it was on the "wrong track." Almost two-thirds of the former backed Gore, and Bush won the latter by nearly two-to-one.

The scandals surrounding President Clinton were one reason for this dim view of the nation's morals, and the next entry reports the importance of scandal to the vote. Overall, a majority of the



TABLE 3.3.

## The 2000 Presidential Vote and Moral Issues

	Gore	Bush	Nader	Other	ALL
<b>ALL</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.1 =100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>In terms of morals, the country is:</b>					
<i>On the right track</i>	69	27	2	1 =100%	40
<i>On the wrong track</i>	33	62	3	2	60
					100%
<b>Clinton scandal:</b>					
<i>Not at all important</i>	75	19	4	2	37
<i>Not too important</i>	59	37	2	2	17
<i>Somewhat important</i>	28	70	2	*	20
<i>Very important</i>	18	80	1	1	24
					100%
<b>Abortion should be:</b>					
<i>Always legal</i>	70	25	4	1	24
<i>Mostly legal</i>	58	38	3	1	35
<i>Mostly illegal</i>	29	69	1	1	28
<i>Always illegal</i>	23	74	1	3	13
					100%
<b>Candidate qualities:</b>					
<i>Experience</i>	82	17	1	*	15
<i>Handle complexity</i>	75	19	4	1	13
<i>Cares</i>	63	31	5	2	12
<i>Other qualities</i>	49	46	2	3	7
<i>Good judgment</i>	48	50	1	1	13
<i>Likeable</i>	38	59	2	1	2
<i>Strong leader</i>	35	64	1	*	14
<i>Honest</i>	15	80	4	2	24
					100%

% rounded to nearest whole number

\* less than 1 percent

Source: 2000 VNS National Exit Poll (N=13,259)

electorate claimed that scandal was “not at all” or “not too” important to their vote; Gore won three-quarters of the former group and almost three-fifths of the latter. However, the large minority of voters who claimed that the scandal was “somewhat” or “very important” voted decisively for Bush (70 and 80 percent, respectively). Clearly, the perception of moral problems helped Bush and hurt Gore. But it is worth noting that these perceptions were not strong enough to give Bush a majority of the popular vote. Instead, they just evened the score.

The next entry in table 3.3 reports attitudes on abortion, the quintessential moral controversy in recent times. Gore won large majorities of voters who believe abortion should be “always legal” (70 percent) and “mostly legal” (58 percent), while Bush had even larger majorities among those who wanted abortion to be “mostly illegal” (69 percent) and “always illegal” (74 percent). The patterns here are remarkably similar to the results on the Clinton scandals, except that pro-choice voters were a larger majority than voters who tolerated the scandals. It is likely, then, that moral issues benefited both major party candidates with key constituencies, but on balance favored Gore. When put together with the question on government activism in table 3.2, these data cast a new light on the 2000 election: the voters were on balance opposed to government action in the economic and moral spheres.

The final entry in table 3.3 reports voters’ priorities with regard to a list of candidate qualities, factors often associated with moral character. As in table 3.2, this list was preselected, producing an “other qualities” category of respondents who did not choose one of the options. Gore did quite well among voters who were concerned with candidate “experience” and ability to “handle complexity,” and a candidate that “cares.” All told, 40 percent of the electorate focused on these qualities.

Interestingly, another 40 percent chose qualities on which Bush did very well: being “likeable,” a “strong leader,” and “honest.”

The issue of honesty was especially important during the campaign, where exaggerations by the Gore campaign caused voters to question Gore's integrity—and perhaps connect him to President Clinton's failings. Of course, Bush suffered an “integrity” problem as well, when his past DUI conviction was disclosed just days before the election.

The major party candidates essentially broke even on the remaining qualities, with Bush edging Gore on “good judgment” and the reverse happening on the combination of “other” qualities. In sum, moral and character questions divided the electorate, undermining Gore's appeal but denying Bush a victory.

### THE HIDDEN SURPRISE: FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign affairs played only a modest role in the 2000 campaign. As we saw in table 3.2, just 13 percent of the electorate gave “world affairs” priority in their vote. This pattern fit the pre-election expectations reasonably well, but it is surprising given the events that followed the campaign, including the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This lack of attention to foreign policy reflects the fact that America was at peace and that the Clinton foreign policy was regarded as successful. Indeed, the principal debate of the campaign was whether George W. Bush had the necessary ability and experience to manage foreign affairs. However, despite the lack of attention, there were some important differences between the major candidates.

Table 3.4 reports attitudes on foreign policy and the 2000 vote, using data from the 2000 National Election Study.<sup>5</sup> The first entry concerns trade restrictions. Although a majority of the electorate opposed trade restrictions “to protect jobs,” the issue divided both major political parties. For instance, Gore received 51 percent support from voters who supported trade limits, while Bush pre-

TABLE 3.4.

## The 2000 Presidential Vote and Foreign Policy Issues

	Gore	Bush	Nader	Other	ALL
<b>ALL</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.1 =100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Foreign Trade:</b>					
<i>Support import limits</i>	51	46	2	1 =100%	<b>46</b>
<i>Oppose import limits</i>	47	48	4	1	<b>54</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Immigration:</b>					
<i>Increase</i>	58	33	8	1 =100%	<b>8</b>
<i>Keep the same</i>	53	43	3	1	<b>44</b>
<i>Decrease</i>	44	52	3	2	<b>48</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Defense spending:</b>					
<i>Decrease</i>	65	25	6	4 =100%	<b>16</b>
<i>About the same</i>	62	34	3	1	<b>24</b>
<i>Increase</i>	33	65	2	*	<b>60</b>
					<b>100%</b>

% rounded to nearest whole number

\* less than 1 percent

Source: 2000 National Election Study (N=1,807)

vailed by the slimmest of margins among voters who oppose such limitations. Other evidence reveals that attitudes on NAFTA resembled these overall results closely: in one pre-election poll, 47 percent of the public favored NAFTA and 39 percent opposed (with the remainder undecided).<sup>6</sup>

A similar pattern occurred on the question of immigration restrictions. Overall, a slim plurality of voters favored laws that would decrease immigration, but nearly as many wanted immigration policy to be unchanged. Bush received a slight majority among the former and Gore nearly an identical majority among

the latter. (Gore won the small group who favored increased immigration by a substantial majority.)

The final entry is defense spending. Here a majority of the electorate favored increased defense spending. Bush won these voters—and Gore did well among those who favored the status quo and those who wanted a decrease in defense outlays. On balance, then, foreign policy probably helped Bush to tie Gore at the polls.

Each of these policies had implications for the “reluctant trinity” of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Both Gore and Bush would have continued the policy of continental free trade embodied in NAFTA, but Bush had incentives to be sympathetic to immigration restrictions and a larger military role, policy directions reinforced by post-election events. However, relations with Canada and Mexico received only slight attention in the campaign, mostly in the form of Bush’s greater interest in Mexico, symbolized by his personal relationship with Vicente Fox.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting the attitudes of the American public toward their continental neighbors circa the 2000 election, as reported in table 3.5. First, Americans had a positive view of Canada and Mexico, and second, the quality of the relationship with each country was different. Just before the 2000 election 63 percent of Americans regarded Canada as a “close ally” and another 23 percent as a “friend.” In contrast, 28 percent of Americans saw Mexico as a “close ally” and 40 percent as a “friend.” In neither case did many Americans have a negative view of the neighboring countries. These differences may reflect the long-standing military alliance between the United States and Canada, as well as the cultural similarities between the English-speaking majorities in both countries.

A separate set of questions adds some details to this picture. When asked about the relative “overall” importance of the two neighbors, almost one-half chose Canada, and a little over one-third Mexico. This result was consistent with the previous ques-

TABLE 3.5.

## Attitudes toward Canada and Mexico circa the 2000 Election

**Views of neighbors:**

	Canada	Mexico
Close ally	63	28
Friend, not close ally	23	40
Not friend, not enemy	5	16
Unfriendly and enemy	2	4
Don't know/Refused	7	12
	100%	100%

Source: Harris Interactive, August 10–August 14, 2000 (N=1,010)

**Which neighbor is more important to the United States:**

	Overall	To American:		
		Politics	Economics	Culture
Canada	45	34	27	26
Not sure, the same	20	16	9	9
Mexico	35	50	64	65
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: *Time*, Cable News Network, Harris Interactive, May 23–May 24, 2001 (N=1,031)

tion. However, when the query focused on key aspects of the relationship, the pattern reversed itself. For example, one-half of Americans regarded Mexico as more important to American politics, compared to the one-third who named Canada. And the pattern becomes even more lopsided in economics and culture, where Mexico was chosen as more important by almost two-thirds and Canada by a bit more than one-fourth. These results may well reflect the growing prominence of the Hispanic population in the United States. Such evidence may well presage the creation of a

“special relationship” between the U.S. and Mexico on a par—or perhaps greater—than the special relationship between the U.S. and Canada.

### **BEHIND THE SURPRISES: DEMOGRAPHY AND THE 2000 VOTE**

What lies behind the mixed and offsetting impact of the issues on the vote? One way to answer this question is to look at the voting behavior of key demographic groups, including those defined by socioeconomic status, and social and cultural characteristics. Some well-known patterns were evident, but the great demographic diversity the American electorate produced tended to offset them.

#### *Socioeconomic Status*

Table 3.6 looks at the presidential vote and three common measures of socioeconomic status: income, education, and self-identified social class. Since the days of the New Deal, socioeconomic status has been one of the pillars of the American party system. The Democrats have traditionally drawn strong support from lower status voters (the “have nots, have little, and have problems”) and the Republicans have been strongly supported by upper status individuals (the “haves, have hope, and have help”). The 2000 election shows evidence of this pattern, but also some departures.

The first entry in table 3.6 is for 2000 household income. Voters who reported income of less than \$30,000 voted 55 percent for Gore, while those who earned more than \$50,000 voted 53 percent for Bush. Voters in the middle-range (\$30,000 to \$50,000) gave Bush a slight edge—and also supported the minor party candidates. So, the income gap between the highest and lowest categories in table 3.6 was about twelve percentage points. This gap

TABLE 3.6.

## The 2000 Presidential Vote and Socioeconomic Status

	<i>Gore</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Nader</i>	<i>Other</i>	<b>ALL</b>
<b>ALL</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.1 =100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Income</b>					
<i>Under \$30,000</i>	55	40	4	1 =100%	<b>23</b>
<i>\$30,000 to \$50,000</i>	45	47	6	2	<b>49</b>
<i>Over \$50,000</i>	44	53	2	1	<b>28</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Education</b>					
<i>High school or less</i>	50	47	1	1 =100%	<b>26</b>
<i>Some college, grad</i>	45	51	3	1	<b>56</b>
<i>Post-graduate</i>	52	44	3	1	<b>18</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Social Class</b>					
<i>Working class</i>	52	45	3	1 = 100%	<b>21</b>
<i>Middle class</i>	47	51	2	1	<b>75</b>
<i>Upper class</i>	56	39	3	1	<b>4</b>
					<b>100%</b>

% rounded to nearest whole number

Source: 2000 VNS National Exit Poll (N=13,259)

certainly fits with conventional wisdom, but it is worth noting another bit of conventional wisdom as well: due to differences in turnout, lower income groups were under-represented in the electorate compared to the population as a whole, and the higher income groups were over-represented.

A different pattern appears for education, the second entry in table 3.6. Voters with a high school diploma or less gave Gore a very slight advantage, with Bush doing nearly as well. In fact, Gore did much better among voters with post-graduate education, beating Bush 52 to 44 percent. Bush won the “some college and college graduate” category by a similar margin. These results are



the product of a long-term trend: although high levels of education are associated with high income, many well-educated people vote Democratic rather than Republican.

A similar pattern can be seen in self-identified social class, the third entry in table 3.6. Of course, Americans overwhelmingly think of themselves as “middle class” regardless of their income, education, or occupation—as evidenced by the three-quarters of the electorate that claimed some kind of middle-class status in 2000. Bush won this large group by just four percentage points. However, Gore won decisively the small portion of the electorate who considered themselves “upper class,” and also prevailed among the “working class” voters. So there was no significant “education” or “class” gap in the 2000 presidential vote.

These findings may help explain why economic issues did not help Gore as much as anticipated: the weakness of the socioeconomic underpinning of the vote opened the door for other factors.

### *Social Characteristics*

Table 3.7 looks at three key social characteristics: gender, family status (marital status and the presence of at least one child at home), and age. The first entry in the table shows the much-discussed “gender gap”: a majority of women voted for Gore and a majority of men for Bush. The size of the gender gap was about twelve percentage points, about the same as the income gap. Note, however, that the gender gap was almost symmetrical. Because women were more numerous in the electorate, Gore had a very slight advantage, but one almost offset by the fact that Bush did slightly better among women than Gore did among men.

Family status had a larger impact on the vote in 2000 than gender (second entry in table 3.7). Gore received some three-fifths of the vote of unmarried voters with children, a group especially concerned with government assistance. However, this group was almost four

TABLE 3.7.

## The 2000 Presidential Vote and Social Characteristics

	<i>Gore</i>	<i>Bush</i>	<i>Nader</i>	<i>Other</i>	<b>ALL</b>
<b>ALL</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.1 =100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Gender</b>					
<i>Female</i>	54	43	2	1 =100%	<b>52</b>
<i>Male</i>	42	54	3	1	<b>48</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Family Status</b>					
Unmarried, child	61	36	3	1 = 100%	<b>8</b>
Unmarried, no child	56	39	4	1	<b>27</b>
Married, no child	46	51	2	1	<b>34</b>
Married, child	41	56	2	1	<b>31</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Age</b>					
Under 30 years	48	46	5	2 = 100%	<b>17</b>
30 to 50 years	47	49	2	1	<b>45</b>
Over 50 years	50	48	2	1	<b>38</b>
					<b>100%</b>

% rounded to nearest whole number

Source: 2000 VNS National Exit Poll (N=13,259)

times smaller than the opposite category, married voters with children (8 to 31 percent of the electorate, respectively), and the latter group voted strongly for Bush, by a margin of fifteen percentage points. Gore also did quite well among unmarried voters with no children, winning by seventeen percentage points, but lost to Bush by six points among the larger group of married people without children. Overall, the “family status gap” was twenty percentage points, nearly twice the size of the gender and income gaps.

The final entry in table 3.7 is age. Age often has an impact on politics, in large part because it represents the generational differences. But these effects were very muted in 2000: Gore edged out

Bush among voters under thirty and over fifty by the same slim margin, while Bush did slightly better with middle-aged voters. Older voters did not strongly support Gore, despite their special interest in Social Security and childhood connection to the New Deal. Indeed, among voters over 65, Gore's lead was just four percentage points. Similarly, the youngest voters did not strongly back Gore either, despite their special concern with education and other government programs. But here, the 5 percent of younger voters who backed Nader probably prevented a Gore majority. In any event, there was no "generation gap" in 2000.

These findings also help explain the surprising impact of economic issues on the vote: social factors that have tended to help the Democrats in past elections were offset by other factors that favored the Republicans.

### *Cultural Characteristics*

Table 3.8 looks at three key cultural characteristics and the 2000 vote: place of residence, race, and religion. Many cultural differences are captured in the places where voters reside, with the cosmopolitan cultures of large cities contrasting with the middle-class values of suburbs and the traditional ethos of smaller cities and rural areas. As the first entry in table 3.8 reveals, these distinctions mattered in 2000: the large cities gave Gore three-fifths of their votes, while small cities and rural areas voted nearly as strongly for Bush. Interestingly, these two groups were about of equal size in the electorate (a little over one-quarter). The larger group of suburban voters gave Bush a very slight margin over Gore. Thus, Gore was competitive in the traditionally Republican suburbs.

Race is one of the most powerful factors in American politics, and the 2000 election was no exception (second entry in table 3.8). African Americans cast 90 percent of their ballots for Gore, a larger margin than usually occurs among this bedrock Demo-

TABLE 3.8.

## The 2000 Presidential Vote and Cultural Characteristics

	Gore	Bush	Nader	Other	ALL
<b>ALL</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.1 =100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Place of Residence</b>					
<i>Large City</i>	61	35	3	1 =100%	<b>29</b>
<i>Suburbs</i>	47	49	3	1	<b>43</b>
<i>Small City, Rural</i>	38	59	2	1	<b>28</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Race</b>					
<i>Black</i>	90	9	1	1 = 100%	<b>10</b>
<i>Hispanic</i>	62	35	2	1	<b>7</b>
<i>Other Non-White</i>	55	40	3	2	<b>3</b>
<i>White</i>	42	54	3	1	<b>81</b>
					<b>100%</b>
<b>Religion</b>					
<i>Black Protestants</i>	92	7	1	1 = 100%	<b>8</b>
<i>Jews</i>	78	20	1	1	<b>4</b>
<i>Minority Catholics</i>	67	30	2	2	<b>5</b>
<i>Secular</i>	61	32	6	2	<b>11</b>
<i>Other Non-Christians</i>	54	34	8	4	<b>4</b>
<i>Hispanic Protestants</i>	52	44	3	1	<b>1</b>
Infrequent Worship Attenders:					
<i>White Other Christians</i>	50	44	5	2	<b>7</b>
<i>White Catholics</i>	47	49	3	1	<b>6</b>
<i>White Protestants</i>	46	52	2	*	<b>8</b>
Frequent Worship Attenders:					
<i>White Catholics</i>	42	54	2	1	<b>13</b>
<i>White Protestants</i>	40	57	2	1	<b>16</b>
<i>White Other Christians</i>	34	63	3	1	<b>6</b>
<i>"Religious Right"</i>	14	84	1	1	<b>11</b>
					<b>100%</b>

% rounded to nearest whole number

\* less than 1 percent

Source: 2000 VNS National Exit Poll (N=13,259)

cratic constituency. Indeed, George W. Bush's 9 percent was the worst performance of a Republican presidential candidate in many years. Gore also won smaller majorities among Hispanics (62 percent) and other non-whites (55 percent). One reason Bush did better with the last two groups was their internal diversity. For example, the Hispanic community varies according to country of origin, with, for example, voters of Mexican heritage being more Democratic and those of Cuban ancestry more Republican. Also, recent immigrants tended to prefer Gore more strongly and longer-term residents Bush.

Race and ethnicity strongly favored the Republicans in another respect: Bush won a solid majority of the white vote, which accounted for four-fifths of the electorate in 2000. Put another way, without support from minorities, Gore would have been defeated decisively. (In 2000, the small group of "Canadian-Americans" voted like other white Americans.) All told, there was a huge "racial gap" of 48 percentage points.

The final entry in table 3.8 is religion. Combining a number of exit poll questions produces a useful picture of the great diversity of American religious groups. The small size of these groups reveals the complexity of the major party coalitions in 2000.

The first five religious groups were solidly Democratic, as they have been for many years. Black Protestants voted even more strongly for Gore than African Americans as a whole, reflecting the central political role of the black church. Much the same can be said for minority Catholics, most of which were Hispanic. More than three-quarters of Jews voted for Gore, and so did three-fifths of the secular (non-religious) population, a newly emerged Democratic constituency.

In addition, Gore won a small majority of a polyglot category of "Other Non-Christians" (Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, "New Age" adherents, and others) and Hispanic Protestants. It is worth noting that the minor party candidates also did well among the other

non-Christians and secularists. Gore drew strong support from the one-third of the electorate that included the most obvious examples of religious diversity.

The remaining seven religious categories are varieties of white Christians. The first three are groups of voters who were infrequent churchgoers (less than once a week). Here, Gore received a bare majority of the “White Other Christians” and narrowly lost the white Catholics and white Protestants. Thus, Gore essentially broke even among the less traditional—and more liberal—white Christians.

Bush won a large majority of the four remaining groups, all of which reported frequent worship attendance (once a week or more). Bush did well among white Catholics (once a bastion of the Democratic Party), better among white Protestants (the largest portion of which are mainline Protestants, long a bedrock constituency of the GOP), and even better among these “Other White Christians” (which include conservative churches, such as the Latter Day Saints). But Bush’s best group was the “Religious Right” (white, regularly attending Protestants who claimed to be members of the religious right), where he received 84 percent of the vote. This controversial constituency has become an integral part of the GOP coalition, having a role similar to African Americans among the Democrats.

Thus, there was a striking “religion gap” in 2000. The difference between black Protestants and the religious right was a whopping 78 percentage points (better than six times the size of the gender gap). Of course, this difference was partly based on race. But the difference between Jews and the religious right was 64 points (five times the size of the gender gap), and the comparable difference between seculars and the religious right was 47 percent (not quite four times the gender gap and equal to the racial gap). These patterns also help explain the impact of moral issues in 2000: the diverse cultural groups were deeply divided politically.

### **THE FINAL SURPRISE: THE FLORIDA BALLOT DEBACLE**

The 2000 election is most likely to be remembered for the disputed presidential ballots in Florida than the other surprises of the campaign. However, the ballot controversy arose directly from the closeness of the election. Indeed, the peculiar combination of politics, issues, and demography that produced the “perfect tie” nationally was most fully exemplified in the Sunshine State. Campaign strategy was a factor as well. Originally counted in the Bush column (in part because the candidate’s brother was governor), Florida became a special target of the Gore campaign as election day approached. This effort very nearly paid off, but may have cost Gore the election elsewhere: the resources spent in Florida might have secured at least one of four Democratic-leaning states, any one of which would have given Gore an Electoral College win regardless of the Florida dispute. Gore lost New Hampshire by a nose and was also defeated in the Democratic bastion of West Virginia, in Bill Clinton’s Arkansas, and in his home state of Tennessee.

The multiple failures of the Florida electoral machinery, both physical and institutional, certainly shocked most Americans. The weaknesses of punch-card ballots, ranging from “hanging chads” to “undervotes,” revealed the lack of public investment in basic instruments of democracy, and raised serious questions about systemic neglect of poor and minority neighborhoods. Ballot design errors, such as the confusing “butterfly ballot” in Palm Beach County, showed even the well-intentioned efforts of local officials could deny citizens a voice. The lack of clear standards for judging disputed ballots and the intense partisanship of state and local election officials reduced further the legitimacy of the process. And the inability of many citizens to follow simple balloting instructions underscored the real-world limits of citizen participation.

It is worth noting, however, that such problems were not unique to Florida. In fact, many states had similar problems, and in at least three (New Mexico, Iowa, and Wisconsin) the margins were close enough that balloting failures might have made a difference in the outcome. These balloting failures were deeply embarrassing to the United States, which frequently criticizes other countries for poor election administration. Indeed, both Canada and Mexico had far fewer problems of this sort in 2000.

The combination of a close contest and balloting problems renders it unlikely that there will ever be a definitive answer to the Florida ballot dispute. Indeed, the intensive post-election review of the ballots by news organizations produced extensive grounds for debate. Such debate was encouraged by the unprecedented thirty-six-day post-election campaign waged by the Gore and Bush campaigns in the news media, canvassing boards, and courts. Americans were familiar (if often uncomfortable) with campaigning *before* the ballots are cast, but the rare spectacle of such campaigning *after* election day was especially unsettling. The major parties provided a steady stream of commentary and invective designed to influence public perceptions of both the election results and the post-election maneuvers. For more than a month, the nation watched the contenders criticize the legitimacy of the very process in which they were engaged. These efforts clearly hardened partisan lines, although it is unclear if either candidate prevailed.

The candidates' litigation strategies were at the center of these post-election campaigns. Gore focused on securing an expanded recount in four counties via the state courts, while Bush moved early into federal court, arguing the recount efforts violated the equal protection provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Both strategies produced some successes. After an extended legal tug-of-war, the Gore campaign eventually received a favorable ruling when the Florida state supreme court voted 4-3 to extend the recount.



The Bush campaign then appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, to the surprise of most observers, took the case. The result was two rulings in the precedent-setting case of *Bush v. Gore*, both of which favored Bush. The first ruling was decided by a 7-2 vote and found that the Florida balloting system did indeed violate the equal protection provisions due to the absence of a uniform standard for counting votes. The second ruling was decided by a 5-4 margin and ordered the end of the recount efforts in Florida. This second ruling was the most controversial, providing a storm of criticism in both political and legal circles.<sup>7</sup>

The short-term impact of the Florida ballot debacle was to intensify the political effects of the close contest, reducing the legitimacy of the winner—an effect that would have applied to Gore if he had prevailed, much as it affected Bush. An ironic result of the situation was that the Bush administration adopted a strategy of partisan confrontation in domestic and foreign policy, instead of the anticipated strategy of bipartisanship and cooperation.<sup>8</sup> In this sense, the surprises continued after the contest was resolved.

### A CONTEST OF SURPRISES

In the end, which of the surprises in the 2000 contest were most important? In the short run, it might well have been the Florida ballot debacle, with its grand spectacle and partisan rancor. But from a longer perspective, the factors that created the close balloting may matter more. The high degree of unity among Democrats and Republicans was crucial. In this context, the weaker-than-anticipated impact of economic issues on the vote kept Gore from obtaining an overall majority, opening the way for other factors to matter. Meanwhile, the regularly neglected moral issues helped Bush pull even with Gore—as did the unnoticed influence of foreign policy. Although there was no way to know at the time, American attitudes on key issues tended to benefit Bush and pro-

vided a base for the Bush administration's approach to foreign affairs, especially after 9/11. These issues may well influence the future of the "reluctant trinity" among the North American democracies. The great demographic diversity of the American electorate lies behind these patterns.

What about the legitimacy of the American regime? There is no doubt that the "contest of surprises" sorely tested the patience of many Americans with the political process. The reputations of the major political parties, the new media, and even scholars were tarnished by the unanticipated results. Many election officials could hardly show their faces in public, President Bush entered office under a cloud of suspicion, and even the Supreme Court lost some of its luster. At a deeper level, the divisions among the citizenry over the future direction of the country were troubling to all manner of observers. But the legitimacy of the regime was not shaken, as illustrated by the national response to the crisis of 9/11. To some observers, this result may be the biggest surprise of all.

## Notes

### CHAPTER 1

1. Press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. Fox speech at The Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
4. Transcript of the presidential debate on October 4, 2000.
5. Miami, Fla., August 25, 2000.
6. Ibid.
7. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 10, 2000.
8. On January 11, 2001, a disgruntled and sorely disappointed Lucien Bouchard resigned as premier of Quebec, saying he had failed to keep his promise to make Quebec independent.
9. From an address to the National Policy Research Conference in Ottawa on November 30, 2000.

### CHAPTER 2

1. Enrique Krauze, *La Presidencia Imperial: Ascenso y Caída del Sistema Político Mexicano, 1940–1996* (Mexico City: Tusquets Editores, 1997).
2. These figures were taken from “México Social,” edited regularly by the Banco Nacional de México, and the electoral database at the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, CIDAC.
3. A brief review of these three main parties’ histories and programs can be found in Mónica Serrano, ed., *Governing Mexico: Political*

- Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
4. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).
  5. Volker G. Lehr, "Modernización y movilización electoral, 1964–1976: Un estudio ecológico," *Estudios Políticos* 4, no. 1 (1985): 54–61, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
  6. Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
  7. Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, "Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: Construction of Partisan Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 34–48.
  8. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
  9. Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
  10. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).

11. The empirical evidence for this chapter comes from a collection of surveys conducted in Mexico between 1990 and 2002. A list of the surveys includes: 1) The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey*'s second, third, and fourth waves, administered in 1990, 1996/7, and in 2000, respectively, to slightly over 1,500 respondents in each wave. The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey* were conducted in 1990, 1996/7, and 2000 among 1,531, 1,511, and 1535 Mexican adults, respectively. They are part of the ICPSR archives, at the University of Michigan. The fourth-wave survey was conducted in February 2000, sponsored by Grupo Reforma, and conducted by the Departments of Survey Research at newspapers *Reforma*, *El Norte*, *Mural*, and *Palabra*. 2) A national exit poll administered to over 3,000 voters as they left their corresponding polling places in the 2000 elections. I compare these results with those from a national exit poll conducted in the 1997 elections. The 1997 exit poll was sponsored by the Partido Acción Nacional and conducted by *Arcop*, on July 6, 1997, among 3,452 voters. The 2000 exit poll was sponsored by Grupo Reforma and conducted on July 2, 2000, among 3,377 voters by newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. 3) Four national pre-election polls conducted between April and June 2000 and pooled into one single database. The national pre-election polls were conducted in early April, early May, late May, and mid-June, 2000, by the newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. Each survey had slightly over 1,500 respondents (with the exception of the April one, which had slightly over 1,600) from all thirty-two federal entities. For the analysis in this chapter, the four polls were pooled into a single database of 6,289 cases. All the surveys listed here are national representative samples of Mexican adults or voters, and were conducted face-to-face in the respondents' homes or as they left their polling places, in the case of the exit polls.
12. Between one-fourth and one-third of Mexican respondents, depending on the survey, do not place themselves on the left-right

scale. In this analysis, I assigned an average placement to those who did not originally place themselves on the scale. The general averages fell between categories six and seven on a ten-point scale.

13. The original measure is a ten-point self-placement scale.
14. Alejandro Moreno, "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa." *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
15. The shift to the right probably reflects the influence of the PRI's also historic primary to select its presidential candidate. The 2000 survey was conducted in February, four and a half months before the presidential election and with campaigns officially running, but, most importantly, three months after the PRI primary of November, 1999, and after Fox and others had started to advertise widely on television. Very intense negative campaigning and mudslinging characterized the primary contest, but it boosted voter interest in the PRI.
16. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, England, 1998).
17. According to Moreno (1999b), the liberal-fundamentalist dimension is empirically observable in many Latin American countries, and it provides a useful tool to analyze party competition across the region.
18. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
19. Empirically, these dimensions result from a theoretically-guided principal components factor analysis based on the Mexican sam-

- ples of the 1997 and 2000 *World Values Surveys* pooled into one single dataset.
20. Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
  21. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (February 2000): 19–51.
  22. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 1 (1999a): 45–81.
  23. Moreno, 1999a.
  24. The model is based on a multinomial logit regression that uses vote choice as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables that have been of theoretical and empirical relevance in the literature of Mexican voting behavior. The model is then applied to the different types of survey data (exit polls and pre-election polls). The vote for PAN or Fox is taken as a basis for comparison in the results shown in the tables. See for example Domínguez and McCann 1995; Magaloni 1997; Buendía 1997; Magaloni and Moreno, 2003.

25. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
26. The official vote for Congress in 2000 is not broken down by party in the case of the Alliance for Mexico (PRD) and the Alliance for Change (PAN), but opinion polls showed that support for the Green party alone was about 2 to 4 percent.
27. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
28. Alejandro Moreno, "The Effects of Negative Campaigns on Mexican Voters," in *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election*, ed. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson.
29. Alejandro Moreno and Roy Pierce, "The Impact of the PRI Primary of November 1999 on the Mexican Presidential Election of July 2000," unpublished manuscript.
30. Alejandro Moreno, "Mesa 1: Encuestas preelectorales, serie incluyendo últimas encuestas (Estimación de los votantes probables)," in *El papel de las encuestas en las elecciones federales: Memoria del taller Sumiya 2000*. Federal Elections Institute (IFE), Mexican Association of Research Agencies (AMAI), and Colegio Nacional de Actuarios, 2000, and Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, "Cómo llegó: La debacle y el triunfo". *Reforma*, December 1, 2001.

### CHAPTER 3

1. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, *The Perfect Tie* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). See also John C. Green and



- Rick Farmer, *The State of the Parties*, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
2. Larry J. Sabato, *Overtime* (New York: Longman, 2002).
  3. Ibid.
  4. John C. Green et al., "Murphy Brown Revisited: The Social Issues in the 1992 Election," in *Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the Future of American Politics*, ed. Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 43–66.
  5. These data were made available by the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research. All analysis and interpretation are solely the responsibility of the authors.
  6. These data come from a poll by the Gallup Organization, May 18–May 21, 2000 (N=1,011). Data provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
  7. David K. Ryden, "Out of the Shadows, but Still in the Dark? The Courts and Political Parties," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 79–94.
  8. Gerald M. Pomper, "Parliamentary Government in the United States: A New Regime for a New Country," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 267–86.

#### CHAPTER 4

1. The Canadian Election Study is based on a rolling cross-section survey of 3,651 interviews conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University and Jolicoeur & Associés. It follows in the tradition of previous Canadian election studies conducted in 1979, 1984, 1988, 1993, and 1997.
2. Blais et al., *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002), 13.

3. Mordecai Richler, "More Proof That Pundits Can't Be Trusted," *National Post*, December 2, 2000, A18.
4. Conrad Black, "The Most Boring Election in History." *Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 2000, A22.
5. Peter Gzowski, "Where Do They Stand? How Would We Know?" *Globe and Mail*, November 11, 2000, A13.
6. Statistics Canada. <http://www.statcan.ca/>.
7. Ibid.
8. Blais et al., *Anatomy*.
9. Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
10. Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
11. Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder, "Issue Frames and Group Centrism in American Public Opinion," *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 1055–78.
12. Doris Graber, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide* (New York: Longman, 1984).
13. Milton Lodge, Marco Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 309–26.
14. Diana C. Mutz, "Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries," *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 4 (November 1995): 1015–42.
15. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 35.
16. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 73.
17. Barry Cooper, *Sins of Omission: Shaping the News at CBC TV* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 1.
18. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 40.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Hartley and Josephine Mazzuca, "Fewer Canadians

- Favour Legalized Abortion under Any Circumstance,” *The Gallup Poll* (Toronto: Gallup Canada, December 12, 2001).
21. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 145.
  22. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 175.
  23. Lydia Miljan and Barry Cooper, *Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003) 92.
  24. Reginald Bibby, *Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada* (Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1993).
  25. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 71.
  26. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 80 n. 12.

## CHAPTER 5

1. A feat not accomplished since Mackenzie King had won three in a row in 1935, 1940, and 1945.
2. Robert A. Young, *The Struggle for Quebec* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 87.
3. Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
4. The referendum question asked voters whether they agreed “Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership.”
5. Voter turnout was an astonishing—by Canadian standards, at any rate—93.5 percent. See Québec, Directeur-général des élections, <http://www.dgeq.qc.ca/information/>.
6. The amendment of section 93 was not implemented until after the 1997 federal election, which returned the Liberals to power.
7. Formerly a political scientist at the Université de Montréal, Dion was elevated to the cabinet, along with Pierre Pettigrew, in January 1996. Dion, Allan Rock, and Marcel Massé were members of a special cabinet committee charged with elaborating a strat-

- egy for dealing with the Quebec question in early 1996. See Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 102.
8. Ibid.
  9. A third question asked the Court whether international or Canadian law would have precedence in the event of a conflict between them. For more on the Supreme Court reference see Young, *The Struggle for Quebec*, 108–9, and David Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999).
  10. In March 1997 Duceppe replaced Michel Gauthier as leader of the Bloc Québécois. Gauthier had succeeded Lucien Bouchard when the latter resigned in January 1996 to become leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec.
  11. Thus the third question put before the Court, namely whether international or Canadian law would take precedence in the event of a conflict between them, was moot.
  12. Supreme Court of Canada, *Reference Re the Secession of Quebec*, para. 138. The entire judgment is reprinted in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 14–71. The cited passage is on page 64.
  13. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 151, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69.
  14. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 153, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69–70.
  15. Canada, House of Commons, 2d session, 36th Parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999.
  16. *Clarity Act*, s. 1(4)(b).
  17. Bill C-20 does not spell out what exactly constitutes a “clear majority,” stating only that the size of the majority, along with the percentage of eligible voters and other relevant matters, will be taken into account by the House of Commons. *Clarity Act*, s. 2(2).
  18. Canada, House of Commons, 2d Session, 36th Parliament, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, *Evidence*, February 23, 2000. Online at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/CLAR/Meetings/Evidence/clarev08-e.htm>.

19. In a survey conducted between May 1 and May 8, 2000, Ekos Research Associates, Inc., found that Joe Clark had fairly high levels of trust among voters, was better known and had more widely acceptable platform ideas than his Canadian Alliance counterparts (either Preston Manning or Stockwell Day), but that his positioning on the Clarity Bill was unpopular. The sample size was 3,530 and the margin of error +/- 1.6 percent, 19 times out of 20. See "The Political Landscape: Continued Liberal Dominance, Resurgent CA, Conservatives Fading." This and other surveys can be accessed in the Ekos archives available on the Web. <http://www.ekos.ca/media>.
20. Québec, Assemblée nationale, First session, 36th legislature, December 15, 1999.
21. *An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State*, ch. 1, art. 2 and 3 (emphasis added).
22. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "Fin de siècle: Fin de la souveraineté? Quebeckers think the unthinkable," December 14, 1999. The sample consisted of 803 respondents in Quebec and 2204 Canadians outside Quebec. Margins of error were +/- 3.5 percent in Quebec and +/- 2.1 percent in the rest of the country, 19 times out of 20. The study is available online at the Ekos webpage (see note 19 above).
23. Tammy McNamee, "The Clarity Bill: Examining Liberal Party Hegemony in the Transitional Party System" (M.A. major research paper, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), 55. McNamee cites an editorial, "The Centre Stops Being Soft" in *The Economist*, December 18, 1999, which argues along similar lines.
24. Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 91. As a result of the vote, Bouchard walked out of the convention and rumors spread that he was considering resigning as party leader. Bouchard stayed put, of course, and he gradually asserted control over the party apparatus (if not over the most militant advocates of independence, *les purs et*

- durs*): over 90 percent of delegates supported his leadership at the PQ convention in May 2000.
25. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "The Quebec Political Landscape," March 5, 1999. Sample size was 1,006 in Quebec and 1871 in ROC.
  26. Angus Reid Group, "Issues and Attitudes in a 1998 Post-Election Quebec," December 1, 1998. Sample size was 1,000 and the margin of error was +/- 3.1 percent, 19 times out of 20. The survey was accessed online at <http://www.angusreid.com>.
  27. Bloc Québécois, *Le Québec gagne à voter Bloc* (Montreal, 2000; English version). Accessed online at <http://www.blocquebecois.org>. Sovereignty is mentioned only once, at the beginning of the pamphlet, in an excerpt from the BQ's declaration of principles. The thrust of the document concerns the Bloc's role in defending Quebec's interests within the federal system and in holding the federal Liberals accountable, just as an opposition party should do. For an insightful analysis of the 2000 federal election campaign, and the relatively minor role played by the issue of sovereignty, see Stephen Clarkson, "The Liberal Threepeat: The Multi-System Party in the Multi-Party System," in *The Canadian General Election of 2000*, ed. Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2001), 13–57.
  28. Claire Durand, a sociologist at the Université de Montréal, argues that pollsters systematically underestimate Liberal support in Quebec, perhaps (though this is only speculative) because respondents in surveys are reluctant to admit to supporting the federalist party. In 2000, the underestimation of Liberal support, when all polls were averaged together, was approximately 4 percent. See Durand's paper, "Electoral Surveys in the 2000 Canadian Campaign: How Did They Really Fare?" <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/socio/durandc/menurecherche.htm>, n.d.
  29. André Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," in Pammett and Dornan, *Canadian General Election of 2000*, 139–40.

30. The three defectors were André Harvey in Chicoutimi, David Price in Compton-Stanstead, and Diane St.-Jacques in Shefford.
31. In spite of this pronounced decline, Quebec still had the third-highest turnout among the provinces and territories in the 2000 election. Only Prince Edward Island (72.7 percent) and New Brunswick (67.7) registered higher turnout rates. I have calculated Quebec turnout rates from raw data supplied by Elections Canada. There is a very slight difference (one-tenth of one percent) between the figures for Quebec voter turnout reported in the *Official Voting Results* for the 37th General Election and those calculated from the raw data.
32. Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," 141.
33. Édith Brochu and Louis Massicotte, "Élections fédérales de novembre: Coup de loupe sur un scrutin," *Le Devoir*, February 26, 2002, A7.
34. Don Macpherson, "The Evil of Two Lessers: Neither Liberals nor the Bloc Can Hold Heads High as Apathy Ruled in Quebec," *Montreal Gazette*, November 29, 2000.
35. Michaud made his remarks—inter alia, he claimed that Jews feel that they are the only people to have suffered in the history of humanity—in a radio interview in early December and repeated them in testimony before the Estates-General on the Situation and Future of the French Language in Quebec. I have written in greater detail about the Michaud Affair in "Sclerosis or a Clean Bill of Health? Diagnosing Quebec's Party System in the 21st Century," in *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2004).
36. Québec, Premier ministre, "Allocution à l'occasion de la démission du premier ministre du Québec," January 11, 2001. Available at the website of the Association internationale des études québécoises. <http://www.aieq.qc.ca/bouchard.htm>.
37. This remark was actually made before Landry officially became leader of the PQ, in January 2001, at a party caucus meeting.

- Landry's outburst was occasioned by the federal government's offer of an \$18 million subsidy to the province for the renovation of the Aquarium de Québec. One of the strings attached to this money, however, was that the Canadian flag (the "bits of red rag" in question) be allowed to fly and bilingual signs be posted at the renovated site. This offer prompted Landry's crude metaphor.
38. The data on "Referendum Voting Intentions" are available at Léger Marketing's website, <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was generally close to 1,000, and the surveys were conducted approximately 10 or so times each year. The margin of error for a sample this size is +/-3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
  39. Léger Marketing, "Opinions of Quebecers toward Provincial Politics and More Particularly the ADQ," May 2002. <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was 1,001, with a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
  40. Léger Marketing finds that the ADQ and the Quebec Liberals are running neck and neck, with 35 percent of voters saying that they would vote Liberal if a provincial election were to be held and 32 percent supporting the ADQ (the PQ stands at 26 percent). See "Opinions of Quebecers Toward Provincial Politics," May 2002.
  41. See Lisée's book, *Sortie de secours* (Montreal: Boréal, 2000). For commentary on the Lisée proposal, see Gordon Gibson, "Will Separatists Settle for a Half a Loaf?" *National Post*, January 18, 2001. Online at <http://www.vigile.net/01-1/gibson.html>. See also Alexander Panetta, "PQ Strongly Considers Referendum to Ask Ottawa for More Cash: Landry," *Montreal Gazette*, June 4, 2002.
  42. Québec, Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec, *Le français, une langue pour tout le monde* (Québec, 2001), 12 (my translation).
  43. Shawn McCarthy, "Shut Down Campaign, PM Orders Martin," *Globe and Mail*, May 31, 2002, A1.



## CHAPTER 6

1. Matthew Stevenson, "Canada's Other Brain Drain: The Continuing Exodus from Quebec," *Political Options/Options Politiques* (October 2000): 63–66, page 64, [www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf](http://www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf).
2. Richard Rodriguez, *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* (New York: Viking, 2002) 94, 103, 105, and 108.
3. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 110.
4. "Carnaval Celebrants Grin and Bare It Despite S.F. Fog," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, B1.
5. Robert E. Chenard, "Historical Perspective on Waterville's 19C Franco-Americans," <http://members.mint.net/frenchcx/frcanwtv/htm>.
6. Roger Roy, "An Analysis of the Assimilation of French-Canadian Language and Culture into American Language and Culture: How French-Canadian Became Franco-American and then Became Invisible" (Graduate research essay for EDU 690 Social Context of Higher Education, University of Maine).
7. Juliana L'Hereux, "North American French as an Academic Subject." [www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm](http://www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm).
8. Ilan Stavans, "Spanglish: Tickling the Tongue," *World Literature Today* 74.3 (Summer 2000): 555.
9. "Tom, Tom and Julia . . . The Names Say It All," *Globe and Mail*, February 6, 2000, R2.
10. Neva Chonin, "Morissette Does Her Own Thing," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 7, 2002, D3.
11. Neva Chonin, "Furtado in Control at Warfield," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 16, 2002, D1.
12. Paula Martinac, *k.d. lang* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1997), 89.
13. Quoted in David Bennahum, ed., *In her own words: k.d. lang* (New York: Omnibus, 1995), 18.

14. Bennahum, *In her own words*, 7.
15. "Celine's New Album," *Globe and Mail*. February 7, 2002, R2.
16. Tim Goodman, "Families, Frisco Formulas for Fall," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, D1.
17. Jonathan Curiel, "Lack of TV Diversity Hit," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 15, 2002, A2.
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20. Andrew Mollison, "Researchers Attack Bush's Education Reforms," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 16, 2002, A4.
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23. "INS Unveils New Plan, Devices for Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A9.
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25. "More People Say That They're Just 'Americans,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 8, 2002, A8.
26. Anthony Walton, rev. of *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* by Richard Rodriguez, *New York Times Book Review*, April 7, 2002, 7.
27. Rodriguez, *Brown*, xii.
28. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 164.

## CHAPTER 7

1. Anthony DePalma, *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 354.
2. Seymour M. Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee, 1989).
3. Seymour M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and*

- Persistence in Social Structures* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988).
4. James Laxer, *Discovering America: Travels in the Land of Guns, God, and Corporate Gurus* (New York: New Press, 2001). See also, Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1996).
  5. For a fuller description of this analysis, see Stephen Brooks, "A Tale of Two Elections: What the Leaders' Rhetoric from the 2000 Election Tells Us about Can-Am Political Culture Differences" (paper delivered at the Biennial Meeting of the Canadian Studies in the United States, San Antonio, Tex., November 2001). Readers may also contact the author at [brooks3@uwindsor.ca](mailto:brooks3@uwindsor.ca).

## CHAPTER 8

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5. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, 79.
6. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
7. *Globe and Mail*, April 29, 2002.
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9. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
10. Earl H. Fry and Jared Bybee, *NAFTA 2002: A Cost/Benefit Analy-*

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11. Nick Schultz, "Canadian Energy Policy and Trade with the United States," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
  12. Michel Tremblay, "Hydro-Québec and TransÉnergie: Continuity in a Changing Environment," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
  13. *Wall Street Journal*, April 24, 2002.
  14. *AuCanada*, "Bruising Battle over Tomatoes," Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 2002.
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  17. *Globe and Mail*, April 25, 2002; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, *Economic Trends*, May 2002.
  18. *Globe and Mail*, March 6, 2002.

## CHAPTER 9

1. Jorge Castañeda, "El nuevo activismo internacional mexicano," *Reforma*, September 23, 2001a, Section Enfoque 15–17; "Los ejes de la política exterior," *Nexos* 23 no. 288 (December 2001b) 66–74; and "El factor externo y consolidación de la democracia en México," *Reforma*, February 24, 2002, 10A.
2. For Castañeda's critical view on U.S.-Mexican relations before becoming minister of foreign affairs, see Castañeda, 1996.
3. Robert Pastor has made an effort to articulate a greater post-NAFTA vision for North America. He advocates institutional deepening, among other things, in order to deal with continental problems that hitherto were handled under national or bilateral agendas. However, Pastor's position does not represent the official positions of any NAFTA members. See Robert Pastor, *Toward a North American Community* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

4. For a comprehensive view of migratory problems between Mexico and the U.S. see SRE, 1997.
5. George Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/), 2002a.
6. “Estrategia nacional para la seguridad del territorio nacional. Resumen ejecutivo,” Office of the Press Secretary, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html). 2002; and George Bush, “Securing the Homeland and Strengthening the Nation,” [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/), 2002b.
7. Eduardo Sojo, et al., “Sociedad para la Prosperidad: Reporte a los Presidentes Vicente Fox y George Bush,” Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002, electronic copy.
8. A declaration was released from a top official of that ministry, suggesting that Mexico was considering bringing the case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, but eventually did not.
9. Mr. Castañeda’s most recent address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, condemning any unilateral action against Iraq in the global war against terrorism, suggests that Mexico is heading in that direction. See *Reforma*, September 14, 2002.

## CHAPTER 10

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3. Graeme Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000).
4. “Aleman llama a Ortega a concertar pacto de gobernabilidad en Nicaragua,” *La Prensa* (Honduras), November 23, 1996, <http://www.laprensahn.com/caarc/9611/c23002.htm>.

5. Both had resigned from their positions; their continuation was not desired by the new members. Moreover, they were not interested in supporting the new establishment.
6. "Desconfianza impera en el ámbito pre-electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana*, July 28, 2000.
7. The extent of corruption in Aleman's government is the subject of another paper. However, suffice it to say that in 1999 the comptroller had identified a number of anomalies and abuses of government resources on behalf of the president. The most public case was the use of resources to build infrastructure at the president's farm, La Chilamapa, the construction of a special road leading to the president's home, and a number of contracts. His wealth was estimated to have increased by millions of dollars. *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000.
8. "A Society Scandalized," *Envio* (June 2000).
9. "The Air is Thick with Electoral Fraud," *Envio* (July 2000).
10. "Indeciso proceso electoral en marcha," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), April 28, 2000.
11. "Entre Partidos te veas: candente ambiente pre electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), August 18, 2000.
12. "Renuncia evidencia lucha por el poder" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), May 26, 2000.
13. "Contraloría va contra Solórzano," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 11, 2000.
14. Consuelo Sandoval and Nidia Ruiz López, "Solórzano sorprende a políticos," *La Prensa* (Managua), March 17, 2001.
15. "No tengo la alternativa ideal," *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000. In late March 2001 Daniel Ortega announced the endorsement of Jarquín and the alliance with the Christian Way.
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20. John Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1998), 174.
21. Edelberto Torres Rivas, *Costa Rica crisis y desafíos* (San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones [DEI], 1987).
22. Eliana Franco and Carlos Sojo, *Gobierno, Empresarios y políticas de ajuste* (San José: FLACSO, 1992).
23. "Pactos, descrédito, inestabilidad" *La Nación* (San José) 1995.
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27. INCEP, *Reporte Político/Panorama Centroamericano No. 171: Llegaron las internas partidarias para designación de candidatos*, Guatemala, June 2001, 5.
28. *Inforpress*, June 2001.
29. IDESPO, *La población costarricense del gran area metropolitana frente a su participación ciudadana y sus valores políticos*, Heredia: IDESPO, May 23, 2001.
30. Juan Manuel Villasuso, Jenny Díaz, and Laura Chinchilla, *Gobernabilidad democrática y seguridad ciudadana: El Caso de Costa Rica* (Managua: CRIES, 2000).
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32. Jorge Rovira Mas, *La democracia de Costa Rica ante el siglo XXI*, San José: FLACSO, 2000.
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