

PART IV

Epilogue

## CHAPTER 10

# Beyond Trinity: Parties and Elections in Central America

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UNTIL THE LATE 1980s, the politics of elections in Central America were linked to the prevalence of dictatorships, military rulers, and warfare. For many years, political leaders struggled to gain the right to vote or to participate in free and fair elections. As a consequence, Central American countries have entered into a process of democratization in which elections continue to be an important part.


To understand the deepening integration of North America, and of the whole Western Hemisphere—potentially moving beyond the “reluctant trinity” of the United States, Mexico, and Canada, it is necessary to look at two elements. First, it is important to understand the key characteristics of Central American elections from a historic perspective, while considering the recent challenges faced by countries such as Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Second, we should address the constraints Central American party systems face internally and externally within the context of the democratization and modernization of their political systems.

## PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICAN HISTORY

Four key factors have determined the fate and influence of power and politics in Central America: the level of social stratification; the concentration or fragmentation of power; the ways in which violence and repression are employed; and the form in which resistance to authority has occurred. These four factors have traditionally functioned through *caudillo* politics: a highly stratified society with significant levels of social inequality, concentrated power and authority in the hands of a *caudillo*, be this a dictator or military ruler, the extensive use of violence and repression as a method of managing everyday life, and limited social resistance to these practices due to repression and the presence of a culture of violence.

Within this context political parties were historically subsumed by the forces of powerful economic elites, dictators, and the military. Dictators and military rulers of various kinds, including Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, Anastasio Somoza Garcia in Nicaragua, Tiburcio Carías in Honduras, and Maximiliano Martínez in El Salvador (see figure 10.1), have plagued Central American political history. Each sought to control political power by strengthening the armies they commanded and buying off parties.

This does not mean that political parties were inactive; table 10.1 lists the parties active in Central America today, the years in which they were founded, their ideologies, and positions on the right-left spectrum. The earliest parties supported or rejected political schemes related to regional federation proposals; these have been replaced by a wide variety of parties. First, the rise of “liberalism,” which in Latin America meant the separation of church and state, produced competing parties, some with pro-liberal positions or with the opposite pro-conservative stances. During the period of dictatorships and military rule, such parties sought to accommodate their ideologies to those in power by seeking limited demands. Second, in many Latin American countries, new political parties were created

**Figure 10.1. Dictatorships and Military Rule, 1930–1990s**

in the 1940s and 1950s, ascribing to Christian Democratic ideologies. There were also Communist parties whose existence was briefly permitted during the period preceding the Cold War, but were then banned, and regained legal recognition in the 1960s. Other socialist and social-democratic parties have appeared since then, some of which were involved in the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s, such as the FSLN in Nicaragua and FMLN in El Salvador. In addition, new conservative parties, such as ARENA in El Salvador, have developed in recent times, some tied to the civil wars as well.

Within dictatorial regimes, parties coexisted with military forces in order to survive, acquiescing to the demands of clientage systems dominated by generals or economic elites. In some countries, Guatemala and El Salvador, for instance, the military rulers created their own political parties, headed by retired army officers. Even when elections were permitted, fraud was a prevalent practice or the military intervened in the political and electoral process. The tables below show the various forms of access to power, the main authorities in charge, and the significance of military participation, which limited opportunities for pluralism and competition.

TABLE 10.1.

## Political Parties in Central America

Country and Party	Founded	Ideology	Positioning
<i>Nicaragua</i>			
Partido Conservador de Nicaragua (PCN)	1940	Conservative	Right
Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN)	1940	Liberal	Right
Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC)	1967	Liberal	Right
Partido Socialista Nicaraguense (PSN)	1944	Socialist	Center Left
Partido Social Cristiano (PSC)	1957	Social Democrat	Center Left
Frente Sandinista de Liberacion (FSLN)	1960	Socialist	Left
<i>Costa Rica</i>			
Partido Republicano (PR)	1940	Conservative	Right
Partido Unidad Social Cristiano (PUSC)	1985	Christian Democrat	Center
Partido Accion Cuidadana (PAC)	2001	Social Democrat	Center Left
Pueblo Unido (PU)	1978	Socialist	Center Left
Partido Comunista (PC)	1940	Communist	Left
Partido Liberacion Nacional (PLN)	1948	Communist	Left

TABLE 10.1. (continued)

<b>Country and Party</b>	<b>Founded</b>	<b>Ideology</b>	<b>Positioning</b>
<i>Guatemala</i>			
Frente Republicano			
Guatemalteca (FRG)	1988	Conservative	Right
Partido Accion Nacional (PAN)	1990	Conservative	Right
Union Centro Nacional (UCN)	1990	Conservative	Right
Partido Democrata			
Cristiano (PDC)	1955	Christian Democrat	Center
Unidad Revolucionaria			
Nacional (URNG)	1982	Socialist	Center Left
<i>El Salvador</i>			
Alianza Republicana			
Nacional (ARENA)	1981	Conservative	Right
Partido Conciliacion			
Nacional (PCN)	1961	Liberal	Right
Partido Democrata			
Cristiano (PDC)	1960	Christian Democrat	Center
Frente Farabunto			
Marti (FMLN)	1981	Socialist	Left
<i>Honduras</i>			
Partido Nacional (PN)	1902	Conservative	Right
Partido Liberal (PL)	1891	Liberal	Right
Partido Democrata			
Cristiano (PDC)	1980	Christian Democrat	Center
Partido Comunista de			
Honduras (PCH)	1954	Communist	Left

TABLE 10.2.

## Forms of Access to Power, 1950–1980

Forms of Access to Power	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Nicaragua	Central America
Election	26.70%	50.00%	33.30%	44.40%	37.50%
Fraud	20.00%			33.30%	12.50%
Congress	13.30%	8.30%	25.00%		12.50%
Coup	26.70%	33.30%	41.70%	11.10%	29.20%
Revolution				11.10%	2.10%
Other	13.30%	8.30%			6.30%

Source: Data compiled by the author

TABLE 10.3.

## Main Authority in Charge, 1950–1980

Main authority in charge	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Nicaragua	Central America
Civilian	26.70%	16.70%	41.70%	11.10%	25.00%
Civic/Military	26.70%			11.10%	10.40%
Military	46.70%	83.30%	58.30%	77.80%	64.60%

Source: Data compiled by the author

Thus, except for Costa Rica, most political parties in Central America prior to the 1980s operated under significantly restricted schemes of political participation due to the presence of dictatorial regimes. Table 10.4 offers a typology of party systems in Central America.<sup>1</sup> Elections were racist, fraudulent, and both pluralism and competition were largely absent. Resistance to the state was also commonplace, often in the form of guerrilla warfare.

TABLE 10.4.

## Types of Political Parties in Central America

Regime Type	Party System	Country and Period
Dictatorial	Hegemonic system	El Salvador, 1950–1979
		Nicaragua, 1936–1979
	Restricted pluralism	Guatemala, 1963–1982
	‘Artificial’ two-party scheme	Honduras, 1965–1971
Democracy	Dominant party	Costa Rica, 1953–1978
	Tolerated pluralism	Costa Rica, 1953–1978 (legislature)
		Honduras, 1982–2002
	Two-party system	Costa Rica, 1982–2002
		Nicaragua, 2000–2002

However, by the 1980s the demand and struggle for democracy led to a process of liberalization that attempted to reconstruct or redefine political traditions in many ways. The struggle between a conservative state, its elites and followers, and the larger community of people struggling to increase their participation of society in national life gradually transformed a process of military and violent confrontation to conditions of dialogue, negotiation, and political reform. This struggle has generally undergone four stages.

First, negotiations to end the civil wars occurred in all the countries which had such conflicts. Guerrilla forces such as the Contras, FMLN, Morazanist Front, Cinchonero, URNG and others, negotiated to end civil wars in order to democratize their countries. One fundamental aspect of this process is the inclusion of electoral politics and the protection of human rights as both an element of and a condition for negotiation. Second, all over Central America, social forces, increasingly including governments,



engaged in efforts to improve human rights. This struggle took two forms: on the one hand there was (and is) an attempt to reverse the culture of violence that became endemic in the region; and, on the other hand, there was increased pressure to implement efficient administrative measures of justice and human rights. Within this context, Central Americans sought to face the past by investigating abuses.

Third, social forces organized in various ways to transform democracy from a process of exclusion to a process of engaging in active participation in everyday problems by promoting democracy from below. Fourth, electoral politics were legitimized. The nations of Central America recognized that as a fundamental aspect, democracy demands the election of governmental representatives with participatory and competitive political parties at work. Many of these competing parties were involved in demanding free and fair elections. From the end of the 1980s and through most of the 1990s, a number of Central American countries underwent these experiences. Although far from achieving true democracy, especially in the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan cases, these forces continue to treat it as a work in progress. Ending internal conflict, dealing with the past, participating in electoral processes, and strengthening civil society have been central to the region's democratic successes.

Political parties, however, continue to face serious challenges. Although electoral fraud is no longer an issue, the lack of representation of parties has affected the progress, of democratization in the region. Other problems involve the prevalence of *caudillo* politics within each political party, preventing younger cadres from achieving positions of authority.

### *The Politics of Reform: Nicaraguan Elections*

An agreement between the two major political forces in Nicaragua, culminating with the November 2001 election

changed the political dynamics and prospects for democracy in that country. The forced imposition of a two-party system led to the decomposition of democratic institutions and the gradual exclusion of citizen participation in politics.

A democratic transition was inaugurated in Nicaragua after national elections were held in 1990 and Violeta Chamorro declared the victor. Chamorro was concerned with achieving national reconciliation, pacification, and state reform. Although her government inherited deep political polarization, and small-scale violence continued after the war, she was able to demilitarize the state, increase political participation, and peacefully guarantee a second democratic election in 1996.<sup>2</sup> For the first time in Nicaragua one democratically elected government passed power to another popularly elected government. Arnaldo Alemán became the new president, and the FSLN remained the dominant opposition party.

Alemán's victory consolidated key political allegiances and deepened a division between traditional, pro-status-quo groups (Liberals) and populist, pro-labor-rights organizations (the Sandinistas). The preference for Liberals reflected Nicaraguan traditionalism and conservative values, the negative memories associated with life under the FSLN, and support for a free-market economy. The support for the Sandinistas reflected a rejection of Somocismo, as well as an orientation toward policies that sought to redistribute wealth and was grounded in populist rhetoric. Alemán has adopted an undemocratic style of rule. He surrounded himself with traditional politicians, some of whom had worked with the Somoza dictatorship, and technocrats, who maintained structural adjustment measures and emphasized strengthening the construction and agricultural sectors. His rule, conservative economically and politically, has angered many sectors of society, the Sandinistas included, but Alemán has made pacts with the San-

dinistas to secure important power positions. As a consequence the country has no legitimate and viable political opposition.

Democracy was most strongly undermined when Alemán and the FSLN negotiated a political formula that protects his influence after his term ends. The pact is also designed to exclude other political forces from electoral competition or at least make participation extremely difficult. It was accompanied by consistent abuse of political authority and government corruption at all levels.

### *Negotiating Exclusion: Constitutional and Electoral Reforms*

Elite pacts have been an important method of achieving democratic change. Graeme Gill has also explained, however, that real democratization is achieved by involving broader social sectors, not just the political elites.<sup>3</sup> In the history of Nicaraguan politics, however, elite pacts between any two dominant forces have traditionally been anti-democratic, as they have sought to eliminate potential and existing opposition forces. Table 10.5 lists the major political agreements in Nicaraguan history. In contrast, the 1995 agreement on constitutional reforms was reached as a result of different political forces working in concert to produce positive changes.

However, the Alemán government, in agreement with the FSLN, designed a political formula that returned to the old practices of 'pactism.' Furthermore, it has endangered the future of democracy by establishing an almost perfect legal framework for excluding political parties through a form of neocaudillism. Shortly after Alemán's electoral victory in 1996, he encouraged former president Daniel Ortega to recognize defeat and move to establish a political agreement that would work for both.<sup>4</sup> (In fact, once Alemán came to power, he engaged in private conversations with Ortega in order to resolve a property dispute.) By 1998, the talks had moved on to achieving a political agreement, through

TABLE 10.5.

## Political Pacts in Nicaragua

<i>Year</i>	<i>Pacts</i>
1857	Pact between Liberals and Conservatives: "Thirty years of Conservative peace"
1893	Pact of Sabana Grande and Momotombo: Conservatives negotiate presidential succession
1910	Dawson Pact: shared government, elections, and continuity between Liberals and Conservatives
1927	Pact of Espino Negro (this pact continued A. Sandino's struggle against U.S. intervention)
1940	Washington Pact: Liberals, Conservatives, and U.S. government
1950	The General's Pact: agreement between Somoza Garcia, and the Conservative Party
1972	Pact Kupia Kumi or Agüero-Somoza Pact: agreement between Somoza Debayle and Conservatives
1990	Transition Protocol: FSLN and UNO agreement about the transfer of power
1995	Framework Law: national political elites' agreement on constitutional reforms

Source: Information elaborated by the author.

constitutional reforms, to create a power-sharing scheme by dividing appointments to governmental institutions, such as the Supreme Court, the Comptroller's Office, and the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC). To the Sandinista faction supporting Daniel Ortega, this agreement represented an important stepping stone toward achieving political power in 2001. To Alemán supporters, it represented a consolidation of their current grip on power, as well as protection of the economic benefits they had achieved while in government. During formal negotiations in 1999, a number of is-

sues were addressed, such as Alemán's demand for re-election, the division of Managua into three municipalities (which decreased its administrative and political influence), and the distribution between Liberals and Sandinistas of appointments to the Supreme Court, the Electoral Councils, and other key governmental institutions.

By August 1999, after eleven meetings, the two sides had drafted a final version of the political agreement to be legalized through constitutional reforms. Despite national opposition and rejection of the pact by public opinion and civil society, the reforms were published as law in the official government newspaper, *La Gaceta*, in January 2000. The reforms included more than nine changes to the Constitution, including reform of the electoral law. The electoral law also established constraints on the formation of political parties. Two of the most damaging reforms were, first, lowering from 45 percent to 40 percent the votes needed to win an election in a first round, or to 35 percent if the leading party has a 5 percent lead over the other parties, and second, the requirement to garner loyal endorsements from 3 percent of registered voters in order to participate in an election. The following tables illustrate the reforms to the Constitution and electoral law.

### *Exercising Exclusion: Constraining Citizens*

Key to democratic practice is the ability of citizens to express themselves in different political contexts: as individuals with political opinions, as citizens organized in civil society groups or in social movements, as citizens who belong to political parties, or as citizens who choose to run for government offices. Political parties, candidates, and citizens represent the means for political competition and participation. The Alemán government and the FSLN with Daniel Ortega as its leader designed an almost perfect political formula that excludes all three from choosing how they

**Figure 10.2. The Constitutional Reforms**

- **DUAL NATIONALITY:** The Constitution allowed the existence of dual nationality. This reform is a very important one as it provides incentives to Nicaraguans living abroad to retain or reapply for their Nicaraguan nationality while being citizens of another country. The intent or at least effect, was politically oriented, namely to legalize the status of a number of Alemán supporters who were U.S. citizens.
- **LEGISLATIVE SEAT TO A PRESIDENT:** This reform stipulates that after serving a term, the president automatically joins the Legislative Assembly. This change means that Alemán will continue to influence politics, now from Congress after 2001.
- **SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE MAGISTRATES:** The number of its members increased from 12 to 16 members and was between the FSLN and Liberals.
- **A BOARD IN THE COMPTROLLERS OFFICE:** The authority of the office changed from one person to a five member board, also composed ideologically.
- **SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL:** The membership increased from five to seven members and three deputies. The formation followed an ideological divide.
- **PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY:** The number of votes required to remove the immunity of a president changed from a simple majority into a two thirds majority.
- **ELECTORAL VICTORY:** A candidate running for office can win an election with 40% of the vote (this was changed from 45%). However if a leading candidate has 35% of the votes and is 5% ahead of the candidate in the second place, then such candidate wins the election.

*The Electoral Reforms*

- **PARTY FORMATION:** In order for a political party to run, it must have 3% of support from those registered to vote. This equals about 73,000 registered voters.
- **PARTY LOYALTY:** Citizens can only express support for one political party with their signature. Supporting more than one party invalidates their endorsement.
- **PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:** A political party must have a complex structure comprised of a nine member national directorate, seven member departmental directorates, and five representatives in each of the municipalities.

**Figure 10.2. The Constitutional Reforms (continued)**

- **LEGAL RECOGNITION:** Political parties must achieve legal recognition at least one year before a national election, and six months before a municipal election. This year, opposition parties had only four months to achieve recognition to participate in municipal elections.
- **NATIONAL PARTICIPATION:** Parties must participate in all contests of a national election.
- **PARTISANSHIP OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITIES:** Electoral Authorities must be formed by the two major political parties. In case of an alliance they would be formed by the leading party of that alliance. In the current scenario, this meant the FSLN and the PLC.
- **MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS:** Parties could be allowed to obtain 80% of signatures and representatives in 80% of municipalities and still be recognized as new parties.
- **LOSS OF RECOGNITION:** If the party earns less than 4% of votes in an election it has to apply again for recognition for the next election.
- **POPULAR SUBSCRIPTION:** Candidates have to be party members. Independents are not allowed.
- **MUNICIPAL DIVISION:** Managua was to be divided into three municipalities, resulting in gerrymandering.
- **ALLIANCES:** To form an alliance two requirements exist. All alliance member parties must obtain the 3% support from registered citizens, and the alliance must be lead by a political party, not by a new coalition.

want to participate in politics. Political parties are legally constrained through the reforms by eliminating their chances to run for government, as the requirements are highly demanding. Fragmentation followed as groups attempted to form coalitions and disagreements ensued. It has also prevented the creation of regional parties or parties interested only in legislative seats, not in presidential runner-ups. Candidates wishing to participate in electoral contests have been prevented from doing so in various ways. They cannot run as independents, nor just for legislative seats. Citizens have been discouraged from voting if their preferences are for a third party, which is the case for approximately 30 percent of

the population. Moreover, the electoral law stimulates abstention. (The law and constitutional reforms have also been constrained by political maneuvering and through abuses of governmental authority.)

After the reforms were implemented, a political machine emerged designed to enforce a new *caudillo* system, organized through hierarchical settings, from top to bottom. The Supreme Court judges, Supreme Electoral Council members, Bank Superintendency chief, and Comptroller's Office Board now divided its membership under two political flags, the FSLN and PLC. The previous heads of the Supreme Electoral Council, Rosa Marina Zelaya, and the Comptroller's Office, Agustin Jarquin, were eventually removed from their positions.<sup>5</sup> The new members had tainted the posts with their ideological views. Zelaya stated, for example, that "the positions from the Electoral Affairs Division, and the General Directorate of Informatics represented the vertebral column of the elections, [and these are] positions held by Sandinista member Adonai Jiménez and Narciso Aguilera respectively."<sup>6</sup> Jarquin, on the other hand, had suffered jail time for alleged fraud, charges which in fact were Alemán's way of intimidating the comptroller's investigation of corrupt activities by the president.<sup>7</sup>

After the January implementation of the reforms, all political parties began to organize and form alliances to comply with the requirements. A significant number of small parties immediately decided not to participate, overwhelmed by the excessive demands placed on them by the CSE. At least seven political groups, however, sought to engage in the political game. Among them were the Movimiento Renovación Sandinista (MRS), Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI), Unión Social Cristiana (USC), Movimiento Democrático Nicaraguense (MDN), Pronal, Camino Cristiano (Christian Way), and Partido Conservador de Nicaragua (PCN). Attempts to form coalitions were part of the strategy, while the



FSLN and PLC were hoping some of these parties would be excluded. It was important to the Sandinista party to remove the MRS (and its alliance group, the Third Way) from the political landscape in order to run unchallenged as the party of the left. Alemán's party, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC), wanted PLI and other smaller liberal groupings out of the electoral game as well.

By February and March 2000, these political opposition parties sought to establish alliances as a third force to confront the two parties that had compacted with each other, abusing the constitution and the legal framework to protect their status quo. Eight political groups agreed to form an implicit alliance supporting one party, the MDN, without formally declaring their alliance, thus avoiding the unrealistic quest of gathering the seventy-thousand-plus signatures per party. Unfortunately the implicit alliance broke down before it was formed, with fifteen MDN leaders (some who were close friends of Alemán) fearing a Sandinista victory, endorsing the Conservative Party and splitting from the movement.<sup>8</sup> The alliance, reorganized with five parties supporting the MRS, still moved forward and submitted 86,000 signatures to request legal representation to participate in the November 2000 municipal election. The Supreme Electoral Council rejected their petition. The council argued that 25,981 signatures had been eliminated because they appeared in other parties' lists; 31,829 were annulled for having invalid identification numbers; and 9,115 were annulled because they were said to appear twice in the list.

The MRS demanded the right to compare the signatures with the registration polls, but the SEC denied them that right without justification.<sup>9</sup> This refusal to comply with the demands of a political party may be linked to the SEC's inability to prove its verification work. In fact, according to the former director of the registrar's office of the SEC, Maria Teresa Alemán, the institution

does not have a system to guarantee the verification and validity of signatures provided by registered voters.<sup>10</sup> The MDN and MRS experience was only one case of the political maneuvering emerging from reforms.

The exclusion of the Conservative Party's Pedro Solórzano from the electoral game is another example of the use of formal institutions to inhibit political participation. Solórzano, a leader of the Conservative Party, was a favorite in Managua's municipality. Fearing a victory by Solórzano, the reforms redrew the municipal districts, leaving this leader outside Managua's boundaries. Solórzano contested the redistricting and continued his electoral campaign.

In August, however, after the Conservative Party had submitted its request for participation (fulfilling the requisites demanded by the SEC), Solórzano was prevented from participating due to the council's allegation that the candidate had submitted two addresses, and then that he had reported no address, thus violating article 173 of the electoral law, which demands that a candidate must have resided in the municipality for at least two years.<sup>11</sup> Solórzano allowed William Báez to run for mayor instead.

Yet another example of censorship and rights violations is the case of José Antonio Alvarado. Alvarado was a major supporter of Alemán and had been as minister of defense. However, he had grown critical of the way Alemán was conducting his presidency and was particularly critical of the proposed meeting of a constituent assembly in lieu of holding national elections.

Following that pattern, Alemán would have to remain in power longer, until the assembly drafted a new constitution. Alvarado wanted to form a new political party, the Liberal Democratic Party. As a result of Alvarado's criticisms of Alemán and his attempt to form a new party, the minister of government, René Herrera, nullified Alvarado's nationality, arguing that there were legal discrepancies that could not be reconciled. Although Alvarado

had U.S. citizenship, in 1990 he had regained Nicaraguan citizenship after applying for it. The government, however, had nullified his nationality days after he had announced the formation of a new party and voiced his criticisms of Alemán.<sup>12</sup>

Only four political parties (FSLN, PLC, PCN, and the Christian Way) ran in the 2000 municipal elections. One month before the deadline for forming a political party for the 2001 national elections, a high degree of uncertainty prevailed in Nicaragua. Political divisions and intimidation had plagued the country. Alemán used his power to discourage, weaken, or intimidate its opponents, inside or outside its ranks. In the end, despite a partial victory by the PLC, which won 94 of 151 municipalities, the Sandinistas prevailed in some of the key municipalities in the country: Managua, León, and Chinandega (and the Conservatives won Granada).


The short-term outcome of the reforms and the municipal elections suggests that the FSLN and PLC have succeeded in becoming the two dominant parties: the Sandinista group and the PLC rightist group with strong ideological links to the Somoza legacy. The legal framework and the political authorities' monopoly on enforcing the laws of exclusion have secured electoral victories and the ability to distribute political power for the two parties. Pedro Solórzano, a potential presidential candidate for the Conservative Party, was investigated on charges of corruption while a council member of Managua's municipality. These allegations appeared just weeks before the deadline to register candidates and parties before the SEC.<sup>13</sup> Eventually, Solórzano gave in to political pressures and endorsed the Liberal party, thereby creating uproar among various opposition leaders.<sup>14</sup>

*The Electoral Contest in 2001*

The election of 2001 was one of the most contested campaigns in recent history. The two main candidates' margins of victory were very close. Until October 2001, opinion polls showed that the FSLN was leading, but only by one percentage point. Ortega had received the endorsement of Agustín Jarquín (the leader of the Social Christian Unity Party) in exchange for the vice presidency (or the presidency itself) and the possibility of legislative seats lost by the USC in 1996.<sup>15</sup> The FSLN counted some 30 percent of popular support. With a third party, weakened by internal fights and political intimidation by Alemán and the Sandinistas, the "third force" functioned as a spoiler, which could attract a significant percentage of votes, but not enough to compete in a second round.

Given the PLC's loss of popularity, due to Alemán's widespread corruption—reported almost daily in the national press—its chances of winning were slim but not impossible.<sup>16</sup> The political landscape of Nicaraguan politics showed three major parties in the contest: the FSLN with Daniel Ortega as candidate, the PLC with Enrique Bolaños, and a weak Conservative Party with Alberto Saborío as its newest candidate. Bolaños, a former member of COSEP, the private enterprise council, was Alemán's vice president and has been strongly criticized for supporting Alemán and not standing against his corrupt practices while in office.

The continued political pressure on the Conservative Party eventually weakened its leaders and provoked a split in the party, ultimately leaving the group debilitated politically. Because the Conservative Party was viewed by the opposition as the only alternative within the electoral process that could function as a "third force," leaders of various movements sought to form alliances with the party. However, traditionalists within the party (such as the former mayoral candidate, William Báez) opposed the idea of integrating non-Conservative groups.

**Figure 10.3. Arnaldo Alemán's Decline in Popularity**

Two of the main political groups seeking to form coalitions with the party were the Liberal Democratic Party, led by José Antonio Alvarado, and the National Unity Movement (MUN), led by former general Joaquín Cuadra. Alvarado succeeded in gaining the support of the Conservative leadership to run as the vice-presidential candidate. However, the Supreme Electoral Council, siding along party lines, and with the Liberal Party's support, rejected Alvarado's candidacy for vice president, arguing that he was not a Nicaraguan citizen. As a result, the then presidential candidate, Noel Vidaure, supported the option of integrating Carlos Tunnermann as an outside force. (Tunnermann had worked with the Sandinista government in the 1980s.) Tunnermann accepted the offer. In July, however, another crisis emerged within the Conservative Party dealing with the selection of legislators for the election.<sup>17</sup>

The MUN, in particular, had agreed to support the party in exchange for giving Joaquín Cuadra Managua's deputation. The tension between traditionalists and reformists led to the party's split after Vidaure's resignation over the Conservative leadership's re-

TABLE 10.6.

## Public Opinion Polls in Support of Presidential Candidates

Candidate	Daniel Ortega	Enrique Bolaños	Noel Vidaure	Undecided
February	33.4	24.8	14.1	27.7
May	34.1	28.8	13.6	23.5
July	37.3	35.5	8.0*	19.2
September	40.0	43.0	5.0	12.0


\* The July poll captured the demise of Vidaure and the crisis of the Conservatives. *Confidencial*, edición no. 244: June 10–16, 2001, Empate técnico Bolaños-Ortega, *La Prensa*, August 9, 2001. Polls conducted by Borge & Asociados.

jection of Cuadra as a Conservative legislator. The result was a decline in support for the party, as voters moved to support the Liberal Party. Table 10.6 shows how support for the Liberal Party increased thanks to the crisis within the Conservatives. The table also shows that the number of undecided voters had declined significantly. These results can also be observed in figure 10.4, showing the surveys of different polling companies.

The scenario prior to the national election raised questions as to the implications of a Sandinista victory tainted by an illegitimate pact.<sup>18</sup> The legacy of the FSLN remained fresh in people's minds, and public dislike of Daniel Ortega was very significant. Although he received support from a large segment of society, polls showed that 48 percent of the population would never vote for him.<sup>19</sup>

The end result of the election was an overwhelming victory for Enrique Bolaños, who received 56 percent of the votes, versus 42 percent for the FSLN. His rupture with Alemán, the electoral sup-

**Figure 10.4. Nicaragua's 2001 National Elections: Survey Results**



port gained over time, and fears about a Sandinista return tipped the balance to Bolaños' side. The Sandinista defeat demonstrated the party's inability to garner more than 40 percent vote for the third consecutive time (see table 10.7).

TABLE 10.7.

Nicaraguan Elections since 1990

Party	1990	1996	2001
FSLN	40.8	37.70	42.28
Other	5.3	11.15	1.41
Liberals*	53.9	51.06	56.30
FSLN defeat	13.1	13.36	14.02

\*In 1990 the party running was the UNO.

Source: Supreme Electoral Council.

## A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN FLUX: COSTA RICA

Neither of the traditional leading Costa Rican political parties, National Liberation (PLN) and Social Christian Unity (PUSC), won the presidency in that country's national elections, held in February 2002. Costa Rican voters stunned politicians by giving their support to at least four different parties, breaking down the two-party framework that had prevailed for over fifty years. This election marked a new political stage, in which traditional leaders will seek to accommodate changing demands from society, and new political players will take the opportunity to promote alternative social and political agendas.

Two key questions weigh on the future of Costa Rican politics. The first is whether the traditional two-party balance of power will change into a multi-party system. The second is how the new president will meet social demands and growing dissatisfaction with national political leaders.

### *Trends Prior to the Election*

Costa Rican citizens have traditionally expressed their support for a two-party system. Since the mid-fifties, voters chose between the traditional PLN and a coalition group until 1983 and the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC) thereafter. These tendencies led scholars to conclude that "what was previously a bipolar system, with one strong party (National Liberation Party, or PLN) and a shifting series of ad hoc opposition coalitions, has become a stable two-party system."<sup>20</sup>

Historically, an important aspect of political debate in Costa Rica has been the role of the state and its capacity to address social demands. In particular, after the economic crisis of the early eighties, when Costa Rica experienced high levels of external indebtedness, a rising fiscal deficit, and unemployment, the nature of the welfare state was subjected to scrutiny by the public and



the elites. Scholars and policy experts then referred to a crisis of the welfare development model implemented in Costa Rica and sought ways out of that crisis and model.<sup>21</sup>

As part of the process of economic adjustment, most Costa Rican administrations during the eighties and nineties adopted outward-looking strategies emphasizing state reform, which included a combination of policies oriented toward diversification of markets, privatization, trade liberalization, reduction of government subsidies, and changes in fiscal and monetary policy.<sup>22</sup> To some extent, Costa Rica's economic restructuring closely followed the model advocated in the Washington Consensus. However, successive governments balanced different formulas to increase the growth rate through state reform without completely dismantling the welfare system that characterized the country.

In the 1990s, the political debate turned partly around the extent of privatization, the effects of economic liberalization on society, and the management of the fiscal deficit. In April 1995, President Jose Figueres (son of Jose Figueres Ferrer, former president and founder of the PLN) sought to continue a strategy of advancing economic reforms by securing an agreement with the opposition Social Christian Unity Party. The country's elites embarked on a process of "*concertación*" (understanding or agreement) with broad sectors of society in order to face emerging economic and social challenges.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, in 1998, President Miguel Angel Rodriguez inaugurated his term with a national dialogue that opened the door to a debate about political inclusion and modernization of political parties.

Although the efforts of Figueres and Rodriguez were positive, events relating to privatization schemes of the telecommunications and electricity industries led to a decline of "*concertación*" and growing social opposition to Rodriguez and the PLN. Since 2000, criticism has grown over social conditions in the country and the pace and effects of privatization. Economists argued that despite the economic liberalization process that led to increasing

growth rates (particularly in 1999 with the arrival of Intel), poverty rates actually increased by one percent in 2000.<sup>24</sup> Public opinion polls showed dissatisfaction, and people demonstrated in the streets over the Congress's lack of consultation about privatizing the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity.

While this debate was developing, tensions within the parties were increasing over their capacity to attract support for the upcoming 2002 election. Sensing criticism and popular dissatisfaction and speaking before Congress in May 2001, President Rodríguez proposed the formation of a semi-parliamentary system in Costa Rica as a formula to improve democratic governance.

#### *From the Electoral Campaign to the First Round*

The leading parties found themselves challenged in this changed political landscape. Criticism within the parties about the lack of access for women and young political cadres in decision-making structures, a very high rate of voter abstention, and growing discontent within the PLN about moving away from its social democratic tradition were key issues on the national agenda. In addition to these challenges to and changes in the two historically dominant parties, third forces emerged with greater strength to voice their views about increased participation. During the Rodríguez administration there were non-traditional political parties holding seven legislative seats and representing 24 percent of the electorate.

The internal selection process of presidential candidates in the two leading parties was marred by relative confrontation between traditionalist and reformist groups. In each party, important developments took place that signaled or reinforced dissatisfaction with the parties. The PLN's first problem was low voter turnout. The contest in the PLN involved selecting one of three candidates. The first was Rolando Araya, nephew of former president

Luis Alberto Monge and an ally of former president Oscar Arias. He was the party's favorite.<sup>25</sup> Second was Jose Miguel Corrales, a traditionalist leader who had run for the presidency in 1998, losing against Rodriguez. He had lost support due to his previous defeat. Finally, Antonio Alvarez Desanti represented the younger generation of the Liberación Nacional but was perceived as inexperienced. Although the vote was disputed, Araya won 50 percent of the votes, compared with 30 percent for Corrales.<sup>26</sup>

The selection process in the PUSC presented a different scenario in that a relatively new actor in the party, Abel Pacheco de la Espirella, received significant support. His opponent, Rodolfo Méndez Mata, a traditionalist leader supported by former president Rafael Angel Calderon and his minister of the presidency, lost the vote in a landslide defeat. Seventy-seven percent of PUSC voters gave their support to Pacheco.<sup>27</sup>

A major surprise was the strong emergence of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC) created by Otton Solis, a former minister of President Oscar Arias. This new party was supported by Walter Coto, former secretary general of the PLN, Margarita Penon, former first lady, and Rodrigo Carazo, son of former president Carazo Odio. The party represented a significant group dissenting from the PLN. According to some analysts, the 1995 political agreement between Figueres Olsen and Calderón Fournier and the support in April 2000 to approve the privatization of the telecommunications company were the triggering factors that provoked the split within the PLN.<sup>28</sup> The formation of the PAC, as well as the mobilization of other smaller parties, initiated a new process in the debate: as the parties gained support during the contest, they began to receive the label of 'emerging parties' and signal the question about the fate of a two-party system in Costa Rica.


The polls showed growing support for the emerging parties, particularly for the PAC, and declining support for the PLN. Between

August 2001 and January 2002, the number of voters supporting the PAC tripled. Most importantly, the polls showed growing dissatisfaction among voters over the major candidates. In April 2001, a poll conducted by a research center showed that 60 percent of Costa Ricans were unsatisfied with the way the country's democracy was functioning.<sup>29</sup>

A key issue in this campaign was Pacheco's popularity. His appeal to voters and the citizenry at large was due to his approach to mainstream Costa Ricans as a man who speaks the language of the people. Moreover, to the PUSC, he represented a fresh way to look at the traditional political cleavages and signaled new hopes for the party. Although support for him vis-à-vis the other parties declined, his popularity continued to affect the political process.

The political discourse during the campaign focused on the rule of law, improving the judicial system, corruption, employment, participation of women in politics, privatization, and free trade. Crime and public safety in particular were key issues for voters. Crime in Costa Rica had gradually increased over the previous decade, producing a greater sense of insecurity in the population,

Figure 10.5. Costa Rican Elections: Opinion Polls



highlighted in its identification as the number one problem in the country.<sup>30</sup>

Although Costa Ricans have generally acknowledged that state interventionism was somewhat detrimental to the country's economy and welfare, there has been reluctance to move toward a complete reduction of state involvement in some economic activities. This debate and ambivalence is illustrated in the opposition to the privatization of the telecommunications company. There has also been opposition to or criticism of other privatization initiatives such as those of the airport, the oil refinery, and the water companies. In a similar vein, free trade was criticized by others, such as some agricultural groups, arguing that it could negatively affect small farmers.

Some voter abstention, undecided voters, and an often disillusioned electorate characterized the elections. A survey conducted by Procesos, an NGO, and the political science department at the University of Costa Rica a few days prior to the election, confirmed both disappointment with politicians and parties and the intention of some not to vote. A little over half of the respondents expressed the view that Costa Rica was heading in the wrong direction ("*Costa Rica va por el camino equivocado*"), with women responding more pessimistically (53 percent) than men (47 percent).<sup>31</sup>

#### *The April 2002 Outcome and Future Perspectives*

The February election surprised many groups. First, for the first time in the country's history, a president was not elected in the first round. Second, the election results showed significant support for non-traditional third parties. Third, voters' disappointment in political leaders was reflected in the increasing rates of abstention. Finally, women gained significant prominence in the election.

The inability of any party to win in the first round represented a major blow to their capacities to defeat the opposition. The PLN probably suffered the greatest loss, as its political clout had been declining over time and they had expected to regain strength in 2002. The table below shows that Acción Ciudadana reached a very close third place behind the PLN, reflecting remarkable success for a new and third party.

TABLE 10.8.

Election Results from February 3, 2002, Votes

	PUSC	PLN	PAC	ML*	Abstaining
Parties	38.57	30.99	26.16	1.68	32.00

\*ML: Movimiento Libertario

Source: Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.

However, support for third forces gained even more momentum in the election for the legislative assembly. The balance of power shifted from the two dominant parties into three blocs with close voting power. Table 10.9 shows the division in the number of seats held before and after the election. At least two major changes occurred. First, Acción Ciudadana enjoyed a strong showing, winning fourteen seats. Second, the number of women in the legislature increased from eleven to nineteen *diputadas*, exactly one-third of total legislators.

The news of a second round moved each party to reconfigure its strategy. The two traditional parties, the PLN and the PUSC, reorganized their campaigns and opened new wounds within each group. In particular, the PUSC appointed Lineth Saborio, causing friction by rejecting Luis Fishman, an ally of former president Calderón Fournier. Laura Chinchilla was named to direct the PLN's campaign in the second round. Opinion polls indicated that

TABLE 10.9.

## Legislative Seats in Parliament

Party	Total Legislators	
	1998–2002	2002–2006
PUSC	27	19
PLN	23	17
PAC	0	14
PML	1	6
PRC	1	1
PIN	1	0
PALA	1	0
Total	54	57

Source: Asamblea Legislativa and Tribunal Supremo Electoral

Pacheco would win the second round. In fact, the election results showed that Pacheco won on April 7 by a large margin, with 58 percent of the votes, against Araya's 42 percent, but with 39 percent of voters abstaining.

The challenge for all political parties remains to increase citizen interest in and support for the political process. In one of the most important studies on contemporary democratic politics in Costa Rica, analyst Jorge Rovira showed that, starting in the mid-eighties, the two-party system began to weaken in the legislature. In 1986, 90 percent of voters chose legislators from one or the other party, but that number dropped to 76 percent in 1998. When asked whether the 1998 election results were altering the two-party framework, Rovira replied that the parties were showing signs of weakening and that the two-party system was not in danger as long as the small parties showed sufficient strength to challenge the status quo.<sup>32</sup> However, the question of a two- versus multi-party system remains relevant because in the 2001 election

power shifted even more significantly to the extent that the two parties received less than 70 percent of votes.

Analysts agree that there is no question that the balance of power has shifted. To some this shifting balance may have a longer duration but is contingent on emerging political groups strengthening their own power. Carlos Sojo stresses that, with four political groups in the legislature, circumstances may favor the formation of alliances; otherwise political stagnation could occur.<sup>33</sup> Cecilia Cortes asserts that there is also another emerging power, that of the women in the legislature who represent one-third of the assembly.<sup>34</sup> What seems to be the key to the future of the party system is whether the PAC will become stronger and increase its capacity to create larger coalitions and attract new political elites. Rodriguez believes that part of that skill will involve the PAC's not falling prey to the internal fragmentation produced by personal infighting, which has occurred within the Fuerza Democratica, the third party in the 2001 legislature.<sup>35</sup>

The implications of these political changes will be fourfold. First, there is a significant chance that Costa Rica will move from a two-party to a multi-party system. The immediate effect will be a reconfiguration of the ideological and political landscape that prevailed before 2001. Second, there will be a shift from the traditional political party leadership to new political leaders who will advocate different agendas or question prevailing ones. Third, the decision-making process will be constrained by debate over social policy, privatization, and free trade. As the political map has shifted from center to left of center, questions about privatization and free trade will dominate the debate. As a result the ratification of the free trade agreement with Canada may be the first test of the extent to which Costa Rica is prepared to continue economic liberalization. Finally, the political maneuvering will oscillate between consensus building and coalition building in an effort to prevent stagnation or paralysis between the executive and legislative branches.



These issues will define the future political scenario of Costa Rica and the direction in which the country will head with regard to political party and state reform, free trade, and citizenship participation.

### **POLITICS AS USUAL: GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, AND HONDURAS**

The characteristic political dynamics of the Central American countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras are often troubling. The Central American peace agreements (Nicaragua in 1990, El Salvador in 1991, and Guatemala in 1996) ended decades of war and ushered in a new era of democratization and stability in the region. Since then, free and relatively clean elections have been held on a regular basis, civil liberties and freedom of expression have been protected, and civilians are in control of the region's military forces. Despite recent progress, however, major obstacles, including political fragmentation, weak political parties, and corruption, continue to impede further democratic development.

#### *Guatemala*

Guatemala most recently held presidential elections in 1999. During the first round, Alfonso Antonio Portillo Cabrera, representing the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), secured 1,037,775 votes, for a total of 48 percent. Oscar Berger Perdomo of the Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN), received 660,404 votes, 31 percent of the total. The Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG, founded in 1982 when major guerrilla groups united to form this party) finished in third place with only 12 percent of the vote. Finally, the Partido Libertador Progresista (PLP) came in last with a mere 3 percent of the total vote. In the second round, Perdomo received only 32 percent of the

votes, while Portillo secured a decisive victory, receiving more than 68 percent of the total votes cast.

Since taking office, the government of President Alfonso Portillo has sought to integrate liberal forces and indigenous leaders into his cabinet. He has faced significant opposition from a still influential and often retrograde army as well as from Congress and the private sector. Portillo has not been an effective leader, and his government is widely considered to be corrupt. Crime rates in Guatemala continue to rise and affect the average citizen. Judicial systems are also ineffective, to the extent that in some rural areas, peasants have executed criminals vigilante-style. Racial and ethnic differences are major sources of conflict in the country, which must be confronted as Guatemala continues its process of democratization.

### *El Salvador*

The presidential elections in 1999 declared Francisco Flores of the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) the winning candidate, having received 51 percent of the vote in the first round. The Frente Farabundo Martí Para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and the Unión Social Cristiana (USC) finished in second place, with 29 percent of the vote. The Centro Democrática Unido (CDU, formerly *Covergencia Democrática*, CD) placed third, with 7 percent of the total votes cast, while the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), came in last, with only 6 percent of the vote. Like Guatemala, El Salvador also experienced a high rate of voter abstention in 1999. In fact, it reached a notable 61.4 percent, an increase of more than 6 percent since previous elections (1994) and, moreover, the highest rate of abstention recorded in El Salvador since 1989.

El Salvador has experienced a stronger process of democratization relative to its neighbors, but discontent is growing over the government's inability to control crime and promote economic

growth. The large increase in the number of private security guards protecting the wealthy exemplifies both problems. The two earthquakes that hit El Salvador in 2001 only increased poverty and insecurity. Currently, the governing ARENA party is losing the confidence of the country's voters, but the opposing FMLN remains too divided to capture a national election. The March 2003 legislative campaigns illustrate the political struggle over control amidst the challenges these two parties face.

The political outcome of the legislative and municipal elections held on Sunday, March 16, 2003, in El Salvador reaffirmed the country's political landscape of competitive party elections but also raised questions about the country's future agenda. While the drive toward free trade and privatization has characterized the agenda of the ruling party, ARENA, the decline in growth rates, crime, and the decline in popularity of current President Francisco Flores were demonstrated in the electoral results.

Contrary to the expectations of many, including pollsters, the opposition party, FMLN, emerged triumphant in this election. It retained control of key municipal governments and the same number of legislators in the assembly (thirty-one out of eighty-four seats). The ruling party, on the other hand, lost municipalities and two legislators (retaining twenty-seven of eighty-four). However, the conservative and traditional ally of ARENA, the National Conciliation Party (PCN), won sixteen seats, three more than in 2000, which guaranteed the continuity of a conservative majority in Congress.

The results caught some by surprise, because the FMLN had undergone serious divisions between orthodox factions within the party and reformist groups that highlighted a crisis of legitimacy. Prior to the election, a segment of the reformist groups had formed their own political coalition that ran independently. But they received less than 2 percent of the vote and elected one legislator as part of a

coalition formed with two other parties. Moreover, public opinion polls showed less than 30 percent of the vote going to the FMLN.


One important result of the election was the FMLN victory in the city of San Salvador after a close battle between the two leading parties. For the FMLN, winning the capital municipality meant a continuation of its control of the most important city in El Salvador.

To many observers, these electoral results were clearly a defeat for ARENA, which had ruled the country through three consecutive governments. However, discontent with the government has been widespread. Despite ARENA's attempts to reorganize its leadership, it could not address key issues. The public perception remains that the economy has worsened since President Flores took office. El Salvador's economic growth has not increased above 2 percent between 2000 and 2004. Crime has not improved and continues to affect the poor predominantly. In addition to domestic violence, youth gangs are a troublesome reality. According to police reports, three gang members die daily in turf fights and it is estimated that there are at least thirty thousand young Salvadorans involved with these groups. There is also increasing discomfort over the effect of privatization on society. The attempt to privatize the health care sector produced opposition among low-income sectors.

Overall, the electoral results are not simply a defeat for ARENA but also a warning about the need to renew the social contract with the people. ARENA has lost the leadership in the assembly and as a result will face a major challenge in the upcoming 2004 election.

The next twelve months will be critical with regard to various issues. First, the debate over the possible ratification of a free-trade agreement with the United States will most likely meet with opposition from the FMLN. Second, the presidential elections in 2004 have opened a window of opportunity for an FMLN victory. On the other hand, Salvadorans still tend to lean toward the right

**Figure 10.6. Municipalities Won/Lost by Party and Legislators per Party**



in presidential elections. On legislative issues, the FMLN will continue to face opposition from ARENA, the PCN and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). More importantly, however, if the current head of the FMLN, Schafik Handal, were to be selected as a presidential candidate, voters would be less likely to vote for the FMLN and might abstain from voting altogether due to his lack of leadership. Electoral apathy and voter abstention in El Salvador continue to be pressing issues as the current level of voter turnout remains at 41 percent—low enough to pose a predicament in the presidential elections of 2004.

### *Honduras*

Honduras' last national election, in November 2001, was characterized by political manipulation. Members of the opposing Liberal Party (namely, Rafael Pineda Ponce, who also served as the president of Congress and was a Liberal presidential candidate at the time) attempted to block Ricardo Maduro (of the National Party) from running for the presidency. The Liberals based their contention on a constitutional technicality that questioned Maduro's nationality and thereby challenged his legal right to run

for president in the national elections. Eventually, an agreement was reached that allowed Maduro to run as a National Party candidate, but not until March 2001—a mere eight months before the election.<sup>36</sup>

Five candidates represented their respective parties in the 2001 presidential elections. Ricardo Maduro Joest of the National Party (Partido Nacional) received 1,137,734 votes, which accounted for 52.21 percent of the total, so a second round of voting to declare a victor was not necessary. Maduro's competition included Rafael Pineda Ponce of the Partido Liberal, which received 964,590 votes, or 44.26 percent of the total. The Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU) placed third and obtained 31,666 votes, which represented a mere 1.45 percent of the total. Finally, the Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras (PDC) received only 21,089 votes or .97 percent of the total. Interestingly, the abstention rate of 33.73 percent in the Honduran presidential election was rather low vis-à-vis its Central American neighbors, but represented more than a 5 percent increase since the prior 1997 elections (see table 10.10).

Upon assuming office, President Maduro launched a campaign against corruption and for crime prevention. In an unprecedented initiative, Congress is debating whether to strip fifteen legislators of their immunity from prosecution.

### **CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIZING THE PARTY SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA**

Electoral processes in Central America have progressed dramatically towards participatory, competitive politics. The region is making significant progress toward liberal democracy, and the countries of Central America are gradually approaching a political synergy similar to that described by Anthony DePalma in the opening essay of this book. More importantly, the concurrence of

TABLE 10.10.  
Past Elections in Contemporary Central America


Country	Winning Party	Second Place	Third Place	Fourth Place	Percent Abstention
<i>Guatemala (4-year term)</i>					
1985	DCG (34)	UNC (18)	PDCN-PR (12)	MLN-PID (11)	30.0%
1985 (second round)	DCG (63)	UNC (30)			34.6%
1991 (second round)	MAS (68)	UNC (32)			58.0%
1995 (first round)	PAN (36.6)	FRG (22.1)			53.2%
1995 (second round)	PAN (51.2)	FRG (48.78)			63.1%
1999 (first round)	FRG (48)	PAN(30)	URNG (12)	PLP (3)	61.0%
1999 (second round)	FRG (68)	PAN (32)			
<i>El Salvador (5-year term)</i>					
1989	ARENA (50)	PDC (34)	PCN (4)	CD (4)	44.0%
1994 (first round)	ARENA (49)	FMLN-CD (25)			47.0%
1994 (second round)	ARENA (68)	FMLN-CD (32)			54.5%
1999	ARENA (51)	FMLN-USC (29)	CDU (7)	PDC (6)	61.4%
<i>Honduras (4-year term)</i>					
1989	PNH (53)	PLH (45)	PDC (1.5)	PIU-SD (1.3)	23.0%
1993	PLH (53)	PNH (40)			35.0%

TABLE 10.10.  
(cont.)

1997	PLH (53)	PNH (42)	PINU (2)	PUD (1)	28.0%
2001 (Nov. 25, 2001)	PNH (52.2)	PLH (44.3)	PINU (1.5)	PUD (1)	33.7%
<i>Nicaragua (5-year term)</i>					
1984	FSLN (70)				25.0%
1990	UNO (55)	FSLN (41)	MUR (1)		14.0%
1996	AL-PLC (51)	FSLN (37)	PCCN (4)	PCN (2)	24.0%
2001 (Nov. 4, 2001)	PLC (56.3)	FSLN (43)			
<i>Costa Rica (4-year term)</i>					
1990	PUSC (51.4)	PLN (47.2)	PU (1)		18.0%
1994	PLN (50)	PUSC (48)			19.0%
1998	PUSC (47)	PLN (44)	FD (3)	IN (2)	
2002 (Feb. 3, 2002)					
first round	PUSC (38)	PLN (31)	PAC (26)	PML (2)	
2002 (April 7, 2002)					
second round	PUSC (58)	PLN (42)			39.0%



**Figure 10.7. Voter Abstention in Previous Elections (Percentage), 1996–2001**



interests within these different and independent countries is drawing the region closer to rest of the North American community.

It is important to carefully follow the political processes in Central America during negotiations over free trade with the United States. Central America has supported a free trade agreement with Mexico, and some countries in the region have also negotiated individual agreements with Canada. The negotiations with the United States concern legislatures and governments, as well as ordinary citizens, as the impact on households and economies will be dramatic. The approval of the trade agreements is contingent on how civil society responds to the possible setbacks of free trade and to the ratification by the legislatures. In recent elections the process of economic integration with North America has been debated, and the governments and various sectors of society have envisioned a deeper relationship that encompasses goods and labor. In fact, the synergy in the region goes beyond governmental coordination to include transnational linkages among people and migrants. In consequence, governments are studying and reacting to increasing demands of Central Americans in the United States,

Canada, and Mexico concerning the right to hold dual citizenship and vote abroad.

Central American political systems are thus facing both a national process of democratic consolidation and emerging transnational demands that result from a gradual integration with North America. The continued democratization of the party systems in Central America will be critical to this process.

## Notes

### CHAPTER 1

1. Press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. Fox speech at The Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
4. Transcript of the presidential debate on October 4, 2000.
5. Miami, Fla., August 25, 2000.
6. Ibid.
7. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 10, 2000.
8. On January 11, 2001, a disgruntled and sorely disappointed Lucien Bouchard resigned as premier of Quebec, saying he had failed to keep his promise to make Quebec independent.
9. From an address to the National Policy Research Conference in Ottawa on November 30, 2000.

### CHAPTER 2

1. Enrique Krauze, *La Presidencia Imperial: Ascenso y Caída del Sistema Político Mexicano, 1940–1996* (Mexico City: Tusquets Editores, 1997).
2. These figures were taken from “México Social,” edited regularly by the Banco Nacional de México, and the electoral database at the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, CIDAC.
3. A brief review of these three main parties’ histories and programs can be found in Mónica Serrano, ed., *Governing Mexico: Political*

- Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
4. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).
  5. Volker G. Lehr, "Modernización y movilización electoral, 1964–1976: Un estudio ecológico," *Estudios Políticos* 4, no. 1 (1985): 54–61, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
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  9. Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
  10. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).

11. The empirical evidence for this chapter comes from a collection of surveys conducted in Mexico between 1990 and 2002. A list of the surveys includes: 1) The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey*'s second, third, and fourth waves, administered in 1990, 1996/7, and in 2000, respectively, to slightly over 1,500 respondents in each wave. The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey* were conducted in 1990, 1996/7, and 2000 among 1,531, 1,511, and 1535 Mexican adults, respectively. They are part of the ICPSR archives, at the University of Michigan. The fourth-wave survey was conducted in February 2000, sponsored by Grupo Reforma, and conducted by the Departments of Survey Research at newspapers *Reforma*, *El Norte*, *Mural*, and *Palabra*. 2) A national exit poll administered to over 3,000 voters as they left their corresponding polling places in the 2000 elections. I compare these results with those from a national exit poll conducted in the 1997 elections. The 1997 exit poll was sponsored by the Partido Acción Nacional and conducted by *Arcop*, on July 6, 1997, among 3,452 voters. The 2000 exit poll was sponsored by Grupo Reforma and conducted on July 2, 2000, among 3,377 voters by newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. 3) Four national pre-election polls conducted between April and June 2000 and pooled into one single database. The national pre-election polls were conducted in early April, early May, late May, and mid-June, 2000, by the newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. Each survey had slightly over 1,500 respondents (with the exception of the April one, which had slightly over 1,600) from all thirty-two federal entities. For the analysis in this chapter, the four polls were pooled into a single database of 6,289 cases. All the surveys listed here are national representative samples of Mexican adults or voters, and were conducted face-to-face in the respondents' homes or as they left their polling places, in the case of the exit polls.
12. Between one-fourth and one-third of Mexican respondents, depending on the survey, do not place themselves on the left-right

scale. In this analysis, I assigned an average placement to those who did not originally place themselves on the scale. The general averages fell between categories six and seven on a ten-point scale.

13. The original measure is a ten-point self-placement scale.
14. Alejandro Moreno, "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa." *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
15. The shift to the right probably reflects the influence of the PRI's also historic primary to select its presidential candidate. The 2000 survey was conducted in February, four and a half months before the presidential election and with campaigns officially running, but, most importantly, three months after the PRI primary of November, 1999, and after Fox and others had started to advertise widely on television. Very intense negative campaigning and mudslinging characterized the primary contest, but it boosted voter interest in the PRI.
16. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, England, 1998).
17. According to Moreno (1999b), the liberal-fundamentalist dimension is empirically observable in many Latin American countries, and it provides a useful tool to analyze party competition across the region.
18. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
19. Empirically, these dimensions result from a theoretically-guided principal components factor analysis based on the Mexican sam-

- ples of the 1997 and 2000 *World Values Surveys* pooled into one single dataset.
20. Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
  21. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (February 2000): 19–51.
  22. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 1 (1999a): 45–81.
  23. Moreno, 1999a.
  24. The model is based on a multinomial logit regression that uses vote choice as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables that have been of theoretical and empirical relevance in the literature of Mexican voting behavior. The model is then applied to the different types of survey data (exit polls and pre-election polls). The vote for PAN or Fox is taken as a basis for comparison in the results shown in the tables. See for example Domínguez and McCann 1995; Magaloni 1997; Buendía 1997; Magaloni and Moreno, 2003.

25. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
26. The official vote for Congress in 2000 is not broken down by party in the case of the Alliance for Mexico (PRD) and the Alliance for Change (PAN), but opinion polls showed that support for the Green party alone was about 2 to 4 percent.
27. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
28. Alejandro Moreno, "The Effects of Negative Campaigns on Mexican Voters," in *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election*, ed. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson.
29. Alejandro Moreno and Roy Pierce, "The Impact of the PRI Primary of November 1999 on the Mexican Presidential Election of July 2000," unpublished manuscript.
30. Alejandro Moreno, "Mesa 1: Encuestas preelectorales, serie incluyendo últimas encuestas (Estimación de los votantes probables)," in *El papel de las encuestas en las elecciones federales: Memoria del taller Sumiya 2000*. Federal Elections Institute (IFE), Mexican Association of Research Agencies (AMAI), and Colegio Nacional de Actuarios, 2000, and Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, "Cómo llegó: La debacle y el triunfo". *Reforma*, December 1, 2001.

### CHAPTER 3

1. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, *The Perfect Tie* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). See also John C. Green and



- Rick Farmer, *The State of the Parties*, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
2. Larry J. Sabato, *Overtime* (New York: Longman, 2002).
  3. Ibid.
  4. John C. Green et al., "Murphy Brown Revisited: The Social Issues in the 1992 Election," in *Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the Future of American Politics*, ed. Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 43–66.
  5. These data were made available by the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research. All analysis and interpretation are solely the responsibility of the authors.
  6. These data come from a poll by the Gallup Organization, May 18–May 21, 2000 (N=1,011). Data provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
  7. David K. Ryden, "Out of the Shadows, but Still in the Dark? The Courts and Political Parties," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 79–94.
  8. Gerald M. Pomper, "Parliamentary Government in the United States: A New Regime for a New Country," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 267–86.

#### CHAPTER 4

1. The Canadian Election Study is based on a rolling cross-section survey of 3,651 interviews conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University and Jolicoeur & Associés. It follows in the tradition of previous Canadian election studies conducted in 1979, 1984, 1988, 1993, and 1997.
2. Blais et al., *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002), 13.

3. Mordecai Richler, "More Proof That Pundits Can't Be Trusted," *National Post*, December 2, 2000, A18.
4. Conrad Black, "The Most Boring Election in History." *Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 2000, A22.
5. Peter Gzowski, "Where Do They Stand? How Would We Know?" *Globe and Mail*, November 11, 2000, A13.
6. Statistics Canada. <http://www.statcan.ca/>.
7. Ibid.
8. Blais et al., *Anatomy*.
9. Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Presidential Campaigns* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
10. Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
11. Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder, "Issue Frames and Group Centrism in American Public Opinion," *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 1055–78.
12. Doris Graber, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide* (New York: Longman, 1984).
13. Milton Lodge, Marco Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 309–26.
14. Diana C. Mutz, "Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries," *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 4 (November 1995): 1015–42.
15. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 35.
16. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 73.
17. Barry Cooper, *Sins of Omission: Shaping the News at CBC TV* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 1.
18. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 40.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Hartley and Josephine Mazzuca, "Fewer Canadians

- Favour Legalized Abortion under Any Circumstance,” *The Gallup Poll* (Toronto: Gallup Canada, December 12, 2001).
21. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 145.
  22. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 175.
  23. Lydia Miljan and Barry Cooper, *Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003) 92.
  24. Reginald Bibby, *Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada* (Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1993).
  25. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 71.
  26. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 80 n. 12.

## CHAPTER 5

1. A feat not accomplished since Mackenzie King had won three in a row in 1935, 1940, and 1945.
2. Robert A. Young, *The Struggle for Quebec* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 87.
3. Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
4. The referendum question asked voters whether they agreed “Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership.”
5. Voter turnout was an astonishing—by Canadian standards, at any rate—93.5 percent. See Québec, Directeur-général des élections, <http://www.dgeq.qc.ca/information/>.
6. The amendment of section 93 was not implemented until after the 1997 federal election, which returned the Liberals to power.
7. Formerly a political scientist at the Université de Montréal, Dion was elevated to the cabinet, along with Pierre Pettigrew, in January 1996. Dion, Allan Rock, and Marcel Massé were members of a special cabinet committee charged with elaborating a strat-

- egy for dealing with the Quebec question in early 1996. See Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 102.
8. Ibid.
  9. A third question asked the Court whether international or Canadian law would have precedence in the event of a conflict between them. For more on the Supreme Court reference see Young, *The Struggle for Quebec*, 108–9, and David Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999).
  10. In March 1997 Duceppe replaced Michel Gauthier as leader of the Bloc Québécois. Gauthier had succeeded Lucien Bouchard when the latter resigned in January 1996 to become leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec.
  11. Thus the third question put before the Court, namely whether international or Canadian law would take precedence in the event of a conflict between them, was moot.
  12. Supreme Court of Canada, *Reference Re the Secession of Quebec*, para. 138. The entire judgment is reprinted in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 14–71. The cited passage is on page 64.
  13. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 151, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69.
  14. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 153, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69–70.
  15. Canada, House of Commons, 2d session, 36th Parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999.
  16. *Clarity Act*, s. 1(4)(b).
  17. Bill C-20 does not spell out what exactly constitutes a “clear majority,” stating only that the size of the majority, along with the percentage of eligible voters and other relevant matters, will be taken into account by the House of Commons. *Clarity Act*, s. 2(2).
  18. Canada, House of Commons, 2d Session, 36th Parliament, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, *Evidence*, February 23, 2000. Online at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/CLAR/Meetings/Evidence/clarev08-e.htm>.

19. In a survey conducted between May 1 and May 8, 2000, Ekos Research Associates, Inc., found that Joe Clark had fairly high levels of trust among voters, was better known and had more widely acceptable platform ideas than his Canadian Alliance counterparts (either Preston Manning or Stockwell Day), but that his positioning on the Clarity Bill was unpopular. The sample size was 3,530 and the margin of error +/- 1.6 percent, 19 times out of 20. See "The Political Landscape: Continued Liberal Dominance, Resurgent CA, Conservatives Fading." This and other surveys can be accessed in the Ekos archives available on the Web. <http://www.ekos.ca/media>.
20. Québec, Assemblée nationale, First session, 36th legislature, December 15, 1999.
21. *An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State*, ch. 1, art. 2 and 3 (emphasis added).
22. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "Fin de siècle: Fin de la souveraineté? Quebeckers think the unthinkable," December 14, 1999. The sample consisted of 803 respondents in Quebec and 2204 Canadians outside Quebec. Margins of error were +/- 3.5 percent in Quebec and +/- 2.1 percent in the rest of the country, 19 times out of 20. The study is available online at the Ekos webpage (see note 19 above).
23. Tammy McNamee, "The Clarity Bill: Examining Liberal Party Hegemony in the Transitional Party System" (M.A. major research paper, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), 55. McNamee cites an editorial, "The Centre Stops Being Soft" in *The Economist*, December 18, 1999, which argues along similar lines.
24. Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 91. As a result of the vote, Bouchard walked out of the convention and rumors spread that he was considering resigning as party leader. Bouchard stayed put, of course, and he gradually asserted control over the party apparatus (if not over the most militant advocates of independence, *les purs et*

- durs*): over 90 percent of delegates supported his leadership at the PQ convention in May 2000.
25. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "The Quebec Political Landscape," March 5, 1999. Sample size was 1,006 in Quebec and 1871 in ROC.
  26. Angus Reid Group, "Issues and Attitudes in a 1998 Post-Election Quebec," December 1, 1998. Sample size was 1,000 and the margin of error was +/- 3.1 percent, 19 times out of 20. The survey was accessed online at <http://www.angusreid.com>.
  27. Bloc Québécois, *Le Québec gagne à voter Bloc* (Montreal, 2000; English version). Accessed online at <http://www.blocquebecois.org>. Sovereignty is mentioned only once, at the beginning of the pamphlet, in an excerpt from the BQ's declaration of principles. The thrust of the document concerns the Bloc's role in defending Quebec's interests within the federal system and in holding the federal Liberals accountable, just as an opposition party should do. For an insightful analysis of the 2000 federal election campaign, and the relatively minor role played by the issue of sovereignty, see Stephen Clarkson, "The Liberal Threepeat: The Multi-System Party in the Multi-Party System," in *The Canadian General Election of 2000*, ed. Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2001), 13–57.
  28. Claire Durand, a sociologist at the Université de Montréal, argues that pollsters systematically underestimate Liberal support in Quebec, perhaps (though this is only speculative) because respondents in surveys are reluctant to admit to supporting the federalist party. In 2000, the underestimation of Liberal support, when all polls were averaged together, was approximately 4 percent. See Durand's paper, "Electoral Surveys in the 2000 Canadian Campaign: How Did They Really Fare?" <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/socio/durandc/menurecherche.htm>, n.d.
  29. André Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," in Pammett and Dornan, *Canadian General Election of 2000*, 139–40.

30. The three defectors were André Harvey in Chicoutimi, David Price in Compton-Stanstead, and Diane St.-Jacques in Shefford.
31. In spite of this pronounced decline, Quebec still had the third-highest turnout among the provinces and territories in the 2000 election. Only Prince Edward Island (72.7 percent) and New Brunswick (67.7) registered higher turnout rates. I have calculated Quebec turnout rates from raw data supplied by Elections Canada. There is a very slight difference (one-tenth of one percent) between the figures for Quebec voter turnout reported in the *Official Voting Results* for the 37th General Election and those calculated from the raw data.
32. Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," 141.
33. Édith Brochu and Louis Massicotte, "Élections fédérales de novembre: Coup de loupe sur un scrutin," *Le Devoir*, February 26, 2002, A7.
34. Don Macpherson, "The Evil of Two Lessers: Neither Liberals nor the Bloc Can Hold Heads High as Apathy Ruled in Quebec," *Montreal Gazette*, November 29, 2000.
35. Michaud made his remarks—inter alia, he claimed that Jews feel that they are the only people to have suffered in the history of humanity—in a radio interview in early December and repeated them in testimony before the Estates-General on the Situation and Future of the French Language in Quebec. I have written in greater detail about the Michaud Affair in "Sclerosis or a Clean Bill of Health? Diagnosing Quebec's Party System in the 21st Century," in *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2004).
36. Québec, Premier ministre, "Allocution à l'occasion de la démission du premier ministre du Québec," January 11, 2001. Available at the website of the Association internationale des études québécoises. <http://www.aieq.qc.ca/bouchard.htm>.
37. This remark was actually made before Landry officially became leader of the PQ, in January 2001, at a party caucus meeting.

- Landry's outburst was occasioned by the federal government's offer of an \$18 million subsidy to the province for the renovation of the Aquarium de Québec. One of the strings attached to this money, however, was that the Canadian flag (the "bits of red rag" in question) be allowed to fly and bilingual signs be posted at the renovated site. This offer prompted Landry's crude metaphor.
38. The data on "Referendum Voting Intentions" are available at Léger Marketing's website, <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was generally close to 1,000, and the surveys were conducted approximately 10 or so times each year. The margin of error for a sample this size is +/-3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
  39. Léger Marketing, "Opinions of Quebecers toward Provincial Politics and More Particularly the ADQ," May 2002. <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was 1,001, with a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
  40. Léger Marketing finds that the ADQ and the Quebec Liberals are running neck and neck, with 35 percent of voters saying that they would vote Liberal if a provincial election were to be held and 32 percent supporting the ADQ (the PQ stands at 26 percent). See "Opinions of Quebecers Toward Provincial Politics," May 2002.
  41. See Lisée's book, *Sortie de secours* (Montreal: Boréal, 2000). For commentary on the Lisée proposal, see Gordon Gibson, "Will Separatists Settle for a Half a Loaf?" *National Post*, January 18, 2001. Online at <http://www.vigile.net/01-1/gibson.html>. See also Alexander Panetta, "PQ Strongly Considers Referendum to Ask Ottawa for More Cash: Landry," *Montreal Gazette*, June 4, 2002.
  42. Québec, Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec, *Le français, une langue pour tout le monde* (Québec, 2001), 12 (my translation).
  43. Shawn McCarthy, "Shut Down Campaign, PM Orders Martin," *Globe and Mail*, May 31, 2002, A1.



## CHAPTER 6

1. Matthew Stevenson, "Canada's Other Brain Drain: The Continuing Exodus from Quebec," *Political Options/Options Politiques* (October 2000): 63–66, page 64, [www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf](http://www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf).
2. Richard Rodriguez, *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* (New York: Viking, 2002) 94, 103, 105, and 108.
3. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 110.
4. "Carnaval Celebrants Grin and Bare It Despite S.F. Fog," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, B1.
5. Robert E. Chenard, "Historical Perspective on Waterville's 19C Franco-Americans," <http://members.mint.net/frenchcx/frcanwtv/htm>.
6. Roger Roy, "An Analysis of the Assimilation of French-Canadian Language and Culture into American Language and Culture: How French-Canadian Became Franco-American and then Became Invisible" (Graduate research essay for EDU 690 Social Context of Higher Education, University of Maine).
7. Juliana L'Hereux, "North American French as an Academic Subject." [www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm](http://www.happyones.com/franco-american/Julian/North-American-French.htm).
8. Ilan Stavans, "Spanglish: Tickling the Tongue," *World Literature Today* 74.3 (Summer 2000): 555.
9. "Tom, Tom and Julia . . . The Names Say It All," *Globe and Mail*, February 6, 2000, R2.
10. Neva Chonin, "Morissette Does Her Own Thing," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 7, 2002, D3.
11. Neva Chonin, "Furtado in Control at Warfield," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 16, 2002, D1.
12. Paula Martinac, *k.d. lang* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1997), 89.
13. Quoted in David Bennahum, ed., *In her own words: k.d. lang* (New York: Omnibus, 1995), 18.

14. Bennahum, *In her own words*, 7.
15. "Celine's New Album," *Globe and Mail*. February 7, 2002, R2.
16. Tim Goodman, "Families, Frisco Formulas for Fall," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, D1.
17. Jonathan Curiel, "Lack of TV Diversity Hit," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 15, 2002, A2.
18. Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
19. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 117.
20. Andrew Mollison, "Researchers Attack Bush's Education Reforms," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 16, 2002, A4.
21. Ibid.
22. Mary Jordan, "Fewer Migrants Caught on Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A14.
23. "INS Unveils New Plan, Devices for Border," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 2002, A9.
24. Quoted in Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
25. "More People Say That They're Just 'Americans,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 8, 2002, A8.
26. Anthony Walton, rev. of *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* by Richard Rodriguez, *New York Times Book Review*, April 7, 2002, 7.
27. Rodriguez, *Brown*, xii.
28. Rodriguez, *Brown*, 164.

## CHAPTER 7

1. Anthony DePalma, *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 354.
2. Seymour M. Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee, 1989).
3. Seymour M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and*

*Persistence in Social Structures* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988).

4. James Laxer, *Discovering America: Travels in the Land of Guns, God, and Corporate Gurus* (New York: New Press, 2001). See also, Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1996).
5. For a fuller description of this analysis, see Stephen Brooks, "A Tale of Two Elections: What the Leaders' Rhetoric from the 2000 Election Tells Us about Can-Am Political Culture Differences" (paper delivered at the Biennial Meeting of the Canadian Studies in the United States, San Antonio, Tex., November 2001). Readers may also contact the author at [brooks3@uwindsor.ca](mailto:brooks3@uwindsor.ca).

## CHAPTER 8

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2. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, chapters 8 and 9.
3. Fair, <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/>.
4. Mark J. Kasoff and Christine Drennen, eds., *Canada: A Fractured Political Landscape*, Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 1994.
5. Jones, *Who Will Be in the White House*, 79.
6. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
7. *Globe and Mail*, April 29, 2002.
8. United Press International, September 10, 2001.
9. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
10. Earl H. Fry and Jared Bybee, *NAFTA 2002: A Cost/Benefit Analy-*

- sis for the United States, Canada and Mexico* (Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, Orono, 2002).
11. Nick Schultz, "Canadian Energy Policy and Trade with the United States," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
  12. Michel Tremblay, "Hydro-Québec and TransÉnergie: Continuity in a Changing Environment," in Kasoff and Drennen, 2003.
  13. *Wall Street Journal*, April 24, 2002.
  14. *AuCanada*, "Bruising Battle over Tomatoes," Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 2002.
  15. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
  16. *Globe and Mail*, May 22, 2002.
  17. *Globe and Mail*, April 25, 2002; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, *Economic Trends*, May 2002.
  18. *Globe and Mail*, March 6, 2002.

## CHAPTER 9

1. Jorge Castañeda, "El nuevo activismo internacional mexicano," *Reforma*, September 23, 2001a, Section Enfoque 15–17; "Los ejes de la política exterior," *Nexos* 23 no. 288 (December 2001b) 66–74; and "El factor externo y consolidación de la democracia en México," *Reforma*, February 24, 2002, 10A.
2. For Castañeda's critical view on U.S.-Mexican relations before becoming minister of foreign affairs, see Castañeda, 1996.
3. Robert Pastor has made an effort to articulate a greater post-NAFTA vision for North America. He advocates institutional deepening, among other things, in order to deal with continental problems that hitherto were handled under national or bilateral agendas. However, Pastor's position does not represent the official positions of any NAFTA members. See Robert Pastor, *Toward a North American Community* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

4. For a comprehensive view of migratory problems between Mexico and the U.S. see SRE, 1997.
5. George Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/), 2002a.
6. "Estrategia nacional para la seguridad del territorio nacional. Resumen ejecutivo," Office of the Press Secretary, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html). 2002; and George Bush, "Securing the Homeland and Strengthening the Nation," [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/), 2002b.
7. Eduardo Sojo, et al., "Sociedad para la Prosperidad: Reporte a los Presidentes Vicente Fox y George Bush," Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002, electronic copy.
8. A declaration was released from a top official of that ministry, suggesting that Mexico was considering bringing the case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, but eventually did not.
9. Mr. Castañeda's most recent address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, condemning any unilateral action against Iraq in the global war against terrorism, suggests that Mexico is heading in that direction. See *Reforma*, September 14, 2002.

## CHAPTER 10

1. Alvaro Artiga, *La Política y los Sistemas de Partidos en Centroamérica*, (San Salvador: 2000).
2. Manuel Orozco, *International Norms and Mobilization of Democracy*, (London: Ashgate, 2002).
3. Graeme Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000).
4. "Alemán llama a Ortega a concertar pacto de gobernabilidad en Nicaragua," *La Prensa* (Honduras), November 23, 1996, <http://www.laprensahn.com/caarc/9611/c23002.htm>.

5. Both had resigned from their positions; their continuation was not desired by the new members. Moreover, they were not interested in supporting the new establishment.
6. "Desconfianza impera en el ámbito pre-electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana*, July 28, 2000.
7. The extent of corruption in Aleman's government is the subject of another paper. However, suffice it to say that in 1999 the comptroller had identified a number of anomalies and abuses of government resources on behalf of the president. The most public case was the use of resources to build infrastructure at the president's farm, La Chilamapa, the construction of a special road leading to the president's home, and a number of contracts. His wealth was estimated to have increased by millions of dollars. *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000.
8. "A Society Scandalized," *Envio* (June 2000).
9. "The Air is Thick with Electoral Fraud," *Envio* (July 2000).
10. "Indeciso proceso electoral en marcha," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), April 28, 2000.
11. "Entre Partidos te veas: candente ambiente pre electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), August 18, 2000.
12. "Renuncia evidencia lucha por el poder" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), May 26, 2000.
13. "Contraloría va contra Solórzano," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 11, 2000.
14. Consuelo Sandoval and Nidia Ruiz López, "Solórzano sorprende a políticos," *La Prensa* (Managua), March 17, 2001.
15. "No tengo la alternativa ideal," *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000. In late March 2001 Daniel Ortega announced the endorsement of Jarquín and the alliance with the Christian Way.
16. "Presidente Alemán admite desgaste," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 19, 2000.

17. "Renuncian candidatos conservadores," *La Prensa*, July 17, 2001.
18. A poll showed that Ortega had the lead in the election with 31 percent. Shortly after this poll, he endorsed the alliance with the Christian Way. "Encuesta nacional de CINCO: Ningún ganador a la vista," *Confidencial*, 233, March 18–24, 2001.
19. "Milagro Electoral de Enrique Bolaños," interview with Victor Borge (Borge y Asociados) by Adolfo Pastran, August 9, 2001.
20. John Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1998), 174.
21. Edelberto Torres Rivas, *Costa Rica crisis y desafíos* (San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones [DEI], 1987).
22. Eliana Franco and Carlos Sojo, *Gobierno, Empresarios y políticas de ajuste* (San José: FLACSO, 1992).
23. "Pactos, descrédito, inestabilidad" *La Nación* (San José) 1995.
24. "Modelo económico impulsa crecimiento con pobreza," *Inforpress Centroamericana*, December 1, 2000.
25. Araya joined the party very young, was president of the youth movement, legislator, minister, and president of the party.
26. "Complicado panorama para elecciones," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala) June 22, 2001.
27. INCEP, *Reporte Político/Panorama Centroamericano No. 171: Llegaron las internas partidarias para designación de candidatos*, Guatemala, June 2001, 5.
28. *Inforpress*, June 2001.
29. IDESPO, *La población costarricense del gran area metropolitana frente a su participación ciudadana y sus valores políticos*, Heredia: IDESPO, May 23, 2001.
30. Juan Manuel Villasuso, Jenny Díaz, and Laura Chinchilla, *Gobernabilidad democrática y seguridad ciudadana: El Caso de Costa Rica* (Managua: CRIES, 2000).
31. Florisabel Rodríguez (Director of Procesos), interview by author, March 22, 2002.

32. Jorge Rovira Mas, *La democracia de Costa Rica ante el siglo XXI*, San José: FLACSO, 2000.
33. Carlos Sojo (director of FLASCO), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 21, 2000.
34. Cecilia Cortes (Director of Funpadem), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 23, 2002.
35. Rodríguez interview.
36. "Liberales aceptan inscribir a Maduro," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Honduras), March 2, 2001.



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