

The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron

---

Williams Honors College, Honors Research  
Projects

The Dr. Gary B. and Pamela S. Williams Honors  
College

---

Spring 2023

## Variations in Refugee Acceptance Among Democratic States

Ryan King  
rdk36@uakron.edu

Follow this and additional works at: [https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/honors\\_research\\_projects](https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/honors_research_projects)



Part of the [Comparative Politics Commons](#), and the [International Relations Commons](#)

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you [through this survey](#). Your feedback will be important as we plan further development of our repository.

---

### Recommended Citation

King, Ryan, "Variations in Refugee Acceptance Among Democratic States" (2023). *Williams Honors College, Honors Research Projects*. 1753.

[https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/honors\\_research\\_projects/1753](https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/honors_research_projects/1753)

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by The Dr. Gary B. and Pamela S. Williams Honors College at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in Williams Honors College, Honors Research Projects by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact [mjon@uakron.edu](mailto:mjon@uakron.edu), [uapress@uakron.edu](mailto:uapress@uakron.edu).

**Variations in Refugee Acceptance Among Democratic States**

Honors Research Project

University of Akron

## Introduction/Background

As the global population continues to grow alongside a rapidly changing climate and widespread political instability, many populations are forced to relocate to avoid political violence, drought, economic instability, and many other life-threatening crises. The United Nations defines refugees as “people who have fled war, violence, conflict or persecution and have crossed an international border to find safety in another country” (UNHCR). In recent years, an influx of refugees traveling into developed nations has led to political controversy, media attention, and increasingly dire rhetoric around the topic of refugee movement and resettlement. Despite these trends, the international community has agreed that refugees and migrants maintain certain rights throughout their travel, these include the right to leave and return to their state freely (United Nations, Art. 13), the freedom to seek protection from persecution, protection from violence, and access to adequate living conditions (United Nations, Art. 5, 14, and 25). According to the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, cannot discriminate against these people on the basis of “race, religion or country of origin” (The UN Refugee Agency, 195, p. 19) , and cannot “expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (Refugee Host Countries, p. 32). However, the treatment of these peoples has largely failed to meet these and other agreed upon standards.

Many governments have discouraged and even refused refugees from entering their country (Wanat, 2019), while in others it has become all too common that migrating peoples are sent back to unlivable conditions (Chishti & Pierce, 2020), or redirected

toward countries to which they have no connection (Marx, 2022), after struggling to leave their country of origin (Human Rights Watch, 2022). This phenomenon grows even more troubling when one realizes that the countries most guilty of turning away refugees are often the wealthiest and most capable of relocating these individuals. According to the UN Refugee Agency, though high income countries maintain nearly two thirds of the world's wealth, these countries are only responsible for hosting 17%-26% of the world's refugees since the 1990s (Refugee Host Countries). This research paper seeks to better understand what factors account for the variation of acceptance of refugees in developed, democratic countries.

### **Economic Conditions**

A state's economic condition is one of the most important factors on its policies. Periods of high unemployment and price inflation can be devastating. Unemployment is particularly poignant for citizens; a lack of consistent income and an inability to work impacts nearly all aspects of an individual's life. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, passed by the United Nations in 1966, recognizes the right to work as a foundational human right. The UN also identifies wages from consistent work as a key factor in human development (United Nations, 2023). Since labor exists as such a paramount piece of day to day life, increases in unemployment can be threatening to the average citizen. In democracies, policies and officials chosen by voters are dictated in large part by the ongoing economic trends. Policies towards refugees are no different, and should be influenced by the economic conditions within a state. Wealthy nations with more resources, the ability to fund generous welfare programs, high GDP per capita, and high rates of employment should

be more likely to host relatively high levels of refugees. An economy threatened by high or rising unemployment should be less likely to host high levels of refugees.

Wealthy states with a high GDP per capita have greater resources to expend on each individual within its borders. This wealth gives these states more options on how they manage their borders, run their bureaucracies, and resettle and integrate immigrants and refugees. More resources can lead to better organization and efficiency of asylum processes, better quality of life for refugees that are going through the asylum process, and greater ability to resettle refugees (Shaw, Funk, Garlock, & Arok, 2021). States lacking sufficient resources often choose to house refugees in poorly resourced camps that are low cost, subject refugees to slow and understaffed bureaucratic systems, and often cannot expend any resources to assist refugees with resettlement. Wealthy countries have the advantage of resources that can speed up asylum processes and handle a large number of refugees in ways that poorer states simply cannot.

Further, for states that have undergone strong economic growth, it would seem beneficial to integrate more workers and consumers, in the form of refugees and immigrants, to expand and strengthen the national economy over time. This is especially true in countries with aging populations that are currently facing or expecting to face labor shortages owing to a shrinking workforce. In these states, and those facing economic growth that requires new workers, refugees should be seen as a resource to better economic outcomes, rather than a threat to existing workers (Vijaya, 2020, p. 174). For these reasons, wealthy states should be likely to receive higher levels of refugees than poorer states.

States with high unemployment, on the other hand, can face numerous problems that result in lower levels of refugees. Under conditions of high or rising unemployment, refugees are often seen as threats that take jobs and undercut existing workers and are less likely to be welcomed by the public (Savun & Gineste, 2019). This perceived threat of potentially worsening economic realities of citizens should result in lower levels of refugees.

Politicians and public figures can also lean into the fear and uncertainty surrounding worsening economic conditions, using refugees as a scapegoat for complex problems. Blaming populations of refugees for worsening material conditions for the average citizen can be a way to provide the public with a straightforward reason for economic uncertainty and unemployment (Savun & Gineste, 2019). Arguments making this case claim that refugees increase competition for jobs by undercutting workers and worsening material conditions, and that refugees seek to abuse welfare systems lessening the resources available to citizens. The result of this scapegoating should be a decrease in the levels of refugees into the country during periods of instability.

High rates of unemployment can also be met with state funded support programs. Jobs programs, social support programs, and other initiatives intended to bolster the economy and lessen the burden on citizens takes away from the availability of resources needed to resettle refugees. At these times, refugees and the systems funded to assist them can be seen as competition for scarce resources, leading unions, social programs, businesses both small and large to oppose them. With all of these groups vying for scarce resources, governments are likely to face pressure to focus on

domestic support above other issues. With less financial support, refugees have a more difficult time affording basic necessities, navigating bureaucratic systems, accessing medical care, and making the transition into a host country (Devi, 2020). This decrease in funding for institutions that allow for refugees to enter a country, and programs that help refugees through those pathways, should directly result in a decrease to levels of refugees through the slowing of these often complicated legal processes (Akashi, 2021). Each of these reasons account in part for the fact that periods of economic distress should lead to a reduction in the flow of refugees.

### **Social Conditions**

Looking beyond economic concerns, social conditions within a country are likely to play a role in the total number of refugees hosted there. One factor that should influence the rate of refugee intake is the homogeneity of a population. The more homogenous a population is, the more likely that population may be to push back against the welcoming of refugees, especially when these refugees are Black and brown entering predominantly white populations. Traub, covering refugees entering Sweden, claimed that “The ethnically homogeneous nations of Eastern Europe have refused to take any refugees at all” (Traub, 2016, P. 3). Studies have shown that in highly homogenous populations, there is an increased likelihood for discriminatory practices and instances of racist violence (Rees, 2022). Further, these racist sentiments often lead to the election of public officials willing to enact laws restricting the movement of migrants and refugees (Lulat, 2022, p. 61). Lulat affirms that racially and ethnically homogenous voters can be motivated by racist rhetoric, which leads to the imposition of restrictions upon refugees and migrants (Lulat, 2022, p. 55).

In another study, Heo cited “conservative Christian politics” and existing “anti-communist sentiment” in South Korea as reasons for hostility during a recent migrant crisis (Heo, 2021, P.11-12), but noted that these anti-refugee ideologies have such a strong impact in the country due to South Korea’s high level of racial and religious homogeneity. These ideologies create an in-group of the homogeneous population that adheres to them, and an out-group of populations like refugees that come from different backgrounds, worship in different ways, and look different than the in-group. Like above, racist rhetoric precipitates fear around this out-group, often using them as a scapegoat or labeling them as a threat to the nation (Lulat, 2022, p. 63), which is likely to lead to restrictions on refugee flows.

Looking at another highly homogenous country, researchers identified that the sociocultural climate in China prevented multiculturalist ideology from growing within the country (Wang, 2020). The country's lack of diversity is seen as a factor preventing the population from readily welcoming refugees. In an account of the history of Islamophobia in the region, Abdelkader writes that the government in China points to “the Han cultural and linguistic identity as a source of geographic and demographic cohesion” (Abdelkader, 2020, p. 5). Further, the Chinese government views deviation from the Han majority as a threat to national security and unity. Refugees, especially those from majority Muslim countries, would be seen through this same lens as a threat to national unity and security.

The treatment of these “security threats” has been widely reported as abhorrent. Reports claim that the Chinese government forces this Muslim minority population into laogai (work camps), saying “the goal seems to be to eliminate Uyghurs as a distinctive



ethnic population” with “reports of forced sterilizations of Uyghur women, destruction of Uyghur shrines and graveyards, limits on the use of the Uyghur language, forced labor programs, and the removal of Uyghur children... from their parents.” (Wasserstrom, 2021, P. 157-158) These cultural and social circumstances paint an unsettling picture for refugees fleeing violence and instability in the Middle East and Central Asia to China, since they are another population differing from China’s Han culture. If China will go to such great lengths to eliminate existing populations to maintain homogeneity, it would also likely cut off or lower rates of refugees to prevent the diversification of its nation.

Another factor that should impact the rate of refugees entering a host state is the visibility of the conflict that these refugees are fleeing. The more a nation and its lawmakers are invested in a conflict, the more refugees they should be willing to host. One example of this was the US’s acceptance of an influx of refugees fleeing communist regimes during the Cold War (Moorthy et al., 2019, p. 2). One study found that countries are “often willing to shoulder those costs when they have an interest in the ongoing conflict” (Turkoglu, 2022, p. 138), and later shares that countries supporting one side of a conflict go on to host twice as many refugees as others (Turkoglu, 2022, p. 147). While this increased acceptance may be largely due to public perception of the conflict and a public willingness to support one side over another, allowing refugees can also serve strategic purposes in an ongoing conflict. Refugee camps can serve as training centers and supply depots for one side of a conflict (Turkoglu, 2022, p. 139). Host nations may use humanitarian aid as a pretense for direct support of one side. This has been seen in states like Turkey that “allowed the Syrian opposition to open an

office in Istanbul and hosted their meetings. Turkey let them operate on its soil and use Syrian rebels for its military operation in Northern Syria” (Turkoglu, 2022, p. 139). This level of support for one side of a conflict would lead to increased allowance of refugees into a country. Conflicts with less visibility that elicit little interest from surrounding nations would not receive the same level of refugee allowance.

A final socio-cultural condition that should influence the rate of refugees into a host country is a historical colonial connection with a refugee’s country of origin. Moore and Shellman established that if they travel to noncontiguous states, refugees are more likely to travel to states that “have colonial ties to their country of origin” (Moore & Shellman, 2007, p. 830-831). This study explains that the cultural and linguistic influence of former imperial states makes resettlement more appealing to refugees than resettlement to an entirely unknown state. However, the literature lacks adequate investigation into whether former colonial states are more likely to welcome refugees (either in general or from former colonial regions). Because of the shared history, language, and culture, states with imperial histories should be more likely to host more refugees as many could be from former colonies with shared culture.

### **Political Conditions**

Similarly to a country’s culture, a country’s political context is a crucial factor when considering their outlook on and acceptance of refugees. Due to years-long citizenship processes and voting restrictions, refugees (especially those that have resettled recently) are often unable to vote in elections. Further, those that can vote often make up a minority of a country’s overall population. Due to their relatively small influence on elections, policy makers are more likely to cater to groups that maintain

more political power. Some elected officials have extended this deprioritization of refugees to the point of scapegoating and villainization. Using refugees as a political tool to create fear in the minds of larger voting populations can serve as a way to energize and mobilize voters. Many politicians, including those in areas that have low refugee populations, develop narratives that depict refugees in a negative light. Some of these narratives depict refugees as criminals that are a danger to society. Some of these narratives conflict by saying that refugees either steal jobs from citizens or are lazy and abuse publicly funded social programs. Irrespective of the veracity or exact claims of these narratives, they all serve as a way to motivate voters to support certain candidates over others. In this way, refugees serve as an easy target to gain political support.

At large, far-right politicians have been the most likely to restrict refugee movement and characterize refugees in negative ways. These figures often stoke fear of unfamiliar groups in voters, lean into nationalist sentiment, and seek to preserve cultural, racial, and ethnic homogeneity within their state. These groups differentiate themselves from existing conservative groups by advocating an intolerance for outsiders, and by developing a sense of nationalism that goes beyond national pride into xenophobia and racism. Pulling from a voter base of largely homogenous populations that often feel economically overlooked and undervalued, far-right leaders have been able to provide targets to blame for their economic and social conditions. This strategy works as a way to get voters to the polls, and its success has led to growing popularity in many different democratic states. Using refugees as a target, talk of securing borders from criminals and protecting existing populations from dramatized

claims about refugees can be seen in rhetoric used by the GOP in the United States (Republican National Committee, 2016, p. 25-26), the far-right National Rally party in France (Ray, 2023), the Brothers of Italy party (Tranchina, 2022), and numerous other parties on the right across Europe, South America, and North America.

This strategy of far-right politicians is important to note as it should result in a direct decrease in the flow of refugees into a country. Elected officials that serve as either executives of a state or legislators of a state that utilize this anti-refugee rhetoric to gain support should be expected to use their political power to decrease or stagnate the flow of refugees when possible.

Far-right officials serving as the executive of state that gain support through anti-refugee rhetoric are likely to advocate for and enforce anti-refugee policies and reduce the flow of refugees into a country. Controlling the national agenda, facing the public frequently, and likely serving as the leader of a major party are all aspects of the immense political power executives wield. Anti-refugee policies can serve as visible and straightforward action that only directly hurts refugees.

One such executive notorious in recent years for his resistance to migrants and refugees is Hungary's Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. Gozdziaik and Marton explain, "for Viktor Orbán, the arrival of refugees was not a humanitarian challenge but a Muslim invasion that required an appropriate response: closing the Balkan land route to the European Union. A 100-mile-long, four meter-high, razor-wire-topped fence on Hungary's southern borders with Serbia and Croatia was erected to keep refugees out" (Gozdziaik & Marton, 2018, p. 9). Orbán has also instituted a policing force called "border hunters" that chase down refugees and migrants that manage to circumvent this

fence and other measures. Hungary has not always had such harsh practices towards refugees, but since the rise of their far-right conservative party, led by Orban, these anti-refugee policies have become a salient aspect of Hungarian politics. Scholars have reasoned that far-right conservative ideology, with its penchant for claims of refugees as bad faith actors and threats to existing norms, was “associated with increased support for restrictive policies that either limited the freedom of the accepted asylum seekers or rejected them” (Mancini, 2020, p. 760). Mancini goes on to explain that these claims have been leveraged as justification for restrictive policies across the European Union, in places like Italy and the Netherlands (Mancini, 2020, p. 762). Serving as Prime Minister, Orban has been able to enact a wide-range of policies meant to repel and mistreat refugees.

The rise of increasingly far-right leaders has not been restricted to Eastern Europe, with countries like the United States seeing an increase in popularity of these figures. The 2016 election of Donald Trump denoted a stark shift to the right in both domestic and international politics for the U.S.. From the beginning of his campaign, Trump gathered support promising to “send every Syrian refugee admitted into the United States back from where they came” (Scribner, 2017, P. 264), increase surveillance on migrants, and outright ban Muslim refugees from entering the country. This rhetoric struck a chord with many, and led to the policies enacted over the next four years. As promised, Trump implemented a ban on migration from majority Muslim countries and began to extend restrictions on refugees on the southern border of the U.S.. Implementation of these illiberal policies granted legitimacy to widespread racist

and anti-refugee sentiment, drastically changing the refugee resettlement landscape (Scribner, 2017, P. 272).

Both of the examples above show far-right figures that have leaned into nationalism and fear mongering to characterize refugees as an existential threat to their state. After being elected by adequately mobilizing voters with these tactics, these leaders used their power to restrict the flow of refugees. Advocating for, passing, and enforcing anti-refugee policies followed running on an anti-refugee platform that emphasized the supposed threat refugees pose.

Alongside executives, democracies have a legislative component of elected representatives. The previously discussed use of nationalism and fear-mongering to mobilize voters is present in this branch of government as well, and, as above, lawmakers that exhibit anti-refugee sentiment tend to fall towards the far-right of the political spectrum (Consterdine, 2020, p. 183). Some elected legislators use the same tactics as executives to gain support by scapegoating refugees because they hold little political capital. These legislators are then able to use their power to decrease a state's support of refugees.

The influence that far-right legislators can have depends on the level of representation their party has in the legislature and the structure of the legislature. In a legislative body, a majority of anti-refugee policy makers are able to use their power to enact laws that decrease the rates of migrants and refugees. Even a minority of anti-refugee policy makers can leverage their power to prevent legislation that aids refugees, indirectly keeping the rate of refugees as low as possible. In dual-party legislatures, stop guards like filibusters may exist that would prevent a slight majority

from passing anti-refugee legislation without some level of outside support. However, these mechanisms would also allow a substantial minority to prevent any laws that increase the level of incoming refugees.

Using the example of the current Biden Administration, the Democratic Party maintained a majority in both chambers of Congress for two years, but still failed to remove the anti-refugee policies previously set in place. This is due in part to the conservative minority that was able to prevent legislation from being passed through its use of the filibuster (Lau, 2020). This administration also prioritized other issues above immigration and refugee treatment, possibly as a compromise with conservative lawmakers to gain support on other issues like infrastructure investment (Sonnenfeld, 2021) (New York Times, 2022). Leveraging these mechanisms, even a minority of legislators were able to prevent substantial changes to how refugees are treated in the country.

Multiparty democratic systems can also be heavily influenced by relatively small, anti-refugee groups. According to Duverger's Law, proportional electoral systems that grant seats based on the share of the total vote a party receives in a region leads to multiparty systems (Almond et al, 2008, p. 114). Instead of seats being awarded only for attaining the most votes in a region, proportional electoral systems grant representation to numerous parties, even fringe groups with a relatively small share of the overall vote. Due to this proportional representation, these systems often have a number of smaller parties rather than one dominant party. In times when a single party does have majority control, they are free to pass legislation without compromising to gain the votes of minority parties. However, when representation is spread amongst a number of parties,

with no one party maintaining a majority, legislation can only be passed through coalition building. During these times, a coalition of multiple minority parties must bargain and cooperate to gain enough votes to pass legislation (Almond et al, 2008, p. 120). This bargaining process leads to compromises with relatively low representation parties as their vote or votes could be necessary in establishing a majority. Fringe parties with a relatively low number of seats may be able to make demands that slow or decrease the number of refugees allowed into the country or diminish resources being spent on refugee processes and support. So, even an anti-refugee party that does not hold a majority of seats can still be an important part of a coalition, thereby having a substantial influence on issues such as asylum-seeking.

The political conditions of a country, specifically the officials in leading the country, have a substantial impact on its flow of refugees. The presence of political figures that gain popular support by using nationalist rhetoric that portrays refugees as a threat should lead to policies that decrease or stagnate the level of refugees hosted in that state.

### **Hypotheses**

This research is intended to provide deeper insight into the relationship between a number of economic, social, and political conditions and refugee acceptance. A better understanding of the relationships laid out in the below hypotheses should shed light which variable may be closely tied with refugee acceptance.

For this research, I have developed the following hypotheses:

*H<sub>1</sub>: Democratic states with high GDPs will have higher levels of refugee acceptance.*



*H<sub>2</sub>: Democratic states undergoing periods of high unemployment will have lower levels of refugee acceptance.*

*H<sub>3</sub>: Democratic states with high levels of homogeneity (racial and ethnic) will have lower levels of refugee acceptance.*

*H<sub>4</sub>: Democratic states with a political/strategic interest in an ongoing conflict will have higher levels of refugee acceptance.*

*H<sub>5</sub>: Democratic states with historical colonial connections in the global south will have higher levels of refugee acceptance.*

*H<sub>6</sub>: Democratic states with right-leaning governments should have lower levels of refugee acceptance.*

## **Research Design**

The goal of this research is to determine if the factors discussed above influence rates of refugee acceptance in democratic states. This research includes an N of 23 using 23 democratic states with varied economic, social, and political environments<sup>1</sup>. These states were chosen for their status as liberal democracies, and variations in level of wealth per capita, employment rates, population diversity, political interests, historical backgrounds, and partisanship. This research will use a mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods to analyze existing data and research on these variables.

---

<sup>1</sup> States in sample: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (UK), and United States (US). Values of former USSR states were only introduced after each transitioned to a democratic state.

***Dependent variable: Refugee population by country or territory of asylum***

This research will operationalize its dependent variable with total refugee population by year in each of the sample countries. This data was collected from *Our World in Data* as it had the most comprehensive and accessible dataset for the purposes of this research. This data considers those people recognized as refugees under a number of international agreements (Our World in Data), and was collected through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (via World Bank). Collecting data on refugees can be challenging as some refugees may not know to register or be unable to register due to certain circumstances. It is also “easier to register than to de-register” as a refugee, which leads to some overestimations (Our World in Data). Further, these data do not indicate true refugee acceptance rates, but the total refugee population from year to year. These figures do capture the trends, though, with decreases in population likely coming in part from low acceptance rates. Some limitations have been somewhat offset through the exclusive use of developed democracies, which are more likely to have reliable data. This indicator may fail to capture factors like deregistration and mortality.

***Independent Variables:******GDP per capita***

A country’s economic resources largely determine the scale and functionality of systems it has in place for refugee acceptance and resettlement. Refugee acceptance and resettlement rely heavily on the resources a state has to expend on each individual. The goal of analyzing this variable is to determine whether wealthier states accept greater numbers of refugees with their high level of resources. Gross domestic product

per capita aims to measure these resources by accounting for the goods and services produced in a country over a given time period and adjusting for population. Although this measure fails to capture many details and nuances of a state's economic conditions, it will suffice as a way to compare wealth between states. Using the average GDP per capita of each country over a ten year period (2009-2018), and the country's average overall refugee population and average refugee population per 10,000 citizens in the same period, this research will determine if there is any significant correlation between these variables. *Our World in Data* database provides the information used in this analysis.

### ***Unemployment***

Similar to GDP per capita, unemployment rates provide key insights into a country's economic condition. Using these rates in a given country over a ten year period (2009-2018), corresponding periods of high unemployment and low refugee acceptance will indicate this variable's influence. This variable can fluctuate briefly without leading to widespread economic vulnerability, so sustained periods of high unemployment are expected to have a greater effect on refugee acceptance. The goal of this analysis is to determine whether unemployment in a country impacts refugee acceptance. This analysis will measure the correlation between the average unemployment rate of each sample country from 2009-2018 and the change in refugee population during that period. Based on the previously discussed hypothesis, a high average unemployment rate should correspond with a decrease in total refugee population (which indicates a low refugee acceptance rate). *Our World in Data* database provides the information used in this analysis.

### ***Homogeneity***

A state's culture is influenced by the varied ethnic, racial, and religious groups of which it is made up. Data concerning diversity of these groups is less available than economic data and poorly standardized between countries, so this analysis will rely on looking at the sample countries with available data to discern the variable's impact. There are a number of challenges with gathering data on ethnic diversity. Defining distinct and separate ethnic groups can be difficult as different communities and individuals all have varied ideas of what distinctions characterize an ethnicity's members. Research has been done to standardize the degree of ethnic fractionalization within countries in order to better research ethnic diversity as a variable between states (Fearon, 2003). This fractionalization is found by comparing the share of the population made up by the majority ethnic group and the share of the population made up by the minority ethnic group(s) (Fearon, 2003, p. 206-207). Higher portions in the minority ethnic group constitute a higher overall fractionalization, since the population is less homogenous. More minority ethnic groups in a state also increase this level of fractionalization. Using fractionalization data available through previous research efforts, I will provide a deeper insight into the relationship between homogeneity and refugee acceptance by determining whether the variables are correlated.

### ***Political Interests***

A state's political and strategic interests are at the forefront of political decision-making. Situations that involve a state supporting one side of a conflict over another can make refugee acceptance politically and strategically advantageous. This variable will be investigated qualitatively, looking more closely at the sample countries.

This section will determine whether countries are more likely to accept refugees from a politically relevant conflict by looking closely at states involved directly or indirectly in a conflict that is causing individuals to relocate and seek asylum outside of their country of origin.

### ***Colonial History***

History of colonial connections with other states can often be indicative of shared language and culture, making resettlement between connected states easier than movement to a completely foreign country. This ease of resettlement and historical tie may make states with colonial histories more apt to receive refugees. Admittedly, these lingual and cultural connections do not allow for refugees to integrate into a new society seamlessly, but it may be easier for both refugees and citizens, and thereby more widely accepted. This research seeks to explain this possible link between colonial ties and refugee acceptance by looking more closely at overall refugee acceptance of former colonial powers.

### ***Far-Right Representation***

Beyond social and economic factors, elected officials and the ideologies they represent are an important determinant of policy. Using a measure of the right-left partisan lean, this research hopes to gain insight into the relationship between anti-refugee rhetoric on the far-right and the actual acceptance rates of refugees under far-right officials. To do this, the public dataset from the *Manifesto Project* was used as the independent variable. The *Manifesto Project* analyzes “election manifestos in order to study parties’ policy preferences” (Manifesto Project Database), creating a right-left metric to compare the partisan lean of parties within a country, parties between different


countries, and the partisanship between governments. Using this metric<sup>2</sup>, this research was able to better understand how partisanship influenced refugee acceptance rates in 23 countries from 1990 to 2020<sup>3</sup>.

## Results and Discussion

### Hypothesis 1: GDP

This research will perform a mix of quantitative analyses over the previously mentioned hypotheses. First, I will examine the relationship between average GDP per capita from 2009-2018 (due to data availability) and total refugee population (Figure 1) as well as refugee population per 10,000 citizens (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Refugee Population vs. GDP per Capita




<sup>2</sup> The right-left scores of each government are not reported each year. Each country was given about 8 right-left partisanship scores during the period from 1990 to 2020.

<sup>3</sup> Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania had incomplete refugee population datasets in the early 1990s and did not always meet democratic standards.

Running a correlation between the variables in Figure 1 yields a correlation coefficient of 0.375, meaning that there is a weak positive correlation between a state's GDP per capita and total refugee population. This is a notable finding as it indicates that there is a positive relationship between the resources a country has per capita and the number of refugees they accept overall. This relationship appears to support the idea that with more resources, countries are able to manage higher levels of refugees through asylum and resettlement processes.

The relationship in Figure 1 does not adjust the refugee population according to the total population in a country. Replacing the average total refugee population on the y-axis for average refugee population per 10,000 citizens (Figure 2) demonstrates more clearly the proportion of the population these refugees make up.

Figure 2: Refugee Population per 10,000 vs. GDP per Capita



The correlation coefficient between these two variables is higher than that of Figure 1 at 0.591. This indicates a moderate positive correlation between these variables. Adjusting for population took into account the size of the population in these states and illustrates the proportion of refugees. This correlation indicates that wealthy and well-resourced democratic states are more likely to have higher proportions of refugee populations than less wealthy democratic states. The relationship identified here is important to note as it indicates the importance of wealth and resources in refugee resettlement efforts. Future research should expand its scope to include non-democratic states in this analysis, and democratic states (especially wealthy ones) should consider the influence their policies have on refugee resettlement at large.


This analysis shows a weak positive correlation between a democratic state's wealth and its total refugee population and a moderately positive correlation between a democratic state's wealth and refugee population per 10,000 citizens. Due to the relationships demonstrated above, there is room for continued and specified research into how GDP per capita impacts the total refugee population.

## **Hypothesis 2: Unemployment**

Looking next at the independent variable of unemployment, Figure 3 depicts the relationship between each state's average unemployment over a 10 year period (2009-2018) and the average refugee population during that period. This average is an indicator meant to capture the unemployment rate over a course of time, and the average refugee population serves as an indicator of refugee acceptance over time.



Figure 3: Refugee Population Per 10000 vs. Unemployment



The correlation coefficient of the data in Figure 3 is  $-0.279$ . This indicates a weak negative correlation between average unemployment rates of these democratic states and their acceptance of refugee populations. This finding does correspond to the hypothesis above, indicating a slight relationship between unemployment and refugee acceptance. This relationship is weak and requires further analysis, however, the tendency expressed in Figure 3 is interesting as it indicates that states with high unemployment often are unable or unwilling to accept refugees at the same rates as states with greater economic stability.

### Hypothesis 3: Homogeneity

Due to restraints on data concerning racial and ethnic diversity, this research relied on the ethnic fractionalization data provided through the work of James D. Fearon in “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country” (2003). It should be noted that in the 20

years since publication, ethnic fractionalization numbers may have changed. Using the sample countries, a correlation was run to determine the relationship between how homogenous or fractionalized a state is, and the average number of refugees per 10,000 citizens from 2009-2018 in that state.

Figure 4: Refugee Population per 10,000 vs. Ethnic Fractionalization




Figure 4 depicts the average number of refugees over a ten year period over each country's degree of fractionalization (0 being perfectly homogenous) to gain insight about whether countries with larger or more abundant minority populations are more receptive to receiving refugees. The correlation coefficient of the data in Figure 4 is -0.202, indicating only a very weak negative relationship. It was hypothesized that low ethnic fractionalization would lead to a lower overall refugee population, which would have been indicated by a positive correlation. Instead, a weak negative relationship was

found, suggesting that low ethnic fractionalization may be linked to higher refugee acceptance. This finding did not match expectations.

#### **Hypothesis 4: Political/Strategic Interests**

Hypothesis four seeks to investigate the relationship between a state's political interests and its acceptance of refugees. States supporting one side of a conflict over another may be more likely to grant refugees displaced by this conflict priority status, offer more resources for resettlement, and accept greater levels of these refugees than it would otherwise. To examine this possible relationship, this research will examine trends in refugee populations around the time of known conflict in which a country had a strategic interest.

One major conflict that a number of sample countries had a political interest in was the Vietnam War. One report claims that “between 1965 and 1969 nearly 3.2 million people... had been classified as refugees” (Vong, 2020, p.76). Vong explains that these uncoordinated groups of internal refugees were not choosing a side in the conflict, but rather escaping active warzones (Vong, 2020). The US military, though, decided to direct as many of these displaced people as possible to South Vietnam and depict it as an endorsement by local populations of US involvement. Vong continues, “US military policies categorized Vietnamese as ‘assets’ during the war laid the groundwork for how the American media and military reframed them as heroically ‘rescuing’ them afterwards” (Vong, 2020, p. 78). Following the collapse of the US backed South Vietnamese government in 1975, “approximately 130,000 refugees from Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia and Laos, found their way to the United States.” (Kelly, 1986, p. 139) This acceptance of refugees in the United States further supported the

narrative that the US was rescuing Vietnamese people. This narrative was valuable to the US government as a justification for the war during a time when many citizens began to question or oppose US involvement. These accounts indicate that the political and strategic interests of the United States influenced the movement of refugees within Vietnam, and from Vietnam to the United States throughout and following the conflict.

A more recent example of how political interests influence refugee acceptance can be seen in the United Kingdom's acceptance of refugees from Hong Kong. China's "increasingly authoritarian grip" (Chan, T, 2022) has led thousands of Hong Kongers to flee their homes, with many choosing the UK as their place of refuge. One report states that "The government is expecting about 300,000 people to use this new route to citizenship in the next five years" (Chan, T, 2022), and explains how the UK's new British National (Overseas) visa system allows for those in Hong Kong to enter the UK for a number of years as a worker or student, and then obtain permanent residency fairly easily following the expiration of this visa (Government Service, 2021). Previously a British colony, Hong Kong has maintained political and economic ties with the UK following its transfer from the UK to China. Because of this, the UK has political and strategic interests that have led it to support efforts to maintain democracy and oppose total Chinese control over the region (Benson, 2021). One way that the UK has done this is through programs like the aforementioned BNO visa system and other streamlined asylum processes exclusively offered to those in Hong Kong (Benson, 2021). While there is no active conflict leading the UK to accept Hong Kongers, the political tension in the region combined with the UK's strategic interests in the region

have led to increases in refugee and migration acceptance, as was hypothesized above.

These cases support the hypothesis that democratic states with political/strategic interests in ongoing conflicts (or in regions of high political tensions) will be more likely to accept refugees. Similar to in Hypothesis 5, quantitative analysis on this topic is challenging as there are few standardized databases that include both country of origin and country of asylum of refugees, but the cases presented above indicate that political interests lead to an increased willingness to accept refugees.

### **Hypothesis 5: Colonial History**

Historical colonial connections are hypothesized to influence refugee acceptance. Countries with wide-reaching colonial empires have had lasting influence on developing nations across the world. These historical and cultural ties between former colonial states and developing states are hypothesized to result in greater refugee acceptance in former colonial states than states without such historical ties. If this hypothesis is correct, former colonial states will host higher levels of refugees (adjusting for population) than other states in the sample.

Of the sample countries, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, and the UK have all maintained large colonial empires with the longest lasting impacts<sup>4</sup>. Each of these empires spread language and influenced culture to the furthest points of their colonial holdings. One remaining piece of evidence of this spread is language. English is spoken natively by 370-380 million people as the official language of 54 countries, and French (used in both the former French and Belgian empires) is spoken natively by around 80

---

<sup>4</sup> Countries like Japan, Germany, and the United States both could be argued as part of the colonial powers group, but were excluded from this group as neither had as early an impact as those listed above.

million and serves as the official language for 30 countries (Kästle). Similarly, Spanish is spoken natively by 360-490 million people as the official language of 21 countries, and Portuguese is spoken natively by 250-260 million and serves as the official language of 9 countries (Kästle). The prevalence of these languages in so many countries indicates the lasting impact colonial powers had on their colonial territories. In many areas, this lasting influence stretches beyond language and into culture. Regardless of the full extent of this linguistic and cultural influence, the shared history between colonies and their former colonizers serves as a significant connection between states.

The colonial connection between states around the world is hypothesized to serve a significant role today in refugee acceptance. This research will analyze the commonalities and differences between previously colonial and non-colonial states to deepen our understanding of the relationship between colonial history and present

refugee acceptance.

Figure 6: Former Colonial States





Figure 6 charts the refugees per 10,000 citizens of each of these former colonial states. At first glance, the past 20 years of refugee population numbers adjusted for population do not seem to indicate any commonalities between these former colonial powers. France, Belgium and the United Kingdom host relatively high levels of refugees, while Spain and Portugal host at times less than one refugee per 10,000 citizens. This is interesting due to the fact that Spain and Portugal were some of the earliest and most powerful empires. It would be expected that these two countries would be significantly more accepting of refugees if historical colonial connections influence refugee acceptance. This clear disparity between former colonial states suggests that this factor has no meaningful effect on refugee population, and refugee acceptance by

extension.

Figure 7: Former Colonial States (blue) alongside Remaining Sample Countries (Yellow)



Graphing the two groups together, similarly, yields no distinguishable difference between states with and without colonial histories. States like Hungary and Poland hosted, at times, less than one refugee per 10,000 citizens, while Sweden had at times over 200 refugees per 10,000 citizens. It was expected that those states with colonial pasts would accept notably more refugees than other countries, but Figure 7 indicates that this is not necessarily true. Though the sample here is small, there is no evidence to suggest a significant relationship between these variables.

Existing research may further support the finding that there is no significant relationship between former colonial states and total refugee acceptance. One study investigated the Cambodian refugee communities of Lyon and Paris (Wijers, 2011). Wijers explains that France welcomed an influx of refugees fleeing Cambodia in the



mid-to-late 1970s, relating to hypothesis 4 and a state's political interest in a conflict, utilizing government and NGO resources to resettle refugees under a limited quota system. Throughout this process "Many of the formalities around obtaining official residency for these Cambodians were reduced to a minimum as a form of judicial priority treatment" (Wijers, 2011, p. 243). This judicial priority given to Cambodians (hailing from a former French colony) suggests that colonial ties may increase the acceptance rate of refugees. However, during this period, France was utilizing a quota system which limited the number of work permits, temporary residential permits, and overall number of refugees welcomed (Wijers, 2011, p. 244). So, in this case, these Cambodian refugees were granted priority, found the resettlement process more simplified than other refugees, and were accepted at higher rates than refugees without this priority status. However, France was not, at this time, increasing its overall acceptance of refugees.

Evidence from this 2011 study suggests that the measurement of refugee population per 10,000 citizens fails to adequately assess a relationship between colonial ties and refugee acceptance. The analysis presented here is unable to conclusively determine whether a relationship exists between historical colonial ties and refugee acceptance.

Future research on this topic should include a more specified dataset with overall refugee numbers as well as the refugees accepted by country of origin. In the case of France, including countries of origin would likely show a propensity towards accepting refugees from former colonies, such as Cambodia, that overall refugee statistics are unable to demonstrate.

### Hypothesis 6: Partisanship

Hypothesis 6 seeks to better understand the relationship between the partisan leaning of a government and the refugee acceptance rate of that government. This research hypothesizes that far-right tendencies of a government should lower the acceptance rate of refugees in a country. Nationalist rhetoric that often villainizes refugees should lead to policy changes that lower the overall acceptance rates of refugees. Because the right-left scores range from far-left (highly negative) to far-right (highly positive), this hypothesis should be supported by a significant negative correlation between refugee population and right-left partisanship score.

Figure 8: Refugee Population by Right-Left Partisanship




Figure 8 depicts all measurements of the 23 countries' right-left partisanship scores from 1990 to 2020 along with the refugee population in the corresponding year. A correlation coefficient of 0.312 indicates that there is a weakly positive correlation

between these two variables. This result is somewhat surprising as it seems to indicate that right-leaning governments are more likely to increase the refugee population. There are a few possible explanations for this, but it is a notable finding.

One possible explanation for why right and far-right governments are somewhat more likely to have higher refugee populations could be that there is a delay between election and policy. When officials take office, it often takes time for their intended policies to pass and go into force. This delay would decrease the accuracy of the dataset used here. The independent variable (right-left score) may indicate that a far-right government has been in power only briefly, while previous government policies may still be in place allowing for high populations of refugees. This potential delay could not be accounted for within the scope of this paper, but merits accounting in future research.

Other explanations for this discrepancy could be that, in politics, rhetoric does not necessarily lead directly to policy, or that anti-refugee politicians are elected as a pushback against high refugee acceptance rates. The first of these explanations holds that candidates may run on a platform that is explicitly anti-refugee, but then not implement any significant anti-refugee policies. In Jonathon Mellon's research on this topic, the centrality of a promise for a candidate's campaign is an important factor here (Mellon et al., 2021). This means that the more central anti-refugee rhetoric is to a candidate or party, the more likely it is that they enact anti-refugee policies. It is possible, then, that anti-refugee sentiments are often peripheral issues and less likely to actually result in policy change. The other explanation holds that when refugee acceptance increases, populations may vote for anti-refugee politicians. In these cases,

anti-refugee politicians would take office in times of high refugee populations, corresponding with Figure 8, when in reality they are simply taking office at times of high refugee populations as a backlash to the increased acceptance. These explanations are speculative, but may hold some truth in explaining why right-leaning politicians, that claim to oppose refugee acceptance more than left-leaning politicians, tend to have higher refugee populations than left-leaning politicians.

### **Conclusion**

As hypothesized, GDP per capita was found to have a slight relationship with total refugee population and an even greater relationship with refugees per 10,000 citizens. Unemployment was found to have a weakly negative relationship with refugee population numbers, corresponding with the hypothesis above. It was found that there was a slightly negative relationship between homogeneity and refugee acceptance, contrary to what was hypothesized. Political and strategic interests were shown, qualitatively, to influence refugee acceptance numbers and asylum processes in a number of the sample countries. Historic colonial connections did not, at first, indicate any significant relationship with refugee acceptance, however, it was shown that these connections can often lead to more streamlined asylum processes and preferential treatment. Finally, and most surprisingly, right-leaning governments were found to have a weakly positive relationship with refugee acceptance, which was previously unanticipated.

Future analysis should seek to find more robust ways of examining refugee acceptance numbers. Beyond this, further investigating how wealth plays a part in

refugee acceptance and how partisanship and political rhetoric influences refugee acceptance numbers could lead to noteworthy findings. Extending this investigation beyond the limited number of democracies included here would be beneficial in future studies.

## Citations

- Abdelkader, E. (2020). China's Repression of Uigher Muslims: A Human Rights Perspective in Historical Context. *UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law*, 18, 1–20.
- Almond, G. A., Powell, G. B., Dalton, R. J., & Strom, K. (2008). *Comparative politics today: A theoretical framework (Fifth)*. Pearson/Longman.
- Akashi, J. (2021). How a Policy Network Matters for Refugee Protection: A Case Study of Japan's Refugee Resettlement Programme. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 40(3), 249–270. <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/10.1093/rsq/hdab001>
- Benson, M. (2021). Hong Kongers and the coloniality of British citizenship from decolonisation to 'global Britain.' *Current Sociology*, 001139212110485. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921211048530>
- Chishti, M., & Pierce, S. (2020, February 11). *Despite Trump invitation to stop taking refugees, red and blue states alike endorse resettlement*. *migrationpolicy.org*. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/despite-trump-invitation-stop-taking-refugees-red-and-blue-states-alike-endorse-resettlement>
- Chan, T. (2022, April 25). 'Hong Kong is strange to me now': how five refugees are finding their new lives in Britain; More than 88,000 Hong Kongers have come to the UK under a new visa scheme after a harsh crackdown on civil liberties in the city. How are they coping? What are they doing? And do they think they will return? *Guardian* [London, England], NA.

[https://link-gale-com.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/apps/doc/A701571777/OVIC?u=uakron\\_main&sid=bookmark-OVIC&xid=1e0ddc8b](https://link-gale-com.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/apps/doc/A701571777/OVIC?u=uakron_main&sid=bookmark-OVIC&xid=1e0ddc8b)

Consterdine, E. (2020). Parties matter but institutions live on: Labour's legacy on Conservative immigration policy and the neoliberal consensus. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 22(2), 182–201.

Devi, S. (2020, November 28). *Funding crisis threatens Palestinian Refugee Agency - the lancet*. The Lancet. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from [https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(20\)32527-7/fulltext](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)32527-7/fulltext)

Fearon, J. D. (2003). Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8(2), 195–222. <https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024419522867>

Gozdziak, E. M., & Marton, P. (2018, October 19). *Where the wild things are: Fear of Islam and the anti-refugee ... - CEEMR*. Central and Eastern European Migration Review. Retrieved February 19, 2023, from [http://www.ceemr.uw.edu.pl/sites/default/files/Gozdziak\\_Marton\\_Where\\_the\\_Wild\\_Things\\_Are.pdf](http://www.ceemr.uw.edu.pl/sites/default/files/Gozdziak_Marton_Where_the_Wild_Things_Are.pdf)

Government Service, (2021, February 3). *British National (Overseas) visa*. GOV.UK. <https://www.gov.uk/british-national-overseas-bno-visa>

Heo, A. The Christian Right and Refugee Rights: The Border Politics of Anti-communism and Anti-discrimination in South Korea. *Religion and Society*, [s.l.], v. 12, n. 1, p. 86–101, 2021. DOI 10.3167/arrs.2021.120107. Disponível em: <https://discovery-ebsco-com.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/linkprocessor/plink?id=f0d0424e-2971-320a-9822-5427f9661200>. Acesso em: 23 fev. 2023.

*Human Rights Watch. (2022, March 24). Haitians being returned to a country in Chaos.*

*Human Rights Watch. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from*

*<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/24/haitians-being-returned-country-chaos>*

Kästle, K. (n.d.). *Languages of the World - Nations Online Project*. A Nations Online Project. <https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/languages.htm>

Kelly, G. P. (1986). Coping with America: Refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the 1970s and 1980s. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 487(1), 138-149. doi:10.1177/000271628648700109

Lau, T. (2020, October 30). *The filibuster, explained*. Brennan Center for Justice.

Retrieved March 8, 2023, from

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/filibuster-explained>

Lulat, Y. G.-M. (2022). Demagogy and populism in the Americas. *Handbook of Racism, Xenophobia, and Populism*, 55–78. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13559-0\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13559-0_3)

Mancini, T., Caricati, L., di Bernardo, G. A., & Vezzali, L. (2020). Support for rejection and reception policies toward asylum seekers in Italy: The role of conservative ideologies and legitimizing myths. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 160(6), 751–767.

<https://doi-org.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/10.1080/00224545.2020.1755217>

*Manifesto Project Database About*. Manifesto Project Database. (n.d.).

<https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/documents/information>

Marx, W. (2022, December 19). *U.K. Top Court upholds a controversial plan to send migrants to Rwanda*. NPR. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from



<https://www.npr.org/2022/12/19/1143413968/britain-rwanda-migrants-court-decision>

Mellon, J., Prosser, C., Urban, J., & Feldman, A. (2021). Which promises actually matter? election pledge centrality and promissory representation. *Political Studies*, 003232172110274. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211027419>

Moore, W. H., & Shellman, S. M. (2007). Whither Will They Go? A Global Study of Refugees' Destinations, 1965-1995. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(4), 811–834.

Moorthy, S., & Brathwaite, R. (2019). Refugees and rivals: The international dynamics of refugee flows. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 36(2), 131–148. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216657047>

New York Times. (2022, October 28). *A compromise on immigration is possible. this bill could make it happen*. The New York Times Editorial Board. Retrieved March 8, 2023, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/28/opinion/asylum-immigration-biden.html>

Ray, M. (2023, March 19). *National rally*. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved March 25, 2023, from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Rally-France>

Rees, Y. P. M., Kurtenbach, S., Rees, J. H., & Zick, A. (2022). Intergroup contact and conflict in a climate of exclusion: An interview study in the ethnically super-homogenous German town of Bautzen. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 52, 511– 521. <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/10.1111/jasp.12875>

*Refugee host countries by Income Level.* UNHCR Refugee Statistics. (n.d.). Retrieved February 7, 2023, from [https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/insights/explainers/refugee-host-countries-income-level.html#:~:text=The%20remaining%2029%20per%20cent,countries%20\(18%20per%20cent\).](https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/insights/explainers/refugee-host-countries-income-level.html#:~:text=The%20remaining%2029%20per%20cent,countries%20(18%20per%20cent).)

*Refugee population by country or territory of asylum.* Our World in Data. (n.d.). <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/refugee-population-by-country-or-territory-of-asylum?tab=table&time=2000..latest&country=BEL~CAN~JPN~USA~FRA~ESP~HUN~POL~PRT~GBR>

*Republican National Committee.* Republican Platform 2016. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2023, from [https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT\\_12\\_FINAL\[1\]-ben\\_1468872234.pdf](https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf)

Savun, B., & Gineste, C. (2019, January 1). *From protection to persecution: Threat environment and refugee scapegoating.* Sage Journals. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343318811432>

Scribner, T. You Are Not Welcome Here Anymore: Restoring Support for Refugee Resettlement in the Age of Trump. *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, [s.l.], v. 5, n. 2, p. 263–284, 2017. Disponível em: <https://discovery-ebSCO-com.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/linkprocessor/plink?id=f2274530-f927-3b4b-8d96-43182f9c6555>. Acesso em: 21 fev. 2023.

Shaw, S. A., Funk, M., Garlock, E. S., & Arok, A. (2021). Understanding Successful

Refugee Resettlement in the US. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 34(4), 4034–4052.  
<https://doi-org.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/10.1093/jrs/feaa137>

Sonnenfeld, J. (2021, July 29). *The compromise infrastructure bill reflects the public's priorities*. Yale Insights. Retrieved March 8, 2023, from  
[https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/the-compromise-infrastructure-bill-reflects-t  
he-publics-priorities](https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/the-compromise-infrastructure-bill-reflects-the-publics-priorities)

The UN Refugee Agency. (1951). *Convention and Protocol Relating to the status of refugees*. UNHCR. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from  
[https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-  
status-refugees.html](https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html)

Tranchina, G. (2022, September 29). *The new Italian government poses a human rights challenge*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved March 25, 2023, from  
[https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/28/new-italian-government-poses-human-right  
s-challenge](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/28/new-italian-government-poses-human-rights-challenge)

Traub, J. (2016, February 10). *The death of the most generous nation on Earth*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved February 19, 2023, from  
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/10/the-death-of-the-most-generous-nation-on-e  
arth-sweden-syria-refugee-europe/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/10/the-death-of-the-most-generous-nation-on-earth-sweden-syria-refugee-europe/)

Turkoglu, O. (2022). Supporting rebels and hosting refugees: Explaining the variation in refugee flows in civil conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research*, 59(2), 136-149.  
doi:10.1177/0022343321989786

UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency. (n.d.). *What is a refugee?* UNHCR. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/what-is-a-refugee.html>

- United Nations. (1948, December 10). *Universal declaration of human rights*. United Nations. Retrieved February 7, 2023, from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>
- United Nations (2023, January 23). *Human development index*. Human Development Reports. Retrieved March 25, 2023, from <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>
- Vijaya, R. (2020). Comparing Labor Market Trajectories of Refugee Women to Other Immigrant and Native-Born Women in the United States. *Feminist Economics*, 26(4), 149–177. <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/10.1080/13545701.2020.1759815>
- VONG, S. (2020). “Assets of War”: Strategic Displacements, Population Movements, and the Uses of Refugees during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973. *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 39(3), 75–100. <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/10.5406/jamerethnhist.39.3.0075>
- Wanat, Z. (2019, October 31). *3 EU countries broke law by refusing to take in refugees, says Court lawyer*. POLITICO. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from <https://www.politico.eu/article/3-eu-countries-broke-law-by-refusing-to-take-in-refugees-says-court-lawyer/>
- Wang, Jing. (2020). Limits of Multicultural Imagination and the Anti-Refugee Controversy in Contemporary China. *Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia*, 19(2), 125–147. <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uakron.edu:2443/10.17477/jcea.2020.19.2.125>

Wasserstrom, J. (2021). The War on the Uyghurs: China's Internal Campaign against a Muslim Minority. *DISSENT*, 68(1), 156–159.

Wijers, G. D. (2011). The reception of Cambodian refugees in France. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 24(2), 239–255. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fer008>