

CHAPTER 9

Mexico's Linkage with North America after 2000: From NAFTA-Plus to NAFTA-Blues?

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FROM THE BEGINNING OF 2000 to the fall of 2001, a kind of honeymoon existed between Mexico and the United States. Largely responsible was the increasing optimism of Washington elites about democratic change in Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partner still run by an authoritarian political clique whose members had inherited power through non-competitive elections since the late 1930s. Mexico's presidential elections in the year 2000 became a watershed. Vicente Fox suddenly emerged as the strongest and most credible rival to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) candidate, Francisco Labastida, a man with a rather bureaucratic profile associated with political bosses of the now-named "old regime." In contrast, Vicente Fox, supported by the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), a conservative Catholic-based party, appeared to be a charismatic and credible leader whose major goal while campaigning was to eject the PRI's political clique from power and to inaugurate political openness and competition in the country. His

campaign successfully attracted the support of some smaller center-left parties and groups, creating a major coalition reaching beyond the PAN's traditional constituencies that eventually delivered the presidency to Fox.

But another goal of Vicente Fox's campaign was to enlarge his political constituency beyond national borders. He campaigned intensively in New York and California, seeking the support of Mexican and Mexican American communities, whose electoral participation in the United States is becoming more and more decisive in key bilateral issues, such as illegal migration from Mexico and the social conditions of Mexicans in the United States. In many ways, Fox launched a double-edged diplomacy, the purpose of which was to send a message to both Washington and home. While campaigning in the United States, he announced that the major goals of his presidential term would include legalizing the status of some three million Mexicans already working in that country and the liberalization of labor markets between the two countries. Furthermore, he called for the creation of a stronger North American community, with the free movement of labor, institution building, and development-oriented policies at its core. The message was clear: Mexico was taking the lead in going beyond NAFTA while deepening continental integration, with labor mobility and a developmental approach as its main goals. By so doing, the new political elite hoped to enlarge its domestic constituency for supporting further integration within North America.

NAFTA-PLUS

Once in power, the government better framed what then became known as the "NAFTA-plus" project. In fact, Fox's alliances with center-left groups made it possible for Jorge G. Castañeda—a major critic of PRI's regime through his influential books and ar-

ticles—to become the brain and the executor of Mexico's new foreign policy. This consisted of opening various international fronts to Mexico's participation. The very first one was to obtain a non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, through which Mexico could participate in global issues, such as peace-keeping operations, or more contentious ones like the right of intervention for humanitarian reasons. Another goal was Mexico's participation in strengthening its institutional commitments with principled international regimes. Castañeda has openly recognized, at the theoretical level, that his country is enmeshed in an international arena where Westphalian-based notions of sovereignty are being discarded. For him, the post-Cold War order cannot be ruled on the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, but on universal rules and principles held to be valid and enforced worldwide. This means intruding in the affairs of other countries when they breach those general principles. Those principles which advocate democracy and human rights became most important to Mexico, inasmuch as the Fox administration epitomizes, according to Castañeda's approach, the triumph of those principles.¹

Hence, within this new foreign policy approach, principled institutions and international agreements are playing—and will continue to play—a major role in reinforcing Mexico's political openness and transparency. At the same time, principled regimes can both denounce those who breach international norms and pressure them to abide by the rules. This could explain Mexico's interest in participating in the creation of the International Penal Court or its historic vote at Geneva, after the UN-Human Rights Commission, challenging the respect and enforcement of human rights in Cuba.

The third front opened by the new foreign policy approach was the NAFTA-plus plan already sketched out by Fox during his presidential campaign. Fox's government devised a three-tier strategy

centering on migration, development, and institution building. Migration became the core of the Mexican initiative, as earlier explained. Although its long-term goal was the full mobility of Mexican labor, legalizing the status of around 3 million illegal Mexican immigrants and protecting their basic social and human rights was its short-term target. In an accompanying move, Mexico started negotiating a guest-worker program, the scope and terms of which were never defined. The idea was to send the message that the borders were about to be opened for low-skilled labor. Second on the NAFTA-plus agenda was development. NAFTA, as it stands, is mainly a trade and investment plan favoring export-oriented industries and large corporations and investors. NAFTA has meant nothing for small inward-looking enterprises, peasants, or unions, let alone the deprived families amounting to half of the overall Mexican population. Though the development NAFTA-linked agenda has never been defined, Castañeda's own criticism of the agreement during the Salinas years was that it lacked a program of cohesion funds, similar to that existing in the European Union.²

Last but not least, the third tier of the NAFTA-plus plan was the ambitious idea of pushing for the creation of new trilateral institutions capable of dealing with issues currently handled at the unilateral or bilateral level. Common cross-border problems like environmental protection, drug trafficking, and migration could be better worked out with common goals and trilateral regional policies. Although the new institutional approach Mexico wanted was never defined at the official level, the intention to explore this possibility was consistent with Mexico's commitment in being further involved with principled international regimes. According to this rationale, it could be anticipated that deeper integration within North America, with stronger trilateral institutions, would give Mexico greater influence in dealing with common problems, as well as winning the support of a wider domestic constituency.³

Such an ambitious agenda, addressing both global and North American issues, was devised amidst great expectations in Mexico and abroad. North American economies were still growing, thanks to the impact of trade and investment liberalization conveyed by NAFTA and the booming years of the “new economy” in the United States. All three NAFTA partners experienced political change either at the executive or the legislative levels, with Mexico raising most of the optimistic expectations. The defeat of the PRI—the hegemonic party that had ruled the country for more than seventy years through noncompetitive, transparent, and pacific elections—became the sign that Mexico was becoming closer to its NAFTA and OECD partners than ever before.

At any rate, the Fox administration had the legitimacy and authority to launch a “new regime” policy approach, including this regional- and global-oriented diplomacy. However, the conditions on which this new diplomatic approach was based suddenly changed. The American economy went into recession around the beginning of the new century, due largely to its widespread global economic interests. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center in New York abruptly changed all the parameters, notions, and strategies of American national and international security. And last but not least, the democratic awakening in Mexico and the lack of a partisan majority in Congress made it much more difficult for Fox to pursue his ambitious “new regime” political approach.

AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

The terrorist attacks of September 11 have already become a watershed in world politics. At the end of the Cold War, during 1989–1990, the so-called emergence of a “new world order” became commonplace. Nonetheless, it wasn’t until the fall of 2001, after the dramatic collapse of the twin towers in New York, that a

new world order started to emerge. Political and economic alliances are currently being remade all around the world, and traditional U.S. political and economic partners are obliged to react and adapt to the new security agenda drafted and implemented by Washington. Hence, Mexico's priorities have been subordinated to the primacy of American security.

Migratory policies were already a contentious issue between Mexico and the United States before the fall of 2001. Washington and local authorities of southern border states perceived Mexican migration as a judicial issue, i.e., Mexicans trespassing across the American border without documents or working permits and consequently breaking state and federal laws. On the other side, the Mexican perception was an economic one: there were pull factors on the U.S. side demanding Mexican labor and push factors in Mexico side provoking a surplus of a low-skilled labor force.⁴

Illegal Mexican immigration to the United States came under the spotlight when local authorities in American border states attempted to suppress any rights of those illegal aliens, and abuses inflicted by patrol and police members while attempting to deter that migration became evident—including physical and in many cases fatal attacks. The heavy-handed penalization of illegal cross-border movement and the plethora of related physical and social abuses prompted Mexico, under the Fox administration, to frame the issue as either an economic or a human rights question. Mexican consulates all over the United States began to advocate for the protection of Mexicans' rights in the United States, regardless of whether they were legal aliens or not.

Mexico also realized that, in the short- and medium-terms these migration questions could only be handled at the bilateral level, in the best of cases, and not with the trilateral approach the third tier of the NAFTA-plus design anticipated. Although Canada has a stake in working on immigration issues with the United States, human migration between these two countries is different than

that between Mexico and the United States. Canada, rather, suffers from a “brain drain” (Canadian-trained professionals such as doctors emigrating to the United States for higher salaries and benefits) while simultaneously promoting immigration into Canada. As a result, bilateralism remains the best approach for these two countries in dealing with emigration to the United States. Furthermore, any negotiation for reaching a type of “guest workers” program would require legalization of the status of millions of illegal migrants in the United States—either they are Mexicans or not. The last amnesty to those illegal aliens was granted in 1986, in the midst of major negotiations involving Washington political groups and the federal government.

However, after September 11, 2001, human, trade, and information flows across borders became a security issue for the United States. Although Washington’s definition of its new transnational enemies and challenges came promptly, it took longer to define the new security architecture for dealing with the changing nature of the threat. North America became the first territorial zone in which security borders were redrafted. In December 2001, Washington announced the shift of its security perimeter in order to include its Canadian partner, with whom it would share the establishment and functioning of “smart borders.” In March 2002, the security perimeter as defined by Washington was extended to Mexico, including the “smart borders” mechanisms already in place with the Canadians. By one year after the terrorist attacks, it had become clear that enlarging the U.S. security perimeter to include its North American partners was part of a major plan aiming to reduce the risks of physical, biochemical, and cybernetic attacks on American territory. This tactic, called “The National Strategy for Homeland Security,” is based on four pillars—intelligence and warning, security in borders and transport, domestic counter-terrorism, and infrastructure protection—all of them to be supervised and administered by the newly conceived Depart-

ment of Homeland Security. Due to the subordination of border issues to this security architecture, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services and the Customs Service, among other agencies, have been integrated into the new department.⁵

According to Washington's new security scheme, "smart borders" and transport are intertwined, in the sense that every community in the United States—whether small or large—is connected within a worldwide transport infrastructure. Harbors, railroads, airports, highways, energy grids, virtual networks, and any flow conveying people or commodities are currently considered part of that worldwide transport infrastructure. The goal of smart borders is to promote the efficient and safe transit of people, goods, and services across borders using modern technology.⁶ Canada and Mexico are now committed, even in their own territories, to cooperate with U.S. authorities to ensure the security of the North American transport network.

It is clear that September 11 changed the parameters in which Mexico formulated its NAFTA-plus strategy. The migration agenda that reflected economic and human rights was reformulated according to the U.S. guidelines: human flows were not only to be divided between legal and illegal but also between safe and unsafe. The smart borders mechanism aims to detect, measure, and evaluate those distinctions. Furthermore, the new security agenda and architecture devised by Washington since fall 2001 suggests that the United States is ready to move from unilateral or bilateral formulas, as long as this protects its own interests. Migratory policies will be decided at the national level, but policies aiming to protect U.S. national territory call for the creation of security strategies that must be shared by its two border partners.

But September 11 also made clear that the domestic setting in which Fox's new foreign policy was anchored had also changed. Castañeda's first reaction after the New York attack was to invoke Mexico's "unconditional" support for the American government.

This statement, and the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to legitimize Mexico's support of U.S. military action against Afghanistan, was highly criticized by opposition parties in the Mexican Congress. The criticism became more acute after Cuban president Fidel Castro's sudden and controversial visit to Mexico, and once Mexico made explicit its condemnation to human rights violations in Cuba. Exploiting the lack of a majority party in Congress, opposition parties identified Castañeda's new foreign policy as a departure from the nationalistic and non-interventionist foreign policy principles, traditionally invoked by old-regime politicians when they wanted to distance themselves from or even criticize U.S. foreign policy. The opposition saw Castañeda's position as too close to American interests. Tensions between opposition leaders and the executive branch reached a peak when President Fox had to cancel a short visit to the United States and Canada because a majority vote in the Senate refused to accept his petition to leave the country. The message was clear: the new foreign policy had no constituency in Congress.

In spite of these setbacks on the foreign and domestic fronts, Castañeda successfully negotiated a so-called "Alliance for Prosperity," facilitating the transfer of technology and resources between the United States and Mexico. The alliance was announced in the midst of a summit of the three North American heads of state, held in Monterrey in March 2002. It was based on four premises: a) access to private investment for small- and medium-sized enterprises; b) transfer of technology through targeted projects involving small entrepreneurs and American universities; c) upgrading of infrastructure; and d) promotion of institutional interconnectedness.

A major goal of this alliance is reducing the costs of remittances made by Mexicans living in the United States, regardless of their legal status. According to this plan, money originating from the United States can be used to help finance private construction

projects (mainly private dwellings) for migrants' families still living in Mexico. Also announced were plans to disperse credits obtained in the United States in Mexico. In addition, the alliance considered the promotion of American franchises and tourist-oriented development projects. These market-based mechanisms had as a goal halting illegal immigration to the United States by rooting Mexican families to their own localities. This new economic alliance also claimed it would market Mexican handicrafts in the States through institutional mechanisms and teach medium-sized enterprises to get funding for their projects. Plans for new investment in infrastructure—such as transport, power transmission, telecommunications, among other sectors—was also announced, as well as coordination among major multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, and regional ones, like the Inter-American Development Bank, in order to fulfill this task.⁷

Though this new “alliance for prosperity” was proclaimed as a major success for Mexico within its NAFTA-plus agenda, it was in fact far from the three-tier approach envisaged at the beginning of the Fox administration. Although it was publicized when Fox, Bush, and Chrétien met in Monterrey, this alliance involved only the United States, and not Canada. Washington made no commitment to a unilateral transfer of funds for deprived regions of Mexico. Any reference to income disparities among the country's different regions was omitted, let alone the increasing number of poor households. In fact, this alliance was instead announcing the privatization of development policies, originally accomplished by public development banks and public programs targeting deprived populations through the transfer of resources from the better off. Ironically, this new alliance anticipated that Mexicans living in the United States would become major actors in propelling development in their native country. Their remittances suddenly became a strategic means for funding development programs in

Mexico, while at the same time the entrance of Mexican labor in the United States had become more and more securitized.

In fact, this new prosperity alliance was announced and highlighted in such a way that the extension of the U.S. security perimeter into Mexico and the establishment of smart borders on the Mexican side—two approaches also discussed during the Monterrey summit—were minimized by the media. Although (as of this writing) no official statement has been released by the Mexican government regarding this continental strategy conceived by Washington, it is clear that Mexican cooperation will be required somehow. Will this be the trade-off for the “prosperity” deal?

A few days later, a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court made more evident the contradictory terms under which the new prosperity alliance was negotiated. In a split vote, the Court ruled against the National Labor Relations Board, which was asking for wage relief for an illegal Mexican worker fired by an American business once it was discovered that he wanted to create a union. The Court grounded its decision in the illegal status of the Mexican worker, although it said nothing about the illegality of the U.S. firm’s hiring of an illegal alien. The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered only a timid response.⁸ It became evident that relying on the remittances of Mexican workers living in the United States for funding development projects in Mexico was not a sound business. Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision, which set a precedent for similar cases to come, showed clearly that negotiating any immigration deal between Mexico and the United States was still far from easy. Immigration policies and decisions are still so fragmented in the States that to reach a single and unified position vis-à-vis Mexican migration is almost impossible. It became evident that in migration issues, as in development and institution-building, a holistic approach was not the best way to deal with the Washington agenda. A piecemeal approach was the only way to follow through.

This once again became apparent during the hot summer of 2002, when American farmers contended that Mexico was not honoring a treaty signed in 1944, through which the United States and Mexico shared water coming from the Colorado and Bravo rivers. According to this treaty, the United States delivers an amount of water, estimated on a five-year basis, from the Colorado River to Mexican farmers; in exchange, American farmers benefit from water coming from the Bravo River. For the period 1997–2002, Mexico was delivering much less than agreed in the treaty, alleging drought and a change in agricultural production in northern states, which had become more water-intensive. Though the water war did not escalate and spill over to other border issues, it was clear that many problems between Mexico and the United States should be handled on an ad hoc basis. But summer 2002 was hot not only due to water shortages. It also marked the end of the NAFTA-plus approach initiated by Fox while campaigning for the presidency. In June and July, he twice cancelled visits to Texas, during which a short encounter had been scheduled with President Bush. The water war was the reason for the first cancellation, and the execution of a Mexican convicted of killing a U.S. anti-narcotics officer the reason for the second. This last decision boosted the Mexican president's political support in Congress, even among the PRI and Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) opposition parties. In early September, just after President Bush threatened Iraq with a possible unilateral intervention if it did not comply with United Nations resolutions, and a little before the sad anniversary of the terrorist attack in New York, Mexico announced its decision to suspend its commitments with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty). These two decisions marked a major change in the North American approach pursued by Mexico.

NAFTA-BLUES

The sudden cancellation of President Fox's visit to the United States, alleging human rights violations in that country, along with the announcement that Mexico was defecting from the Rio Treaty, marks the end of the NAFTA-plus undertaking begun in 2000. Mexico seems to be returning to basic bilateral relations, having apparently given up on taking a continental approach to what it perceived as being North American issues. If there is any room for a continental approach in the short- to midterm, it will only be found in those areas where American interests lie. If this was true during the NAFTA negotiations, it became even more evident after the terrorist attacks on New York. Mexico and Canada suddenly became part of a domestic U.S. territory in relation to the "securitization" of American borders. And the new security agenda, both domestic and international, is being shaped and enforced by Washington's perceptions and definitions of its enemy and the threat it poses.

In this sense, Mexico's decision to renounce its Inter-American Treaty membership can be interpreted as a declaration of independence, both at the regional and global levels, from U.S. security policies. At the North American level, institution building and trilateral agreements are not possible. As a result, Mexico will probably shift its efforts to multilateral forums, in order to increase its leverage with its powerful neighbor when dealing with bilateral issues. As it did in the Cold War years, Mexico will probably focus on reinforcing and creating new international legislation and institutions as a means to deter and contain U.S. unilateralism in security and strategic issues. It seems likely that Mexico will be tempted to join in coalitions with those countries interested in drafting new legislation and changing perceptions regarding international terrorism, the right of intervention for humanitarian reasons, and the like, a fine example being its participation in the creation of the International Penal Court. The Fox administra-

tion's original vision of Mexico as a major global activist may have to be curtailed, as its dealings on bilateral hot-button issues with the United States and its need to enlarge its own political constituency domestically will divert significant resources. As in the Cold War years, however, Mexico will be a sought-after and perhaps necessary presence in global forums, if only to clarify its differences on some global issues vis-à-vis its neighbor.⁹ This independent move in global affairs will target both domestic and international audiences, and by so doing, enlarge the political support Fox still needs domestically to govern his country.

At the continental level NAFTA will probably remain an investment and trade regime, and it will be in nobody's interest to attach any other agenda to it, in order to avoid any risk of contaminating any other bilateral issue. In other words, contentious issues among its countries, such as migration, drug trafficking, security, border issues, and the like, will remain framed by and treated within national and bilateral agendas. However, some linkages across agendas are also possible. If in fact Mexico has become part of America's security space, there are many sensitive issues that require intergovernmental accommodation. If people, goods, transport services, chemical stocks, and the like, have become potential security threats, cooperation between the armies, police, intelligence services, and customs officers of the two countries (three if we include Canada) will be necessary. And the good will and aid of the Mexican government is essential to such an endeavor. Mexico will need to restructure and modernize its security agencies, which have been permeated by corruption and drug dealers. At the same time, it will be in the Mexican government's interest to keep its territory safe from any major threat to national and continental security. The United States won't offer any major concessions if Americans perceive security threats as coming from Mexico. Linkages between security and immigration issues can be anticipated in the future U.S.-Mexican relations. One of Mexico's

major challenges will be to change American perceptions of Mexican emigrants as “undesirable people” in the context of those “smart borders”—in other words, as people suspected of being dangerous to American security. At least a minimum of global activism on Mexico’s part will be necessary and desirable. This would give Mexico the standing to denounce eventual abuses done in the name of “continental security” in international forums.

The Mexican government also needs to link global activism with its domestic politics. Denouncing the Inter-American Treaty might be the first case of this type of linkage. As previously stated, Fox’s “new” foreign policy led to criticism and animosity from opposition parties. It raised the costs of establishing political coalitions to launch new policies, at a time when President Fox did not have a majority in Congress. After two years in power, Fox and his party urgently needed to demonstrate that they could steer the country without resorting to the PRI’s old methods and solutions. A major fiscal reform proposal ended up making only slight changes to the fiscal regime the original proposal attempted to attack. A plan to move Mexico City’s current airport was cancelled due to the activism of furious peasants who denounced the irregularities involved in the expropriation of their land, the proposed site of the new airport. President Fox was forced to cancel a short visit to the U.S. and Canada, as already noted, because the Senate, still dominated by the PRI, did not accept the grounds for his trip. And when, more recently, the government announced a restructuring of the electricity and energy sectors, for which a qualified majority vote is needed in Congress, electricity unions marched in the streets, denouncing the “selling of the country” to U.S. corporations. There is a growing perception among political circles and public opinion leaders that Fox and his cabinet have become hostages of a divided Congress.

How will Washington—and to some extent, Ottawa—perceive this shift in Mexico's foreign policy? The answer to this question is crucial. If Washington perceives Mexico's "independent" globalism as a non-cooperative strategy vis-à-vis key U.S. strategic interests, bilateral issues will become more difficult to handle, exacerbating the misperceptions and mistrust between the two countries, which could eventually affect the ongoing democratization of Mexico. In contrast, if Washington accepts Mexico's independent activism in global issues as a trade-off for enlarging the domestic support of its current administration, progress on both the security and migratory agendas of the two countries can be anticipated, with no risk of affecting Mexico's political transition. In both scenarios, NAFTA will remain as it is, because entrepreneurs, corporations, consumers, and political leaders of its three countries have already realized its benefits. In the first scenario, however, a climate of misperception and confrontation over bilateral issues could eventually politicize some NAFTA-based issues, increasing the costs of an eventual deepening of the agreement or its enlargement through the long and more difficult negotiations of a hemispheric deal. Misperception and confrontation would inevitably spill over into North American security concerns, making enhanced cooperation with American and Canadian officials increasingly difficult for the Mexican government. Under the second scenario, the possibilities of a political contamination of the agreement remain much lower. The gains, whether great or poor, obtained from bilateral negotiations could eventually contribute to revive some parts of the original NAFTA-plus formula Fox attempted to push vis-à-vis the United States and Canada at the beginning of his administration.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. Press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. Fox speech at The Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
4. Transcript of the presidential debate on October 4, 2000.
5. Miami, Fla., August 25, 2000.
6. Ibid.
7. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 10, 2000.
8. On January 11, 2001, a disgruntled and sorely disappointed Lucien Bouchard resigned as premier of Quebec, saying he had failed to keep his promise to make Quebec independent.
9. From an address to the National Policy Research Conference in Ottawa on November 30, 2000.

CHAPTER 2

1. Enrique Krauze, *La Presidencia Imperial: Ascenso y Caída del Sistema Político Mexicano, 1940–1996* (Mexico City: Tusquets Editores, 1997).
2. These figures were taken from “México Social,” edited regularly by the Banco Nacional de México, and the electoral database at the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, CIDAC.
3. A brief review of these three main parties’ histories and programs can be found in Mónica Serrano, ed., *Governing Mexico: Political*

- Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
4. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).
 5. Volker G. Lehr, "Modernización y movilización electoral, 1964–1976: Un estudio ecológico," *Estudios Políticos* 4, no. 1 (1985): 54–61, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
 6. Juan Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México City: Cal y Arena, 1991).
 7. Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, "Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: Construction of Partisan Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 34–48.
 8. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
 9. Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
 10. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Moreno, "Catching All Souls: Mexico's Partido Acción Nacional," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).

11. The empirical evidence for this chapter comes from a collection of surveys conducted in Mexico between 1990 and 2002. A list of the surveys includes: 1) The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey*'s second, third, and fourth waves, administered in 1990, 1996/7, and in 2000, respectively, to slightly over 1,500 respondents in each wave. The Mexican samples of the *World Values Survey* were conducted in 1990, 1996/7, and 2000 among 1,531, 1,511, and 1535 Mexican adults, respectively. They are part of the ICPSR archives, at the University of Michigan. The fourth-wave survey was conducted in February 2000, sponsored by Grupo Reforma, and conducted by the Departments of Survey Research at newspapers *Reforma*, *El Norte*, *Mural*, and *Palabra*. 2) A national exit poll administered to over 3,000 voters as they left their corresponding polling places in the 2000 elections. I compare these results with those from a national exit poll conducted in the 1997 elections. The 1997 exit poll was sponsored by the Partido Acción Nacional and conducted by *Arcop*, on July 6, 1997, among 3,452 voters. The 2000 exit poll was sponsored by Grupo Reforma and conducted on July 2, 2000, among 3,377 voters by newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. 3) Four national pre-election polls conducted between April and June 2000 and pooled into one single database. The national pre-election polls were conducted in early April, early May, late May, and mid-June, 2000, by the newspaper *Reforma* and its affiliates. Each survey had slightly over 1,500 respondents (with the exception of the April one, which had slightly over 1,600) from all thirty-two federal entities. For the analysis in this chapter, the four polls were pooled into a single database of 6,289 cases. All the surveys listed here are national representative samples of Mexican adults or voters, and were conducted face-to-face in the respondents' homes or as they left their polling places, in the case of the exit polls.
12. Between one-fourth and one-third of Mexican respondents, depending on the survey, do not place themselves on the left-right

scale. In this analysis, I assigned an average placement to those who did not originally place themselves on the scale. The general averages fell between categories six and seven on a ten-point scale.

13. The original measure is a ten-point self-placement scale.
14. Alejandro Moreno, "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa." *Política y Gobierno* 6, no. 1 (1999): 45–81.
15. The shift to the right probably reflects the influence of the PRI's also historic primary to select its presidential candidate. The 2000 survey was conducted in February, four and a half months before the presidential election and with campaigns officially running, but, most importantly, three months after the PRI primary of November, 1999, and after Fox and others had started to advertise widely on television. Very intense negative campaigning and mudslinging characterized the primary contest, but it boosted voter interest in the PRI.
16. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, England, 1998).
17. According to Moreno (1999b), the liberal-fundamentalist dimension is empirically observable in many Latin American countries, and it provides a useful tool to analyze party competition across the region.
18. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998).
19. Empirically, these dimensions result from a theoretically-guided principal components factor analysis based on the Mexican sam-

- ples of the 1997 and 2000 *World Values Surveys* pooled into one single dataset.
20. Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Series on Latin America in Global Perspective, 1999).
 21. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (February 2000): 19–51.
 22. Alejandro Moreno, "Party Competition and the Issue of Democracy: Ideological Space in Mexican Elections," in Mónica Serano (ed.), *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (Macmillan-ILAS Series, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998) and "Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México en los noventa," *Política y Gobierno* 1 (1999a): 45–81.
 23. Moreno, 1999a.
 24. The model is based on a multinomial logit regression that uses vote choice as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables that have been of theoretical and empirical relevance in the literature of Mexican voting behavior. The model is then applied to the different types of survey data (exit polls and pre-election polls). The vote for PAN or Fox is taken as a basis for comparison in the results shown in the tables. See for example Domínguez and McCann 1995; Magaloni 1997; Buendía 1997; Magaloni and Moreno, 2003.

25. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
26. The official vote for Congress in 2000 is not broken down by party in the case of the Alliance for Mexico (PRD) and the Alliance for Change (PAN), but opinion polls showed that support for the Green party alone was about 2 to 4 percent.
27. Beatriz Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré, "Sincere and Strategic Party Switching in the course of the Presidential Campaign," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson (eds.), *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Campaigns, Voting Behavior, and the 2000 Presidential Race* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
28. Alejandro Moreno, "The Effects of Negative Campaigns on Mexican Voters," in *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election*, ed. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson.
29. Alejandro Moreno and Roy Pierce, "The Impact of the PRI Primary of November 1999 on the Mexican Presidential Election of July 2000," unpublished manuscript.
30. Alejandro Moreno, "Mesa 1: Encuestas preelectorales, serie incluyendo últimas encuestas (Estimación de los votantes probables)," in *El papel de las encuestas en las elecciones federales: Memoria del taller Sumiya 2000*. Federal Elections Institute (IFE), Mexican Association of Research Agencies (AMAI), and Colegio Nacional de Actuarios, 2000, and Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, "Cómo llegó: La debacle y el triunfo". *Reforma*, December 1, 2001.

CHAPTER 3

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2. Larry J. Sabato, *Overtime* (New York: Longman, 2002).
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 4. John C. Green et al., "Murphy Brown Revisited: The Social Issues in the 1992 Election," in *Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the Future of American Politics*, ed. Michael Cromartie, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 43–66.
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 7. David K. Ryden, "Out of the Shadows, but Still in the Dark? The Courts and Political Parties," in *The State of the Parties*, ed. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 79–94.
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CHAPTER 4

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16. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 73.
17. Barry Cooper, *Sins of Omission: Shaping the News at CBC TV* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 1.
18. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 40.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Hartley and Josephine Mazzuca, "Fewer Canadians

- Favour Legalized Abortion under Any Circumstance,” *The Gallup Poll* (Toronto: Gallup Canada, December 12, 2001).
21. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 145.
 22. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 175.
 23. Lydia Miljan and Barry Cooper, *Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003) 92.
 24. Reginald Bibby, *Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada* (Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1993).
 25. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 71.
 26. Blais et al., *Anatomy*, 80 n. 12.

CHAPTER 5

1. A feat not accomplished since Mackenzie King had won three in a row in 1935, 1940, and 1945.
2. Robert A. Young, *The Struggle for Quebec* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 87.
3. Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
4. The referendum question asked voters whether they agreed “Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership.”
5. Voter turnout was an astonishing—by Canadian standards, at any rate—93.5 percent. See Québec, Directeur-général des élections, <http://www.dgeq.qc.ca/information/>.
6. The amendment of section 93 was not implemented until after the 1997 federal election, which returned the Liberals to power.
7. Formerly a political scientist at the Université de Montréal, Dion was elevated to the cabinet, along with Pierre Pettigrew, in January 1996. Dion, Allan Rock, and Marcel Massé were members of a special cabinet committee charged with elaborating a strat-

- egy for dealing with the Quebec question in early 1996. See Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 102.
8. Ibid.
 9. A third question asked the Court whether international or Canadian law would have precedence in the event of a conflict between them. For more on the Supreme Court reference see Young, *The Struggle for Quebec*, 108–9, and David Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999).
 10. In March 1997 Duceppe replaced Michel Gauthier as leader of the Bloc Québécois. Gauthier had succeeded Lucien Bouchard when the latter resigned in January 1996 to become leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec.
 11. Thus the third question put before the Court, namely whether international or Canadian law would take precedence in the event of a conflict between them, was moot.
 12. Supreme Court of Canada, *Reference Re the Secession of Quebec*, para. 138. The entire judgment is reprinted in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 14–71. The cited passage is on page 64.
 13. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 151, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69.
 14. *Reference Re Secession*, para. 153, in Schneiderman, ed., *The Quebec Decision*, 69–70.
 15. Canada, House of Commons, 2d session, 36th Parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999.
 16. *Clarity Act*, s. 1(4)(b).
 17. Bill C-20 does not spell out what exactly constitutes a “clear majority,” stating only that the size of the majority, along with the percentage of eligible voters and other relevant matters, will be taken into account by the House of Commons. *Clarity Act*, s. 2(2).
 18. Canada, House of Commons, 2d Session, 36th Parliament, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, *Evidence*, February 23, 2000. Online at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/2/CLAR/Meetings/Evidence/clarev08-e.htm>.

19. In a survey conducted between May 1 and May 8, 2000, Ekos Research Associates, Inc., found that Joe Clark had fairly high levels of trust among voters, was better known and had more widely acceptable platform ideas than his Canadian Alliance counterparts (either Preston Manning or Stockwell Day), but that his positioning on the Clarity Bill was unpopular. The sample size was 3,530 and the margin of error +/- 1.6 percent, 19 times out of 20. See "The Political Landscape: Continued Liberal Dominance, Resurgent CA, Conservatives Fading." This and other surveys can be accessed in the Ekos archives available on the Web. <http://www.ekos.ca/media>.
20. Québec, Assemblée nationale, First session, 36th legislature, December 15, 1999.
21. *An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State*, ch. 1, art. 2 and 3 (emphasis added).
22. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "Fin de siècle: Fin de la souveraineté? Quebeckers think the unthinkable," December 14, 1999. The sample consisted of 803 respondents in Quebec and 2204 Canadians outside Quebec. Margins of error were +/- 3.5 percent in Quebec and +/- 2.1 percent in the rest of the country, 19 times out of 20. The study is available online at the Ekos webpage (see note 19 above).
23. Tammy McNamee, "The Clarity Bill: Examining Liberal Party Hegemony in the Transitional Party System" (M.A. major research paper, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), 55. McNamee cites an editorial, "The Centre Stops Being Soft" in *The Economist*, December 18, 1999, which argues along similar lines.
24. Young, *Struggle for Quebec*, 91. As a result of the vote, Bouchard walked out of the convention and rumors spread that he was considering resigning as party leader. Bouchard stayed put, of course, and he gradually asserted control over the party apparatus (if not over the most militant advocates of independence, *les purs et*

- durs*): over 90 percent of delegates supported his leadership at the PQ convention in May 2000.
25. Ekos Research Associates, Inc., "The Quebec Political Landscape," March 5, 1999. Sample size was 1,006 in Quebec and 1871 in ROC.
 26. Angus Reid Group, "Issues and Attitudes in a 1998 Post-Election Quebec," December 1, 1998. Sample size was 1,000 and the margin of error was +/- 3.1 percent, 19 times out of 20. The survey was accessed online at <http://www.angusreid.com>.
 27. Bloc Québécois, *Le Québec gagne à voter Bloc* (Montreal, 2000; English version). Accessed online at <http://www.blocquebecois.org>. Sovereignty is mentioned only once, at the beginning of the pamphlet, in an excerpt from the BQ's declaration of principles. The thrust of the document concerns the Bloc's role in defending Quebec's interests within the federal system and in holding the federal Liberals accountable, just as an opposition party should do. For an insightful analysis of the 2000 federal election campaign, and the relatively minor role played by the issue of sovereignty, see Stephen Clarkson, "The Liberal Threepeat: The Multi-System Party in the Multi-Party System," in *The Canadian General Election of 2000*, ed. Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2001), 13–57.
 28. Claire Durand, a sociologist at the Université de Montréal, argues that pollsters systematically underestimate Liberal support in Quebec, perhaps (though this is only speculative) because respondents in surveys are reluctant to admit to supporting the federalist party. In 2000, the underestimation of Liberal support, when all polls were averaged together, was approximately 4 percent. See Durand's paper, "Electoral Surveys in the 2000 Canadian Campaign: How Did They Really Fare?" <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/socio/durandc/menurecherche.htm>, n.d.
 29. André Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," in Pammett and Dornan, *Canadian General Election of 2000*, 139–40.

30. The three defectors were André Harvey in Chicoutimi, David Price in Compton-Stanstead, and Diane St.-Jacques in Shefford.
31. In spite of this pronounced decline, Quebec still had the third-highest turnout among the provinces and territories in the 2000 election. Only Prince Edward Island (72.7 percent) and New Brunswick (67.7) registered higher turnout rates. I have calculated Quebec turnout rates from raw data supplied by Elections Canada. There is a very slight difference (one-tenth of one percent) between the figures for Quebec voter turnout reported in the *Official Voting Results* for the 37th General Election and those calculated from the raw data.
32. Bernard, "The Bloc Québécois," 141.
33. Édith Brochu and Louis Massicotte, "Élections fédérales de novembre: Coup de loupe sur un scrutin," *Le Devoir*, February 26, 2002, A7.
34. Don Macpherson, "The Evil of Two Lessers: Neither Liberals nor the Bloc Can Hold Heads High as Apathy Ruled in Quebec," *Montreal Gazette*, November 29, 2000.
35. Michaud made his remarks—inter alia, he claimed that Jews feel that they are the only people to have suffered in the history of humanity—in a radio interview in early December and repeated them in testimony before the Estates-General on the Situation and Future of the French Language in Quebec. I have written in greater detail about the Michaud Affair in "Sclerosis or a Clean Bill of Health? Diagnosing Quebec's Party System in the 21st Century," in *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2004).
36. Québec, Premier ministre, "Allocution à l'occasion de la démission du premier ministre du Québec," January 11, 2001. Available at the website of the Association internationale des études québécoises. <http://www.aieq.qc.ca/bouchard.htm>.
37. This remark was actually made before Landry officially became leader of the PQ, in January 2001, at a party caucus meeting.

- Landry's outburst was occasioned by the federal government's offer of an \$18 million subsidy to the province for the renovation of the Aquarium de Québec. One of the strings attached to this money, however, was that the Canadian flag (the "bits of red rag" in question) be allowed to fly and bilingual signs be posted at the renovated site. This offer prompted Landry's crude metaphor.
38. The data on "Referendum Voting Intentions" are available at Léger Marketing's website, <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was generally close to 1,000, and the surveys were conducted approximately 10 or so times each year. The margin of error for a sample this size is +/-3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
 39. Léger Marketing, "Opinions of Quebecers toward Provincial Politics and More Particularly the ADQ," May 2002. <http://www.legermarketing.com/english/set.html>. Sample size was 1,001, with a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percent, 19 times out of 20.
 40. Léger Marketing finds that the ADQ and the Quebec Liberals are running neck and neck, with 35 percent of voters saying that they would vote Liberal if a provincial election were to be held and 32 percent supporting the ADQ (the PQ stands at 26 percent). See "Opinions of Quebecers Toward Provincial Politics," May 2002.
 41. See Lisée's book, *Sortie de secours* (Montreal: Boréal, 2000). For commentary on the Lisée proposal, see Gordon Gibson, "Will Separatists Settle for a Half a Loaf?" *National Post*, January 18, 2001. Online at <http://www.vigile.net/01-1/gibson.html>. See also Alexander Panetta, "PQ Strongly Considers Referendum to Ask Ottawa for More Cash: Landry," *Montreal Gazette*, June 4, 2002.
 42. Québec, Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec, *Le français, une langue pour tout le monde* (Québec, 2001), 12 (my translation).
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CHAPTER 6

1. Matthew Stevenson, "Canada's Other Brain Drain: The Continuing Exodus from Quebec," *Political Options/Options Politiques* (October 2000): 63–66, page 64, www.irpg.org/po/archive/oct00/stevenso.pdf.
2. Richard Rodriguez, *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* (New York: Viking, 2002) 94, 103, 105, and 108.
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6. Roger Roy, "An Analysis of the Assimilation of French-Canadian Language and Culture into American Language and Culture: How French-Canadian Became Franco-American and then Became Invisible" (Graduate research essay for EDU 690 Social Context of Higher Education, University of Maine).
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8. Ilan Stavans, "Spanglish: Tickling the Tongue," *World Literature Today* 74.3 (Summer 2000): 555.
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11. Neva Chonin, "Furtado in Control at Warfield," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 16, 2002, D1.
12. Paula Martinac, *k.d. lang* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1997), 89.
13. Quoted in David Bennahum, ed., *In her own words: k.d. lang* (New York: Omnibus, 1995), 18.

14. Bennahum, *In her own words*, 7.
15. "Celine's New Album," *Globe and Mail*. February 7, 2002, R2.
16. Tim Goodman, "Families, Frisco Formulas for Fall," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 27, 2002, D1.
17. Jonathan Curiel, "Lack of TV Diversity Hit," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 15, 2002, A2.
18. Mireya Navarro, "Hollywood's Dirty Little Broom Closet," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 17, 2002, D13.
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21. Ibid.
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25. "More People Say That They're Just 'Americans,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 8, 2002, A8.
26. Anthony Walton, rev. of *Brown: The Last Discovery of America* by Richard Rodriguez, *New York Times Book Review*, April 7, 2002, 7.
27. Rodriguez, *Brown*, xii.
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CHAPTER 7

1. Anthony DePalma, *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 354.
2. Seymour M. Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee, 1989).
3. Seymour M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and*

Persistence in Social Structures (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988).

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CHAPTER 8

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 13. *Wall Street Journal*, April 24, 2002.
 14. *AuCanada*, "Bruising Battle over Tomatoes," Canadian Studies Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, 2002.
 15. *National Post*, April 29, 2002.
 16. *Globe and Mail*, May 22, 2002.
 17. *Globe and Mail*, April 25, 2002; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, *Economic Trends*, May 2002.
 18. *Globe and Mail*, March 6, 2002.

CHAPTER 9

1. Jorge Castañeda, "El nuevo activismo internacional mexicano," *Reforma*, September 23, 2001a, Section Enfoque 15–17; "Los ejes de la política exterior," *Nexos* 23 no. 288 (December 2001b) 66–74; and "El factor externo y consolidación de la democracia en México," *Reforma*, February 24, 2002, 10A.
2. For Castañeda's critical view on U.S.-Mexican relations before becoming minister of foreign affairs, see Castañeda, 1996.
3. Robert Pastor has made an effort to articulate a greater post-NAFTA vision for North America. He advocates institutional deepening, among other things, in order to deal with continental problems that hitherto were handled under national or bilateral agendas. However, Pastor's position does not represent the official positions of any NAFTA members. See Robert Pastor, *Toward a North American Community* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

4. For a comprehensive view of migratory problems between Mexico and the U.S. see SRE, 1997.
5. George Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/, 2002a.
6. "Estrategia nacional para la seguridad del territorio nacional. Resumen ejecutivo," Office of the Press Secretary, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/200207-16.es.html. 2002; and George Bush, "Securing the Homeland and Strengthening the Nation," www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/, 2002b.
7. Eduardo Sojo, et al., "Sociedad para la Prosperidad: Reporte a los Presidentes Vicente Fox y George Bush," Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002, electronic copy.
8. A declaration was released from a top official of that ministry, suggesting that Mexico was considering bringing the case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, but eventually did not.
9. Mr. Castañeda's most recent address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, condemning any unilateral action against Iraq in the global war against terrorism, suggests that Mexico is heading in that direction. See *Reforma*, September 14, 2002.

CHAPTER 10

1. Alvaro Artiga, *La Política y los Sistemas de Partidos en Centroamérica*, (San Salvador: 2000).
2. Manuel Orozco, *International Norms and Mobilization of Democracy*, (London: Ashgate, 2002).
3. Graeme Gill, *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000).
4. "Alemán llama a Ortega a concertar pacto de gobernabilidad en Nicaragua," *La Prensa* (Honduras), November 23, 1996, <http://www.laprensahn.com/caarc/9611/c23002.htm>.

5. Both had resigned from their positions; their continuation was not desired by the new members. Moreover, they were not interested in supporting the new establishment.
6. "Desconfianza impera en el ámbito pre-electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana*, July 28, 2000.
7. The extent of corruption in Aleman's government is the subject of another paper. However, suffice it to say that in 1999 the comptroller had identified a number of anomalies and abuses of government resources on behalf of the president. The most public case was the use of resources to build infrastructure at the president's farm, La Chilamapa, the construction of a special road leading to the president's home, and a number of contracts. His wealth was estimated to have increased by millions of dollars. *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000.
8. "A Society Scandalized," *Envio* (June 2000).
9. "The Air is Thick with Electoral Fraud," *Envio* (July 2000).
10. "Indeciso proceso electoral en marcha," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), April 28, 2000.
11. "Entre Partidos te veas: candente ambiente pre electoral" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), August 18, 2000.
12. "Renuncia evidencia lucha por el poder" *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala), May 26, 2000.
13. "Contraloría va contra Solórzano," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 11, 2000.
14. Consuelo Sandoval and Nidia Ruiz López, "Solórzano sorprende a políticos," *La Prensa* (Managua), March 17, 2001.
15. "No tengo la alternativa ideal," *Confidencial* (Managua) 5, no. 206, August 27–September 2, 2000. In late March 2001 Daniel Ortega announced the endorsement of Jarquín and the alliance with the Christian Way.
16. "Presidente Alemán admite desgaste," *La Prensa* (Managua), October 19, 2000.

17. "Renuncian candidatos conservadores," *La Prensa*, July 17, 2001.
18. A poll showed that Ortega had the lead in the election with 31 percent. Shortly after this poll, he endorsed the alliance with the Christian Way. "Encuesta nacional de CINCO: Ningún ganador a la vista," *Confidencial*, 233, March 18–24, 2001.
19. "Milagro Electoral de Enrique Bolaños," interview with Victor Borge (Borge y Asociados) by Adolfo Pastran, August 9, 2001.
20. John Peeler, *Building Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1998), 174.
21. Edelberto Torres Rivas, *Costa Rica crisis y desafíos* (San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones [DEI], 1987).
22. Eliana Franco and Carlos Sojo, *Gobierno, Empresarios y políticas de ajuste* (San José: FLACSO, 1992).
23. "Pactos, descrédito, inestabilidad" *La Nación* (San José) 1995.
24. "Modelo económico impulsa crecimiento con pobreza," *Inforpress Centroamericana*, December 1, 2000.
25. Araya joined the party very young, was president of the youth movement, legislator, minister, and president of the party.
26. "Complicado panorama para elecciones," *Inforpress Centroamericana* (Guatemala) June 22, 2001.
27. INCEP, *Reporte Político/Panorama Centroamericano No. 171: Llegaron las internas partidarias para designación de candidatos*, Guatemala, June 2001, 5.
28. *Inforpress*, June 2001.
29. IDESPO, *La población costarricense del gran area metropolitana frente a su participación ciudadana y sus valores políticos*, Heredia: IDESPO, May 23, 2001.
30. Juan Manuel Villasuso, Jenny Díaz, and Laura Chinchilla, *Gobernabilidad democrática y seguridad ciudadana: El Caso de Costa Rica* (Managua: CRIES, 2000).
31. Florisabel Rodríguez (Director of Procesos), interview by author, March 22, 2002.

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33. Carlos Sojo (director of FLASCO), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 21, 2000.
34. Cecilia Cortes (Director of Funpadem), interview by author, San José, Costa Rica, March 23, 2002.
35. Rodríguez interview.
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