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THE REPEAL OF GENERAL UTILITIES FOR CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS — THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCOMPLETE AND UNEXPECTED TAX REFORM

by

LOUIS F. LOBENHOFER*

The rules of corporate taxation are an integrated whole. If changes are made to certain of the basic provisions — for example, the rule of General Utilities — those changes will reverberate throughout the system. Some provisions previously thought necessary to prevent abuse may no longer be relevant; others may have to be redrawn and strengthened. Accordingly, we believe that a fundamental restructuring must take into account all collateral consequences.1

INTRODUCTION

"The General Utilities rule provide[d], with certain exceptions, that a corporation [did] not recognize gain or loss upon the distribution of property to its shareholders with respect to [their] stock."2 An example may help to clarify the operation of the General Utilities doctrine in corporate liquidations. T Corp. has one shareholder, J, an individual. J owns stock in T Corp. with a basis of $10 and a fair market value of $100. T Corp. owns one asset, Blacklot, a piece of undeveloped land, with a basis of $20 and a fair market value of $100. If J causes T Corp. to dissolve and to distribute its assets to J in complete liquidation, J would recognize gain of $90 in J's stock.3 The General Utilities doctrine, codified in Section 336 of the Internal Revenue Code,4 generally provided that T Corp. would recognize no gain or loss upon distributing its asset in liquidation. J would receive T Corp.'s land, however, at a basis equal to the fair market value of the land, $100, even though the $80 gain in the T Corp. asset was not recognized in the liquidation.

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3Shube, Corporate Income or Loss on Distributions of Property: An Analysis of General Utilities, 12 J. CORP. TAX'N, 3 (1985).


Section 337 of the Code, a companion rule to Section 336, provided that, if T Corp. adopted a plan of liquidation, sold its asset, and then liquidated within twelve months after the adoption of the plan of liquidation, T Corp. would recognize no gain on the sale of the land. Finally, if J sold his T Corp. stock to P Corp., P Corp. could elect under Section 338 to increase the basis of the T Corp. asset to $100 while only recognizing the gain that would have been recognized by T Corp. if it had sold its asset in a Section 337 transaction. In this example, no gain would be recognized.


The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine had been discussed in professional and governmental circles for many years. The General Utilities doctrine had long been excoriated by many commentators as the source of complexity, confusion, and distortion of the federal income tax laws. Over time Congress attempted to limit the revenue loss and distortions caused by the General Utilities doctrine by enacting amendments to Subchapter C and other parts of the Internal Revenue Code to create more and more exceptions to the General Utilities doctrine. In 1984 the doctrine was almost entirely abolished with respect to nonliquidating distributions. Beginning with the first draft of the American Law Institute (ALI) study of Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code in 1977, reform proposals had specifically focused on the possible repeal of the General Utilities doctrine with regard to acquisitions and liquidations. Basing its work on the proposals of the ALI study, the Senate Finance Committee also prepared comprehensive proposals for revision of the corporate acquisition rules including repeal of the doctrine.

In both the ALI study and the Senate Finance Committee Staff proposals, the repeal of General Utilities was a part of a larger effort to revise the rules

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The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was carefully considered by experts, both in and out of government, and found by many to be a necessary step in reforming the tax laws governing corporations and shareholders.

The discussions and proposals of the reformers assumed that many of the major features of the income tax system would stay in place. The proposals usually assumed that the present two-tier structure of taxing corporations and shareholders would be retained. Most of the reformers also assumed that some form of favorable treatment for capital gains transactions would remain as a part of the income tax system for both individuals and corporations.

The repeal of the General Utilities rule in corporate liquidations was finally accomplished in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, one of the most sweeping Tax Reform bills in the history of the income tax. The repeal accomplished many of the goals of the reformers, but because the abolition of the General Utilities doctrine was not accompanied by the necessary complementary amendments to other sections, and because it was accompanied by the abolition of capital gains, the repeal has some unexpected and unfortunate consequences. This article will first discuss the history of the General Utilities doctrine and its gradual demise. Second, it will summarize the provision, noting both relief provisions and provisions designed to prevent tax avoidance under the new rules. Finally, this article will compare the effects of legislation to the justifications that prompted its enactment and discuss its side-effects.

I. History of the General Utilities Doctrine

According to its critics, the General Utilities doctrine has caused confusion and complexity in corporate tax law. Not surprisingly, its history is also complex and somewhat confusing. The General Utilities doctrine existed long before the case was decided that gave the doctrine its name. The doctrine took its name from a case which probably did not decide a "General Utilities" issue. In addition, the doctrine had undergone a process of gradual erosion for a
number of years before its final repeal in 1986.

The current federal income tax on corporations began in 1909, before the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, and did not depend on the amendment for its constitutionality. When the income tax on individuals was enacted, the double taxation of corporate income was almost an accidental consequence of treating corporate dividends as income to individual recipients. While the law contained a double tax on the distributed profits of corporate operations, only a single tax, if any, on the shareholder, burdened the formation or dissolution of corporations. Liquidations "were regarded as mere changes in the form that the distributed assets were held, and thus not as appropriate events for the imposition of a tax." While the tax consequences of nonliquidating distributions were not so clear, several cases decided before General Utilities established that distributions of property were taxable only if the corporate resolution declaring the dividend specified that the dividend was to be a sum of money, and the property satisfied the debt created by the corporate resolution. Thus, the principal features of the General Utilities doctrine were clearly established before the Supreme Court decided the General Utilities case in 1935.

The General Utilities case involved an attempt to escape the corporate level tax on the sale of corporate assets, a fact pattern not unlike the later Court Holding Company and Cumberland Public Service cases. The General Utilities Company had received an offer for the highly appreciated stock that it held in a subsidiary corporation, Islands Edison Company. To avoid the corporate level tax, the parties agreed that the sale would occur only after the stock had been distributed to the shareholders. The Board of Directors of General Utilities passed a resolution directing the distribution of the Islands Edison Company stock to the General Utilities shareholders; unfortunately, the dividend resolution was ambiguous and could be read as directing either a cash dividend to be satisfied with stock or a distribution of the stock. The Commissioner argued that a cash dividend had been declared and that the resulting debt had been satisfied with appreciated property. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed on an argument not made before the Board of Tax Appeals, that

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24Shube, supra note 2, at 5.
25Id. at 7-9.
26Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
29Id. at 202.
30Id.
31Id.
33Id. at 940.
the corporation had, in substance, sold the stock before it was distributed to the shareholders, and thus that the gain was realized by the corporation. Before the Supreme Court, the Commissioner presented yet a third theory, that a corporation always realized gain when it distributed appreciated property to its shareholders. The Supreme Court clearly rejected the theory relied upon by the Fourth Circuit on the grounds that the argument was "not properly raised." The Commissioner's argument that corporations always recognize gain on a distribution of property was not discussed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court merely upheld the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, stating that: "Both tribunals below rightly decided that petitioner derived no taxable gain from the distribution among its stockholders of the Islands Edison shares as a dividend. This was no sale; assets were not used to discharge indebtedness."

While the language of the Court in upholding the Board was broad, most commentators believe that the Court did not intend to reject the Commissioner's realization argument or to establish a blanket doctrine of nonrecognition. The lower courts, however, treated the General Utilities case as establishing the principle that corporations recognized no gain on the distribution in kind of their appreciated property.

The erosion of the General Utilities doctrine, like its existence, began even before the Supreme Court's decision gave the doctrine its name. Section 44(d) of the Revenue Act of 1928 provided that the distribution of an installment obligation would cause gain recognition. Continuing the erosion after the General Utilities decision, the Court Holding Company case limited the doctrine when the corporation had arranged for a sale before liquidating.

Taxpayers then discovered that they could avoid the burden of ordinary income at the corporate level from some business ventures, such as the production of motion pictures, by forming a "collapsible" corporation for one venture, then selling their stock in the corporation or liquidating the corporation before

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32 Helvering v. General Utils. & Operating Co., 74 F.2d 972, 975-76 (4th Cir. 1935).
33 General Utils., 296 U.S. at 203-06.
34 Id. at 206.
35 Id.
39 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). Taxpayers could escape the sweep of the Court Holding Co. case by liquidating first and then negotiating the sale of the company's assets. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). To prevent these rules from becoming a trap for the unwary, and to de-emphasize the form of sale and liquidation transactions, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 337 in 1954, permitting the corporation to adopt a plan of liquidation and sell its assets tax-free, so long as the corporation completed its liquidation within twelve months after the adoption of the liquidation plan. I.R.C. § 337(a) (1985). See also Shube, supra note 2, at 14.
realizing the ordinary income from the venture. Congress responded by creating the elaborate and confusing collapsible corporation rules designed to penalize shareholders making use of the collapsible corporation. The overly-complex collapsible corporation rules are one of the most unfortunate side-effects of the General Utilities doctrine.

In the comprehensive recodification of the Internal Revenue Code in 1954, Congress grouped the rules applicable to corporations in Subchapter C, but the codification occurred without any systematic examination or analysis of the corporate tax rules. The new code embodied the General Utilities principle for distributions in liquidation in Sections 336 and 337 and for nonliquidating distributions in Section 311. The enactment of the General Utilities principle in Section 311 continued the erosion of the doctrine, because the section contained two new exceptions to the principle of nonrecognition. Several later tax bills provided further exceptions, such as depreciation recapture, to the rule of nonrecognition for both current distributions and distributions in liquidation. By 1983, corporations recognized gain on most distributions of appreciated assets in redemption of their stock.

The 1984 Tax Reform Act completed the process of abolishing the General Utilities doctrine for most nonliquidating corporate distributions by requiring that corporations recognize gain on ordinary distributions of ap-

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40 B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, ¶ 12.01.
42 Leduc, supra note 16, at 23.
44 I.R.C. § 311(b) (1954) provided that gain would be recognized on distributions of LIFO inventory, and § 311(c) required gain recognition in the case of property distributed subject to a liability in excess of basis. I.R.C. § 311(a) continued the rule requiring the recognition of gain on the distribution of installment obligations. See Leduc, supra note 16, at 24 n. 37.
preciated property to shareholders. After the 1984 Act, a corporation distributing appreciated property to its shareholders in a non-liquidating distribution generally recognized the gain inherent in the distributed property. Only the following distributions qualified for nonrecognition by the distributing corporation: qualified dividends, distributions in partial liquidation to noncorporate distributees, distributions of the securities of controlled corporations, stock redemptions to pay death taxes or the administrative expenses of an estate, certain redemptions of stock held by private foundations, and distributions at the request of shareholders by regulated investment companies in redemption of their stock. After the 1984 Tax Reform Act, the only vestiges of the General Utilities rule were the exceptions just enumerated under Section 311 and the general rule of nonrecognition for distributions in liquidation of corporations.

II. EXPLANATION OF PROVISION

The 1986 Tax Reform Act changes Section 336 so that gain and loss will generally be recognized on the liquidating distribution of assets by a corporation to its shareholders. The new gain recognition rules have very few exceptions, leaving most of the opportunities to avoid gain recognition outside Subchapter C.

The first exception, the so-called "related party anti-stuffing" rule,

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47 I.R.C. § 311(d), as amended by P.L. 98-369 § 54. The most important amendment to § 311(d) required a distributing corporation to recognize gain on ordinary distributions of property to "corporate distributees." Beller & Palmer, The Corporate Side of Distributions to Shareholders: Sections 311 and 336, 43 INST. ON FED. TAX’N (1984).
49 A qualified dividend was a dividend paid to a noncorporate shareholder of property used in the active conduct of a trade or business, other than inventory or other property held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. I.R.C. § 311(e)(3) (1985). Such a dividend had to be paid with respect to "qualified stock:" stock held by a noncorporate shareholder for five years before the distribution. The shareholder of "qualified stock" had to own at least "10 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the distributing corporation," including stock attributed to the shareholder under I.R.C. § 318. I.R.C. § 311(e)(1) (1985).
50 The distribution in partial liquidation had to be made with respect to "qualified stock," as defined in note 49. Such a distribution could only be made to a noncorporate shareholder. I.R.C. § 302(b)(4) (1985). In addition, the partial liquidation had to meet the requirements of § 302(e). The distribution could not "essentially equivalent to a dividend," and it had to be made within the taxable year in which the plan of partial liquidation was adopted or the succeeding taxable year. I.R.C. § 302(e)(1) (1985).
51 Such a distribution had to be made with respect to "qualified stock" of a controlled corporation. I.R.C. § 311(e)(2)(A)(i) (1985). Substantially all of the assets the controlled corporation had to consist of the assets of a qualified business — actively conducted for five years before the distribution and not acquired in a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized. I.R.C. § 311(e)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(ii) (1985). The controlled corporation's nonbusiness assets could not have been acquired by contribution within five years of the distribution. I.R.C. § 311(e)(2)(A)(iii) (1985). Finally, the distributing corporation had to distribute more than fifty percent in value of the stock of the controlled corporation. I.R.C. § 311(e)(2)(A)(iv) (1985).
53 I.R.C. § 311(d)(2)(D) (referring to redemptions under § 537(b)(2)(A) and (B)).
prevents taxpayers from causing the corporation to recognize losses by contributing loss properties to the corporation and then distributing the recently contributed loss properties to related shareholders in liquidation.\textsuperscript{57} The loss will be disallowed if either the liquidating distribution is not pro rata or if the property is “disqualified property.”\textsuperscript{58} If the corporation received the loss property in a Section 351 transaction or as a contribution to capital “during the 5-year period ending on the date of the distribution,”\textsuperscript{59} the property will be considered disqualified property.\textsuperscript{60}

A stricter anti-stuffing rule reduces the basis of a loss property on sale, exchange, or distribution if the “principal purpose”\textsuperscript{61} of a contribution of property was “to recognize loss by the liquidating corporation with respect to such property in connection with the liquidation.”\textsuperscript{62} For example, A owns 100\% of the stock of X Corp., which operates a retail store, and A contributes an asset unrelated to the business of X Corp. with a basis of $100 and a fair market value of $5. One month after A contributes the asset, X Corp. sells the asset to B, an unrelated third party, for $5. Two months after the contribution, A causes X to liquidate. Under new Section 336(d)(2), the basis of the contributed asset will be reduced to $5, thereby disallowing X Corp.’s loss on the sale to B. The forbidden contribution can either be a capital contribution or a Section 351 exchange of property for stock or securities between the shareholder and the liquidating corporation.\textsuperscript{63} If the liquidating corporation acquires loss property in a Section 351 exchange of property for stock or securities between the shareholder and the liquidating corporation.\textsuperscript{64} If the liquidating corporation acquires loss property in a Section 351 exchange or as a capital contribution within two years before the adoption of the plan of liquidation, it will be presumed that the contribution was made as a part of a plan to recognize the loss in connection with the liquidation.\textsuperscript{65}

The real purpose of the basis reduction rule of Section 336(d)(2) is to prevent abuses of the loss recognition rules of new Section 336 by the contribution of assets unrelated to the business operation of the liquidating corporation. Therefore, the regulations will not require a reduced basis in contributed assets that are related to the business of the liquidating corporation. The conferees appear to want the two-year presumption of bad intent to apply only when “there is no clear and substantial relationship between the contributed property and the conduct of the corporation’s current or future business enterprises.”\textsuperscript{66} The conferees also explained that the two-year presumption of planned

\textsuperscript{57}I.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d).
\textsuperscript{58}I.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(1)(A).
\textsuperscript{60}Id.
loss recognition generally should not apply "to a corporation's acquisition of property during its first two years of existence."\textsuperscript{66}

As a further safeguard to prevent tax avoidance, new Section 336 permits the Service to require recapture of the disallowed loss on a sale as gain by the liquidating corporation as a part of its liquidation.\textsuperscript{67} In cases in which a loss from contributed property was disallowed in a year before the year in which the liquidating corporation adopted the plan of liquidation, regulations permit the Service to convert the disallowed loss into gross income for the liquidating corporation in the year of liquidation.\textsuperscript{68} Such regulations could cause a bunching of income in the year of liquidation that could produce unusually high taxes, particularly if it pushes the corporation's taxable income above $100,000 for the taxable year.\textsuperscript{69} This bunching could lead to an increase in the corporation's tax rate to 39\%, instead of the usual 34\%.\textsuperscript{70}

The conferees anticipated that taxpayers would try to avoid the burdens imposed by new Section 336 by having corporations elect S corporation status immediately before a distribution or liquidation to avoid the corporate level tax altogether. Therefore, Congress closed the loophole before it appeared. If an S corporation disposes of an asset within ten years after its S election, new Section 1374 will cause the "recognized built-in gain" of the asset at the time the corporation elected S status to be taxed at the highest corporate rates.\textsuperscript{71} New Section 1374 assumes that any gain realized on a property distributed by the corporation was present when the corporation elected S status.\textsuperscript{72} However, the corporation may avoid the tax by proving that the asset was acquired after the corporation elected S corporation status.\textsuperscript{73} Even if the corporation owned the asset when the Subchapter S election was made, the corporation may minimize the "built-in gain" by proving that the "built-in gain" was less than the difference between fair market value and adjusted basis at the date of disposition.\textsuperscript{74} New Section 1374 does not apply to corporations that have been S corporations since they were first organized\textsuperscript{75} or to corporations that elected to become S corporations before January 1, 1987.\textsuperscript{76} Therefore, corporations that elected S corporation treatment before January 1, 1987, may have a

\textsuperscript{66}Id.
\textsuperscript{67}I.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(2)(C).
\textsuperscript{68}Id.
\textsuperscript{69}Id.
\textsuperscript{70}I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(a).
\textsuperscript{71}I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(d)(2).
\textsuperscript{72}I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(d)(2)(A).
\textsuperscript{73}I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(d)(2)(B).
\textsuperscript{74}I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(c)(1).
\textsuperscript{75}Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(b).
special opportunity to liquidate at low tax cost by taking advantage of new Section 1374 and the transitional rule for small corporations discussed below.77

Another exception clarifies a point of apparent inconsistency between the liquidation rules and the reorganization rules within Subchapter C before the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Before the amendment of Sections 336 and 337, taxpayers argued that a corporation could sell unwanted assets to third parties tax-free while the selling corporation was being acquired in a tax-free reorganization.78 An example may help to clarify this discussion. P Corp. wants to acquire all of the assets of T Corp. except for one asset not related to T Corp.'s business operations. P Corp. is acquiring substantially all of the assets of T Corp. for P Corp. voting stock, so the transaction qualifies as a tax-free "C" reorganization.79 After transferring its assets to P Corp. for P. Corp. stock, T Corp. will liquidate and distribute the P Corp. stock to the T Corp. shareholders. After P Corp. and T Corp. have agreed to the transaction, T Corp. adopts a plan of liquidation and sells the unwanted asset to A, an unrelated third party. Before the 1986 Tax Reform Act, T Corp. could argue that it should not recognize gain on the sale of the unrelated asset because the sale of the unrelated asset qualified for nonrecognition treatment under Section 337. The Court of Claims primarily held that the reorganization provisions preempted the liquidation rules in such transactions, thus forcing T Corp. to recognize any gains from sales of assets to third parties during the pendency of the reorganization.80 The Fifth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion.81 The new Section 336 makes it clear that the liquidation rules do not apply to liquidations that are a part of a reorganization plan.82 Therefore, any opportunity to sell assets without recognizing gain during the liquidation phase of a corporate reorganization has disappeared.83

A. Treatment of Distributions by Continuing Corporations

As noted above, amendments made in 1982 and 1984 had largely wiped out the General Utilities doctrine as it applied to operating distributions,

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78See B. BitkER & J. Eustice, supra note 36, ¶ 14.32 at 103.


81General Housewares, Inc. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).

82I.R.C. of 1986, §§ 336(c), 361.

83Id. While the new §336(c) merely makes it clear that § 336 does not apply in liquidations that are a part of a reorganization, the Conference Committee Report makes it clear that the non-recognition rules of the reorganization rules are to apply. "Neither gain nor loss is recognized, however, with respect to any distribution of property by a corporation to the extent there is nonrecognition of gain or loss to the recipient under the tax-free reorganization provisions of the Code (part III of subchapter C)." H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II-199-200 (1986).
distributions in redemption of stock, and distributions in partial liquidation. The remaining exceptions to gain recognition by nonliquidating corporations making distributions to their shareholders were repealed by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, including the following: distributions in partial liquidation to certain individual shareholders; “qualifying dividends” to certain individual shareholders; Section 303 redemptions; redemptions by regulated investment companies; and certain distributions to private foundations in redemption of stock. The 1986 Act also repealed the former rule that allowed a parent corporation to distribute, with respect to qualified stock of the parent corporation, more than fifty percent in value of the stock of a controlled corporation.

B. Relief Provisions

To ameliorate the effects of corporate level gain recognition, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 contains a few exceptions to the general rule requiring recognition of gain or loss on corporate distributions in liquidation. The new liquidation rules continue to treat subsidiary mergers under Section 332 as a tax-free transaction for the liquidating subsidiary. To qualify for the special treatment, the parent corporation must meet the familiar conditions of Section 332 and have at least 80% voting control of the subsidiary, and also hold stock having a value of at least 80% of the “total value of the stock of such corporation.” Certain non-participating preferred stock does not count as stock for purposes of the control test. If the conditions are met, liquidating distributions by the subsidiary to the parent corporation, including distributions in exchange for debt owed to the parent corporation, will be tax-free. This favorable treatment for subsidiary mergers is apparently designed to further the present policy of preventing imposition of the corporate level tax on assets more than once before they are removed from the corporate solution.

The favorable treatment for subsidiary mergers, however, will not extend

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7I.R.C. of 1986, § 337.
8I.R.C. of 1986, §§ 332, 337(a), (c).
9I.R.C. of 1986, §§ 332, § 337(c). Control for this purpose is defined by § 1504(a)(2). The excluded preferred stock must be non-voting, non-participating preferred stock that is not convertible and that can be redeemed at no more than issue price plus a reasonable redemption premium. I.R.C. of 1986, § 1504(a)(4).
11I.R.C. of 1986, § 337(a). The nonrecognition rule does not apply if the parent corporation is a tax-exempt organization, unless the tax-exempt parent will use the distributed property in a taxable unrelated business. I.R.C. of 1986, § 337(b). The exception for property to be used in an unrelated business has the effect of postponing the gain or loss recognition until the organization later disposes of the property or ceases to conduct the unrelated trade or business. I.R.C. of 1986, § 337(b)(2)(B)(ii).
12Recognition of gain in subsidiary liquidations in which the basis of the distributee's assets are not stepped up just causes an undesirable "cascading" of gain within groups of corporations. See ALI, Proposals, supra note 18, at 17.
to distributions made to the minority shareholders. Distributions to minority shareholders will be treated under the general rules applicable to distributions in redemption of stock or liquidations. Therefore, gain will be recognized on such distributions. Because the new rules apply according to the actual assets received by the parent corporation and the minority shareholders, taxpayers may be able to minimize gain recognition by using cash, or other property with relatively little appreciation, to redeem the stock of minority shareholders.

Another important relief provision aimed at the disposition of assets of an 80% controlled subsidiary creates expanded opportunities for avoiding gain recognition under Section 338(h)(10). An example may help to illustrate the operation of Section 338(h)(10) before the 1986 amendments. The acquired corporation, T, was a member of the S controlled group, which files consolidated returns. P Corp. acquired 80% control of T in a cash purchase. If P and S agreed, the transaction could be treated as a sale of the T assets by the S group to P Corp. The S group would recognize the gain or loss in the T assets but would avoid recognizing the gain on the sale of the S stock. Amendments made in the 1986 Act to Section 338(h)(10) will extend the application of this principle to acquisitions similar to those in our example even if the selling affiliated group of corporations did not file consolidated returns.

The final relief provision takes the form of a transitional rule for small corporations. The repeal of General Utilities generally took effect for distributions and liquidations after July 31, 1986, unless the liquidation was completed before January 1, 1987. However, for some closely-held corporations with stock worth less than five million dollars only the ordinary gains and losses, short term capital gains and losses, and gains from the disposition of installment obligations need be recognized if the corporation completely liquidates before January 1, 1989. To qualify for the special transitional rule, more than fifty percent of the value of the company's stock must be owned by ten or fewer “qualified persons.” Individuals, estates, and certain trusts are

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94 Id.
98 The value of all of the stock of the corporation must be no more than $5 million. The valuation is made at the date that the plan of complete liquidation is adopted, or on August 1, 1986, if the value of the stock was greater at that date. Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(4).
101 Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(6)(A). The trusts permitted are trusts whose incomes were taxed to the grantors during their lives and testamentary trusts. They only qualify for sixty days after the deaths of the grantors (grantor trusts) or they receive stock in the company (testamentary trusts). The sixty-day period can be lengthened for the grantor trusts if the entire value of the trust is included in the gross estate of the grantor. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(ii) and (iii) (1985).
"qualified persons." The Act applies the family attribution rules of Section 318(a)(1) in determining stock ownership, and attributes the stock owned by entities to their members. For example, stock owned by a partnership will be treated as owned pro rata by its partners. The benefit of the transitional rule phases out for corporations with stock worth between five and ten million dollars, and no special rule is available for corporations with stock worth more than ten million dollars.

Thus relief from the repeal of General Utilities is very limited. The burden was removed only for small, closely-held corporations and in situations in which gain could be cascaded through chains of corporations. Suggestions for broader relief provisions were rejected, as this article shall discuss below.

III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REPEAL OF GENERAL UTILITIES

A. Assumptions of the Proponents of Reform

Any proponent of tax reform assumes that many of the features of the current tax law will remain unchanged after the reformed provisions have been enacted. The proponent of a tax change may believe that a present rule is desirable and should not be changed, or the proponent may believe that a less than perfect provision will not be changed for political or administrative reasons. In any event, the proponents of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in corporate liquidations usually assumed that the reformed tax structure would have the following features:

1. Only realized gains would be taxed.

2. The two-level structure of the corporate tax would continue: that is, corporations taxed upon their own income and their shareholders taxed upon distributions received from the corporations. Shareholders, however, would not be taxed on the undistributed earnings of corporations.

103 One's family for this purpose includes one's spouse, children, grandchildren and parents. I.R.C. of 1986, § 318(a)(1)(A). Adopted children are treated the same as children by blood. Id. at (a)(1)(B).
105 Id.
107 ALI, Proposals, supra note 18, at 11. This assumption appears to be implicit in the Senate Finance Committee Report and the ABA Task Force Report.
108 REFORM, supra note 14, at 1, 4; ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 12-13. The ALI did not adopt recommendations for the revision of the rules governing corporate operating distributions. Instead, the reporter of the ALI study, Professor Warren of the Harvard Law School, released a reporter's study accompanying the ALI study that recommended an integration of the corporate level and shareholder level taxes. Id. at 327. The ABA General Utilities Tax Force Report did not expressly make assumptions, intending to respond to the Senate Finance Committee proposals. General Utilities Tax Force, Income Taxation of Corporations Making Distributions With Respect to Their Stock: Task Force Report, 37 TAX LAW. 625, 625-26 (1984). Generally speaking, the Task Force appears to have implicitly adopted the same assumptions as the Senate Finance Committee staff.

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3. Capital gains would receive preferential tax treatment.\textsuperscript{109}

4. Some form of tax-free or tax-deferred treatment would be retained for some corporate acquisitions.\textsuperscript{110}

5. Successors in interest of a decedent would receive a stepped-up basis in the property received from the decedent.\textsuperscript{111}

Also, a major assumption of most of the reform proposals was that the reform of the corporate tax provisions was not intended to be a revenue-raising provision. Except for potentially broadening the tax base, the reforms were to be made for policy reasons other than relief of the federal budget deficit.\textsuperscript{112}

The assumptions made by the reformers about the shape of the reformed tax code turned out to be accurate, with the notable exception of the preferential treatment of capital gains.\textsuperscript{113} The repeal of preferential treatment for capital gains, however, only sharpened some of the arguments against the repeal of the \textit{General Utilities} doctrine, and capital gains repeal may cause more changes of taxpayer behavior in corporate transactions than the proponents of tax reform would have imagined.\textsuperscript{114} In determining whether the repeal of \textit{General Utilities} will achieve what its proponents advocated, it is important to consider reform provisions that were not enacted as a part of the revision of Subchapter C, including both larger reforms that Congress did not add to the law and relief provisions that were not enacted.

B. \textit{Reform Proposals for Subchapter C Not Enacted}

At least three different business transactions may be accomplished by liquidating a corporation: "(1) the termination of a business; (2) the continuation of a corporate business by the shareholders of the corporation in unincorporated form; or (3) the transfer of a business to a third-party purchaser."\textsuperscript{115} The repeal of the \textit{General Utilities} doctrine in corporate liquidations, of course, affects all three possible transactions. The tax reform proposals of both the American Law Institute (ALI) and the Senate Finance Committee Staff focused primarily on complete revision of the rules for corporate acquisitions, the third of the possible transactions listed above.\textsuperscript{116}

In both the ALI study and the Senate Finance Committee Staff Report, the acquiring and selling taxpayers could expressly elect the corporate level tax

\textsuperscript{109} REFORM, supra note 14, at 4; ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 14.
\textsuperscript{110} REFORM, supra note 14, at 4; ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 6-7.
\textsuperscript{111} REFORM, supra note 14, at 4.
\textsuperscript{112} REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Dole).
\textsuperscript{113} I.R.C. §§ 1201(b), 1202 (1985), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, §§ 301, 302, 311.
\textsuperscript{114} See infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{116} ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 43 (Proposal A1); REFORM, supra note 14, at 5.
consequences of a corporate acquisition. By making an election similar to a Section 338 election, the taxpayers could elect to have a cost basis in the assets of the acquired company, at the cost of recognizing the gain or loss in those assets, or to have a carry-over basis accompanied by non-recognition of the gain or loss inherent in the assets of the acquired company. The elective treatment of corporate acquisitions prevented an acquiring corporation from receiving a step-up in basis without recognizing the gains and losses inherent in the assets of an acquired corporation, but it also offered an acquiring corporation the opportunity to avoid gain recognition if that were desirable.

The General Utilities rule was to be repealed for liquidations not incident to an acquisition, but each study considered far-reaching relief provisions for adversely affected corporate taxpayers. The ALI study suggested that corporate level gain from goodwill, going concern value, and purchase premium not allocated to specific assets not be recognized upon a cost-basis acquisition, and that the distributee receive a zero basis in such assets on liquidation. The ALI study also suggested that the shareholders of the liquidating company receive a credit against their own capital gains taxes for their share of the capital gains tax paid by the corporation. The Senate Finance Committee Staff Report briefly listed five possible permanent relief alternatives to ameliorate the harshness of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in liquidations. The first two alternatives were those considered by the ALI study. The staff also suggested that the shareholders who received distributions of the corporate assets in kind in a liquidation could elect to defer either the corporate level tax or the shareholder level tax, or perhaps both, until the shareholders disposed of the assets. In addition, the staff suggested that either the corporate or individual capital gains rates on such transactions might be reduced. The issue of relief provisions was important to both proposals, and indeed was the main focus of the discussion of the repeal of General Utilities in the hearings held by the Senate Finance Committee to discuss the Staff Report.

In examining the revision of Subchapter C, the ALI and the Senate Finance Committee Staff also considered proposals that would have treated publicly traded partnerships as corporations for tax purposes. The ALI considered this step primarily because of "the administrative and compliance complexity

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117 ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 43 (Proposal A1); REFORM, supra note 14, at 55.
118 ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 120-32 (Proposal C2).
119 Id. at 134-53 (Proposal C3).
120 Subchapter C Revision Act, supra note 8, at 65-66.
121 Id.
122 Senator Dole requested the hearings on the staff report. His press release announcing the hearings asked witnesses to consider three questions, the first of which was: "If gain is taxed to the corporation on distribution of appreciated property, is any relief appropriate either on a temporary or permanent basis? If relief is considered necessary, how should it be structured?" SENATE FINANCE COMM. PRESS RELEASE NO. 83-186, (October 4, 1983), quoted in REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Sen. Dole).
of dealing with large publicly held limited partnerships."\textsuperscript{123} The enactment of the partnership audit and litigation procedures in TEFRA largely mitigated the concerns of the ALT, and they have not recommended reclassification of publicly traded partnerships since TEFRA.\textsuperscript{124} The staff justified treating publicly traded limited partnerships as corporations to fairly and consistently apply tax rules to all large business entities.\textsuperscript{125} Congress did not enact a reclassification provision in 1986. Because of the repeal of General Utilities and the consequent increase in the tax burden on corporation liquidations, more business ventures may be conducted in the partnership form in the future, leading to a possible reconsideration of this issue by Congress in the future.\textsuperscript{126}

C. Arguments for Reform — In Retrospect

Perhaps the most important argument made in favor of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was that the doctrine permitted the step up in basis of corporate property with only a shareholder level capital gains tax that did not bear any necessary relationship to the corporate level tax foregone.\textsuperscript{127} Accordingly, General Utilities disrupted the system of double taxation of corporate income.\textsuperscript{128} However, so long as the recipient of property from a corporation in liquidation receives a carry-over basis in the property received from the corporation, double taxation is not threatened.\textsuperscript{129} As Lewis put it in his seminal paper on the repeal of General Utilities: "The provisions hardly pay lip service to the "double tax” system. Congress has sawed off the tailgate of the corporate tax wagon. In doing so, it has weighted the tax system in favor of business liquidators and traders and against continuing owners."\textsuperscript{130}

Because the basis of stock did not necessarily bear any relationship to the basis of the assets within the corporation, the tax imposed on the shareholder at liquidation bore no relationship to the corporate level tax burden avoided.\textsuperscript{131} If the corporation liquidated and distributed its assets to the estate or beneficiaries of a deceased taxpayer, for example, the step-up in basis would wipe out any tax liability for any party to the transaction.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{123}Hobbet, \textit{Limited Partnerships: Associations or Partnerships?}, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 107 (1985).
\textsuperscript{124}REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 356-60 (statement of George S. Slocum).
\textsuperscript{125}REFORM, supra note 14, at 50-51 n.6.
\textsuperscript{126}See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{128}Shube, supra note 2, at 51-53.
\textsuperscript{129}Lyons, supra note 115, at 1106-12.
\textsuperscript{131}Shube, supra note 2, at 51.
\textsuperscript{132}Blum, \textit{Behind the General Utilities Doctrine, Or Why Does the General Have So Much Support From the Troops?}, 62 TAXES 292, 294 (1984).
The opportunity to escape the double tax burden also led taxpayers to shape their transactions to take advantage of the avoidance of the double tax. First, as already noted, General Utilities created incentives for taxpayers to liquidate businesses which might otherwise have continued to operate in the corporate form. Some have even argued that the doctrine has increased acquisition and merger activity. While the Treasury Department has expressed doubt that the doctrine caused acquisition activity, it is certainly true that corporate level nonrecognition of gain provides an incentive rather than a disincentive for taxable acquisitions. Second, the General Utilities rule also encouraged corporations to liquidate and later reincorporate to receive an increase in the basis of their assets at low tax cost. Liquidation followed by reincorporation also provided opportunities for other forms of tax avoidance. Because the first corporation had disappeared, its tax attributes, such as earnings and profits, also disappeared after the liquidation. These attributes did not carry over to the new corporation.

In response to the imposition of a double tax on corporate liquidations, commentators opposed to the repeal of General Utilities argued either that the system of double taxation did not apply to transactions other than the ordinary operation of the corporation, or that corporate level nonrecognition should be retained as a beginning of integration of the corporate and individual taxes.

Integration of the corporate and individual income taxes is certainly a desirable goal. Even the Treasury in previous administrations has proposed it as a goal of tax reform. Because corporations are not consumers in the same sense as individuals are, "all corporate income ultimately can be accounted for either as consumption by individuals or as an increase in the value of claims of individuals who own corporate shares." Therefore, the corporate income tax

113 ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 112.
116 Yin, supra note 134, at 1115-16; see also Allen, A Leveraged Buyout Checklist After Tax Reform, 33 TAX NOTES 1151, 1153 (1986). One cannot, however, underestimate the incentive effects of the deductibility of interest in encouraging use of the leveraged buy-out. Canellos, The Over-Leveraged Acquisition, 39 TAX LAW. 91 (1985).
117 B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, ¶ 11.05 at 11-18. For a thorough discussion of the liquidation-reincorporation transaction and several proposals to eradicate all of its effects, see Nunnallee, The "Liquidation-Reincorporation" Doctrine Revisited After the Tax Reform Act of 1984: Do Sections 302 and 304 Provide the Solution? 40 TAX LAW. 1 (1986).
121 Id. at 4.
imposes an indirect tax on individuals, but it is unclear whether the tax is paid by corporate customers or shareholders. Integration would also eliminate distortions favoring investment in noncorporate rather than corporate entities, accumulation of income within corporations, and the preference for debt rather than equity financing.

However, arguments about whether we have a two-level tax with exceptions or a one-level tax with exceptions remind one of trying to decide whether a glass of water is half full or half empty. At least with a complete system of some sort, one may decide whether or not it is desirable and either avoid or embrace it. If integration is a desirable goal of tax policy, it should be pursued as a systematic policy choice rather than by complex exception. Furthermore, adoption of the policy goal of corporate and individual income tax integration also requires systematic study and choice from among the several possible models for integration.

The second major reason for repealing General Utilities is simplification. According to critics of the doctrine, retaining the General Utilities rule introduced complexity into the lives of both those administering the tax law and the taxpayers and their advisers trying to take advantage of the benefits of General Utilities. Retaining the doctrine but attempting to deal with its adverse side effects led to various remedial rules from Congress, the courts, and the Treasury Department. To appreciate the complexities of a liquidation before the repeal of the doctrine, one need only consider the exceptions to the general rule of nonrecognition for a liquidating corporation. The following gains or recapture could be recognized by the corporation in a "tax-free" liquidation: (1) the difference between FIFO value and LIFO value for LIFO valued inventories; (2) the gain inherent in installment obligations; (3) recapture items; (4) items involving an assignment of income; and (5)
tax benefit items. In addition, the Service could assert that the accounting methods of a liquidating corporation did not clearly "reflect income," even though the accounting method was proper for the corporation before it liquidated. One would hope that more law would produce more clarity, but the sweep of rules such as assignment of income rules, the tax benefit rules, and the rules of proper accounting was uncertain, leaving the law both complex and confusing.

Perhaps the most complex side effect of corporate level nonrecognition in corporate liquidations was the collapsible corporation provision. Among the first collapsible corporations were companies organized to produce one motion picture. Before realizing the income from the venture, the shareholders avoided the corporate level tax by liquidating the corporation or selling it to another taxpayer and realizing capital gains. Congress first attacked the collapsible corporation in 1950 by imposing ordinary income on shareholders of the collapsible corporation who sold their stock or caused the corporation to liquidate without realizing the ordinary gain inherent in the corporation. In its various attempts to refine the collapsible corporation section of the Code so as to plug its gaps and limit its scope to truly abusive situations, Congress began with a bad idea and has ended up with a nightmare. Most commentators believed that the repeal of General Utilities would allow the repeal of Section 341. The elimination of both of its "parents," General Utilities and preferential capital gains treatment, certainly eliminates the need for Section 341.

In addition, taking advantage of nonrecognition required careful planning to avoid the remedial rules and to conform to the requirements of sections like 337, the twelve-month liquidation rule. Before 1986, Section 337 permitted a corporation to sell off assets without recognizing gain or loss on the sales if the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation before selling the assets and liq-

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153 Bittker & Eustice, supra note 36, ¶ 11.62 at 59-60.
154 Shube, supra note 2, at 45.
156 Bittker & Eustice, supra note 36, ¶ 12.01 at 1-3. A more complete discussion of the roots of the provision, including titles of films produced by collapsible corporations, may be found in Shube, supra note 2, at 42-43 & n. 180.
158 Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 310-12.
Taxpayers were often able to multiply their tax advantages under Section 337 by a tax straddle, recognizing their losses before the adoption of a liquidation plan, the event that began the twelve-month period of nonrecognition for sales of corporate assets. After adoption of the plan of liquidation, the taxpayers then sold their appreciated property without recognizing gain. The tax avoidance possibilities to manipulate Section 337 led to the belief in the government that the provision was just too favorable and caused litigation over the technical requirements of Section 337. The ensuing litigation produced complexity without producing certainty.

The existence of the General Utilities doctrine also made necessary the consistency rules of Section 338. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Section 338 permitted an acquiring corporation that purchases 80% of the stock of a target company to elect a step-up in basis to the fair market value of the target company's assets at the cost of recognizing the income, such as depreciation recapture, that would be recognized if the target corporation had sold its assets under old Section 337. Requiring recognition of the recapture items in the target company's assets imposed a price on the step-up in basis under Section 338 and limited the tax advantages of the General Utilities principle in Section 338 transactions. The consistency rules were an attempt to make sure that a fair price was paid for the step-up in basis. Consistency prevented an acquiring company from selecting some of the assets of a purchased corporation for stepped-up basis treatment without recognizing the recapture income inherent in all of the assets of the acquired company. These complex and intricate rules placed a premium on the skill of the tax adviser, created traps for the unwary taxpayer, and had the effect of maintaining a tax system that discriminated, more severely than usual, against the ill-advised.

In summary, removing significant complexities in the law of corporate liquidations and simplifying the variety of transactions for taxpayers were the second important reasons for the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.

The third major reason for the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was to broaden the tax base. The opportunity for a tax-free step-up in basis in cor-

162 I.R.C. § 337(a) (1985) repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(3). Corporate level non-recognition under § 337, however, was subject to the same exceptions, recapture items for example, on nonrecognition that haunted distribution of assets in liquidation.

163 B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, ¶ 11.64 at 71-74.

164 Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 317-19.


166 I.R.C. §§ 338(d)-(e).

167 See REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury). Id. at 87-88 (statement of Edward Delaney, chairman of the ABA Section on Taxation).

168 Id. at 19 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).
Corporate liquidations was one of the tax expenditures listed in the periodic reports of the Joint Committee on Taxation. The doctrine's repeal, without a decrease in tax rates, was estimated to produce approximately $26 billion over a five year period, 1987-1991. More taxable income from corporate liquidations should occur even if taxpayers change their behavior and avoid taxable acquisitions. Economists estimate that the reduced depreciation deductions from acquisitions with a carry-over basis will cause an increase in projected revenue three or four years after the repeal of the doctrine. On the other hand, at least one commentator believes that less base broadening will occur because taxpayers will change their behavior in order to take advantage of the new rules. The ability to elect either gain recognition and a carryover basis or gain recognition and a step-up in basis, available to corporations acquiring other corporations under Sections 332 and 338, may tend to mitigate the base broadening effect. As one commentator noted, "My instincts tell me that the revenue loss each year from recapture, and other taxes that would be collected under present law but will not be collected with the repeal of General Utilities coupled with an 'escape hatch,' [the ability to take a carry-over basis in acquired assets without recognition of gain] will outweigh any revenue gained from . . . future depreciation and other deductions."172

Several other arguments supported the reform of the General Utilities doctrine, but these were generally either subsumed in the arguments summarized above or were less important. For example, arguments based on different treatment for comparable transactions were generally examples that were based on the step-up in basis without corresponding recognition of gain.173 The other argument presented by proponents that has some independent force is that the parties to corporate acquisitions and liquidations could allocate the step-up in basis without regard to the fair market value of the assets in liquidation transactions. In a normal sale of property between unrelated parties, the parties have opposing interests that cause them to negotiate prices that reflect fair value. Under the General Utilities rule, if the shareholders of the target company sold their stock to an acquiring corporation that would elect to step-up the basis of the target company's assets, the selling shareholders had no incentive to bargain with the acquiring company about the value of the target's assets. This lack of incentive could lead the acquiring company to allocate the price paid for the target's assets in a manner advantageous to the acquiring


171Yin, supra note 134, at 1117.


173See, e.g., ALL Proposals, supra note 15, at 114.
company, rather than according to fair values.\textsuperscript{174} Of course, the argument that the repeal of \textit{General Utilities} would cause a more accurate allocation of basis to the assets of a liquidated company has little validity in situations in which the corporation is merely distributing its assets to be operated in a noncorporate form by its former shareholders. The shareholders will just make an allocation that produces the most favorable tax result, comparing the present tax burden to the present value of the depreciation deductions of various allocations. Even in corporate acquisitions, there may be no necessity for a seller of corporate stock and a purchaser making a Section 338 election to agree upon the allocation of the price without some statutory requirement that they do so\textsuperscript{175} or unless the government specifies how the price shall be allocated by both parties.\textsuperscript{176}

\textbf{IV. Evaluation of the Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine}

For the repeal of the \textit{General Utilities} doctrine to be a beneficial tax reform, it must alleviate the problems identified by the proponents of reform, and it must not cause severe disadvantages. In evaluating the repeal of \textit{General Utilities}, the reviewer must consider the other provisions of the reform legislation that influence how the repeal of \textit{General Utilities} affects taxpayers. In this case, the major features of the Tax Reform Act that must be considered include (1) the repeal of special treatment of capital gains, (2) the relief provisions enacted with the repeal of \textit{General Utilities}, (3) the failure to repeal unnecessary provisions, and (4) the failure to enact complementary tax reforms, particularly simplification of the tax-free acquisition rules and provisions dealing with publicly-traded limited partnerships.

The most significant disadvantage of the repeal of the \textit{General Utilities} rule identified by most opponents of reform is the increased tax cost of corporate liquidations, particularly in the cost of changing small businesses with long-held capital assets from the corporate form to an unincorporated form.\textsuperscript{177} The repeal of preferential capital gains treatment coupled with the repeal of \textit{General Utilities} made this disadvantage more acute, and the reforms will cause more taxpayers to seek relief in portions of the tax law that are even more complicated and filled with pitfalls than the former body of corporate liquidation law.

The most important arguments for repealing corporate level nonrecognition in corporate liquidations all stemmed from the ability to gain a step-up in basis of corporate assets on liquidation without recognizing the inherent gain.

\textsuperscript{174}Id. at 112-13.

\textsuperscript{175}Thompson, \textit{supra} note 173, at 1125.

\textsuperscript{176}Congress has specified that taxpayers make such allocations in acquisitions governed by § 338, I.R.C. of 1986, § 338(b)(5), and in other asset acquisitions, I.R.C. of 1986, § 1060(a).

\textsuperscript{177}REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, \textit{supra} note 1, at 153-54 (statement of John S. Nolan).
in these assets.\textsuperscript{178} Most commentators recognized that the real abuse was allowing a step-up in the basis of stock in trade and other ordinary income assets without a corresponding corporate level tax.\textsuperscript{179} Much of the gain inherent in other business assets was recognized under old Sections 336 and 337 through the recapture sections.\textsuperscript{180} Most commentators, however, acknowledged that a severe tax burden on long-held capital assets was not desirable,\textsuperscript{181} and the combination of the repeal of \textit{General Utilities} with the repeal of advantageous capital gains treatment only aggravated the ill effects predicted by most commentators.

The repeal of the preferential treatment for capital gains in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the failure to enact meaningful relief provisions for the gain in long-held capital assets produce a real hardship on current small businesses. The theoretical reasons for granting special relief from corporate level gain recognition for long-held capital assets resemble the justifications offered for long term capital gains.\textsuperscript{182} Much of the gain in these assets is usually due to the general increase in price levels and was accrued over a number of years. Unless the requirement that no gain be taxed before realization is repealed, the bunching of such income and its taxation at one time are harsh, particularly when very often the gain is reflected in the capital gain recognized by the shareholder upon sale or liquidation of the shareholder's stock.\textsuperscript{183} Congress saw fit to repeal the special treatment of capital gains in 1986 primarily because of the low overall rates being applied to taxable income.\textsuperscript{184} This justification makes much less sense when the lower overall rates are being applied to both the corporation and the shareholder in the same transaction.

The burden of capital gains taxes will be particularly great for smaller businesses for several reasons.\textsuperscript{185} First, large corporations usually do not liquidate, and in acquisitions they can avoid the burden of taxation by using loss carry-overs to offset gains, using the reorganization provisions to avoid gain

\textsuperscript{178}Id.
\textsuperscript{179}E.g., ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 113-14.
\textsuperscript{180}Id.
\textsuperscript{181}General Utilities Tax Force, supra note 108, at 625.
\textsuperscript{183}Nolan, supra note 138, at 98-99. This argument does not seem theoretically compelling, but the harshness of the repeal of \textit{General Utilities} without relief for such assets was a widely perceived need among commentators. \textit{Reform of Corporate Taxation}, supra note 1, at 142 (statement of Robert A. Jacobs).
\textsuperscript{185}It is possible to overstate the case favoring small business. While the repeal of the \textit{General Utilities} doctrine may cause real hardship to many small businesses, some of the "small" corporations are wealthy enough to pay the tax. "Although the idea of asset distributions by Mom and Pop corporations that are free of one level of tax evokes sympathy, one observer noted that the reality is closer to the Carringtons of the prime time television drama 'Dynasty.' 'What you really have out there is 'Dynasty' waiting to use the \textit{General Utilities} rule,' Prof. James S. Eustice of New York University commented at the September 30, 1985 Senate Finance Committee hearing on subchapter C reform." Sheppard, \textit{General Utilities Repeal and 'Dynasty.} ' Tax Notes (January 13, 1986).
recognition, and electing carry-over basis treatment under Section 338 to avoid gain recognition.\textsuperscript{167} Second, small and family-owned corporations are likely to hold the investment assets of the owners or their families, leading to additional capital gains. Third, because the small corporations are the only ones that can realistically take advantage of tax-free incorporation under Section 351, small corporations are those mostly likely to be burdened by tax on preincorporation appreciation in corporate assets.\textsuperscript{167} Fourth, personal or family concerns may cause dissolution of the corporation, while larger corporations do not face such problems.\textsuperscript{168} Fifth, because small business owners are often employed by their businesses, this increased tax burden and decrease in the after-tax proceeds from the sale of their businesses may be particularly burdensome because it will coincide with a termination of income from employment.\textsuperscript{169} Finally, longstanding tax policy had encouraged shareholders to contribute long-term capital assets in forming their small corporations. Therefore, all of the problems caused by tax reform for small corporations holding long-held capital assets become more difficult because the taxpayers have relied on the existence of the General Utilities doctrine in devising their corporate plans.\textsuperscript{170}

In spite of the widespread attention to the need for relief from double taxation for the long-held capital assets of closely-held corporations, Congress granted no specific relief for such assets, other than a transitional rule permitting small, closely-held corporations to use the old rules for two more years.\textsuperscript{171} The Senate Finance Committee staff, in their 1985 draft revision of Subchapter C, suggested several alternative forms of relief, primarily aimed at the small corporation. The staff suggested that the shareholders of S corporations receive a basis increase in their stock which reflect the corporate level tax on long-held capital assets.\textsuperscript{172} Under the staff’s proposal, liquidations in kind were exempted from the corporate level tax, and the shareholders would take a carry-over basis in the distributed assets.\textsuperscript{173} Also, acquiring corporations could elect to defer the tax on the intangible assets of target companies by taking a carry-over basis in the intangibles.\textsuperscript{174} In addition, the staff also recommended

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\item \textsuperscript{166} Reform of Corporate Taxation, supra note 1, at 155 (statement of John S. Nolan).
\item Reform of Corporate Taxation, supra note 1, at 153-54 (statement of John S. Nolan).
\item Beck, supra note 187, at 675.
\item Reform of Corporate Taxation, supra note 1, at 175-76 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen). Ordinarily, an argument based on reliance upon the law not changing is a weak one that would prevent all changes in law. In this case, particularly in connection with the reliance on I.R.C. § 351, it seems to make more sense. "Thus those who have relied on the existing structure in planning their affairs would be subject to a greater tax burden on disposition than previously thought. While every change in the tax laws has this effect to a greater or lesser extent, in light of the broad impact of this project, the Committee might want to consider whether a deferred effective date or other transitional relief should be provided." Id. at 23 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).
\item I.R.C. of 1986, § 337(d).
\item Subchapter C Revision Act, supra note 8, at 65.
\item Id. at 66-67.
\item Id.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
relief for small S corporations and transitional relief. Presumably for revenue reasons, the relief granted in the actual bill was significantly less than originally proposed by the Senate Finance Committee staff.

Some smaller corporations may have additional relief available if they elected S corporation status. S corporation status, however, will be difficult to use to ameliorate all of the consequences of the repeal of General Utilities. Not all small corporations meet the requirements for electing S corporation status. Some have disqualifying shareholders, such as corporations or partnerships, or too many shareholders. Frequently for family or other reasons, small corporations have more than one class of stock, or have shareholder trusts that do not fit within the few types of trusts permitted as S corporation shareholders. Even if the corporation qualifies to elect S corporation status, one unwilling shareholder may hold up the others. Finally, being an S corporation does not necessarily prevent gain from recognition at the corporate level on liquidation. Under new Section 1374, any liquidation of the corporation within ten years after it elects S corporation status will cause the recognition of all of the “built-in gain” in its assets. The S corporation may prove that it should not recognize gain if the S corporation acquired the asset after the corporation elected S status, or that the gain in the asset is greater than the gain in the asset at the time of election of S status. For tangible property, these exceptions may work reasonably well, but one becomes concerned about their application to intangible assets. When does an intangible asset arise? One could probably assume that an established corporation has assets like goodwill, customer lists, trade secrets, trade processes, and know how when the S election is made, but such assets are notoriously difficult to value. How can the taxpayer expect to establish the fair market value of an intangible asset as of

195 Id. at 67-68.
196 Sheppard, supra note 185.
197 One commentator has noted that “we must temper our enthusiasm for Subchapter S by being cognizant that it is an alternative which is suitable for only a few businesses.” Shaw, Impact of Proposals on Acquisitions of Closely Held Corporations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 289, 302 (1985).
198 See I.R.C. § 1361(b) (1986).
199 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1986); REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, Hearing, supra note 1, at 176-77 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen). The only trusts that qualify as shareholders in S corporations are trusts that are treated as owned by an individual resident of the United States or, for sixty days after the individual’s death, trusts that were treated as owned by an individual during the individual’s life. (This period may be extended to two years if the trust corpus is includible in the individual’s gross estate.) Id. at (c)(2)(A)(ii), (iii). Also qualifying as shareholders of S corporations are testamentary trusts, for the first sixty days after they receive S corporation stock, voting trusts, and “qualified Subchapter S trusts.” Id. at (c)(2)(A)(iii), (iv), (d). A “qualified Subchapter S trust” (i) may have only one income beneficiary, an individual, at a time; (2) the interest of an income beneficiary may only end at the beneficiary’s death or the termination of the trust; (3) any corpus distributions during the life of an income beneficiary must be made to that income beneficiary; and (4) at termination, the corpus of the trust must be distributed to current income beneficiary of the trust. Id. at (d)(3). In addition, the income beneficiary of a “qualified Subchapter S trust” must elect to have the trust so treated for each S corporation in which it holds stock. Id. at (d)(2).
the beginning of the taxable year of its S election to the satisfaction of an auditor from the Service? It will be interesting to see.

One of the most important arguments for the repeal of the *General Utilities* rule was that repeal would remove complexities from the tax law and the lives of taxpayers. On this count, reform has only partially succeeded. The statutory amendments do make the Code provisions simpler, and they do remove the choices and qualifications associated with the now vanished one-month (Section 333) and twelve-month (Section 337) liquidations. On the other hand, the infamous collapsible corporation provision was not repealed, despite the removal of both the preferential treatment of capital gains and the repeal of the *General Utilities* doctrine, the rules that allegedly caused Section 341 to be written. In the eyes of some commentators, the repeal of Section 341 was the principal simplification that could come from the repeal of *General Utilities*. While Section 341 would have little impact in most cases, and may vanish from lack of enforcement, it could still cause trouble to the unwary shareholder. If a shareholder of a collapsible corporation has substantial capital loss carry-overs, the unexpected conversion of capital gain into ordinary income on the sale of the shareholder's stock could cause consternation for the taxpayer because of Section 341, even though the benefits of capital gains have been repealed. If simplification is to be achieved, Congress must have the courage to remove the superseded provisions or render them ineffective.

In addition, tax reform will bring its own complexities in interpretation of its new rules. One need only consider the proof burdens placed on the officers and shareholders of S corporations under new Section 1374 to show that assets were acquired before the corporation elected S status, and their values at the time that the S election was made, to realize that the lives of taxpayers will not be universally simpler under tax reform. Applying the new anti-stuffing rules will also not be simple for taxpayers or tax administrators. Persons taking property from a liquidating corporation may receive a carry-over basis in the acquired property if the property was contributed to the liquidating corporation and the liquidation "was part of a plan the principal purpose of which was to recognize loss by the liquidating corporation" on such property. As Bittker and Eustice have written of Section 269, another "principal purpose" section, "like most statutory provisions turning on the taxpayer's motive or intent, considerable difficulty in application is to be expected." Even though Congress

201See Beck, *supra* note 187 at 678.
seems to intend that this provision seldom be used, and even though Congress has attempted to require a clear showing of intent,\textsuperscript{211} this provision will likely result in uncertainty for all parties concerned, and ensuing complexity and litigation. Beyond the complexities of language, further complexity may result from taxpayer behavior to avoid the burdens of the new legislation.

A. \textit{Incomplete Tax Reform and Taxpayer Response}

1. Mergers and Acquisitions

In both the ALI study and the Senate Finance Committee staff proposal, the repeal of the \textit{General Utilities} doctrine was to be part of a more generalized revision of the acquisition provisions of Subchapter C.\textsuperscript{212} In both proposals, despite the consideration used to carry out the acquisitions, the corporation could elect to take a carry-over basis without any corporate level gain recognition or could elect to take a stepped-up basis by recognizing the gain inherent in the assets of the acquired corporation. Among the justifications for reform of corporate acquisitions was the belief that the definitional provisions for tax-free reorganizations were complex beyond any justification, inconsistent, and confusing. The proponents of reform believed that making the tax consequences of a corporate acquisition depend on an express election was more reasonable than allowing taxpayers to elect their tax consequences by shaping the form of their acquisition. Requiring taxpayers to shape their transactions correctly to avoid adverse tax consequences penalized the ill-financed and the ill-advised.\textsuperscript{213} The reform of the reorganization provision was not implemented, probably because there was little perceived abuse of the current provisions\textsuperscript{214} and because such a drastic change might have unexpected consequences.

The reorganization provisions are not directly related to the repeal of \textit{General Utilities}, but there will be more opportunities for the current complexities to inconvenience taxpayers after reform. Because the cost of taxable acquisitions has gone up, most commentators expect that taxpayers will switch from taxable acquisitions to nontaxable ones.\textsuperscript{215} It is also reasonable to expect that taxpayers may want to divide up their corporate assets in order to make later sale more convenient. To accomplish this feat, taxpayers may also make use of another "troubled"\textsuperscript{216} portion of subchapter C, the divisive "D"

\textsuperscript{211}See supra note 202 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{212}ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 6-9; SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT, supra note 8, at 50-58. For a critique of the Senate Finance Committee proposals and for a counterproposal that would simplify the definition of a nontaxable reorganization but that would not rely on the elective step-up in basis, see Thompson, \textit{A Suggested Alternative Approach to the Senate Finance Committee Staff's 1985 Proposals for Revising the Merger and Acquisition Provisions}, 5 VA. TAX. REV. 599 (1986).

\textsuperscript{213}Leduc, supra note 16 at 54-59.

\textsuperscript{214}REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).


\textsuperscript{216}B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, ¶ 13.01 at 1.
It is ironic that in reducing complexity and confusion in one part of subchapter C, Congress has encouraged taxpayers to use provisions that may be even more confusing and complex.

Another of the simplifications suggested by some proponents of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was the repeal of the consistency rules of Section 338. An example illustrating the consistency rules may help to explain their operation. P Corp. is the parent corporation and owns 100% of Sub 1 Corp. and 100% of Sub 2 Corp. (For the sake of simplicity, Sub 1 Corp. and Sub 2 Corp. each have only one class of voting common stock.) P Corp. and its two subsidiaries, Sub 1 and Sub 2, are an affiliated group of corporations, because P owns more than 80% of the voting power of Sub 1 and Sub 2 and more than 80% of the value of all of the stock of Sub 1 and Sub 2. A Corp. purchases at least 80% control of Sub 1 and Sub 2 from P Corp. A Corp. wants the assets of Sub 1 to have a stepped-up basis. For the assets of Sub 1 to have a stepped-up basis, A Corp. must make a Section 338 election, which required that Sub 1 recognize the recapture inherent in its assets. The consistency rules required that A Corp. could not elect to step-up the basis of the assets of Sub 1 without also stepping up the basis of the assets of Sub 2. Consistency rules also require that if A Corp. attempted to step up even one asset from either Sub 1 or Sub 2 by purchasing the asset during the one year before beginning the acquisition of the subs, the year allowed for the acquisition of the stock of the subs, or the year after the “acquisition period,” A Corp. would be treated as making a Section 338 election for all of the assets of the Sub from

21I.R.C. of 1986, §§ 368(a)(1)(D), 355. §§ 368(a)(1)(D) and 355 permit a corporation to spin-off an active business that the corporation has operated for five years to a new corporation, Newco, and distribute the Newco stock to the shareholders of the original corporation. The original corporation must also retain an active business that it has operated for five years or the stock of a subsidiary that operates such a business. I.R.C. of 1986, § 355(b). If the original corporation wants to retain the stock in Newco, the original corporation can rely on the provisions of I.R.C. of 1986, § 351 to permit it to drop assets into Newco without recognition of gain.


23A Corp. must acquire 80% of the voting power of each of the subs and must acquire 80% of the total value of the stock of the subs, other than non-voting, non-convertible, non-participating preferred stock. I.R.C. § 338(d)(1), (3) (1985). A Corp. must also acquire the stock by purchase. The term “purchase” is defined by exclusion as an acquisition which does not qualify for non-recognition treatment under § 351 (incorporation) or in an tax-free reorganization, is not determined by reference to the basis of stock in the hands of some other taxpayer, or is not acquired from a related party under § 318. Stock received from a decedent with a basis determined under § 1014 also does not qualify as purchased stock. I.R.C. § 338(h)(3) (1985).

24I.R.C. § 338(a) (1985). The mechanism for this recognition of recapture items was an imaginary sale of the assets within Sub 1 under § 337. Section 337 generally caused the recognition of the difference between the LIFO and FIFO value of the inventory, recaptures of depreciation under §§ 1245 and 1250, recapture of investment tax credit under § 47, and recapture of tax benefit items, among other things. Under § 338(a), the election serves to meet the requirements of § 337, without the adoption of a liquidation plan or a liquidation.

which A Corp. purchased the asset.\footnote{I.R.C. § 338(e) (1985), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 712(k)(3).} Finally, Congress gave authority to the Treasury Department to draft additional regulations to protect avoidance of the consistency rules by transactions taking place even beyond the consistency period.\footnote{I.R.C. § 338(i)(1) (1985), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 712(k)(7).}

Congress passed the consistency requirements to prevent an acquiring corporation from receiving too much of a tax advantage from a corporate acquisition. Under the law prior to the enactment of Section 338, taxpayers could obtain a new basis in selected assets of a target company while still preserving the tax attributes of the target corporation.\footnote{H.R. REP. NO. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 535-36 (1982).} The existence of the General Utilities doctrine aggravated the revenue loss and shrinkage of the tax base from selective asset acquisition because the only tax paid by the acquiring corporation upon electing to step-up the basis of the assets of the target company was the tax on the recapture items of the target company.\footnote{Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 299.} Presumably in later intercorporate distributions, assets could be shifted from company to company without recognition of gain.

The consistency rules introduce a good deal of complexity into the law, both for taxpayers and for those administering the law. Also, because the Congress gave the Treasury Department broad authority to prevent avoidance of the consistency rules by applying the rules beyond the statutory time periods, taxpayers are subject to some uncertainty about how their acquisitions of target company assets will be treated even after the end of the statutory consistency period.\footnote{See Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 46, ¶ 12.06[1][d] at 64.} In addition, the existence of the consistency rules tempts taxpayers to find ways to avoid them, thereby introducing complexity into the transactions in an attempt to obtain a cost basis in some assets without recognizing gain in all corporate assets.\footnote{See Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 303-17.}

The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine makes the consistency rules in some ways less important than they were before repeal. If the taxpayer manages to avoid a tax burden on the initial acquisition of a company, the tax burden will eventually be applied when the property is sold, disposed of, or distributed. Some commentators, particularly Professor Ginsburg of Georgetown University Law Center, believe that the consistency rules should have been repealed with the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.\footnote{Id. at 317-19.} Congress, however, has apparently determined that the consistency rules are still needed after the repeal of the doctrine, because they are retained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

Tax lawyers devised the mirror transaction to avoid the consistency rules.
of Section 338, and Congress’s inability to decide whether to abolish the mirror transaction as a part of tax reform illustrates Congress’s uncertainty about the continuing need for the consistency rules. Mirror transactions were devised to permit acquiring corporations to avoid recognizing the gain inherent in the assets of acquired corporations before disposing of the assets and, incidentally, to defeat the consistency rules.23 An illustration of the mirror transaction may prove helpful in explaining its effect.24 Assume that A Corp. from our previous transaction still wants to acquire Sub 1 and Sub 2 from P Corp. Further, assume that A Corp. still wants to dispose of the assets of Sub 1 without recognizing the gain inherent in the assets of Sub 2. The consistency rules of Section 338 were specifically designed to prevent A Corp. from accomplishing the step-up of assets of Sub 1 alone. A Corp. forms two subsidiary corporations, Sub A-1 and Sub A-2 to acquire Sub 1 and Sub 2 from P Corp. A Corp., Sub A-1, and Sub A-2 are now an affiliated group, and A Corp. elects to have the group file consolidated income tax returns. Sub A-1 acquires 50% of the stock of Sub 1 and 50% of the stock of Sub 2. Sub A-2 acquires the rest of the stock of Sub 1 and of Sub 2. Sub A-1 and Sub A-2 are each treated as owning 100% of the stock of Sub 1 and of Sub 2 under the consolidated return rules.25 Therefore Sub 1 and Sub 2 can be liquidated into Sub A-1 and Sub A-2 in a tax-free subsidiary merger.26 A Corp. causes the assets of Sub 1 to be transferred to Sub A-1 and causes the assets of Sub 2 to be transferred to Sub A-2 in the liquidation. A Corp. then sells the assets of Sub 1 to X, an unrelated third party. A Corp. has managed to acquire and dispose of the assets of Sub 1 without recognizing the gain inherent in the Sub 1 assets. Thus, arguably, the gain in the Sub 1 assets should be recognized. On the other hand, the basis in the Sub 1 assets has not been stepped-up, and X cannot have the benefit of a higher basis in the Sub 1 assets without recognizing the gain inherent in the assets. Therefore, arguably, A Corp. has not escaped the tax burden of the Sub 1 assets; it has merely postponed that gain and shifted it to X.

The mirror transaction apparently works under the law in effect before the repeal of General Utilities. The principal congressional tax writers have differed about whether the mirror transaction will continue to work after tax reform.27 Representative Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, has cogently stated the reasons for the elimination of the mirror transaction:

New owners of a corporation could sell appreciated corporate property without a corporate level tax, placing them in a favored position over the old owners. . . . Old owners who believed it would be desirable for business

24This illustration is patterned after the illustration in Salem, supra note 215, at 4-8.
27Sheppard, supra note 230, at 988.
reasons, and in the best interests of shareholders, to dispose of an appreciated subsidiary could not do so without corporate tax. New owners could do so if they could use the 'mirror' transaction.235

The mirror transaction does not permit permanent avoidance of corporate level tax, but it does permit deferral of the gain in the Sub 1 assets so long as the corporation purchasing the stock of Sub 1 in the example does not make a Section 338 election and does not cause the acquired subsidiary to distribute any of its assets. The perceived danger of the mirror transaction is that the mirror transaction may threaten the consistency rules of Section 338. If corporate managers arrange the assets of a target company or an affiliated group of companies in separate corporations, or if the managers have the power to divide the assets into separate corporations through divisive reorganization techniques, corporate managers can avoid the consistency rules at will, at least with respect to complete businesses.236 Freedom from the consistency rules makes corporate acquisitions easier. Because the movement for repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in the House was based on slowing acquisition activity,237 then, characteristically, the House is also hostile to the mirror transaction.238

Major Senate proponents of tax reform, however, have taken the position that the mirror transaction survives tax reform. Senators Packwood and Dole contend that the mirror transaction should not be re-examined without a "full Treasury review of Subchapter C."239 The split in legislative intent has left the Treasury Department unable to take a position on the mirror transaction. Therefore, Treasury will not rule on the validity of the mirror transaction at this time.240

Proponents of the mirror transaction argue that no corporate-level gain should be recognized until the assets of the corporation are distributed or until some other recognition event occurs.241 The real determination that Congress must make is whether corporate managers should be able to rearrange the assets of acquired businesses, recognizing gain and stepping up the basis of only the assets that the manager selects or whether the assets of a whole business

236Id. at 282-83.
240Sheppard, supra note 230, at 988. The Treasury Department does plan to prohibit transactions that are descendants of the mirror transaction that use sales and retention of particular assets from the acquired company and transactions in which no mirror subsidiaries are created but instead the purchaser merely identifies gain and loss subs to be disposed of in a certain order. Id.
241Faber, Mirror Transactions Are Not Incompatible with General Utilities Repeal, 33 TAX NOTES 397 (1986).
or group of businesses must be treated consistently. This in turn hinges on Congress’s view of mergers and acquisitions. Permitting the mirror transaction fosters acquisitions, by permitting avoidance of a significant part of the tax burden of the acquisition. The result of the repeal of General Utilities will probably be fewer acquisitions, and certainly less stepping up of basis in acquisitions, than before. The cost of consistency, however, will be complex rules and continuing litigation over techniques devised by clever tax lawyers to jump the consistency fence. On grounds of policy, permitting the mirror transaction is a significant retreat from the premises of tax reform. The policies underlying corporate tax reform include making the law less dependent on form, making the tax consequences of transactions less dependent on the skill of the tax lawyer, and making elections more conscious. The mirror transaction, an election by form, is certainly inconsistent with these goals.

2. Choice of Business Entity

Taxpayers concerned with the form of their business organization will find that incorporation is a less favorable alternative after tax reform. Some commentators have gone so far as to predict, with considerable hyperbole, a “partnerization of the U.S.A.” Existing corporations will probably not dissolve into the partnership form, but new businesses will probably adopt the form of a partnership or an S corporation more often than in the past.

With the ordinary corporation tax rules becoming more burdensome, taxpayers forming business entities will find a higher tax cost for the limited liability advantages of incorporation. Limited liability is the major non-tax reason for incorporation, and limited liability is of great concern when the cost of liability insurance is increasing and liability coverage is sometimes not even available. If limited liability is not of concern to the investor, or if limited liability can be obtained by using a limited partnership or S corporation, organizers of new businesses will now have a much greater incentive to use pass-through entities than before the 1986 tax reform.

As a part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress changed several tax rules that previously encouraged incorporation. Corporations had a slightly

21Thompson, supra note 172, at 1124; Yin, supra note 134, at 1115-16.
22Faber, supra note 241, at 397. See also Sheppard, supra note 230, at 988.
24Salem, supra note 216, at 4-2.
25Gould, supra note 139, at 149.
26Id.
27S corporations and partnerships are pass-through entities, because their income and deduction items are not taxed at the entity level, but instead pass through, retaining their character, and are taxed at the level of the shareholder or partner. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 1366 (1986).
lower tax rate than individuals before tax reform, but the top corporate rates will be higher after tax reform. Before tax reform, accepted planning called for businesses that needed to accumulate income for reinvestment in operating assets to be C corporations because of the lower corporate tax rates. While there may still be income-splitting advantages for using a C corporation in very small corporations, in larger businesses it may be less expensive to use a pass-through entity and to distribute sufficient cash to the shareholders or partners to pay their taxes while accumulating the remaining income in the pass-through entity.

To avoid trapping appreciated property within the corporation, shareholders may also retain corporate assets in their own hands and lease them to the corporation rather than contributing them. This will have the helpful side effect of accumulating income at the shareholder, rather than the corporate, level. Unfortunately, leasing property to the corporation will probably have the effect of increasing audits, and perhaps litigation, of leasing transactions.

In addition, the greater expense of removing property from the corporate solution after the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine will act as a disincentive for incorporation, particularly since the double taxation of corporate distributions also applies to S corporations for ten years after the S election. The repeal of advantageous treatment for capital gains has made the effect of the repeal of General Utilities even more severe. Furthermore, in the absence of consistency rules, a corporation acquiring assets from a partnership will not have to recognize the gain in all the assets to acquire some of them.

250 I.R.C. § 11(b) (1985) provided for a top corporate rate of 46%, as compared with the top individual rate of 50%. I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (1985). In addition, the first $100,000 of corporate taxable income was taxed at lower rates. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (1985), which provided for a 15% rate on the first $25,000 of taxable income, 18% for the next $25,000 of taxable income, 30% for the next $25,000 of taxable income, and 40% for the last $25,000 of taxable income before $100,000.

251 I.R.C. § 1(a) (1986) provides for tax at 15% for the first $29,750 of taxable income and 28% above that for married couples filing jointly. In addition, there is a 5% surcharge above $71,900 of taxable income to phase out personal exemptions and the 15% rate. I.R.C. § 11(b) (1986) provides for a 15% rate on the first $50,000 of corporate taxable income, a 25% rate for the next $25,000 of corporate taxable income, and a 34% rate for all subsequent taxable income, with a 5% surcharge for taxable income above $100,000 to offset the corporate rates below 34%.


253 REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 178 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen).

254 Id.

255 Id.

256 Salem, supra note 215, at 4-28.


258 The highest tax rate, absent liability for the alternative minimum tax, for a shareholder receiving a distribution in liquidation of a corporation was 20%. If Congress had repealed the General Utilities doctrine but retained special treatment for capital gains, the highest possible tax rate on gains recognized on a capital asset at both levels would have been 42%. Gould, supra note 139, at 147. After tax reform, the tax rate on such gains will be 52.5%. Salem, supra note 215, at 4-5.

259 Id. at 4-25.
Finally, the partnership form particularly has gained some additional, ancillary tax advantages over the corporation, such as not being subject to the burdensome “book income” adjustment rules in the alternative minimum tax.260

Creating incentives for the formation of pass-through entities, especially partnerships, has disadvantages for the economy and for taxpayers. The rules for pass-through entities, and particularly the rules for partnerships, are complex and unfamiliar to many attorneys and tax advisers.261 Furthermore, investors in partnership interests are more subject to the new passive loss limitations than are investors in other entities.262 In addition, investments in partnerships are usually less marketable than investments in corporations.263 Therefore, the trend toward the creation of partnerships may result in a less liquid capital market and in less capital formation.264

Finally, the repeal of General Utilities and the other tax reforms that encourage the formation of partnerships may create more difficulty in an already troubled area, the definition of the corporation for tax purposes. The 1983 Report of the Senate Finance Committee staff included a provision that would have treated publicly traded master limited partnerships as corporations for tax purposes.265 The proposal was opposed by the Treasury Department266 and other commentators267 and was not included in the Tax Reform Act. Large scale shifting to the partnership form, however, could trigger re-examination of this proposal.

CONCLUSION

It may seem that this corporate tax revision was hastily conceived and harmful. In fact, in reviewing the consideration of the repeal of General Utilities, one comes to an opposite conclusion, that the proposal was carefully

260 I.R.C. of 1986, § 56(c)(1), (f), noted in Salem, supra note 215, at 4-25. Salem also states that partnerships avoid the new “Greenmail” and “Golden Parachute” rules. Id.
261 "The distressingly complex and confusing nature of the provisions of subchapter K [the partnership provisions] present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension of these provisions without the expenditure of a disproportionate amount of time and effort even by one who is sophisticated in tax matters with many years of experience in the tax field. . . . Surely a statute has not achieved 'simplicity' when its complex provisions may confidently be dealt with by at most only a comparatively small number of specialists who have been initiated into its mysteries." Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n. 9 (1964).
264 Id.
265 REFORM, supra note 14, at 7. One of the principle forces driving this proposal was that the proposed corporate tax changes, especially the repeal of General Utilities "would increase the disparity between the taxation of partnership and corporate profits and thereby provide incentives for conducting in partnership form many activities presently conducted by corporations." REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 63 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).
266 Id.
267 E.g., id. at 108 (statement of Willard B. Taylor for the New York State Bar Association); id. at 135 (statement of Donald Alexander).
conceived and long studied by those in the best position to know its effects.\footnote{As Senator Dole stated in 1983, “At least one commentator has characterized this project as embryonic. After 12 months of staff study and public discussion, preceded by a decade of professional discussion, if this project were embryonic, it would imply a longer gestation period for tax legislation than I have recently seen.” \textit{Reform of Corporate Taxation, supra} note 1, at 4 (statement of Sen. Dole).} One proponent, after describing the thousands of hours spent in study and the relatively small constituency for tax reform, feared that efforts at meaningful corporate tax reform might have been delayed for years had not something come of the current effort.\footnote{Id. at 138 (statement of Robert Jacobs). Mr. Jacobs expected that the effort would fail if the provisions were not enacted during the 98th Congress, but the wave of reform apparently survived until the 99th. For comments in a similar vein about the political difficulties of the reform of Subchapter C, see DeArment, \textit{Introductory Remarks on the Senate Finance Committee Staff’s Final Report on Subchapter C, the Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985}, 5 VA. TAX REV. 595, 595-96 (1985).} The repeal of the doctrine did close a loophole in Subchapter C and did achieve some measure of simplification.

The cost of simplification and reform, however, is high. The repeal of special treatment for capital gains, enacted at the same time as \textit{General Utilities} was repealed, was not so carefully considered, and the repeal of capital gains treatment aggravates almost every problem associated with the changes to the corporate liquidation rules. The repeal of \textit{General Utilities} will impose a severe tax burden on small business with only very limited relief available to those small corporations. It will also cause taxpayers to engage more frequently in corporate reorganizations and to organize partnerships rather than corporations. Unfortunately, the demands imposed upon taxpayers and their advisors by using the complex reorganization or partnership rules may more than offset the simplification benefits of the repeal of the \textit{General Utilities} doctrine.

In addition, Congress has left corporate taxation at what one Treasury Department official has called a “real crossroads.”\footnote{J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary of Treasury, Remarks at Ass’n. of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, \textit{reprinted in} Sheppard, \textit{Law School Conference Examines Tax Reform Policy}, 34 TAX NOTES 93, 94 (1987).} Difficult issues left unresolved by Tax Reform, such as the mirror transaction and the tax status of master limited partnerships, threaten the integrity of the corporate income tax.\footnote{Id.} Congress did not take the opportunity to rationalize the reorganization provisions, and so the problem of taxpayers in that area remains unrelieved. Also, Congress left the simplification of corporate liquidations incomplete by failing to repeal the collapsible corporation provisions and by failing to decide the fate of the consistency requirement in acquisitions.

In summary, the benefits of the repeal of the \textit{General Utilities} doctrine were probably oversold, particularly when considered in the context of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Incomplete tax reform with unexpected additions may have caused more problems than it solved. Without resolution of the issues of consistency of treatment of assets in corporate acquisitions (the mirror transaction problem), the tax status of master limited partnerships, revision of the cor-
porate reorganization provisions, and repeal of the provisions made obsolete by the repeal of the *General Utilities* doctrine, corporate tax reform will fail to accomplish much of its purpose.