

FINDING JUSTICE
Remarks for Constitution Day
University of Akron School of Law

*Laurie L. Levenson**

It is time we started talking about Justice with a capital “J.” I’m a survivor of the Trials of the Century. We have one almost every six months in Los Angeles. From the Rodney King beating trial to the O.J. Simpson murder trial to the late Michael Jackson’s molestation trial, I saw them all. Yet, those cases did not teach me what our constitutional rights really mean. That is something I only discovered by founding Loyola Law School’s Project for the Innocent (LPI). In working to exonerate the wrongfully convicted, I learned one of the most profound lessons of our constitutional democracy – there is the justice you find in the Constitution and the Justice you find in the adversarial system when constitutional rights are put to the test.

Prior to teaching full time, I was a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Central District of California. I certainly tried to respect the constitutional rights of the defendants I prosecuted. The basics were easy: no lying, stealing, cheating or withholding exculpatory information. I believed that defense lawyers and judges were the guardians of a defendant’s constitutional rights and that my role was, as the prosecutor, at most peripheral. My job, so I believed, was to represent the People and the victim. The person on the other side of the courtroom was the “defendant.” My client was the “United States of America.” In a fight, I knew on which side I stood.

Frankly, even after I left the federal prosecutor’s office, I still tended to identify with the prosecution’s side of the ledger. At present, I

* Professor of Law and David W. Burcham Chair in Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Professor Levenson is the founder of Loyola’s Project for the Innocent. The author thanks Professor Tracy A. Thomas, Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law and Director, Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of Law, for the opportunity to speak at Constitution Day and prepare this essay for publication.

have over 300 former students who have become prosecutors. When I appear for legal commentary on television, I am frequently chryoned as, “Former Federal Prosecutor.” That label became my professional identity. It was easy for me to appear on television because I could easily identify the prosecution’s strategy and defend it. And, as I did all this, I thought of the Constitution as some type of wonderful historic document that gave some general rules, like the Ten Commandments, but whose rules did not really control what would happen in a case. Those realities were controlled by who had the power. In most of the cases, the prosecutor had the power to control the impact, if any, of constitutional rights. If there was a problem with a search, for example, the prosecutor could alter the impact of the defendant’s constitutional rights on the case simply by making a quick plea bargain.

Yet, after more than thirty years, I have come to appreciate the shortcomings in that basic approach to criminal justice. Five years ago, inspired by my students, I started Loyola’s Project for the Innocent. For decades, I have received a steady stream of letters from inmates in prison and jail. I receive approximately four letters per day from incarcerated individuals. Many of these are now evaluated by the students in our Project. It was a rude awakening. No matter the idealism with which we approach the criminal justice system, the stark reality is that innocent people are convicted. Statistically, close to five percent of all those convicted of a serious crime like murder or rape, are probably innocent. Constitutional rights only go so far in protecting society’s most vulnerable from wrongful conviction.

I have had my birds-eye view of justice by seeing it through the eyes of my clients who have been exonerated after spending decades in prison for wrongful convictions. They are good people, gentle people, noble people, and grateful people. Despite the years they endured in prison, they leave with no bitterness. Rather, they praise those who helped them secure their freedom.

In this essay, I want to discuss why it is not enough to have blind faith that the Constitution will ensure that only the guilty are convicted. We need to do better. We need to realize that constitutional rights only protect individuals if both prosecutors and defense lawyers want those rights to work. A prosecutor who sees constitutional rights as a technicality blasphemes the Constitution. A defense lawyer who lazily disregards his or her duty to zealously defend a defendant does the same. The Constitution is an empty promise without the commitment of lawyers and judges charged with upholding defendants’ rights.

I. INNOCENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: WE NEED TO DO BETTER

The failings of our criminal justice system are best told through the cases of those who suffered by our failure to ensure that their constitutional rights were protected.¹ While society tends to focus on celebrity cases, the real story of our justice system lies with those whose cases were handled outside of the limelight. They are the forgotten—at least, until someone starts to take their constitutional rights seriously.

A. *Obie Anthony*

Consider the case of *People v. Obie Anthony*.² Mr. Anthony was charged with a shooting outside of a brothel in South Central Los

1. There is an increasing body of literature detailing the stories of the wrongfully convicted. See Zieva Dauber Konvisser, “What Happened to Me Can Happen to Anybody”—Women Exonerees Speak Out, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 303 (2015); Russel Covey, *Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions*, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2013); James R. Acker & Catherine L. Bonventre, *Protecting the Innocent in New York: Moving Beyond Changing Only Their Names*, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1245 (2010). In addition to traditional law review articles, there are also on-line sites dedicated to researching the causes, and telling the stories, of wrongful convictions. See National Registry of Exonerations, <https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx> (last visited April 17, 2017); Wrongful Conviction Blog, <https://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/2017/03/07/national-registry-of-exonerations-releases-two-enlightening-reports> (last visited April 17, 2017); American Public Media, *After Innocence in America* (2013), at <http://www.thestory.org/series/after-innocence-exoneration-america> (last visited April 17, 2017).

2. For a more detailed description of Mr. Anthony’s case and the challenges for his post-conviction proceedings, see Laurie L. Levenson, *Post-Conviction Death Penalty Investigations: The Need for Independent Investigators*, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 225, 228-235 (2011). As outlined in that article:

On March 27, 1994, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Felipe Gonzales, Victor Trejo, and Luis Jimenez drove to a building at the corner of Figueroa and 49th Streets in Los Angeles so that Gonzales could see his “friend,” a female named either Melinda or Melissa. John Jones managed the building on the corner and rented rooms for \$10 a day to prostitutes and transients. There, Gonzales got out of the car while Trejo and Jimenez stayed inside to clean up a beer Gonzales had spilled. Trejo then turned the car around and pulled up alongside Gonzales, who was chatting with someone in front of the building. As Gonzales walked toward the car, three African American males surrounded him. One of the men grabbed Gonzales by the neck, pushed him up against Trejo’s car and hit him in the face with a gun. One of the other men yelled, “Stop the fucking car,” opened the passenger door, and said to Trejo and Jimenez, “Give me the money.” He had a silver automatic gun tucked in his pants. As he grabbed Jimenez by the hair, Trejo claimed to have seen his face, although the man did not even partially enter the car. Trejo grabbed the man’s hand, telling him there would not be a problem. The man then shot both Trejo and Jimenez numerous times, and Trejo drove off. As he was driving away, Trejo saw Gonzales being pushed and trying to run, then he heard more shots but did not see anything further.

When the paramedics arrived at the crime scene, they found Gonzales lying in the street

Angeles. Felipe Gonzales died at the scene, but no suspect was apprehended. Instead, the Los Angeles Police Department began an investigation of the case. In that investigation, the police relied heavily on the owner of the brothel, John Jones, and his description of the suspects. No physical evidence linked Mr. Anthony or his co-defendant, Reginald Cole, to the shooting. However, according to Jones, a “Good Samaritan” was able to shoot one of the suspects. Three weeks later, the police arrested Obie Anthony and Reggie Cole. Cole had a bullet wound in his leg. The only problem was that the wound was eight years old—a detail that did not seem to bother the police.

Working backward from their theory that Cole and Anthony had been involved in the shootings, the police engineered a case to be presented to the jury. Jones would be a key witness. So would another robbery victim at the scene, even though that individual had not been able to identify either Cole or Anthony until right before trial, their faces “came to him in a dream.”

Based upon Jones’ testimony and that of the so-called eyewitness, Anthony and Cole were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. There they sat for seventeen years until their constitutional rights went from mere words to keys to freedom.

When Loyola’s Project for the Innocent reinvestigated the case, we quickly discovered that the Due Process Clause was given lip service at trial. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to due process.³ Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed a rich jurisprudence of what due process means for criminal defendants. At its core, it means that a defendant must be given a fair opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s evidence against him, not just by cross-examining witnesses, but by providing defendants with the information in the government’s possession that might assist the

on his stomach. They pronounced him dead on arrival at 11:41p.m. The medical examiner testified that Gonzales died of a through-and-through gunshot wound to the back. When Detective Marcella Winn arrived at the scene at about 1:30 a.m., she found no witnesses. At 4:00 a.m., as she was standing on the corner of 49th and Figueroa, John Jones leaned out a second-floor window, said, “Pssst, officer, they ran that-a-way,” and pointed eastward on 49th Street. After a few requests, Jones came downstairs and spoke with Winn for about five minutes. No other witnesses came forward.

3. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.

defense.⁴ It also means that law enforcement should refrain from creating and presenting false evidence.⁵

In Anthony's case, due process was jettisoned in several significant ways. First, the prosecution did not disclose the sweet deal that John Jones received in exchange for his testimony. Mr. Jones had his own problems with the law. He had been charged with shooting the mother of his child in the head as she held the baby. Prosecutors never disclosed that Jones walked away with a probationary sentence on that case because he was such a valued witness for the prosecution.

Prosecutors also did not reveal that another victim who was shot the night of the murder, but survived, would not identify Anthony as one of the shooters. That witness had been sent out of state by prosecutors and was only located when LPI went knocking on the doors of people on the south side of Chicago looking for him. When he came to California for the habeas hearing, the prosecutors tried to rebound with a Perry Mason moment. The prosecutor stood behind Mr. Anthony, with his hands on his shoulders, and asked, "Is this the man who shot you?" Oblivious or indifferent to the problems with such suggestive identification methods, the prosecutor tried to salvage his case by asking for a one-on-one in-court identification. It seemed to be far from the prosecutor's mind whether such an approach even came close to the noble goal of fair process for Mr. Anthony. Despite this suggestive attempt, the witness stared at Anthony and answered the question, "no."

It was at that moment that I realized that there is *nothing* wrong with our Constitution. Thank God for our Constitution. The problem is not with a 200-year-old document that says defendants should receive due process.⁶ The problem is that those charged with ensuring that the Constitution plays a critical role in today's trials continue to see it as nothing more than an ancient document. Moreover, even when they recognize that the Constitution guarantees Due Process, they don't seem

4. See *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A *Brady* violation consists of three elements. First, the evidence at issue must be favorable to the defendant, either because it is impeaching or because it is exculpatory. Second, the State must have suppressed the evidence, either willfully or unintentionally. Finally, the failure to disclose the evidence must have resulted in prejudice.

5. See *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). See also *Miller v. Pate*, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) ("More than 30 years ago this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. There has been no deviation from this established principle."). "A defendant has a due process right to a fair trial. Government agents may not manufacture evidence and offer it against a criminal defendant." *Doswell v. City of Pittsburgh*, No. 07-0761, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51435, at 24 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2009) (quoting *Stepp v. Mangold*, No. 94-2108, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8633, 1998 WL 309921, at 7 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1998)).

6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

to consider that the Constitution sets a bare minimum for a fair trial. In this day and age when we realize that wrongful conviction is a very real phenomenon, prosecutors must recalibrate their sense of due process. Due process is, in a very real sense, what we want it to be. If prosecutors want to try and win with questionable identifications,⁷ case law probably won't stand in their way. Similarly, if prosecutors want to withhold disclosing evidence to the defense because they assess that the information is insufficiently material, they might succeed with such arguments in a post-conviction review. Finally, if prosecutors want to pick and choose among percipient witnesses to give a distorted view to the jury, they might be able to do that and throw the responsibility of finding and calling such witnesses on the defense.

However, if prosecutors are truly invested in honoring the right to a fair trial and sensitive to the fact that jurors often reach the wrong verdict, their approach to due process might be different. They might see their role less as an adversary and more as a partner in the search for justice.

As it turned out, a reinvestigation of Anthony's case revealed that the likely shooter was someone on the roof of the brothel. Coincidentally, that is a place John Jones would often frequent as he took target practice from his building. A *Los Angeles Times* reporter who shadowed the police investigation later revealed in his book, *The Killing Season*,⁸ that the roof was littered with so many bullet shell casings that the reporter just pocketed some after the shooting.

There is nothing spelled out in the Constitution about pocketing bullet shells, evaluating the credibility of pimps, or pursuing leads that might be helpful to the defense. However, participants in the criminal justice system have an opportunity to do better than rely on the minimum due process standards that might protect against a reversal. To do that, one must view the due process clause as an affirmative charge to challenge the evidence, whether one is serving in the role of a prosecutor or defense counsel.

7. As is now well established, erroneous eyewitness identifications play a role in approximately 75 percent of all wrongful convictions. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, *ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED* 95 (2000).

8. MILES CORWIN, *THE KILLING SEASON* 25 (1st ed. 1997).

B. *Kash Register*

Yes, Kash Register was our client's name. And it was a good thing that his mother gave him such a memorable name. Thirty-four years after he was convicted of a murder he did not commit, it was that name that saved him because it led to a witness coming forward to expose the due process violations in Mr. Register's case.⁹

In 1979, an elderly white man was robbed and shot at close range. The physical evidence at the scene did not establish Mr. Register as the suspect. Nonetheless, he spent 34 years in prison for the crime.¹⁰ The reason was revealed years later when LPI discovered that the prosecutors used witnesses who were obviously lying.

There were two so-called eyewitnesses in Mr. Register's case. The first, Brenda Anderson, lived in an apartment on the same street as the shooting. On the day of the shooting, she was out stealing Avon products left on people's doorsteps. In exchange for her testimony, she was not charged with that crime—a key piece of information prosecutors failed to share with Mr. Register's defense counsel. The police also did not tell the prosecutor, so the prosecutor did not tell defense counsel, that Brenda had told her older sister, Sheila Vanderkam, that she had only seen the back of the shooter's head. When Vanderkam, who worked as a detective's assistant at the police station, told the investigating detective that her sister could not make the identification and was also completely unreliable,¹¹ he responded by placing his finger over his lips and saying, "ssshhh."

The second witness was Elliott Singleton. He claimed that he had been painting the house across the street from the victim's house when he saw the shooting. At trial, he testified that he left the apartment and chased after the armed suspect for blocks. After about six blocks, the man stopped and pointed the gun at him. According to Singleton, that is when he got a good look at the robber, said, "I'm cool," and then walked

9. The details of Mr. Register's prosecution and exoneration can be found in an excellent article, Lara Bazelon, *A Mistake Has Been Made Here, and No One Wants to Correct It*, SLATE, Dec. 17, 2013, at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/12/the_exoneration_of_kash_register_and_the_problem_of_false_eyewitness_testimony.html.

10. The fingerprints on the victim's car did not match Register's. The police never recovered a wallet or a weapon. In a search of Register's house, they found three brown caps, a pair of black pin-striped pants, and a burgundy shirt, similar to the clothing one of the eyewitnesses said the shooter was allegedly wearing. There was a speck of blood on the pants. DNA testing did not exist in 1979, so the blood was simply found to be Type O, matching the victim, Register, and more than 3 million residents of Los Angeles. Bazelon, *supra* note 9.

11. Vanderkam described Anderson as smoking PCP so much that she became "unable to remember day-to-day conversations, and [could] barely tie her shoes." *Id.*

away. Later, when interviewed LPI, Singleton denied ever seeing the murder. Rather, he said the police had knocked on his door in an effort to get his pregnant wife to testify. She, however, was never called as a witness and an internal District Attorney memorandum showed that the prosecutors did not have confidence in either witness.

Like Mr. Anthony, Mr. Register was not guilty of the shooting for which he originally faced the death penalty and later served many years on a life sentence. As in Mr. Anthony's case, the prosecutors and police in Mr. Register's case abdicated their individual responsibility to ensure due process by deferring to the jury's assessment of the incomplete evidence they were presented.

However, the difference between how the trial prosecutor saw due process and how prosecutors *should* view due process was encapsulated in one little act by the habeas prosecutor in the case. During the proceedings, that prosecutor went back through all of the evidence that the original prosecutor had and disclosed to habeas counsel the memorandum revealing the problems with the prosecution's witnesses. He saw "materiality" through the eyes of a defense lawyer. He also decided not to claim the memorandum was privileged or protected by attorney work product. The habeas prosecutor recognized that the essence of due process is not how little evidence prosecutors can get away with disclosing, but how much evidence might actually help the court discern the truth.

C. *Lessons from the Trenches*

Both Mr. Anthony's and Mr. Register's cases are flesh and blood lessons about the Constitution. The Constitution provides a framework for thinking about how to fairly handle cases. It is the responsibility of prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel to make those concepts work.

Unfortunately, current law often perverts constitutional ideals. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in *Herrera v. Collins*.¹² In that case, Chief Justice William Rehnquist opined that the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment would not prevent a defendant from being executed just because he is actually innocent. Because actual innocence did not fit within the

12. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). See generally Larry May & Nancy Viner, *Actual Innocence and Manifest Injustice*, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 481, 482 (2005) ("Denying actual innocence claims is a paradigmatic example of manifest injustice and a denial of substantive due process."); Bernard A. Williams, *Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas Capital Appeals*, 18 J.L. & POL. 773, 776 (2002) ("Evidence of actual innocence discovered post-conviction establishes a prima facie Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation.").

traditional framework for Eighth Amendment challenges and if a defendant received a fair trial, his innocence did not control his challenge.¹³

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted that "the execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event,"¹⁴ but she did not believe Herrera was innocent, primarily because he received all of the protections of a jury trial. In his concurrence, Justice Antonin Scalia chastised the dissenters who had claimed that the decision shocked the conscience. Justice Scalia wrote, "If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) 'shocks' the dissenters' consciences . . . perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their consciences, or better still, the usefulness of 'conscience shocking' as a legal test."¹⁵

By contrast, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, viewed the operation of the Constitution quite differently. Blackmun wrote, "We really are being asked to decide whether the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been validly convicted and sentenced, but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discovered evidence."¹⁶

For the Justices in the majority, the rigid application of established doctrines is the proper way to use the Constitution. For the dissent, legal tests may be important, but the ultimate goal and purpose of the Constitution is to ensure that persons are treated fairly and to prevent injustices.

When I went from being a prosecutor to the founder of an innocence project, I had to recalibrate my conscience. I also had to recalibrate my approach to the Constitution, especially the Due Process Clause. I had not had the tools to do that recalibration in my role as a prosecutor. Until one talks to an individual who has spent more than half his life in prison for a crime he did not commit it is hard to have that perspective.

II. CREATING PERSPECTIVE

In an adversarial system, there are ways to create the necessary perspective for prosecutors to take a more majestic view of the Constitution. First, coupling constitutional duties with aspirational

13. *Herrera*, 506 U.S. at 400.

14. *Id.* at 419.

15. *Id.* at 428.

16. *Id.* at 431.

ethical duties can help serve this purpose. Accordingly, many states are moving toward ethical rules that go beyond the strict *Brady* standard established by the Supreme Court for post-conviction review. Instead of having prosecutors determine how “material” evidence might be to the defense, they are required to disclose all potentially exculpatory or impeachment evidence. This ethical obligation is a constant reminder that the prosecutor should not be using due process standards as a means to limit a defendant’s access to evidence. Rather, the focus should be on what steps can be taken to further ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial.¹⁷

Second, perspective can be increased by having prosecutors take on new roles that were not previously viewed as “prosecutorial.” In that regard, dozens of prosecution offices in the United States have created Conviction Integrity or Conviction Review units.¹⁸ The role of prosecutors in these units is expressly to evaluate cases to see if there were any shortfalls in the fairness of a defendant’s trial. Success is not achieved by maintaining an unfair conviction; success results from discovering and remedying any flaws in the criminal justice system.

Finally, perspective can be enhanced by acknowledging and being open to discuss what constitutional rights should mean today, even if they were defined differently in prior eras.¹⁹ For example, before DNA testing and comprehensive research on eyewitness identifications, the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the admissibility of eyewitness testimony may have made sense.²⁰ After all, the best we could do at the time was to look at all the circumstances to determine whether an identification was likely fair and accurate. However, society has progressed beyond that point.²¹ We now know that there are significant problems with such identifications and that a court which allows people

17. See Laurie L. Levenson, *The Problem with Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome: Rethinking a Prosecutor’s Role in Post-Conviction Cases*, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335, 372-374 (2015); Dana Carver Boehm, *The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and the Evaluation of Actual Innocence*, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613 (2014).

18. Levenson, *Cynical Prosecutor*, *supra* note 17, at 370-71; see also, Daniel Kroepsch, *Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees and Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal Programs are Fulfilling the Prosecutor’s Duty to Serve Justice*, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095 (2016).

19. For an excellent history of the evolution of the study of wrongful convictions, see Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, *Wrongful Convictions After a Century of Research*, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825 (2010).

20. *Manson v. Brathwaite*, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).

21. See Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, *Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from Social Science*, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 19 (2009); Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, *What Can Psychology Say about the Neil v. Biggers Criteria for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?*, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 347, 349-50 (1983).

to testify to images that come to them in dreams, cannot be said to be enhancing the chances of a fair trial.²²

In the end, to honor our Constitution, the best thing we can do is to recognize that constitutional rights—as traditionally defined—are just a starting point for ensuring a fair trial. It takes much more than that to ensure Justice. And, most importantly, it takes people who care.

It is frustrating to hear a judge say, “I know the defendant is probably innocent, but the jury has spoken.” Judges are extremely reluctant to overturn a jury verdict because of the belief that trials are sufficient to ensure due process. Yet, as anyone who has worked in the criminal justice system can attest, what happens in the courtroom is impacted enormously by what happens outside the courtroom, both before and after trial.

The Constitution is not a straitjacket on those who want to see justice. It must be a tool to help those who seek to prevent and remedy injustice.

III. POSTSCRIPT

Following my remarks at Constitution Day, two more of our clients were exonerated. Mr. Andrew Wilson, who spent thirty-two years in prison, was released on March 15, 2017, because of a host of newly discovered *Brady* violations and improper eyewitness examination procedures.²³ Mr. Marco Contreras was released on March 28, 2017, because the prosecutor conceded he was actually innocent and had been misidentified by the key eyewitness.²⁴

The Constitution came alive for those defendants, in part, because the newly formed Conviction Review Unit and the new head of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Habeas Litigation Unit took a fresh look at what had happened in those cases. They put flesh and blood on the framework of the Constitution. They sought Justice.

22. See Robert J. Norris, Catherine L. Bonventre, Allison D. Redlich & James R. Acker, “*Than That One Suffer*”: *Evaluating State Safeguards Against Wrongful Convictions*, 74 AL. B. L. REV. 1301, 1314-15 (2010).

23. *Andrew Wilson Freed After 32 Years in Prison*, *Innocence Project* (Mar. 16, 2017), at <https://www.innocenceproject.org/andrew-wilson-released-after-32-years>.

24. Marisa Gerber, *Innocent Man Freed After Spending 20 Years Behind Bars for Attempted Murder in a Compton Shooting*, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2017, at <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-wrongful-conviction-20170328-story.html>.