

PART II

The Electoral Politics of 2000

CHAPTER 2

The Coalition for Change: Voters and Parties in the 2000 Mexican Election

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THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 is a crucial point in Mexico's long democratic transition. Vicente Fox, the Alliance for Change candidate, won the presidency thanks to the support of a broad-based electoral coalition, a modern-day melting pot of different ideologies and sociodemographic features. The governing party's defeat was its first after seventy years of uninterrupted rule. The "coalition for change," as I will call the electoral coalition that voted for Fox, was a sociopolitical phenomenon that evolved during the twelve to fifteen years prior to the 2000 election. During the 2000 campaigns and the election itself, the alliance achieved its more recent shape and meaning.

At least since the mid-1980s, Mexicans have been split into two political camps. One of them is younger, more educated, urban, and holds pro-democratic and liberal points of view. The other is older, less educated, more rural, authoritarian, and fundamentalist in its views. The former tends to vote for the opposition and electorally supported the rise of the National Action Party

(PAN) over the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). The latter tends to vote for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and constitutes the core support of a party with a long tradition in government. In 2000, the desire for change was stronger than ever, and Vicente Fox benefited from it, as well as from the support of an ideologically and regionally diverse electoral coalition. Turnout differentials also broadened Fox's electoral base and reduced the PRI's prospects of keeping the presidency for six more years.

According to exit poll data, about two-thirds of those voters who supported Fox in 2000 said they had voted for a change, rather than for a specific party, candidate, or policy program. Certainly, many of the voters for change identified with the PAN, and some others found a very attractive candidate in Fox. But the main motivation behind their votes was the desire to make change a reality. In a country where the PRI had controlled the presidency for seven decades, change was about alteration of leadership rather than a shift in policy orientation. Thus, a political campaign with a charismatic candidate emphasizing change offered a potent message that activated the main divisions in Mexican society.

What was the nature of the electoral coalition for change? What was its underlying meaning? What kind of Mexicans formed part of it? Where are its origins? How likely is it to last beyond 2000? In this chapter I address these questions by analyzing different types of survey data gathered in the 1990s and in 2000.

THE MEXICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM ON THE EVE OF THE 2000 ELECTIONS

Despite the predominantly authoritarian nature of its political system, elections have been held regularly in Mexico since the 1930s, following the end of the revolutionary period: presidential elections every six years and congressional elections every three years since 1934. At least until the late 1980s, the PRI dominated

every election and ran almost uncontested. The coalition for change was not an accident of the 2000 elections; it was an evolving sociopolitical phenomenon that had had its first major electoral impact in the 1988 presidential election, when the PRI candidate faced a real challenge for the first time since the party's creation in 1929.

Before the 1980s, there were two electoral episodes where the PRI faced some challenge. One was in 1940, when Juan Andrew Almazán, significantly supported by middle-class voters, ran for president against Manuel Ávila Camacho, President Lázaro Cárdenas's appointee. As some historians have noted, the election's violence and bloodshed far outstripped any fair political competition.¹ Bullets were more important than ballots once again in 1952, when General Miguel Henríquez significantly challenged Adolfo Ruíz Cortines in the race to succeed President Miguel Alemán. "Henriquismo" became synonymous with opposition.

Despite these incidents, the PRI's hegemony characterized Mexican national elections. The PRI obtained three-quarters of the vote share in every national election from 1964 to 1979. In 1976, José López Portillo ran unopposed; the PAN decided not to nominate a candidate to protest the lack of fair conditions, and Portillo received about 94 percent of the votes cast. In that year's congressional races, the PRI got 86 percent of the votes. The first major political reform came in 1977 as a consequence of the legitimacy crisis produced by the 1976 one-candidate contest, and more political parties were allowed to register for national elections. Support for the PRI in legislative elections dropped from 74 percent in 1979 to 69 percent in 1985, to 68 percent in 1985, and to 51 percent in 1988. After bouncing back to 62 percent in 1991, support for the PRI fell again to 50 percent in 1994 and then to 39 and 38 percent in 1997 and 2000 respectively.² In other words, support for the PRI dropped by almost one-half in the last three decades of the twentieth century.

The challenges to the PRI in 1940 and 1952 were products of party splits, a phenomenon which reoccurred in 1987, when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the son of one of Mexico's most beloved presidents, broke from the PRI and ran for president in the 1988 election. The National Democratic Front, a coalition of several small socialist and leftist parties, as well as PRI defectors, backed his candidacy. Cárdenas obtained 31 percent of the national vote; the election was regarded as highly fraudulent, since the counting system shut down when the election returns seemed to favor the opposition against the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Salinas officially won the election with 51 percent of the national vote, the lowest percentage that the PRI had ever received in a presidential election until then.

Mexicans voted for president again in 1994, a year of strong political and economic turmoil. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had gone into effect on January 1, the same day Mexicans learned about an indigenous uprising and masked guerrillas—known as Zapatistas—in the southern state of Chiapas. A major political assassination took place in March, just three and a half months before the election. The PRI candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was shot in the head at a campaign rally in the Baja California state. Ernesto Zedillo, who replaced Colosio as PRI candidate, won the election with just 50 percent of the vote. The opposition vote was split mainly between the PAN's Diego Fernández de Cevallos (27 percent) and PRD's Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (17 percent).

In December 1994, shortly after the Zedillo administration took office, significant peso devaluation triggered the deepest economic crisis of the 1990s. The peso depreciated value against the U.S. dollar over 100 percent in just a few days, and the exchange rate went from slightly under three pesos per dollar before the devaluation to just over nine pesos per dollar over the next two years. Having received most of the blame, former president Salinas went

on a hunger strike and quickly went from being a highly popular president to a highly unpopular former president. His misfortunes with Mexican public opinion increased during the Zedillo administration, after his brother, Raúl Salinas, was accused of corruption, drug trafficking, and the plotting of another major political assassination. A top PRI official, José Francisco Ruíz Massieu, who had also been married to Salinas's sister, was fatally shot in Mexico City. The economic crisis, scandals, and the Zapatista uprising would pave the way for the 2000 presidential race.

Political Parties

Although there have been several parties in modern Mexico, three deserve attention for their political relevance and electoral performances in the present electoral arena: PRI, PAN, and PRD.³ The PRI was founded in 1929 under the label PRN, or National Revolutionary Party, by President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–1928), head of the winning camp in the Mexican Revolution. In a speech, Calles said that the age of *caudillos* had ended and the age of institutions had begun. President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) gave the party a corporatist structure, incorporating unionized workers and peasants and making its relationship to the state almost symbiotic for many years thereafter. Under Cárdenas, the party's name changed to the Mexican Revolutionary Party, or PRM, and changed again to its current name of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, under President Miguel Alemán (1946–1952), when the new urban middle class was incorporated into it. An entrepreneur, Alemán was also the first civilian to become president after the 1929 revolution.

The PRI was able to incorporate dissent into its regime. Also, the one-party system was legitimized with significant economic growth in the 1950s, when import-substitution industrialization delivered what many call the "Mexican Miracle." Its success was

questioned in the political arena by members of the student movement of 1968. The use of force, including the "Massacre of Tlatelolco" where a number of students were shot during a demonstration, deepened the authoritarian image of Mexican politics and increased resentment among the Mexican middle class. The PRI's ideological stands and policy directions changed from one president to the next. For example, during the 1980s, economic policies switched from nationalization to privatization. Also, government officials and party leaders, often one and the same, were increasingly involved in corruption scandals in the 1970s and 1980s. Corruption and economic crises were, thereby, some of the most common issues associated with the long-ruling party. The PRI lost a great deal of its electoral support in the 1990s, but still remains one of the two strongest political parties in Mexico.

The National Action Party (PAN) was founded in 1939, partly as a reaction to the corporatist and leftist policies of President Lázaro Cárdenas, and also as a protest against the anti-clerical orientation of the Mexican state that had started in the 1920s. The party had Catholic and entrepreneurial bases, and served as the real opposition to the PRI from the 1940s to the 1980s. Despite its Catholic, middle-class origins, the PAN has clearly become a catchall party in recent years, which has helped boost its success in national and local elections. The party joined the international Christian Democratic movement in 1998.⁴ The PAN obtained only 5 percent of the national vote in the 1942 midterm elections, when it participated for the first time. Its support had increased to 27 percent of the national vote by the 1997 legislative elections, and then to 38 percent in the congressional races of 2000. In 2000, the PAN presidential candidate, Vicente Fox, won the presidency with 43 percent of the national vote.

The Democratic Revolution Party, PRD, was the result of the 1988 electoral coalition that backed Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in his first presidential quest. Founded in 1989, the PRD gathered mem-

bers of small socialist, communist, and workers' parties that had represented the Mexican left in previous years, as well as PRI defectors. Although many of its members supported economically leftist policies, the main issue behind the party label was that of Mexico's democratization. The PRD had its best performance in the 1997 legislative election, receiving about 26 percent of the national vote. In other national elections the PRD has not reached 20 percent. Under the campaign slogan "It's time for the sun to rise" (the PRD's logo is an Aztec sun), the PRD attracted many voters who wanted a change and who later supported Fox in 2000.

Voting Cleavages

It is likely that the coalition for change has its origins in Mexico's modernization process, since it draws its main support from the more educated and urban electorate that started to vote against the PRI in local elections long before 2000.⁵ But its scope and reach go beyond an explanation merely based on a modernization theory. It involves an understanding of the patterns of partisan identification, an assessment of political cleavages, and an appraisal of voter coordination.

The Mexican electorate is a sophisticated one, but a relatively simple and parsimonious explanation best accounts for Mexican voting behavior: Mexicans have been politically split into two sides, those who support the one-party regime that embraced the revolutionary label, and those who oppose it. This split has not been about the specifics of governance, but about the nature of the regime itself.

As Mexican elections became more competitive, due to a long process of political liberalization and reforms, the regime-based political split became stronger and more evident. It crystallized in the electoral arena in a way that even shaped the meaning of "left" and "right" ideologies. The left was supportive of a more open so-

ciety, stood for more competitive elections, and demanded wider political and civil rights. The right supported established authority and sought to keep the ruling party in power. A first look at the characteristics of this divide was developed in a classification of the Mexican political parties in the late 1980s. Such classification was based on interpretations of the parties' strategic positions along a pro-system/anti-system axis of political conflict and their ideological positions along the traditional left-right axis.⁶

The advent of professional and academic survey research in Mexico brought this division into focus. Using survey data gathered around the 1988 and 1991 national elections, Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann argue that voters decided first whether to vote for the PRI or not, and, if not, they would then choose between the other options.⁷ Thus, voting was viewed as a two-step decision process in which the first step was some plebiscitary consideration on the PRI. Based on further evidence, Moreno shows that in the 1990s, Mexicans were split over several relevant dimensions of political competition, the most significant being a democratic-authoritarian cleavage that overshadowed the socio-economic concerns that defined left and right.⁸ The parties' average positions were scattered along the different dimensions of competition: political views, social and moral stands, and socio-economic preferences. Comparative survey data showed that the dimensions of political conflict in Mexico were also relevant, to a higher or lesser degree, in other young Latin American democracies.⁹

The nature of the coalition for change in 2000 reflects the politically relevant split that had already been observed in the 1990s, with an important difference: the winning coalition in 2000 was wider and more ideologically heterogeneous than it had ever been. Support for Vicente Fox was higher than any other candidate among voters from the left, center-left, center, and center-right, and across all the country's regions, especially in the more indus-

trialized northern states. The average Fox voter was more educated, urban, younger, and as we will see presently, more liberal than the average PRD or PRI voters. The average Fox voter was also centrist in his economic views and as pro-democratic as the PRD's.

From this analysis, I draw the following conclusions about the coalition for change. The average PAN voter has held a centrist view about several relevant dimensions of political conflict in Mexico and, more importantly, on all of them combined. Rather than being a compact, Christian Democratic party electorate, the PAN has developed a catchall nature that combines middle- and working-class voters from left to right.¹⁰ The 2000 coalition that supported the PAN was even wider and more ideologically heterogeneous than the 1997 PAN coalition; and the coalition that supported Fox was even wider and more heterogeneous than the PAN's.

This pattern is explained by several facts. First, the proportion of leftist voters decreased during the 1990s, and the consequent shift to the right benefited the PAN, not the PRI, mostly at the expense of the PRD. Second, a significant number of PRD supporters from the left and center in 1997 became PAN supporters in 2000; and a significant number of PRI supporters from the right in 1997 also supported the PAN in 2000. Consequently, the PAN support increased across the entire political spectrum, especially in the center, the most populated region of all. Third, some voters from the left who supported PRD congressional candidates in 2000 did not support Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas for president, but Vicente Fox. This shift gave Fox an even higher and more ideologically heterogeneous share of the vote in his presidential quest than that of the PAN in the congressional races.

Fifth, participation made a difference: the voter for change was more likely to vote in 2000 than the PRI voter, which had negative consequences for a ruling party that was used to mass

electoral mobilization. Across the entire political spectrum, support for the PRI presidential candidate, Francisco Labastida, was about the same as the support received by PRI congressional candidates, with no observable differences between the votes for either office. Additionally, support for Labastida was lower among likely and actual voters than among the general population. Fox benefited from a comparatively low turnout, as compared to the official turnout figures registered in previous presidential elections. The official turnout figures were 77 percent in 1994, and 64 percent in 2000.

The analysis developed in this chapter relies on national surveys that represent both the Mexican electorate as a whole—and also screened for likely voters—and actual voters.¹¹ In order to prove my points, I will first analyze the distribution of left and right in Mexico and discuss its significance in Mexican elections. Secondly, I will discuss the mean placements of the party electorates on the three most relevant dimensions of political conflict that result from a factor analysis and how they have changed in the last few years, thereby affecting the nature of party support. I will then move on to analyze individual vote choices by developing a multinomial logit model applied to exit poll data from 1997 and 2000, and focus on the differences of the presidential and the congressional vote in 2000. Finally, I will apply the vote model to pre-election polls and look at the differences in support among the entire surveyed population and among the sub-sample of likely voters. The model proves to be a good fit across different types of survey data and attains statistical significance using variables that have proved their relevance in previous studies. In my analyses, I discuss the estimated probabilities of the vote derived from the models and also develop the main argument about the coalition for change with more detail.

THE LEFT-RIGHT DISTRIBUTION IN MEXICO, 1990–2000

One of the key variables used in this chapter is the individuals' self-placement on a left-right scale. This variable helps show the Mexican parties' and candidates' sources of support in the 1990s and in 2000. But before delving into partisan features, it is important to make a few remarks on the stability and change of the left-right distribution in Mexico. According to the Mexican component of the World Values Survey, the great majority of Mexicans are consistently located in the center and center-right sections of the left-right continuum, creating a bell-shaped distribution of left and right positions.¹²

However, when we focus more sharply on the differences from one survey to the next, a clear pattern emerges in the 1990s. The category farthest to the right gained more individuals at the expense of the center and, mainly, the center-left. Mexican society moved slightly to the right from 1990 to 1997, but much more dramatically from 1997 to 2000. The mean placement for all respondents in a collapsed five-point measure increased from 3.14 to 3.16 between 1990 and 1997, and then to 3.45 in 2000.¹³ The bell-shaped distribution seems to be very stable in non-electoral periods, but it tends to polarize and takes on a three-modal pattern during periods of political campaigns. This phenomenon was observed for the first time in the 1997 legislative election, when there was an "evidently dramatic increase of the extreme categories (of the left-right continuum) and a decrease in the centrist positions."¹⁴ Some observers argue that the three-modal pattern showed up again in surveys conducted right before the PRI primary held on November 7, 1999, and that left-right orientations had a significant impact on vote choices.¹⁵

The meaning of this shift to the right will be elaborated in more detail below. For now it is sufficient to say that it had significant implications for the dynamics of party support in Mexico in 2000.

The leftist PRD received the major damage. The PRD's share of the national vote in the 1997 midterm election was about 26 percent, but it dropped to 19 and 17 percent in the 2000 congressional and presidential races, respectively. The shift to the right also raises an interesting paradox: the party farthest to the right during this period, the PRI, did not grow stronger during the 1990s, but weakened.

During the 1990s, the major underlying meaning of left and right reflected a democratic-authoritarian dimension of political conflict based on concerns about the nature of the Mexican regime.¹⁶ The left was associated with support for political reform and a democratic government, while the right was associated with support for the status quo, which meant keeping the PRI in power. As political competition increased and opposition parties defeated the PRI in local elections, this left-right divide mirrored the liberal and fundamentalist split. The left aligned with the liberals on many issues, whereas fundamentalists were religious and nationalist and more likely to reject abortion and homosexuality.¹⁷ The left-right axis also continued a socioeconomic line of conflict, which has proven to be less relevant than the former two dimensions but still significant.¹⁸

Using previous research, I constructed two-dimensional party axes using the three dimensions just described.¹⁹ In the first dimension, labeled as "democratic-authoritarian," attitudes pointed toward a military government, democracy's ability to keep order, perform economically well, and its problems of indecisiveness. The second dimension, labeled "liberal-fundamentalist," includes attitudes toward abortion, homosexuality, single mothers, gender roles, and religiosity. The third dimension, defined as "social redistribution versus capitalist incentives," includes attitudes on the role of the state vis-à-vis the individual and preferences for equality versus individual incentives. The three factors explain a cumulative variance of 43 percent. This type of analysis has been used

to map average party electorates,²⁰ and average societal placements.²¹

This analysis shows that both the PAN and the PRD have more pro-democratic supporters than the PRI, and they are, on average, more liberal as well.²² The main difference between PAN and PRD supporters is observed along the socioeconomic axis, with the PRD more to the left and the PAN more toward the center-right. From 1997 to 2000, the PRD electorate became slightly more pro-democratic, slightly more fundamentalist, and also more economically leftist.

Perhaps the PRD electorate was influenced by the 2000 Cárdenas campaign, which had a predominantly nationalist tone and criticized the privatization policies implemented by the PRI. Cárdenas's slogan on a number of television spots reflects the economic nationalism of his messages: "No privatization of the electric industry. Let's say it out loud, Mexico is ours." If true, this probably explains the movement toward a less liberal position and more economically leftist position. Unlike the PRD, the PAN remained at almost the same position on the democratic-authoritarian axis but appeared much more liberal in 2000 than it was in 1997. This increasing liberalism of PAN supporters reflects the attraction of liberal segments of the Mexican electorate to the PAN candidate, Vicente Fox, mostly at the expense of the PRD, although he received support from independent voters as well. Clearly, the PAN drew most of its supporters from the most liberal and pro-democratic segment choosing between the three main parties in 2000.

The PRI voters, on average, hold the most authoritarian and fundamentalist views of the mainstream party supporters. Moreover, from 1997 to 2000 the average PRI supporter became even more authoritarian and more fundamentalist. The struggle to maintain the "official" party and its "official" candidate in power started during the 1999 primary process, when Francisco Labastida

was continuously attacked as the candidate of the status quo. However, the most significant movement of the PRI electorate was not along the sociopolitical axis, but along the socioeconomic continuum. Having been predominantly on the right, and nearest to the pole of capitalist incentives that characterized much of the Salinas and Zedillo administrations, the average PRI supporter became much more centrist on economic matters from 1988 to 2000.

This difference is significant, and it is worth an explanation. Much of the negative tone of the PRI primary campaign focused on the problems created by the "neoliberal," free-market-oriented policies implemented during the last three PRI administrations. Being close to Carlos Salinas, a symbol of economic and structural reform in Mexico, was a handicap for the two main political contenders for the PRI presidential nomination, Francisco Labastida and Roberto Madrazo. Both of them changed the clearly pro-market discourse that had prevailed among the PRI leaders in recent years to messages favoring more social and economic redistribution policies. The result points to a more economically leftist and more fundamentalist average PRI supporter.

Despite this shift to the left on the socioeconomic axis, the PRI was, on average, to the right of the PAN and the PRD. These latter parties also moved slightly to the left on the socioeconomic continuum. Along this line, the PRI is on the right, the PRD on the left, and the PAN in the middle, as had been the case throughout the 1990s.²³ Also, as in the 1990s, the PAN benefited from its central position, attracting defectors from the PRI and the PRD, as well as independent voters. The PRD moved away from the center on every axis, thereby losing chances to benefit from the numerous available centrist voters. It seems that much of what the PRD lost, the PAN won, especially among liberals.

A MODEL OF VOTE CHOICE

What explains voters' decisions in the 2000 election? A model of vote choice based on survey data may offer some answers.²⁴

As explanatory variables, the model employs measures of regional and demographic characteristics of the respondents, party identification, ideological self-classification, religiosity, opinions about the candidates, presidential approval ratings, retrospective economic evaluations, and an indicator of those who said they voted for a change in 2000. After dropping some variables with relatively weak explanatory power, the model also is a good fit across the different surveys. This makes it possible to draw conclusions from three different perspectives: changes in voting behavior from the 1997 to the 2000 election; differences between congressional and presidential vote choices; and the impact of turnout, observing the differences between likely voters and the general population.

Voting for Congress

Let us focus first on the congressional voting model in table 2.1, which uses data from a national exit poll conducted among actual voters in 2000. The reason to start with the congressional vote is that its comparison with the 1997 vote (in the midterm legislative election) will give us a first hint about the nature of the coalition for change in 2000. How different was support for the political parties in each election, not just in its magnitude but also in its composition and meaning? According to the results of the model, there are significant differences in support for the PAN, as compared to both the PRD and the PRI.

Support for the PAN, as opposed to the PRD, was higher in the more industrialized north and the mostly Catholic central-western regions of the country but lower in the more rural, less developed south. Unlike other previous indicators of congressional voting in

TABLE 2.1.

A Model of Vote Choice for Congress and President in 2000: Multinomial Logit Estimates from a National Exit Poll

	CONGRESS				PRESIDENT			
	PRD/PAN*	PRI/PAN*	Cárdenas/Fox	Labastida/Fox	PRD/PAN*	PRI/PAN*	Cárdenas/Fox	Labastida/Fox
	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance
Intercept	.414	.459	-1.496	.005	-.173	.749	-2.329	.000
Gender (Female=1)	.188	.195	.344	.010	.349	.048	.314	.047
Age	.008	.800	.030	.288	.089	.018	.073	.032
Education	-.091	.177	-.135	.030	-.136	.097	-.136	.066
Income	-.049	.279	.002	.961	-.130	.026	-.019	.706
North	-.408	.037	-.036	.839	-.443	.067	-.520	.015
Center-West	-.688	.003	-.251	.199	-.379	.150	-.258	.262
South	.318	.072	.315	.074	.027	.900	-.050	.809
Rural	.003	.988	.623	.000	.340	.134	.564	.006
Church attendance	.110	.066	.156	.007	.110	.128	.186	.006
Labastida opinion thermometer	-.042	.126	.260	.000	-.036	.286	.423	.000
Fox opinion thermometer	-.323	.000	-.273	.000	-.510	.000	-.441	.000
Cárdenas opinion thermometer	.353	.000	.067	.015	.435	.000	.007	.826

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President Zedillo's job approval	-117	.046	.050	.411	-.028	.649	.197	.007
Personal economic situation	.041	.644	.075	.372	.156	.150	.230	.023
National economic situation	.023	.786	.023	.776	.064	.534	.012	.906
Vote for change	-.087	.547	-.648	.000	-.434	.012	-1.223	.000
Left-right self-placement	-123	.027	.007	.900	-.042	.524	.106	.114
PRI strong partisan	-.228	.452	1.943	.000	-.831	.052	2.112	.000
PRI weak partisan	-.057	.844	1.809	.000	-.742	.066	1.963	.000
PAN strong partisan	-1.273	.000	-1.415	.000	-1.724	.000	-2.021	.000
PAN weak partisan	-1.732	.000	-1.224	.000	-2.330	.000	-1.556	.000
PRD strong partisan	2.354	.000	-.736	.246	2.316	.000	-.814	.210
PRD weak partisan	2.074	.000	-.124	.770	2.172	.000	-.040	.927
-2 Log likelihood	3057.584				2153.214			
Chi-Square	3540.618				4448.082			
Significance	.000				.000			
Pseudo R-Square (Cox and Snell)	.679				.751			
Cases included in analysis	2,891				2,955			

*PRD includes the Alliance for Mexico; PAN includes the Alliance for Change. Coefficients in boldface are statistically significant at 0.05 level or less.

Mexico, frequent churchgoers were significantly more likely to vote for the PRD than for the PAN in 2000, and voters with a leftist orientation were also more likely to support the PRD.²⁵ This provides another piece of evidence about the orientation of PAN supporters in 2000.

Support for the PAN, as opposed to the PRD, was also higher among those who held a favorable opinion of Vicente Fox but significantly lower among those who had a positive image of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the PRD's presidential candidate. Presidential approval is also important: those who approved of President Zedillo's job were more likely to support the PAN over the PRD. As expected, party identification played an important role in affecting people's choices: PAN identifiers were significantly more likely to support their party in the election, and strong PAN identifiers were much more likely to do so than weak PAN identifiers. The same applies to PRD identifiers.

Gender and education are significant variables in explaining support for the PAN, as opposed to the PRI. While women were less likely to vote for the PAN, educated voters were more likely to support the PAN. Rural voters tended to vote for the PRI, and regional differences of support are only significant in the south, where voting for the PRI was more common than voting for the PAN. Demographically, then, support for the PAN was higher among more educated Mexicans and lower in rural Mexico. Voting for the PAN, as opposed to the PRI, was less likely among frequent churchgoers, just as in the PAN-PRD comparison. Again, this reflects the difference in the PAN's 2000 electoral coalition in comparison with the past: these findings from exit poll data are consistent with the increase of liberal PAN supporters shown earlier with World Values Survey data.

Opinion thermometers for Fox and Labastida explain the vote choice in the expected ways for the PAN and the PRI: a favorable image of Fox increased an individual's probability of voting PAN,

while favorable opinions of Labastida increased the probability of voting PRI. Additionally, the Cárdenas opinion thermometer is also significant: voters with a favorable opinion of Cárdenas were less likely to vote for PAN congressional candidates and more likely to support the PRI ones. Contrary to expectations, PRI candidates for Congress did not benefit from President Zedillo's high approval ratings in 2000. Presidential approval does not explain the difference of vote between PAN and PRI, suggesting that the message for change and criticism directed at the PRI regime was not targeting the Zedillo government. The *prüista* president enjoyed approval ratings higher than 60 percent at the time of the election, and he was highly popular even among *panistas*. Still, the desire for change accounts for the significant variation in support for the PAN versus the PRI. Those who voted for a change were much more likely to support PAN candidates. In this case, left-right orientations do not make a major difference, but party identification plays a role that confirms all expectations: PRI and PAN identifiers were significantly more likely to vote for the PRI and PAN, respectively, with strong identifiers even more likely to do so than weak identifiers.

Compared to the 1997 congressional elections, the PRI's share of the vote remained relatively stable, dropping only from 39 percent in 1997 to 38 percent in 2000. The PRD's share fell dramatically, from 26 percent to 19 percent (together with other minor parties that formed the Alliance for Mexico in 2000). And the PAN increased its share from 28 percent alone in 1997 to 40 percent, together with the Green Party, under the Alliance for Change in 2000.²⁶ The estimated probabilities of vote choice for the two elections do indeed reflect these trends and offer a look at where the respective losses and gains came from. The PRD lost significant ground on the left and the PAN won a great deal there, especially among educated and liberal segments of the left. The PRI lost ground on the right, giving the PAN a wide coalition

across most of the political spectrum. The coalition for change in 2000 was even more ideologically heterogeneous than the congressional coalition in 1997, when some observers noticed the PAN's catchall character.²⁷

Voting for President

The nature of the coalition for change is clearly depicted by the type of support that the PAN obtained in the 1997 and 2000 elections. However, voting for Vicente Fox demonstrated an even stronger desire for change than voting for the PAN. The Fox vote was larger and more heterogeneous than the PAN vote. In order to explain this, let us return to table 2.1 and focus on the model of presidential vote.

Voting for Fox, as opposed to Cárdenas, is explained by several demographic variables, as well as by candidate image, party identification, and by the desire for change. Women were more likely to vote for Cárdenas, but Fox attracted a younger, better educated, and more well-off electorate, as indicated by the variables for age, education, and income. The probabilities of voting for Fox were also higher in the country's northern region, and, unlike the PAN, Fox did not find significantly strong opposition in the south. Support for Fox was more evenly distributed across the country than was support for the PAN. Opinion thermometers and party identification provide the expected results, with favorable opinions about each candidate increasing the chances of voting for that respective candidate, and strong and weak partisans significantly supporting their party's candidate. In this case, PRI identifiers were significantly more likely to vote for Fox than for Cárdenas. According to research based on panel data gathered during the presidential campaigns, negative messages and mudslinging between Fox and Labastida brought serious consequences to the PRI candidate, influencing some PRI voters to turn their backs on

Labastida.²⁸ Also, some PRI primary-thwarted voters who supported the losing candidate, Roberto Madrazo, were likely to cast their votes away from the PRI in the presidential election.²⁹ It seems that disillusioned *priistas* opted to vote for Fox before they did so for Cárdenas. Most notably, voters motivated by a desire for change were more likely to support Fox, not Cárdenas.

The main influences behind the Fox vote, as opposed to the Labastida vote, reflected sociodemographic and regional characteristics, religiosity, candidate images, retrospective evaluations, party identification, and, of course, the change factor. Support for Labastida was more likely among women, older voters, and less educated Mexicans. Rural voters were a significant source of support for the PRI candidate, while the northern region was much more likely to vote for Fox. Income, however, was not significant in this case. Candidate image, represented by the opinion thermometers, influenced vote choices in the expected ways, and presidential approval worked in favor of Labastida. Interestingly, pocketbook evaluations, measured with retrospective judgments of personal economic situations, were important determinants of the vote for president. Those who considered themselves better off than in the previous year were more likely to vote for Labastida, while those who thought they were worse off were more likely to support Fox.

As usual, party identification influenced the vote in the expected ways, with partisans supporting their respective party candidate. However, left-right self placement was not significant in accounting for the Labastida vote, as opposed to Fox's. Although Labastida's main support came from the right, and very little from the left, Fox was able to draw significant rightist support, and even greater support from the center and left, as will be illustrated later. The desire for change was simply one of the most significant variables accounting for the Fox vote, as opposed to Labastida's. After all, the main point of change was a profound desire to vote the

PRI out of office. As many observers noticed during the campaigns, the presidential election had become a plebiscite on the PRI regime. Francisco Labastida was just the candidate that represented it.

In summary, bringing about a change was one of the most significant influences behind the vote for Vicente Fox, and against the PRI, in 2000. The model shown in table 2.1 indicates that there were other important influences too. The Fox coalition received significant support from young and educated Mexicans from different regions of Mexico, especially the north. According to the regression coefficients, the 2000 election did carry some expression of economic dissatisfaction, especially from pocketbook concerns. In contrast, national economic retrospective evaluations were not that important. The Peso Crisis of 1995 seems to have brought important electoral consequences based on pocketbook evaluations, rather than sociotropic concerns.

These results suggest three conclusions. First, there is an almost indistinct pattern of voting for Labastida and the PRI congressional candidates along the left-right continuum. Supporting Labastida for president was basically the same as voting for the PRI for Congress, and the more right-wing the voter, the more likely he or she would vote for them. Second, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the PRD-led Alliance for Mexico drew higher support from the left, but the probabilities of voting for Cárdenas were lower than the probabilities of voting for his party's congressional candidates in every category of the left-right continuum. The more leftist voters gave the PRD/Alliance for Mexico congressional candidates as many as five percentage points more than their presidential candidate. The same difference is observed among center-left voters. Toward the end of the campaign, one of Fox's messages focused on getting *Cardenistas* to vote for what the PAN candidate called the real option for change and asked them to make a vote that mattered. The so-called *voto útil* (or strategic vote) is reflected

in the lower support drawn by Cárdenas in comparison to the PRD/Alliance for Mexico, especially among left and center-left voters. In the election, that alliance obtained 19 percent of the official vote, while Cárdenas got 17 percent.

Unlike Cárdenas, Vicente Fox got more votes than the PAN-led Alliance for Change. The vote share for the presidential candidate was 43 percent, whereas PAN and the Green congressional candidates got 39 percent altogether. According to opinion polls, support for the Greens at the national level was between 2 to 4 percent. The difference in support for Fox and the congressional candidates came from all over the political spectrum, except on the right, where the probabilities of voting for Fox and the PAN were similar, but much lower than in the rest of the political spectrum. Support for Fox was as much as eight percentage points higher than that of PAN congressional candidates among leftist voters. Also, the PAN alliance performed best among center voters, declining toward the left and right sides, whereas support for Fox was evenly distributed from the left to the center-right. The coalition for change that translated into presidential votes was wide flung in ideological terms, which can probably be explained by strategic voting as well. Based on panel data, Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré argue that although Fox's victory in 2000 cannot be attributed only to strategic coordination, strategic voting played an important role in increasing Fox's share of the vote. According to their findings, some *Cardenistas* who considered their candidate a sure loser voted for Fox. The results presented in this chapter confirm that there was an important segment of leftist voters who supported the PRD congressional candidates but voted for Fox for president.

The Role of Turnout

The outcome of the 2000 presidential election was determined not only by the magnitude of political preferences behind

each candidate, but also by turnout. The official turnout in the 1994 presidential election was about 77 percent. Turnout in 2000 was about 64 percent, thirteen percentage points less than six years earlier. This significant difference in turnout decreased the PRI's chances to keep the presidency, and, consequently, increased Fox's to win it. Pre-election polls widely published a few days before the election showed a slight advantage in voting intentions favorable to the PRI candidate, but these polls did not screen their results by likely voters; doing so would have shown a slight Fox advantage over Labastida. Turnout was particularly low in the countryside, where the PRI usually performs better. We should turn next to analyzing the differences in vote choice between those who were likely to vote as opposed to the whole surveyed population.

Table 2.2 shows the statistical model, but this time using pre-election survey data gathered between April and June 2000 in independent national samples. The analysis used a pooled data set and screening of likely voters was done using the following variables: likelihood of voting on a ten-point scale, interest in the campaigns, and, of course, whether the respondent was a registered voter or not. These screening filters of likely voters provided a very accurate estimation of the election outcome in the pre-election polls, and seem the best way to observe, with the data at hand, the differences in support between voters and nonvoters.³⁰ The main assumption is that the coalition for change was not only about ideological orientations and demographic characteristics, but also about participation. Those who supported Fox were more likely to turn out on election day than those who supported Labastida.

The results of this analysis for the general population show that the significant variables explaining presidential preferences were education, candidate image, and party identification for all candidates. Additionally, the southern region and church attendance

were significant in the Cárdenas-Fox comparison, and gender, income, the northern region, the rural context, presidential approval, left-right orientations, and the desire for change in the Labastida-Fox comparison.

The analysis of likely voters brings some additional differences: in the Cárdenas-Fox comparison some variables that were not significant in the analysis of the total sample gained significance among likely voters. That is the case for age, income, the Labastida opinion thermometer, and national retrospective evaluations. (Favorable evaluations of the economy were linked to the Fox vote.) Education and church attendance lost significance. In the Labastida-Fox comparison age also gains significance, and the rural variable loses it. In this case, retrospective economic evaluations did not influence the choice between Fox and Labastida. A first conclusion from the analysis of likely voters is that age made a significant difference. Younger voters were much more likely to vote for Fox than for Labastida.

In summary, Fox benefited from an unexpectedly low turnout in 2000, as compared to the 1994 presidential election. His performance was higher among likely voters than among the general population. Labastida's story is the opposite: his performance would have been apparently better had more Mexicans turned out on election day. Cárdenas did get a higher support among leftist likely voters, but a lower one among those in the center. The coalition for change was a configuration of voters that were very likely to be pro-democratic, liberal, young, educated, urban, from all regions of the country but especially the north, from all over the left-right continuum except the right, and, on top of that, they were more likely to vote on July 2, 2000. Beyond these factors, the most significant explanatory variables behind the support for Fox, as opposed to Labastida, were the identification with PAN—although Fox drew the highest support among independents voters as well—and a clear desire for change.

TABLE 2.2.
 A Model of Vote Choice for President in 2000: General Population and Likely Voters: Multinomial Logit Estimates from National Pre-Election Polls

	GENERAL POPULATION						LIKELY VOTERS					
	Cárdenas/Fox		Labastida/Fox		Cárdenas/Fox		Cárdenas/Fox		Labastida/Fox		Labastida/Fox	
	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance
Intercept	1.900	.002	.379	.465	2.141	.047	.627	.493				
Gender (Female=1)	.089	.548	.219	.067	.154	.543	.135	.490				
Age	.007	.209	.007	.128	.021	.021	.013	.082				
Education	-.301	.000	-.231	.000	-.165	.181	-.212	.034				
Income	-.083	.108	-.072	.087	-.181	.023	-.105	.090				
North	.028	.886	.453	.003	.267	.420	.530	.029				
Center-West	.065	.768	.112	.515	.502	.171	-.020	.942				
South	.368	.056	.248	.131	.474	.162	.324	.230				
Rural	.057	.743	.282	.041	-.359	.237	-.036	.874				
Church attendance	-.161	.008	-.054	.283	-.124	.215	.013	.872				
Fox opinion												
thermometer	-.597	.000	-.614	.000	-.815	.000	-.739	.000				
Labastida opinion												
thermometer	-.030	.348	.421	.000	-.099	.068	.418	.000				
Cárdenas opinion												
thermometer	.572	.000	.041	.131	.674	.000	.040	.390				

The Coalition for Change

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President Zedillo's job approval	-.083	.149	.100	.047	-.076	.437	.145	.076
Personal economic situation	-.006	.965	.107	.308	.123	.560	.154	.362
National economic situation	-.183	.141	.021	.832	-.336	.097	-.020	.901
Vote for change	-.124	.412	-1.236	.000	-.404	.114	-1.194	.000
Left-right self- placement	-.035	.250	.064	.017	-.015	.761	.104	.017
PRI strong partisan	-1.003	.041	2.546	.000	-.959	.230	2.400	.000
PRI weak partisan	.151	.553	2.256	.000	-.068	.873	2.018	.000
PAN strong partisan	-2.663	.000	-2.272	.000	-2.104	.003	-2.169	.000
PAN weak partisan	-2.394	.000	-2.110	.000	-2.193	.000	-2.680	.000
PRD strong partisan	3.249	.000	-.633	.384	4.498	.000	-.038	.977
PRD weak partisan	2.176	.000	-.203	.502	2.413	.000	-.373	.434
-2 Log likelihood	3469.545				1309.998			
Chi-Square	6551.945				3509.304			
Significance	.000				.000			
Pseudo R-Square (Cox and Snell)	.734				.769			
Cases included in analysis	4,946				2,398			

Coefficients in boldface are statistically significant at 0.05 level or less.

CONCLUSION

The Mexican democratic transition through sharpened party competition has been an excellent natural laboratory for political scientists interested in understanding the dynamics of party support and the configuration of new party systems. The outcome of the 2000 presidential election has been explained from different perspectives, including the impact of a divisive open primary, the effects of campaign messages and contents, the role of strategic voter coordination, the confirmation of the importance of party identifications, the role of turnout, and so on.

Following my previous research in Mexico and Latin America, I have argued that the winning electoral coalition in 2000 was an evolving phenomenon in evidence since at least 1988. The split of two politically relevant camps shows an older, less educated, more rural, more authoritarian, and fundamentalist electorate that predominantly supported the PRI versus a younger, more educated, urban, and pro-democratic electorate that sought a change and supported opposition parties. In 2000, the desire for change was stronger than ever, and it translated mainly into votes for Vicente Fox.

The coalition for change was ideologically and regionally widespread, confirming the catchall character of the PAN. In comparison to 1997, when the PRI lost control of Congress for the first time, the PAN drew higher support in 2000 from the entire political spectrum, gaining from the PRD's losses on the left, and the PRI's losses on the right. In 2000, the PAN coalition was more heterogeneous than ever. Still, support for Vicente Fox was even broader than the PAN's. The PAN electorate confirmed its pivotal position in 2000, becoming generally the centrist party that nonetheless draws support from left and right as no other party in Mexico, stretching even the broad boundaries of a catchall party. The PRD has its niche on the left, but has lost self-identified voters in recent years, given an observable shift to the right in the dis-

tribution of the Mexican electorate. However, all party electorates moved to the left on socioeconomic concerns, after more than one decade of predominantly market-oriented policies in Mexico. The PRI's movement to the left on this axis is the most noticeable and significant and probably reflects the change in discourse among its current leaders.

"Change" was a powerful message that activated the major political opposition in Mexican society. For most people, change was about alternation, not a shift in policy orientations. The coalition for change has no ultimate meaning once change has occurred, but its ideological and demographic features make it likely that the PAN will continue to draw significant support in coming elections, independently of Fox's performance in office. Moreover, the balance of party support, which in current polls shows a slight PAN advantage over the PRI among the general population, is likely to lean more toward the PAN if the PRI is not able to mobilize supporters as it once did. Given their sociodemographic characteristics, PAN supporters are more likely to turn out voluntarily on election day. The midterm election in 2003 will provide further evidence about this question.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. Press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. Fox speech at The Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
4. Transcript of the presidential debate on October 4, 2000.
5. Miami, Fla., August 25, 2000.
6. Ibid.
7. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 10, 2000.
8. On January 11, 2001, a disgruntled and sorely disappointed Lucien Bouchard resigned as premier of Quebec, saying he had failed to keep his promise to make Quebec independent.
9. From an address to the National Policy Research Conference in Ottawa on November 30, 2000.

CHAPTER 2

1. Enrique Krauze, *La Presidencia Imperial: Ascenso y Caída del Sistema Político Mexicano, 1940–1996* (Mexico City: Tusquets Editores, 1997).
2. These figures were taken from “México Social,” edited regularly by the Banco Nacional de México, and the electoral database at the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, CIDAC.
3. A brief review of these three main parties’ histories and programs can be found in Mónica Serrano, ed., *Governing Mexico: Political*

- Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
4. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).
 5. Volker G. Lehr, "Modernización y movilización electoral, 1964–1976: Un estudio ecológico," *Estudios Políticos* 4, no. 1 (1985): 54–61, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
 6. Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
 7. Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, "Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: Construction of Partisan Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 34–48.
 8. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
 9. Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
 10. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).

11. The empirical evidence for this chapter comes from a collection of surveys conducted in Mexico between 1990 and 2002. A list of the surveys includes: 1) The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey*'s second, third, and fourth waves, administered in 1990, 1996/7, and in 2000, respectively, to slightly over 1,500 respondents in each wave. The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey* were conducted in 1990, 1996/7, and 2000 among 1,531, 1,511, and 1535 Mexican adults, respectively. They are part of the ICPSR archives, at the University of Michigan. The fourth-wave survey was conducted in February 2000, sponsored by Grupo Reforma, and conducted by the Departments of Survey Research at newspapers *Reforma*, *El Norte*, *Mural*, and *Palabra*. 2) A national exit poll administered to over 3,000 voters as they left their corresponding polling places in the 2000 elections. I compare these results with those from a national exit poll conducted in the 1997 elections. The 1997 exit poll was sponsored by the Partido Acción Nacional and conducted by *Arcop*, on July 6, 1997, among 3,452 voters. The 2000 exit poll was sponsored by Grupo Reforma and conducted on July 2, 2000, among 3,377 voters by newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. 3) Four national pre-election polls conducted between April and June 2000 and pooled into one single database. The national pre-election polls were conducted in early April, early May, late May, and mid-June, 2000, by the newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. Each survey had slightly over 1,500 respondents (with the exception of the April one, which had slightly over 1,600) from all thirty-two federal entities. For the analysis in this chapter, the four polls were pooled into a single database of 6,289 cases. All the surveys listed here are national representative samples of Mexican adults or voters, and were conducted face-to-face in the respondents' homes or as they left their polling places, in the case of the exit polls.
12. Between one-fourth and one-third of Mexican respondents, depending on the survey, do not place themselves on the left-right

scale. In this analysis, I assigned an average placement to those who did not originally place themselves on the scale. The general averages fell between categories six and seven on a ten-point scale.

13. The original measure is a ten-point self-placement scale.
14. Alejandro Moreno, "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa." *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
15. The shift to the right probably reflects the influence of the PRI's also historic primary to select its presidential candidate. The 2000 survey was conducted in February, four and a half months before the presidential election and with campaigns officially running, but, most importantly, three months after the PRI primary of November, 1999, and after Fox and others had started to advertise widely on television. Very intense negative campaigning and mudslinging characterized the primary contest, but it boosted voter interest in the PRI.
16. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, England, 1998).
17. According to Moreno (1999b), the liberal-fundamentalist dimension is empirically observable in many Latin American countries, and it provides a useful tool to analyze party competition across the region.
18. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
19. Empirically, these dimensions result from a theoretically-guided principal components factor analysis based on the Mexican sam-

- ples of the 1997 and 2000 *World Values Surveys* pooled into one single dataset.
20. Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
 21. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (February 2000): 19–51.
 22. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 1 (1999a): 45–81.
 23. Moreno, 1999a.
 24. The model is based on a multinomial logit regression that uses vote choice as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables that have been of theoretical and empirical relevance in the literature of Mexican voting behavior. The model is then applied to the different types of survey data (exit polls and pre-election polls). The vote for PAN or Fox is taken as a basis for comparison in the results shown in the tables. See for example Domínguez and McCann 1995; Magaloni 1997; Buendía 1997; Magaloni and Moreno, 2003.

25. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
26. The official vote for Congress in 2000 is not broken down by party in the case of the Alliance for Mexico (PRD) and the Alliance for Change (PAN), but opinion polls showed that support for the Green party alone was about 2 to 4 percent.
27. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
28. Alejandro Moreno, "The Effects of Negative Campaigns on Mexican Voters," in *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election*, ed. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson.
29. Alejandro Moreno and Roy Pierce, "The Impact of the PRI Primary of November 1999 on the Mexican Presidential Election of July 2000," unpublished manuscript.
30. Alejandro Moreno, "Mesa 1: Encuestas preelectorales, serie incluyendo últimas encuestas (Estimación de los votantes probables)," in *El papel de las encuestas en las elecciones federales: Memoria del taller Sumiya 2000*. Federal Elections Institute (IFE), Mexican Association of Research Agencies (AMAI), and Colegio Nacional de Actuarios, 2000, and Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, "Cómo llegó: La debacle y el triunfo". *Reforma*, December 1, 2001.

CHAPTER 3

1. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, *The Perfect Tie* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). See also John C. Green and

- Rick Farmer, *The State of the Parties*, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
2. Larry J. Sabato, *Overtime* (New York: Longman, 2002).
 3. Ibid.
 4. John C. Green et al., "Murphy Brown Revisited: The Social Issues in the 1992 Election," in *Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the Future of American Politics*, ed. Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 43–66.
 5. These data were made available by the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research. All analysis and interpretation are solely the responsibility of the authors.
 6. These data come from a poll by the Gallup Organization, May 18–May 21, 2000 (N=1,011). Data provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
 7. David K. Ryden, "Out of the Shadows, but Still in the Dark? The Courts and Political Parties," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 79–94.
 8. Gerald M. Pomper, "Parliamentary Government in the United States: A New Regime for a New Country," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 267–86.

CHAPTER 4

1. The Canadian Election Study is based on a rolling cross-section survey of 3,651 interviews conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University and Jolicoeur & Associés. It follows in the tradition of previous Canadian election studies conducted in 1979, 1984, 1988, 1993, and 1997.
2. Blais et al., *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002), 13.

3. Mordecai Richler, "More Proof That Pundits Can't Be Trusted," *National Post*, December 2, 2000, A18.
4. Conrad Black, "The Most Boring Election in History." *Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 2000, A22.
5. Peter Gzowski, "Where Do They Stand? How Would We Know?" *Globe and Mail*, November 11, 2000, A13.
6. Statistics Canada. <http://www.statcan.ca/>.
7. Ibid.
8. Blais et al., *Anatomy*.
9. Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
10. Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
11. Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder, "Issue Frames and Group Centrism in American Public Opinion," *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 1055–78.
12. Doris Graber, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide* (New York: Longman, 1984).
13. Milton Lodge, Marco Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 309–26.
14. Diana C. Mutz, "Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries," *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 4 (November 1995): 1015–42.
15. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 35.
16. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 73.
17. Barry Cooper, *Sins of Omission: Shaping the News at CBC TV* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 1.
18. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 40.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Hartley and Josephine Mazzuca, "Fewer Canadians

- Favour Legalized Abortion under Any Circumstance,” *The Gallup Poll* (Toronto: Gallup Canada, December 12, 2001).
21. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 145.
 22. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 175.
 23. Lydia Miljan and Barry Cooper, *Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003) 92.
 24. Reginald Bibby, *Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada* (Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1993).
 25. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 71.
 26. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 80 n. 12.

CHAPTER 5

1. A feat not accomplished since Mackenzie King had won three in a row in 1935, 1940, and 1945.
2. Robert A. Young, *The Struggle for Quebec* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 87.
3. Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
4. The referendum question asked voters whether they agreed “Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership.”
5. Voter turnout was an astonishing—by Canadian standards, at any rate—93.5 percent. See Québec, Directeur-général des élections, <http://www.dgeq.qc.ca/information/>.
6. The amendment of section 93 was not implemented until after the 1997 federal election, which returned the Liberals to power.
7. Formerly a political scientist at the Université de Montréal, Dion was elevated to the cabinet, along with Pierre Pettigrew, in January 1996. Dion, Allan Rock, and Marcel Massé were members of a special cabinet committee charged with elaborating a strat-

- egy for dealing with the Quebec question in early 1996. See Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 102.
8. Ibid.
 9. A third question asked the Court whether international or Canadian law would have precedence in the event of a conflict between them. For more on the Supreme Court reference see Young, *The Struggle for Quebec*, 108–9, and David Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999).
 10. In March 1997 Duceppe replaced Michel Gauthier as leader of the Bloc Québécois. Gauthier had succeeded Lucien Bouchard when the latter resigned in January 1996 to become leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec.
 11. Thus the third question put before the Court, namely whether international or Canadian law would take precedence in the event of a conflict between them, was moot.
 12. Supreme Court of Canada, *Reference Re the Secession of Quebec*, para. 138. The entire judgment is reprinted in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 14–71. The cited passage is on page 64.
 13. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 151, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69.
 14. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 153, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69–70.
 15. Canada, House of Commons, 2d session, 36th Parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999.
 16. *Clarity Act*, s. 1(4)(b).
 17. Bill C-20 does not spell out what exactly constitutes a “clear majority,” stating only that the size of the majority, along with the percentage of eligible voters and other relevant matters, will be taken into account by the House of Commons. *Clarity Act*, s. 2(2).
 18. Canada, House of Commons, 2d Session, 36th Parliament, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, *Evidence*, February 23, 2000. Online at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/CLAR/Meetings/Evidence/clarev08-e.htm>.

19. In a survey conducted between May 1 and May 8, 2000, Ekos Research Associates, Inc., found that Joe Clark had fairly high levels of trust among voters, was better known and had more widely acceptable platform ideas than his Canadian Alliance counterparts (either Preston Manning or Stockwell Day), but that his positioning on the Clarity Bill was unpopular. The sample size was 3,530 and the margin of error +/- 1.6 percent, 19 times out of 20. See "The Political Landscape: Continued Liberal Dominance, Resurgent CA, Conservatives Fading." This and other surveys can be accessed in the Ekos archives available on the Web. <http://www.ekos.ca/media>.
20. Québec, Assemblée nationale, First session, 36th legislature, December 15, 1999.
21. *An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State*, ch. 1, art. 2 and 3 (emphasis added).
22. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "Fin de siècle: Fin de la souveraineté? Quebeckers think the unthinkable," December 14, 1999. The sample consisted of 803 respondents in Quebec and 2204 Canadians outside Quebec. Margins of error were +/- 3.5 percent in Quebec and +/- 2.1 percent in the rest of the country, 19 times out of 20. The study is available online at the Ekos webpage (see note 19 above).
23. Tammy McNamee, "The Clarity Bill: Examining Liberal Party Hegemony in the Transitional Party System" (M.A. major research paper, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), 55. McNamee cites an editorial, "The Centre Stops Being Soft" in *The Economist*, December 18, 1999, which argues along similar lines.
24. Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 91. As a result of the vote, Bouchard walked out of the convention and rumors spread that he was considering resigning as party leader. Bouchard stayed put, of course, and he gradually asserted control over the party apparatus (if not over the most militant advocates of independence, *les purs et*

- durs*): over 90 percent of delegates supported his leadership at the PQ convention in May 2000.
25. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "The Quebec Political Landscape," March 5, 1999. Sample size was 1,006 in Quebec and 1871 in ROC.
 26. Angus Reid Group, "Issues and Attitudes in a 1998 Post-Election Quebec," December 1, 1998. Sample size was 1,000 and the margin of error was +/- 3.1 percent, 19 times out of 20. The survey was accessed online at <http://www.angusreid.com>.
 27. Bloc Québécois, *Le Québec gagne à voter Bloc* (Montreal, 2000; English version). Accessed online at <http://www.blocquebecois.org>. Sovereignty is mentioned only once, at the beginning of the pamphlet, in an excerpt from the BQ's declaration of principles. The thrust of the document concerns the Bloc's role in defending Quebec's interests within the federal system and in holding the federal Liberals accountable, just as an opposition party should do. For an insightful analysis of the 2000 federal election campaign, and the relatively minor role played by the issue of sovereignty, see Stephen Clarkson, "The Liberal Threepeat: The Multi-System Party in the Multi-Party System," in *The Canadian General Election of 2000*, ed. Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2001), 13–57.
 28. Claire Durand, a sociologist at the Université de Montréal, argues that pollsters systematically underestimate Liberal support in Quebec, perhaps (though this is only speculative) because respondents in surveys are reluctant to admit to supporting the federalist party. In 2000, the underestimation of Liberal support, when all polls were averaged together, was approximately 4 percent. See Durand's paper, "Electoral Surveys in the 2000 Canadian Campaign: How Did They Really Fare?" <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/socio/durandc/menurecherche.htm>, n.d.
 29. André Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," in Pammett and Dornan, *Canadian General Election of 2000*, 139–40.

30. The three defectors were André Harvey in Chicoutimi, David Price in Compton-Stanstead, and Diane St.-Jacques in Shefford.
31. In spite of this pronounced decline, Quebec still had the third-highest turnout among the provinces and territories in the 2000 election. Only Prince Edward Island (72.7 percent) and New Brunswick (67.7) registered higher turnout rates. I have calculated Quebec turnout rates from raw data supplied by Elections Canada. There is a very slight difference (one-tenth of one percent) between the figures for Quebec voter turnout reported in the *Official Voting Results* for the 37th General Election and those calculated from the raw data.
32. Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," 141.
33. Édith Brochu and Louis Massicotte, "Élections fédérales de novembre: Coup de loupe sur un scrutin," *Le Devoir*, February 26, 2002, A7.
34. Don Macpherson, "The Evil of Two Lessers: Neither Liberals nor the Bloc Can Hold Heads High as Apathy Ruled in Quebec," *Montreal Gazette*, November 29, 2000.
35. Michaud made his remarks—inter alia, he claimed that Jews feel that they are the only people to have suffered in the history of humanity—in a radio interview in early December and repeated them in testimony before the Estates-General on the Situation and Future of the French Language in Quebec. I have written in greater detail about the Michaud Affair in "Sclerosis or a Clean Bill of Health? Diagnosing Quebec's Party System in the 21st Century," in *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2004).
36. Québec, Premier ministre, "Allocution à l'occasion de la démission du premier ministre du Québec," January 11, 2001. Available at the website of the Association internationale des études québécoises. <http://www.aieq.qc.ca/bouchard.htm>.
37. This remark was actually made before Landry officially became leader of the PQ, in January 2001, at a party caucus meeting.

- Landry's outburst was occasioned by the federal government's offer of an \$18 million subsidy to the province for the renovation of the Aquarium de Québec. One of the strings attached to this money, however, was that the Canadian flag (the "bits of red rag" in question) be allowed to fly and bilingual signs be posted at the renovated site. This offer prompted Landry's crude metaphor.
38. The data on "Referendum Voting Intentions" are available at Léger Marketing's website, <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was generally close to 1,000, and the surveys were conducted approximately 10 or so times each year. The margin of error for a sample this size is +/-3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
 39. Léger Marketing, "Opinions of Quebecers toward Provincial Politics and More Particularly the ADQ," May 2002. <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was 1,001, with a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
 40. Léger Marketing finds that the ADQ and the Quebec Liberals are running neck and neck, with 35 percent of voters saying that they would vote Liberal if a provincial election were to be held and 32 percent supporting the ADQ (the PQ stands at 26 percent). See "Opinions of Quebecers Toward Provincial Politics," May 2002.
 41. See Lisée's book, *Sortie de secours* (Montreal: Boréal, 2000). For commentary on the Lisée proposal, see Gordon Gibson, "Will Separatists Settle for a Half a Loaf?" *National Post*, January 18, 2001. Online at <http://www.vigile.net/01-1/gibson.html>. See also Alexander Panetta, "PQ Strongly Considers Referendum to Ask Ottawa for More Cash: Landry," *Montreal Gazette*, June 4, 2002.
 42. Québec, Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec, *Le français, une langue pour tout le monde* (Québec, 2001), 12 (my translation).
 43. Shawn McCarthy, "Shut Down Campaign, PM Orders Martin," *Globe and Mail*, May 31, 2002, A1.

CHAPTER 6

1. Matthew Stevenson, "Canada's Other Brain Drain: The Continuing Exodus from Quebec," *Political Options/Options Politiques* (October 2000): 63–66, page 64, www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf.
2. Richard Rodriguez, *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* (New York: Viking, 2002) 94, 103, 105, and 108.
3. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 110.
4. "Carnaval Celebrants Grin and Bare It Despite S.F. Fog," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, B1.
5. Robert E. Chenard, "Historical Perspective on Waterville's 19C Franco-Americans," <http://members.mint.net/frenchcx/frcanwtv/htm>.
6. Roger Roy, "An Analysis of the Assimilation of French-Canadian Language and Culture into American Language and Culture: How French-Canadian Became Franco-American and then Became Invisible" (Graduate research essay for EDU 690 Social Context of Higher Education, University of Maine).
7. Juliana L'Hereux, "North American French as an Academic Subject." www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm.
8. Ilan Stavans, "Spanglish: Tickling the Tongue," *World Literature Today* 74.3 (Summer 2000): 555.
9. "Tom, Tom and Julia . . . The Names Say It All," *Globe and Mail*, February 6, 2000, R2.
10. Neva Chonin, "Morissette Does Her Own Thing," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 7, 2002, D3.
11. Neva Chonin, "Furtado in Control at Warfield," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 16, 2002, D1.
12. Paula Martinac, *k.d. lang* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1997), 89.
13. Quoted in David Bennahum, ed., *In her own words: k.d. lang* (New York: Omnibus, 1995), 18.

14. Bennahum, *In her own words*, 7.
15. "Celine's New Album," *Globe and Mail*. February 7, 2002, R2.
16. Tim Goodman, "Families, Frisco Formulas for Fall," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, D1.
17. Jonathan Curiel, "Lack of TV Diversity Hit," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 15, 2002, A2.
18. Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
19. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 117.
20. Andrew Mollison, "Researchers Attack Bush's Education Reforms," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 16, 2002, A4.
21. Ibid.
22. Mary Jordan, "Fewer Migrants Caught on Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A14.
23. "INS Unveils New Plan, Devices for Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A9.
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25. "More People Say That They're Just 'Americans,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 8, 2002, A8.
26. Anthony Walton, rev. of *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* by Richard Rodriguez, *New York Times Book Review*, April 7, 2002, 7.
27. Rodriguez, *Brown*, xii.
28. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 164.

CHAPTER 7

1. Anthony DePalma, *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 354.
2. Seymour M. Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee, 1989).
3. Seymour M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and*

- Persistence in Social Structures* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988).
4. James Laxer, *Discovering America: Travels in the Land of Guns, God, and Corporate Gurus* (New York: New Press, 2001). See also, Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1996).
 5. For a fuller description of this analysis, see Stephen Brooks, "A Tale of Two Elections: What the Leaders' Rhetoric from the 2000 Election Tells Us about Can-Am Political Culture Differences" (paper delivered at the Biennial Meeting of the Canadian Studies in the United States, San Antonio, Tex., November 2001). Readers may also contact the author at brooks3@uwindsor.ca.

CHAPTER 8

1. Ray C. Fair, <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/>. Randall L. Jones Jr., *Who Will Be in the White House: Predicting Presidential Elections* (New York: Longman, 2002), and James E. Campbell and James C. Garand, eds., *Before the Vote: Forecasting American Election Politics* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2000).
2. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, chapters 8 and 9.
3. Fair, <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/>.
4. Mark J. Kasoff and Christine Drennen, eds., *Canada: A Fractured Political Landscape*, Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 1994.
5. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, 79.
6. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
7. *Globe and Mail*, April 29, 2002.
8. United Press International, September 10, 2001.
9. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
10. Earl H. Fry and Jared Bybee, *NAFTA 2002: A Cost/Benefit Analy-*

- sis for the United States, Canada and Mexico* (Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, Orono, 2002).
11. Nick Schultz, "Canadian Energy Policy and Trade with the United States," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
 12. Michel Tremblay, "Hydro-Québec and TransÉnergie: Continuity in a Changing Environment," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
 13. *Wall Street Journal*, April 24, 2002.
 14. *AuCanada*, "Bruising Battle over Tomatoes," Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 2002.
 15. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
 16. *Globe and Mail*, May 22, 2002.
 17. *Globe and Mail*, April 25, 2002; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, *Economic Trends*, May 2002.
 18. *Globe and Mail*, March 6, 2002.

CHAPTER 9

1. Jorge Castañeda, "El nuevo activismo internacional mexicano," *Reforma*, September 23, 2001a, Section Enfoque 15–17; "Los ejes de la política exterior," *Nexos* 23 no. 288 (December 2001b) 66–74; and "El factor externo y consolidación de la democracia en México," *Reforma*, February 24, 2002, 10A.
2. For Castañeda's critical view on U.S.-Mexican relations before becoming minister of foreign affairs, see Castañeda, 1996.
3. Robert Pastor has made an effort to articulate a greater post-NAFTA vision for North America. He advocates institutional deepening, among other things, in order to deal with continental problems that hitherto were handled under national or bilateral agendas. However, Pastor's position does not represent the official positions of any NAFTA members. See Robert Pastor, *Toward a North American Community* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

4. For a comprehensive view of migratory problems between Mexico and the U.S. see SRE, 1997.
5. George Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/, 2002a.
6. “Estrategia nacional para la seguridad del territorio nacional. Resumen ejecutivo,” Office of the Press Secretary, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html. 2002; and George Bush, “Securing the Homeland and Strengthening the Nation,” www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/, 2002b.
7. Eduardo Sojo, et al., “Sociedad para la Prosperidad: Reporte a los Presidentes Vicente Fox y George Bush,” Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002, electronic copy.
8. A declaration was released from a top official of that ministry, suggesting that Mexico was considering bringing the case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, but eventually did not.
9. Mr. Castañeda’s most recent address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, condemning any unilateral action against Iraq in the global war against terrorism, suggests that Mexico is heading in that direction. See *Reforma*, September 14, 2002.

CHAPTER 10

1. Alvaro Artiga, *La Política y los Sistemas de Partidos en Centroamérica*, (San Salvador: 2000).
2. Manuel Orozco, *International Norms and Mobilization of Democracy*, (London: Ashgate, 2002).
3. Graeme Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000).
4. “Aleman llama a Ortega a concertar pacto de gobernabilidad en Nicaragua,” *La Prensa* (Honduras), November 23, 1996, <http://www.laprensahn.com/caarc/9611/c23002.htm>.

5. Both had resigned from their positions; their continuation was not desired by the new members. Moreover, they were not interested in supporting the new establishment.
6. "Desconfianza impera en el ámbito pre-electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana*, July 28, 2000.
7. The extent of corruption in Aleman's government is the subject of another paper. However, suffice it to say that in 1999 the comptroller had identified a number of anomalies and abuses of government resources on behalf of the president. The most public case was the use of resources to build infrastructure at the president's farm, La Chilamapa, the construction of a special road leading to the president's home, and a number of contracts. His wealth was estimated to have increased by millions of dollars. *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000.
8. "A Society Scandalized," *Envio* (June 2000).
9. "The Air is Thick with Electoral Fraud," *Envio* (July 2000).
10. "Indeciso proceso electoral en marcha," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), April 28, 2000.
11. "Entre Partidos te veas: candente ambiente pre electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), August 18, 2000.
12. "Renuncia evidencia lucha por el poder" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), May 26, 2000.
13. "Contraloría va contra Solórzano," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 11, 2000.
14. Consuelo Sandoval and Nidia Ruiz López, "Solórzano sorprende a políticos," *La Prensa* (Managua), March 17, 2001.
15. "No tengo la alternativa ideal," *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000. In late March 2001 Daniel Ortega announced the endorsement of Jarquín and the alliance with the Christian Way.
16. "Presidente Alemán admite desgaste," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 19, 2000.

17. "Renuncian candidatos conservadores," *La Prensa*, July 17, 2001.
18. A poll showed that Ortega had the lead in the election with 31 percent. Shortly after this poll, he endorsed the alliance with the Christian Way. "Encuesta nacional de CINCO: Ningún ganador a la vista," *Confidencial*, 233, March 18–24, 2001.
19. "Milagro Electoral de Enrique Bolaños," interview with Victor Borge (Borge y Asociados) by Adolfo Pastran, August 9, 2001.
20. John Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1998), 174.
21. Edelberto Torres Rivas, *Costa Rica crisis y desafíos* (San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones [DEI], 1987).
22. Eliana Franco and Carlos Sojo, *Gobierno, Empresarios y políticas de ajuste* (San José: FLACSO, 1992).
23. "Pactos, descrédito, inestabilidad" *La Nación* (San José) 1995.
24. "Modelo económico impulsa crecimiento con pobreza," *Inforpress Centroamericana*, December 1, 2000.
25. Araya joined the party very young, was president of the youth movement, legislator, minister, and president of the party.
26. "Complicado panorama para elecciones," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala) June 22, 2001.
27. INCEP, *Reporte Político/Panorama Centroamericano No. 171: Llegaron las internas partidarias para designación de candidatos*, Guatemala, June 2001, 5.
28. *Inforpress*, June 2001.
29. IDESPO, *La población costarricense del gran area metropolitana frente a su participación ciudadana y sus valores políticos*, Heredia: IDESPO, May 23, 2001.
30. Juan Manuel Villasuso, Jenny Díaz, and Laura Chinchilla, *Gobernabilidad democrática y seguridad ciudadana: El Caso de Costa Rica* (Managua: CRIES, 2000).
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32. Jorge Rovira Mas, *La democracia de Costa Rica ante el siglo XXI*, San José: FLACSO, 2000.
33. Carlos Sojo (director of FLASCO), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 21, 2000.
34. Cecilia Cortes (Director of Funpadem), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 23, 2002.
35. Rodríguez interview.
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