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Characteristics of Salafi Jihadist Activists

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Abstract

This paper will compare and contrast the personal characteristics among individuals who were born in Middle Eastern countries and have committed violent acts of terror in the name of Salafi Jihadism against Western countries. First, a review of the current literature on the pre-conditions for Salafi-jihadist radicalization and activism in general will be conducted. Next, the study will focus on those issues most salient to the Middle East. This research will serve as a precursor for further study on ways to build a profile on at risk individuals for Salafi jihadist radicalization, recruitment, and activism.

Keywords: Islam, Jihad, Radicalization, Recruitment, Salafi jihadism, Middle East

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I. Introduction

The violence created by terrorism and political extremism has become ever more prevalent in the twentieth century and remains a serious threat to our future stability. Currently some of the strategies for combatting terrorism include targeted killings and responses to violence. Unfortunately these responsive policies do not eliminate the main cause of the movement and killing select leadership members only frees the position for another follower to take. The leadership group of a movement is important to identify but this is only one part of a multi-layered problem. Radicalization and recruitment are also a large part of the problem because they involve getting more individuals involved and supporting the movement. It is necessary to identify and isolate the common social, psychological, and societal characteristics and variables that surround individuals that have already engaged in violent attacks because they serve as a theme for the next generation of recruits. This information can be used to generate a profile of what not only recruits might look like, but also what risk factors lead to activism. The profile can then be used for future policy action to intervene in this radicalization process in hopes that it can stop the spread of the ideology. This argument relies on the fact that ideology can be a terrorist organization's greatest weapon but also its biggest disadvantage when there is a lack of support. Ideology has the ability to unite a large number of individuals with differing backgrounds under one larger cause. However, if people no longer need or support the ideology, then the movement cannot continue.

This paper is a study of data gathered from open source information regarding important characteristics of salafi jihadists. The search for the information was guided by hypotheses about who is likely to drawn to salafi jihadism that is informed by the literature

on the sources of salafi jihadist radicalization. The hypotheses guided the data collection, which was then used to assess the accuracy of the hypotheses.

This study will begin by explaining the history and goals behind the Salafi jihadist ideology to give an understanding of what it is that individuals are being recruited for. The goal of this study is to identify those social, psychological, and societal characteristics that have been common among previous activists. By doing so, it will suggest that there are common profile factors that could place a person more at risk for radicalization and potentially even recruitment. This study will be achieved through a thorough literature review and analysis of the available data as well as a quantitative analysis of one hundred previous Salafi jihadist activists that have engaged in terror attacks against the West.

II. Literature Review

The literature review will consist of several key components that explain the background of Salafi jihadism as an ideology. The following sections will be discussed: Definitions, Development of Salafi Jihadism, Methods of Radicalization, and Common Characteristics. This section will provide a sort of timeline for the evolution of the ideology coupled with analysis on current member characteristics that will be contrasted with the quantitative analysis in the below sections.

Definitions

In order to understand Salafi jihadism as an ideology, it is necessary to understand the path that it took to become what it is today. The Salafi ideology has roots as deep as several hundred years but it really came to the forefront in the twentieth century. This ideology is a path and a method that is used to search for religious truth and a desire to practice Islam exactly as the Prophet revealed it. There are several core concepts of Salafism that must be adhered to in order

to find religious truth. The first of these concepts is the *tawid* or belief that there can only be one God. Those following Salafism are required to have a strict adherence to this concept. Tawid includes three components and each of them is belief based. The first component is that the one God is the sole creator and sovereign of the universe (Wiktorowicz, 2006). The second component is that God is supreme and entirely unique. This means that God does not resemble humans or any other creations and does not share the same characteristics or powers (Wiktorowicz, 2006). The Qur'an mentions God as the supreme legislator and this power cannot be given to or utilized by humans. This is extremely important to salafis and explains their rejection of secularism and the separation of church and state because nothing can have supremacy over divine governance. The third component is that God alone has the right to be worshipped and no one else. The Qur'an and Sunna outline rules that govern every aspect of human belief and behavior and therefore play a large role in every action (Wiktorowicz, 2006). According to a strict adherence to this belief, any deviant behavior that does not meet the criteria set forth in these two documents is considered a submission to something other than God. This component is essential to understanding why salafis feel that actions outside these parameters are impure.

The second concept is related to innovation in the faith and is called *bida'*. This term is given to any belief or action that is not directly in line with the Qur'an or the Prophet (Wiktorowicz, 2006). These actions and beliefs then appear to be a threat to tawid because they do not strictly adhere to the rules set forth by God. Followers believe that the Qur'an and the Sunna reveal the true nature of Islam and how it should be practiced. This means that any deviation of the path to God and the faith is then considered to be wrong.

The final concept that must be considered is the idea that there should not be a separation

of Muslim students into different schools. They believe that there is only one correct interpretation of Islam and that it should be taught universally to all Muslim students. The term to describe the other schools teaching different interpretations of Islam is *taqlid*. The best way to explain this concept is when individuals blindly follow their leader without considering the sources of Islam directly (Wiktorowicz, 2006). This reinforces the belief of tawid and that there is only one God and only this God should be worshipped. Typically individuals that are guilty of taqlid have closely followed one individual and due to their admiration, seldom question their teachings of the faith. This allows for misinterpretations to occur and a deviation from what is believed to be true Islam.

There are many Salafi jihadist organizations currently operating in the Middle East. A few of the more notable groups are Al Qaeda, Jabhat al Nusra in Syria, ISIL/ISIS of Greater Syria, Mujahidin Shura Council of Iraq, and Ansar al Sunna in Iraq. Each of these organizations has left their mark in the history of the Middle East as a Salafi jihadist terrorist organization. These groups were established for varying reasons but all still subscribe to similar ideological principles. Their recruitment methods are slightly different as well because of the area they occupy and the resources that they have available. To show just how far these groups are capable of spreading their ideology, Appendix A shows a map of the outreach of Al Qaeda (The Economist, 2013). Even in 2013, there were a significant number of Salafi jihadist groups present in the Middle East and North Africa. These groups included Al Qaeda Core (AQC), Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Shabab, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These groups were able to establish networks and ground forces in sixteen different countries between the Middle East and North Africa and maintained their recruitment in each of these areas as well.

Development of Salafi Jihadism

In 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Salafi jihadis travelled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets because they believed the fight was a struggle between Communists and Muslims. These fighters were called Afghan Arabs and they believed the best method of violence was jihad, and they used this method not only to protect their lives, but also to protect their beliefs. In 1988, the Soviets began to leave Afghanistan, so the Afghan Arabs felt that they had defeated them with God's help. A chief proponent of this combination was Abdallah Azzam, who created the theory of global jihad. Azzam founded the Maktab al-Kidamat with the help of Usamah bin Laden during the Soviet invasion, which was an office for recruiting Arabs to fight in Afghanistan (Stemmann, 2006). He believed that oppression of Muslims was not limited to just the Middle East and that believers should fight every instance of this oppression. He also believed that all Muslims had a religious obligation to fight and those who didn't, supported the harmful practices and injustices against Muslims everywhere. He worked directly with Usamah bin Laden and the two worked to promote the global jihad ideology. Following Sayyid Qutb's work, they believed that the use of jihad was not only a moral obligation for all Muslims, but also the sixth pillar of the Islamic faith (Stemmann, 2006).

During the 1990s, the Salafi ideology was split into two different sections, reformists or academic Salafism, and fighting or jihadi Salafism (Stemmann, 2006). The academic Salafism was typically the work of spreading the ideology and growing the movement. The jihadi oriented Salafism involved the termination of the individuals that were causing the injustices against Muslims and had a strong emphasis on violence. At this time, the Gulf War prompted Saudi Arabia to allow U.S. troops onto their soil in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Stemmann, 2006). While the intentions were noble, it caused an internal imbalance in Saudi

Arabia and helped to radicalize a good majority of Wahhabi followers. This also helped to spread the Salafi jihadist ideology and the idea of global jihad to end the oppression of Muslims everywhere.

One of the most important figures in the development of the Salafi jihadist ideology was Sayyid Qutb. In order to understand his significance, it is necessary to look at his past experiences and influences. Qutb came from a poor family in the Nile Valley but was still able to obtain both a Western education and an Islamic education and upbringing (Ungureanu, 2010) (Stemmann, 2006). While he was growing up, he maintained an optimistic outlook for the ability to reconcile Western ideas and Islamic ideals. During this time, he supported a lot of different Western ideals such as science, technology, and rationalism; however, he did not believe that these concepts should ever cross Allah (Ungureanu, 2010). His appreciation of Western civilization was completely altered when he traveled to the United States in 1948 as a member of the Ministry of Education in Egypt (Ungureanu, 2010). His time in the United States made him realize that Americans were very out of touch with their faith and values and he believed that they did not act appropriately. This caused him to be very angry towards Western civilization and he feared its influence on the Muslim community as a whole.

When he returned to Egypt in 1951, he renounced his position with the Ministry of Education and joined the Muslim Brotherhood. It is at this time that he argues, "I was born in 1951" (Ungureanu, 2010). Qutb worked his way through the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood and became an integral part of its leadership and advisory boards. He however resigned from this position in 1952 because the group refused to establish an Islamic state (Ungureanu, 2010). In 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood was officially banned and a member of the group attempted to assassinate President Gamal Abd'el Nasser (Ungureanu, 2010). After this time, a lot of members

became imprisoned, including Qutb. During his time in prison, he began writing a lot and was actually able to get some of his work published. The most significant piece of his writing related to the Salafi jihadist ideology was entitled *Ma'alimfi'l-Tari*, which translates to “Milestones on the road” (Ungureanu, 2010). This writing was a sort of call to arms in that, “Qutb argues that all contemporary societies returned to state of *jahiliyya* or pre-Islamic ignorance, in which authority and primacy of God have been replaced by other sources of authority, justifying this way the launch of jihad” (Ungureanu, 2010). He used the Salafist interpretation of the Koran as a sort of playbook for revolution and used jihad as the method of enforcement. He argued that his experience in America allowed him to see that Western civilizations were the true source of evil and that they must be destroyed in order for the true Islam to reign. His writing served as a resource for individuals still questioning their faith and wanting to understand Islam’s true purpose.

Methods of Radicalization

According to Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND Corporation, there is a clear distinction between radicalization and recruitment. “Radicalization comprises internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of one’s conviction. It is the mental prerequisite to recruitment” (Jenkins, 2007). This definition seems to suggest that the radicalization process is something that the individual controls and experiences on their own. In a way this statement is accurate because individual recruits need to process the ideology before seeking the training. If they do not understand the ideology itself and what it aims to achieve, they will not voluntarily engage in jihad. In addition to this, individuals must have the necessary characteristics, needs, and wants that are satisfied by the ideology. This means that the individual must have unique reasons for joining the group and

have an idea of what benefits they expect to gain from joining the organization. Jenkins phrases this radicalization process as a prerequisite to recruitment appropriately because one must have the desire to participate before they can train.

Recruitment on the other hand involves, “turning others or transforming oneself into a weapon of jihad. It means joining a terrorist organization or bonding with like-minded individuals to form an autonomous terrorist cell” (Jenkins, 2007). This definition suggests that recruitment is more of the formal joining process that allows one to hone in on their personal skills and determine what they can physically do to enforce the main principles of the ideology and achieve the goals of the group. The recruiters spread a message of honor, dignity, and religious duty that proves to be extremely attractive to potential radicals. For example, Al Qaeda’s brand offers an uncomplicated solution to individuals looking for adventure, camaraderie, a noble cause, a sense of direction and meaning, a better life, and an outlet for aggression (Jenkins, 2007).

The recruitment process involves a series of lessons that attempts to educate individuals in a way that fulfills their needs. If an individual is seeking purpose or meaning in their life, the lessons will be focused on being part of a larger picture and fighting for a common goal. Sometimes these lessons are catered to the individual recruit if they are showing promise or characteristics that would benefit the organization as a whole. This type of education can take place in a variety of places including colleges, universities, mosques, churches, temples, and even prisons (Forest, 2005). The recruitment process is a gradual one, it can take anywhere from a few months to several years to complete the training and education necessary to assure commitment from a new radical (Jenkins, 2007).

There are many methods used to increase the exposure of a particular group when it

comes to finding recruits. They use a variety of media to broadcast their messages and often times rely on word of mouth as well. The media forms most heavily relied on are social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook, online chat rooms, blogs, newspapers, brochures, and journals. With the increased use of technology, recruits can be found a lot easier and even provided additional informational materials in a matter of minutes.

Common Characteristics

Terrorists are surprisingly very selective when it comes to choosing the right recruits to join their ranks in the organization. Despite the stereotype of terrorists being “wild-eyed fanatics,” organizations typically stay away from this set of characteristics because such individuals bring a level of unpredictability and unreliability (Forest, 2005). These characteristics could pose a serious risk to a group’s security and objectives as the recruit could challenge or expose the organization at any given time. For this reason, very outgoing individuals are kept under watch during the training process and are often weeded out because of their forward behavior.

Several characteristics appear to be relatively common among current salafi jihadists, recruits, and other followers. These characteristics can be broken up into the following categories: education, religion, family life, psychological characteristics, physical characteristics, and geographic location. Each of these categories has appeared in the current literature and some have been presented as common themes among personal characteristics.

Education

Ideological indoctrination through education is not just limited to universities and colleges, but it is also done through what is referred to as *madrasas* and *pasantren*. These are Muslim boarding schools that specialize in training young men the teachings of the Koran. This

form of education teaches young individuals about the extremist ideology as well as provides methods of training in jihad. Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Peter W. Singer, found that “there are as many as 45,000 such schools within Pakistan (the exact number has never been determined), ranging in size from a few students to several thousands” (Singer, 2001). In addition to this, Singer found that between 10-15 percent of Pakistan’s madrasas was affiliated with extremist religious/political groups (Singer, 2001). The curriculum for these institutions includes a study of Arabic and Islam that requires students to not only memorize the Koran, but also develop a commitment to a strict interpretation of what it means. The most extreme cases of this style of teaching include a commitment to fighting a jihad against the enemies of Islam (Forest, 2005).

Religion

The Salafi jihadist ideology is structured on the belief that Islam is not being practiced, as it should, and that those who practice it improperly, should be corrected and punished. They create a sort of religious obligation and call to action for all true followers of the religion. They believe in an all or nothing structure that forces compliance or destruction in the form of jihad.

Recruitment can occur and be increased in mosques because of this religious testament to their ideology. Leaders of this movement are usually able to identify particularly devout Muslims in mosques and slowly advocate for their adherence to their strict interpretation of Islam. They look for those individuals that are not just going to Friday prayers, but those that are also praying five times a day, every day (Forest, 2005). The current members and recruiters will target these individuals to work to develop their motivation for violence to achieve change in the society as a whole. Not all mosques are used for indoctrination but there have been a significant number of them used to spread messages of hatred and violence.

Family Life

Recent observations have concluded that some terrorists come from “broken” homes where the father figure is either not present, estranged, or politically or economically impotent (Stahelski, 2004). While this has been characterized for a variety of terrorist groups, it is still particularly prevalent in individuals that have pursued membership in a salafi jihadist organization. The recruit is usually attracted to the charismatic leader because potentially this is their first instance of encouragement. These recruits are drawn to this social experience because it has been missing from their personal life and they feel that they need and deserve this social affiliation and encouragement (Stahelski, 2004). Not only can this be seen as a membership benefit, it also appears as a necessity for success and fulfillment, especially recruits that are lacking a strong family structure.

It has been seen that individuals that join such groups often have trouble fitting in and forming consistent group identities outside of the home, school, or workplace (Stahelski, 2004). Due to this social ineptitude, individuals are unable to integrate into the society and have a feeling of being alone or insignificant compared to those that do fit in. This is often called a feeling of anomie, where an individual feels that they are not part of a society and that they just do not belong. This feeling can cause individuals to seek easy routes of group formation that allow them to join despite certain social or economic standings.

Psychological Characteristics

It is important to understand that these recruits are not forced into this lifestyle and are more than likely brought to the recruitment stage by personal choice. After being seduced by the charismatic leadership of a group, the recruit will begin to immediately obey the strict rules and guidelines set forth by that leader. This obedience is established from the very beginning as a

norm for group membership and benefits. Current members of the group help to guide the recruits by pressuring them to commit to the group's mission and goals. They are reassured that the benefits of the group membership can only be attained through strict adherence to the guiding principles spelled out by the leadership. Excited recruits willingly adhere to this structure and become even more vulnerable to what psychologist Anthony Stahelski calls the "five-stage social psychological conditioning process" (Stahelski, 2004). This process is often used to explain the formation of a cult ideology but can also explain the adaption of a salafi jihadist ideology because it requires a strict adherence to leadership and a general cause. The process is summarized in Appendix B.

The first goal of this process is to eliminate the recruit's original social and personal identity and then construct a new one based on the principals of the ideology. In this case, the leadership of the group will lead recruits to believe that their past version of themselves will not have to hold them back any longer and that they can be a new person with the group. They allow them to believe that they will be able to make real change and be part of something greater than what they could have ever been on their own. By doing this, they successfully pressure recruits to abandon their original ideology and personal opinions and adopt the group's mission and goals. The recruit will begin to see the goals of the group as their own and take issues to be personally offensive if they are against that new ideology. This is where the willingness to kill comes in and the use of jihad to achieve goals becomes easier to understand.

Research has suggested that there is a fundamental importance of perceived deprivation among individuals that pursue violence as a means to generate change (Moghaddam, 2005). This deprivation can range from a personal feeling of being deprived because of an individual's position within a group, to a much larger picture where a group is seen as subpar to another

group. The former is particularly significant in Salafi jihadist recruits because these individuals feel that they do not have an important role to play in their society. This feeling can be generated by a number of factors such as economic standing, social status, education, family structure, and authority. No matter what the reason may be, the individual feels like they are being deprived of a particular status in the society that they live in and are often angered by this isolation and comparison.

The latter form of deprivation on a group level is often explained by a disdain for the Western culture. This is something that was reinforced with Sayyid Qutb after his trip to the United States and his immediate attachment to the Muslim Brotherhood. When a group is seen as superior to another or more generally is just vastly different from another culture, the perceived inferior group will backlash. This backlash against Western culture has increased over time and essentially established an enemy. Targeted attacks on Western culture can be seen as a way to prevent the injustices against Islam as a religion and its followers.

Individuals that perceive that they have no ability to mobilize their concerns are also drawn to this ideology. When a recruit feels that their opinions and needs are not being addressed, they want to take it into their own hands and take what they believe is rightfully theirs. However, in the Middle East and North Africa, the democratic options for voicing one's opinion are relatively miniscule (Moghaddam, 2005). Without the ability to have options for one's own voice to be heard, mobility of that opinion, and substantial response, individuals feel that they are being cheated out of their fundamental rights. These qualities as well as the option of a participatory democracy are particularly lacking in areas such as Saudi Arabia. This country just happens to have a strong reputation for breeding some of the most influential terrorist networks currently active today (Moghaddam, 2005).

Physical Characteristics

Individuals that are either targeted or self educated on radicalization tend to be in their early 20s to early 30s in age range (Taylor & Louis, 2004). This age range is significant for not only physical purposes but ideological ones as well. At that early of an age, individuals typically have not yet adopted a firm ideology of what the world is and what their place is in it. When targeted at this age, they are more vulnerable to an influence because they are still trying to figure out their purpose and goals in life. When confronted during this critical time, recruits will often feel compelled to joining such groups that will help them understand their world around them. The group not only aids in providing support, but they also give the recruit achievable goals and structure, which they may not have already encountered. At this age, some recruits may just be graduating from school and during their education; they have increased their desire to challenge their environment and superiors. This may not necessarily be a negative assessment on their education but they may now have a better understanding on how society functions and they want to change this to fit their needs better. The desire to establish real social and political change is another area that individuals are targeted because the Salafi jihadist ideology provides a means for achieving this change, through jihad.

Young individuals are often future oriented and anxious to move on to the next chapter of their lives. The problem with this is, as noted above, they don't typically have direction and guidance in which to further their exploration of the self. It has been noted that, "these ambitious young people are the prime candidates not only to engage in, but also to organize and lead terrorist activities" (Taylor & Louis, 2004).

In addition to this, recruits are often appealing at this age because they are fit to fight. It is necessary for the recruits to be able to physically withstand the rigorous activities that the group

engages in and not just get hurt or fall out. According to Austin T. Turk, Department of Sociology Professor at The University of California, “initiating and committing terrorist attacks is nearly always the work of radicalized younger persons with the intellectual and financial resources, and the ideological drive, to justify (at least to themselves) and enable adopting the violence option” (Turk, 2004).

Geographic Location

This study focuses on individuals that are being recruited in Middle Eastern countries and therefore has a broad range of possible targets. Each organization has a different set of criteria that they use for recruiting individuals to their cause but none of them have appeared to denote specific types of locations that are targeted. However, one area that has appeared several times to produce Salafi Jihadist recruits is refugee camps. In these locations, youths are either capable of relocating due to their families resources or they are left in the camps to fend for themselves. Often times these individuals are forced into less than optimal areas with little resources at their disposal to live on. The emotional and physical ramifications of refugee life can take a serious toll on young individuals. When faced with this hopelessness young refugees, “may find attractive a terrorist organization’s offer of a very well defined collective identity that offers a clearly defined route for improving conditions for the individual and the group as a whole” (Taylor & Louis, 2004).

The radicalization and recruitment of followers of the Salafi jihadist ideology can take place anywhere that people gather, either online or in person. There is no set origin that has been seen as common for individuals that have joined such organizations. The ideology has no borders and is able to penetrate into most societies with ease in the Middle Eastern countries. If the access is not directly physical, recruits can still be contacted through the Internet. However, there

have been several educational facilities that have produced significant numbers of radicals pursuing this ideology. Some of these institutions include: Adbul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia, and the Abu Bakar Islamic University in Pakistan (Forest, 2005). Both of these educational facilities have earned a reputation for indoctrinating individuals as potential recruits for Islamic extremist organizations.

III. Hypotheses and Model

The following research design is focused on a quantitative analysis of one hundred individuals that are from the Middle East and have engaged in violent acts against the West in the name of Salafi jihadism. The research will expose the similarities and differences in order to determine whether there are notable characteristics that are the same in individuals that have been radicalized and are following the jihad of the sword, actively participating in violent attacks. While this will not be a complete profile of characteristics, it will provide analysis on each of the similarities and the significance of these to the radicalization process. I expect to find several similarities among the categories of age, gender, religion, and education. . I will first explain my hypotheses and then move in to explain the model and design that I created.

I will investigate the following hypotheses:

- a. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are between the ages of 18-29.
- b. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are male.
- c. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism have pursued higher education post high school.

- d. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are self-radicalized and not influenced.
- e. Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism have social networks that include all of the following: salafi family, salafi friends, salafi mentor.

For this study, my dependent variable will be individuals that are born in the Middle East and commit terror attacks in the name of Salafi Jihadism against the West. My independent variables will fall into several categories including: Age, Gender, Education, Radicalization Method, Recruitment, Affiliation, and Social Networks. Education will be evaluated for higher level, post high school education. Recruitment methods will be used to determine self-motivated practices or characteristics that were sought out by recruiters. Social networks encompass the following identifiers: having salafi family members, having salafi friends, and having salafi mentors.

IV. Research Design

In order to determine the similar characteristics and the probability of the above hypotheses, the research will consist of a review of the current scholarly literature as well as a quantitative analysis of 100 of the most recent terror attacks, focusing on the individuals involved and not the collective unit. Focusing on the individuals will allow for specific characteristics to be gathered but exposes the reality that not every individual can be studied with open source data because they are not named or known. The study will look at recent events and capture the following information for each attacker: Name, Age, Gender, Country of Origin, Current Location, Attacks on the Community/Friends/Family/Job-if yes, by who and why, Religious Affiliation & Degree of Practice, Family Structure, Family Religious Affiliation &

Degree of Practice, Salafi Family, Salafi Friends, Salafi Mentor, Education Type & Location, Attack Type, and Attack Location, Affiliation to Known Salafi Jihadist Group, Duration of Membership to Group Prior to the Attack, Recruiting Others.

Each of these variables will be measured differently according to the data that is available. The first independent variable of age will be assessed using a scale of 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69. Gender will be identified by male, female, or other. Religious affiliation will be identified very broadly because of the limitations of open source information. The labels that will be used include: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Education will be given a rating to determine whether or not the individual obtained any form of higher education above the high school level. This will include all coursework and not just individuals that graduated with a higher degree. The responses for education will be recorded as either Yes, No, or N/A. Radicalization method and recruitment will be given a response of Influenced, Self Radicalized or N/A. Affiliation will be given a response of Yes, No, or N/A and will also have the option of naming the salafi jihadist organization that they are affiliated to. Social networks will be broken down into the following categories: salafi family, salafi friends, salafi mentors. Each of these will receive a response of Yes, No, or N/A.

For this part of the study, the data will be measured by a quantitative approach that generates numbers and figures to represent the presence and significance of personal characteristics and attributes. This is the best approach for this study because it allows for a count of the individual characteristics of individuals that were known to have caused attacks in the name of salafi jihadism. By using data from individuals that have already engaged in violence, it is possible to determine similarities and establish potential risk factors. This count is

necessary to build a profile of what characteristics could make an individual more likely to engage in an attack or become affiliated to a salafi jihadist terrorist organization.

This study will involve collecting data from various online resources and websites in order to create a pool of data. This data from the online research of 100 individuals will be manually entered into an excel database and a statistical analysis will be conducted upon completion. This method is the most appropriate because the current literature does not have this type of refined information available. There is currently no way of pooling all of these individual characteristics together automatically to form analysis from open source data. It is possible that some of this data is kept in different formats at a classified clearance level but for this study, that is unavailable. A variety of online resources will be used for this study varying from general search engines to federal government profile sites. The dataset consists of 100 individuals that were searched in a variety of online search engines. This data is organized in an excel database and graphic representations of the data were created to be used in this paper.

There are very clear limitations on the way this search is conducted because there is not a lot of information publically available. This is particularly true of some of the independent variables associated with this study. It is somewhat difficult to find personal information and social network information on lower level terrorists. Specifically finding information related to friends, family, and mentors is not always feasible. In addition to the variable information, there is not really a set list of individuals that committed violent acts in the name of salafi jihadism to base the analysis on. When conducting my search, I started with a list found online at markhumphrys.com of attacks conducted by individuals of Middle Eastern descent against Western countries. This list is a compilation and up-to-date listing of terror attacks conducted by individuals of Middle East descent against the West that have occurred during the following time

periods: Obama Administration (2008-2015), Bush Administration (2000-2008), Clinton Administration (1992-2000), Bush Senior Administration (1988-1992), Reagan Administration (1980-1988), and the first wave (1968-1980). This list can be found in Appendix C. Each attack listed is linked to a Google search for the event that provides multiple hits in the form of news articles, Wikipedia pages, case studies, and government accounts of each incident. I searched each event on multiple sites to gather appropriate and accurate accounts of each individual searched. If information was inconsistent among websites, I did not use that individual for the data. Occasionally these events also alluded to related events that occurred during the same timeframe and those were searched and added as well.

V. Summary of Research


The following information is organized by variable and category in which I researched. Each section explains the recording methods and the statistics that were gathered from the study as well as some brief conclusions that can be drawn from each data set. Most of the sections include graphic representations and figures to represent the data a little more clearly. The full dataset will not be attached to this paper because it is too large to fit.

Age

There were only five individuals researched in this study that did not have an accurate age or date of birth available in the open source data. This means that ninety-five of the individuals that were profiled had accurate or approximate ages listed on two or more online resources. Of the data that was compiled, it was found that 48% of the individuals were between the ages of 18-29, 19% were between the ages of 30-39, 13% were between the ages of 40-49, 17% were between the ages of 50-59, and 3% were between the ages of 50-59. This data includes individuals that were killed during their acts of violence, killed by other means, or are

still in custody. Due to the fact that some individuals are still in custody, it provides for a few outliers in the data and for higher ages to be represented. The graphic representation in Figure 1 shows that there are a significant number of younger individuals involved with violence and terrorist attacks. The important part to notice is how evenly distributed the ages are in the 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59 age ranges. This is something that was not expected prior to the research as the current literature assumes most recruits and affiliates are between the ages of 18-29. While most of the data supported this claim, it appears that there are still a significant number of individuals between 30-39 and 50-59.

Figure 1: Age Range Percentages of Previous Salafi Jihadist Activists



There were forty-four individuals represented in the data that were between the ages of 18-29 and this accounted for 48% of the total. Of those forty-four individuals twenty-five are deceased, eighteen are currently in custody, and there was one individual that had an unknown status.

Between the ages of 30-39, there were eighteen individuals represented in this study and this accounted for 19% of the total. Of those eighteen, nine are deceased, seven are in custody, and two had an unknown status.

There were thirteen individuals between the ages of 40-49 that represented 13% of the data. Of those thirteen, five are deceased, five are in custody, and three individuals have an unknown status.

Between the ages of 50-59, there were sixteen individuals identified and this represents 17% of the total. Of those sixteen individuals, four are deceased, nine are in custody, and three individuals have an unknown status.


There were nine individuals between the ages of 60-69 that represented 3% of the total data collected. Of those nine, one is deceased, four are currently in custody, and four individuals have an unknown current status.

Gender

Of the one hundred individuals that were profiled, ninety-nine were male and only one was female. There is a very clear historical precedent of males engaging in terror attacks in the name of salafi jihadism. This is highlighted in the literature review at the beginning of the paper.


Religion

When reviewing the religious affiliation of the profiled individuals, I did not label the specific forms of religion and left the categories very broad. This is because a lot of the data was unavailable for most of the individuals that I researched. Out of the one hundred, ninety-three of the individuals had a religious affiliation to Islam, one individual had a religious affiliation to Christianity, and six individuals were not identified in open source data. In Figure 2 it shows just how overwhelming the results were for a religious affiliation with Islam.

Figure 2: Religious Affiliation of Salafi Jihadist Activists

Education

When evaluating the factor of higher education, this study focused on all coursework after high school. This takes into account religious or academic work that may or may not have led to a higher degree. It was difficult to track the completion of some of the degrees so it had to be labeled this way. When looking at the graphic representation of the data in Figure 3, 49% of the individuals profiled had some form of higher education. This percentage represents forty-eight out of the one hundred total. Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the open source data there were 26 individuals that could not be determined whether or not they engaged in higher education or even high school or primary school. This amount is significant to not have available in the study and the results could have been very different if this were available. The research also found that 25% or 25 individuals did not pursue higher education after graduation of high school or primary school. While this data has limitations, it does support the current literature that shows recruits and affiliates as having higher education more frequently than not.

Figure 3: Frequency of Higher Education Among Salafi Jihadist Activists***Radicalization Method***


When looking at the radicalization methods among the profiled individuals, the results were filtered into three categories: Self Radicalized, Face to Face Influenced, and Not Available. The research found that thirty-six out of the one hundred individuals claimed to be self radicalized and sought the ideology. Out of the total amount, forty-four individuals were face to face influenced into the ideology. These results include influence from a mentor, family member, or friend. The study found that eighteen of the individuals did not have publicly available information on their form of radicalization.

When looking at the radicalization method I found it important to also look at the criminal record of each individual. There were too many different types of crimes committed by the profiled individuals to refine them any further than a positive or negative response. There were thirty-four individuals that had no criminal record, twenty-seven individuals that had an unknown criminal record, and thirty-six individuals that had a known criminal record. The

numbers between the positive and negative results of this study are very close and therefore are not a very good measure of criminal history. In addition to this, the number of unknown cases is very high as well and creates a great deal of error in the data.

Despite the close numbers and high margin for error in the criminal history study, when crossed with the radicalization method, things start to get interesting. Out of the thirty-four individuals that had no criminal record, sixteen of those were influenced and thirteen were self-radicalized. With the high rates of radicalization in prisons that are noted in the above literature review, this is a negative result. Out of the thirty-six individuals that had a criminal record, eighteen of those were influenced and fourteen were self-radicalized. This result aligns more closely with the prison radicalization data from the literature review above. The graphic representation of this data in Figure 4 shows the disparities while including the error margins from information that was not available.

Figure 4: Radicalization Method vs. Criminal History of Salafi Jihadist Activists




Recruitment

When evaluating whether or not individuals were recruited into the salafi jihadist ideology or into a specific terrorist group, the responses were reported as Yes, No, or N/A. Out

of the one hundred individuals that were profiled, 41% were reported to have been sought out and recruited, 38% were not recruited, and 21% did not have recruitment information available. The results of this study indicate that a significant portion of individuals involved with the salafi jihadist ideology or a specific salafi jihadist terrorist group, were recruited. While the individuals that sought out the organization themselves are still important to mitigate, it is more difficult to identify and isolate them in the general public. Figure 5 below shows that the majority of individuals were recruited but also emphasizes that a significant number of individuals were not recruited as well.

Figure 5: Recruitment of Salafi Jihadist Activists




Since the majority in this study was recruited, this indicates a possibility of finding recruiters and potentially intervening the process from there instead of just seeking the individuals at risk. Another possibility that this poses is that once a profile of at risk individuals is developed, a population assessment or local profiling can be done in order to find groups of individuals with these characteristics. Once found, isolating a common friend or mentor will most likely allow for identification of the recruiter.

Affiliation

Another crucial part of this study was determining whether or not individuals were recruited into a known terrorist group. The responses for this factor were coded as either Yes, No, or N/A. Out of the one hundred that were profiled, sixty-one were affiliated with a specific salafi jihadist organization, twenty-four did not claim to be affiliated, and fourteen of the individuals did not have the information publically available. The graph in Figure 6 shows the breakdown of the data from the profile. The majority of the individuals profiled were not lone wolves and appeared to have a connection to a larger network. A larger network means more resources, training, and leadership that potentially allows for more successful attacks.

Figure 6: Terrorist Group Affiliation of Salafi Jihadist Activists




In addition to finding out whether or not individuals were affiliated with a group, it was also important to try to determine which group they were affiliated with. Figure 7 shows the varying organizations that were found in this study. Al Qaeda (AQ) represented the majority measured at 84% of individuals that claimed to be affiliated. The different branches of AQ were

not mentioned here because a lot of the publications just indicated AQ and to include some and not all would reflect inaccurate information.

Out of the one hundred individuals, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) represented 11%. This group has gone by many names over time but during the attacks by the individuals in this study, it was referred to as ISIS. This may seem like a shockingly low number based on the great number of violent attacks broadcasted in the news. The reason that this number is so low is because the profile only measures attacks against the West and does not include attacks within the Middle East and against Middle Eastern people.

Figure 7: Known Group Affiliations of Salafi Jihadist Activists




The other two groups that were represented in this study were Ansar Dine and Jaish-e-Mohammed. The reason that more individuals did not represent these groups is because of their geographic location and agendas. For example, Ansar Dine is a local salafi jihadist organization in Mali. This group has been suspected to have ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but it cannot be verified. The other group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, is located primarily in

Pakistan but carries out operation in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Both of these groups typically do not conduct operations in the West and have a more centralized conflict to their home base location.

Social Networks

When researching social networks the following factors were considered: having a salafi family, having salafi friends, and having a salafi mentor. During the research it was quite difficult to determine whether or not an individual had family members let alone determine whether or not they believed in the salafi ideology as well. The factor of salafi family resulted in nine individuals with salafi family members, twenty individuals without family members at all or without salafi origins, and seventy-one individuals with unknown salafi family descent. Salafi family members are not a good factor for creating a profile of at risk individuals mainly because the data is just not available. Figure 8 shows the disparities among the factors for social networks.

Figure 8: Social Networks of Salafi Jihadist Activists




The next factor that was researched is having salafi friends. The results for this indicated that fifty-one individuals associated closely with other salafi followers. Thirty-seven individuals did not have any salafi friends and twelve individuals did not have this information publically

available. The reason that this was somewhat easier to find is because a lot of the individuals worked alongside others when conducting attacks or were recruited into a salafi jihadist group and had associates within the group. This appears to be a good way to target recruiters and other at risk individuals but may not be as easy since it would be prior to the attacks and publications. Instead of using news articles, it may be possible to use social media to track and target these individuals. One would have to look for certain buzzwords using social media search engines and then target individuals from there. While this information is easily accessible to the public, this begs the question of where the boundaries for online search extend to and where regulations prevent privacy infringements.

The final factor in this category is that of having a salafi mentor. Out of the one hundred profiles, fifty-three individuals had a salafi mentor. Having a salafi mentor was easy to access because the event had already taken place and the profiles and publications had already done the research and had it easily accessible. For targeting or profiling purposes in the future, one way to determine this is to establish a set of at risk characteristics, identify at risk groups, find a common associate that doesn't quite fit the group's profile, target the friend or mentor for surveillance. Unfortunately is a very long process and involves a lot of profiling and guessing so it may not be the best option, but it is worth trying to mitigate recruitment.

Figure 9 shows the relationship between having both salafi friends and a salafi mentor and whether or not an individual was recruited. The graph shows that 67% of individuals that had both salafi friends and a salafi mentor were recruited. Individuals that had both factors and were not recruited represented 14% of the total and those with information not available represented 19% of the total.

Figure 9: Salafi Friends & Mentor vs. Recruitment

VI. Conclusion & Discussion

During the course of my study I have come across some inaccuracies in my original hypotheses but also some of them have been further validated. For each of my hypotheses, I will discuss whether or not they were supported and what conclusions can be drawn from the results of my research on each variable.

One of the most important factors that were determined in this study was country of origin and ethnicity. The intent of the study was to look at individuals that originated from the Middle East and conducted attacks on the West but the data that was gathered also included a few outliers. Appendix D shows a table of the different countries of origin for the one hundred individuals that were studied. There were only fourteen individuals that did not have information available for their country of origin. There were seventeen individuals from Saudi Arabia, nine from the United Kingdom, seven from Egypt, five from Afghanistan, and four from Pakistan. Smaller numbers were represented from the following countries: United States, Lebanon, Mali, Palestine, Syria, Canada, Yemen, Jamaica, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, Nigeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Ethiopia, France, Iran, Denmark, India, and Mauritania. It

was surprising to find that there were quite a few individuals from the United States but their families either had origins in the Middle East or they were converts.

In Appendix E, the table shows the different ethnicities of the one hundred individuals that were researched in the study. The responses were very generalized because of the limitations on open source data and that which was available. Out of the one hundred studied, sixty individuals were Arab. There were twenty-eight individuals that their ethnicity could not be determined based on initial search. The remaining ethnicities were represented in smaller numbers by the following: Asian, Chechen-Avar, Egyptian, Pashtun, Afghan American, Albanian, and Iraqi. The majority of these individuals studied were Arabs and this is partly because of the language capabilities and method of transferring the group's messages. If the messages are provided in Arabic, an Arabic speaking and reading audience is most likely to be engaged.

My first hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are between the ages of 18-29. This hypothesis was supported by my results by was by a narrow margin. Not all individuals are between this age range, but 48% of the data was represented here. When combining the information gathered from the literature review and the data found during the research, it appears that a significant number of individuals are getting involved at a younger age and are starting their path earlier. While this is a good conclusion to draw from this data, I think that a better way to describe the ages is that they are starting younger but do not seem to phase out until the 50s age range. This could be because these individuals are incarcerated but that is not the key take away. If targeting at risk individuals is the goal, looking to the age range of 18-29 is going to be the best range to start at.

My second hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror

attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are male. This hypothesis was supported by the results of the study. Ninety-nine males were present in this research and only one female. While this could have been different if the information was more publically available, the current literature seems to indicate that males are more likely to be engaging in violent attacks of jihad than females.

My third hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism have pursued higher education post high school. While this research appears to support this hypothesis by having 49% of the data indicate higher education, there were still a lot of unknown responses to consider. Twenty-six percent of the data was represented by unavailable information and that is cause for concern when making accurate conclusions. While I feel that individuals are starting to join during or after their engagement with higher education, more research needs to be done to determine the validity of this argument.

My fourth hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism are self-radicalized and not influenced. This hypothesis was not really supported or refuted by the data from the study. It showed that forty-four individuals were influenced while only thirty-six appeared to be self-radicalized. This result could have occurred because I evaluated individuals that have already conducted attacks. Most of the data came from affiliated individuals that work with larger terrorist organizations and not just on their own. Typically attacks carried about by known terrorist organizations are easier to find in open source media documents so they are presented more in this research. This could be the reason why the data indicated a slightly higher number of individuals being influenced as opposed to self-radicalized. In addition to this, it would be interesting to assess the number of individuals that are influenced in jails and prisons and see how that would have an impact on the

results.

My fifth hypothesis was: Individuals from the Middle East who engage in terror attacks against the West in the name of salafi jihadism have social networks that include all of the following: salafi family, salafi friends, salafi mentor. This hypothesis was partially refuted in that some of these factors played a key role but one of them did not. This is most likely due to the lack of information regarding the factor of Salafi family. If this information was available the results could have been different. The two factors of Salafi friends and Salafi mentors seemed to play a large role in the profile. Just over half of the data indicated the presence of Salafi friends and Salafi mentors among individuals that have already engaged in attacks. In addition to this, sixty-seven percent of the individuals that had Salafi friends and a Salafi mentor were actually recruited into a known terrorist organization. This appears to be a clear indication that having Salafi friends and mentors is a common characteristic and social network for Salafi jihadist followers.

There are several potential objections that one might raise about the research I have conducted and they all involve the amount of data available. The first objection that might be raised is whether or not conclusions can be drawn from the data when a significant amount of the information I collected was not available for all subjects in the study. While this is accurate, this is the first time this kind of database has been constructed and further research would need to be conducted to gather more subjects and information. In addition to this, open source data is limited to what it can offer for this type of personal information. Another objection that could be raised is whether or not these conclusions are cause for action or whether they should just add to the literature base. I suggest that this study exists as a launching point for further research on the common characteristics of salafi jihadist recruits, members, and fighters. While my study

consisted of those that have already engaged, it is necessary to profile those that are being recruited in order to intervene in the process. Intervention in this process will be necessary to cut off the supply to these groups.

It is necessary to conduct and analyze more specific research on Salafi jihadist groups and their individual recruiting processes in order to understand the nuances of this form of terrorism. These preconditions can be used to establish a profile for what potential radicals and recruits would be like for Salafi jihadist groups. Psychologist Anthony Stahelski understands the significance of establishing such a profile when he comments, “Counterterrorism efforts would be enhanced if likely terrorist candidates could be preemptively identified on a precise individual basis” (Stahelski, 2004). It is unlikely that we can identify each individual as a potential target, but identifying the characteristics of past radicals and recruits will allow for an intervention in the process when such conditions appear in a community.

The next step would be to analyze this data to establish a profile to look for in at risk communities. Once the profile is established, research needs to be conducted on the possible intervention methods or social programs that could be put into place to prevent such radicalization from occurring in the first place.

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Appendix A

This map shows the outreach and settlement of Al Qaeda, affiliates, and fellow Salafi jihadist followers across the Middle East and North Africa (The Economist, 2013).



Appendix B

This figure shows the different phases of social psychological conditioning.

Figure 1: The Five Phases of Social Psychological Conditioning

Phase 1—Depluralization: stripping away all other group member identities

Phase 2—Self-deindividuation: stripping away each member's personal identity

Phase 3—Other-deindividuation: stripping away the personal identities of enemies

Phase 4—Dehumanization: identifying enemies as subhuman or nonhuman

Phase 5—Demonization: identifying enemies as evil

Appendix C

List of Islamic terror attacks against the West displayed on the website markhumphrys.com. This list was used as a starting point for the database created in the above study.

First wave (1968 to 1980):

1. Many countries - [Palestinian terror](#) 1968 on.
2. USA - [RFK assassination](#) 1968.
3. Italy - [El Al Flight 426](#) 1968.
4. Greece - [El Al Flight 253](#) 1968.
5. Switzerland - [El Al Flight 432](#) 1969.
6. Germany - [Frankfurt](#) 1969.
7. UK - [Marks and Spencer](#) 1969.
8. Italy - [TWA Flight 840](#) 1969.
9. UK - [Zim shipping](#) 1969.
10. Belgium - [El Al, Brussels](#) 1969.
11. Greece - [El Al, Athens](#) 1969.
12. Germany - [Munich airport](#) 1970.
13. Switzerland - [Swissair Flight 330](#) 1970.
14. Various countries - [Dawson's Field hijackings](#) 1970.
15. Austria - [Sabena Flight 571](#) 1972.
16. Germany - [Munich Olympics](#) 1972.
17. UK - [Israeli](#)

Under Reagan (1980 to 1988):

1. Italy - [Rome airport](#) 1981.
2. Austria - [Heinz Nittel](#) 1981.
3. Italy - [El Al office](#) 1981.
4. Greece - [travel agency](#) 1981.
5. Italy - [Rome airport](#) 1981.
6. Austria - [Israeli embassy](#) 1981.
7. Austria - [Vienna synagogue](#) 1981.
8. Italy - [Ostia](#) 1981.
9. Belgium - [Antwerp synagogue](#) 1981.
10. France - [Christian Chapman](#) 1981.
11. Germany - [Berlin restaurant](#) 1982.
12. France - [Charles Ray](#) 1982.
13. Italy - [El Al office](#) 1982.
14. France - [Israeli embassy](#) 1982.
15. Austria - [French embassy](#) 1982.
16. UK - [Israeli ambassador](#) 1982.
17. France - [Paris restaurant](#) 1982.
18. Japan - [Pan Am Flight 830](#) 1982.
19. France - [Israeli](#)

Under Bush (1988 to 1992):

1. Many countries - [Salman Rushdie](#) 1989 on.
2. USA - [Rushdie bookshops](#) 1989.
3. USA - [Riverdale Press](#) 1989.
4. Italy - [Rushdie bookshops](#) 1989.
5. Belgium - [Rushdie killings](#) 1989.
6. UK - [Rushdie bookshops](#) 1989.
7. Norway - [Rushdie bookshops](#) 1989.
8. UK - [Rushdie bookshops](#) 1989.
9. France - [Rushdie publisher](#) 1989.
10. Belgium - [Joseph Wybran](#) 1989.
11. USA - [Rashad Khalifa](#) 1990.
12. Switzerland - [Kazem Radjavi](#) 1990.
13. USA - [Meir Kahane](#) 1990.
14. Australia - [Makin Morcos](#) 1991.
15. Italy - [Ettore Capriolo](#) 1991.
16. Japan - [Hitoshi Igarashi](#) 1991.
17. Hungary - [Budapest](#) 1991.
18. Argentina - [Israeli embassy](#) 1992.

- [embassy](#) 1972.
18. USA - [letter bomb](#) 1972.
19. USA - [Hamaas Khaalis](#) 1973.
20. USA - [Stephen Gilroy](#) 1973.
21. USA - [Yosef Alon](#) 1973.
22. Greece - [El Al, Athens](#) 1973.
23. Holland - [Japan Air Lines Flight 404](#) 1973.
24. Greece - [Athens airport](#) 1973.
25. Austria - [train hostages](#) 1973.
26. Italy - [Pan Am Flight 110](#) 1973.
27. UK - [Teddy Sieff](#) 1973.
28. USA - [Zebra killings](#) 1973-74.
29. UK - [London bank](#) 1974.
30. Greece - [TWA Flight 841](#) 1974.
31. France - [Paris airport](#) 1975.
32. Austria - [OPEC](#) 1975.
33. Greece - [Entebbe hijacking](#) 1976.
34. USA - [Hanafi Siege](#) 1977.
35. Spain - [Lufthansa Flight 181](#) 1977.
36. Various countries - [poisoned oranges](#) 1978.
37. France - [Paris airport](#) 1978.
38. UK - [London](#) 1978.
39. Many countries - [Iranian terror](#) 1979 on.
40. France - [Paris bombs](#) 1979.
41. Belgium - [Embassy](#) 1982.
20. Belgium - [Brussels synagogue](#) 1982.
21. Italy - [Rome synagogue](#) 1982.
22. USA - [Daniel Jordan](#) 1982.
23. Australia - [Sydney bombs](#) 1982.
24. USA - [Hotel Rajneesh bombing](#) 1983.
25. USA - [Ahmadi attacks](#) 1983.
26. France - [Paris restaurant](#) 1983.
27. UK - [London](#) 1983.
28. France - [TGV bombing](#) 1983.
29. Greece - [Kenneth Whitty](#) 1984.
30. UK - [Yvonne Fletcher](#) 1984.
31. France - [Marks and Spencer](#) 1985.
32. France - [Jewish film festival](#) 1985.
33. Spain - [Torrejon](#) 1985.
34. Greece - [TWA Flight 847](#) 1985.
35. Germany - [Frankfurt Airport](#) 1985.
36. Spain - [Madrid](#) 1985.
37. Denmark - [Copenhagen synagogue](#) 1985.
38. Germany - [Rhein-Main Air Base](#) 1985.
39. Greece - [hotel attack](#) 1985.
40. Italy - [Rome](#) 1985.
41. Argentina -

- Brussels airport1979.
- 42. Austria - Vienna synagogue1979.
- 43. Spain - Max Mazin 1980.
- 44. UK - Mohamed Mustafa Ramadan 1980.
- 45. Belgium - Yosef Halachi 1980.
- 46. Belgium - Antwerp 1980.
- 47. Italy - Bologna bombing 1980.
- 48. France - Paris synagogue1980.

- Jewish kindergarten 1985.
- 42. Greece - EgyptAir Flight 648 1985.
- 43. Germany - Frankfurt1985.
- 44. France - Paris 1985.
- 45. Italy and Austria - Rome and Vienna 1985.
- 46. France - Paris bombings1986.
- 47. France - TGV bombing1986.
- 48. France - Paris bombing1986.
- 49. Italy - TWA Flight 8401986.
- 50. Germany - West Berlin1986.
- 51. UK - BA office 1986.
- 52. France - Kenneth Marston 1986.
- 53. France - Paris bombings1986.
- 54. Germany - U.S. Tempelhof Air Base1986.
- 55. Belgium - Antwerp synagogue 1986.
- 56. Switzerland - Air Afrique hijack 1987.
- 57. Italy - poisoned grapefruit 1988.
- 58. Greece - City of Poros1988.
- 59. UK - Lockerbie 1988.

Under Clinton (1992 to 2000):

1. USA - [CIA HQ](#) 1993.
2. USA - [WTC](#) 1993.
3. Norway - [William Nygaard](#) 1993.
4. USA - [Brooklyn](#) 1994.
5. Argentina - [Jewish centre](#) 1994.
6. UK - [Israeli Embassy](#) 1994.
7. France - [Algerian terror](#) 1994-95.
8. France - [Paris Metro](#) 1995.
9. France - [Jewish school](#) 1995.
10. France - [Paris train](#) 1996.
11. France - [Paris metro](#) 1996.
12. USA - [Empire State Building](#) 1997.
13. South Africa - [Planet Hollywood](#) 1998.
14. USA - [Egypt Air Flight 990](#) 1999.
15. USA - [H. Rap Brown](#) 2000.
16. Germany - [Dusseldorf synagogue](#) 2000.
17. France - [Villepinte synagogue](#) 2000.
18. UK - [Nabil Ouldeddine](#) 2000.
- .

Under Bush (2000 to 2008):

1. USA - [9/11](#) 2001.
2. UK - [Ross Parker](#) 2001.
3. France - [AZF explosion](#) 2001.
4. USA - [shoe bomber](#) 2001.
5. Holland - [Pim Fortuyn](#) 2002.
6. USA - [LA](#) 2002.
7. USA - [Beltway sniper](#) 2002.
8. France - [Bertrand Delanoë](#) 2002.
9. USA - [Ariel Sellouk](#) 2003.
10. France - [Sebastian Sellam](#) 2003.
11. Spain - [Madrid](#) 2004.
12. Holland - [Theo van Gogh](#) 2004.
13. UK - [London](#) 2005.
14. France - [Ilan Halimi](#) 2006.
15. USA - [NC SUV attack](#) 2006.
16. Germany - [Amir Cheema](#) 2006.
17. USA - [Seattle Jewish centre](#) 2006.
18. USA - [CA SUV attack](#) 2006.
19. Norway - [Oslo synagogue](#) 2006.
20. UK - [London and Glasgow](#) 2007.
21. USA - [Chauncey Bailey](#) 2007.
22. UK - [Exeter](#) 2008.
23. UK - [Sherry Jones](#) 2008.
24. Denmark - [Odense](#) 2008.

Under Obama (2008 to 2016):

1. USA - [Little Rock](#) 2009.
2. Italy - [Milan](#) 2009.
3. USA - [Fort Hood](#) 2009.
4. USA - [Richard T. Antoun](#) 2009.
5. USA - [Flight 253](#) 2009.
6. Denmark - [Kurt Westergaard](#) 2010.
7. USA - [Times Square](#) 2010.
8. UK - [Stephen Timms](#) 2010.
9. Sweden - [Lars Vilks](#) 2010.
10. Sweden - [Malmo synagogue](#) 2010.
11. Denmark - [Copenhagen hotel](#) 2010.
12. Sweden - [Issa Issa](#) 2010.
13. USA - [military shootings](#) 2010.
14. USA/UK - [cargo planes](#) 2010.
15. Sweden - [Stockholm](#) 2010.
16. Italy - [Nello Rega](#) 2011.
17. UK - [Gary Smith](#) 2011.
18. Germany - [Frankfurt](#) 2011.
19. Australia - [Sydney](#) 2011.
20. Brazil - [school shooting](#) 2011.
21. Norway - [apostates](#) 2011.
22. Canada - [Paris Dipersico](#) 2011.
23. USA - [Waltham murders](#) 2011.
24. USA - [Alaa Alsaegh](#) 2011.
25. Germany - [J. Gehirn](#) 2011.

26. France - [Charlie Hebdo arson](#) 2011.
27. Denmark - [Hare Krishna temple](#) 2011.
28. Germany - [Ferhad Ahma](#) 2011.
29. South Africa - [Al-Shabaab terror](#) 2011-12.
30. USA - [Gelareh Bagherzadeh](#) 2012.
31. Norway - [Christian converts](#) 2012.
32. Australia - [Alevi centre](#) 2012.
33. France - [Toulouse massacre](#) 2012.
34. Bulgaria - [Burgas bombing](#) 2012.
35. France - [Paris](#) 2012.
36. Cyprus - [British soldier](#) 2012.
37. USA - [Coty Beavers](#) 2012.
38. Denmark - [Lars Hedegaard](#) 2013.
39. USA - [Boston Marathon](#) 2013.
40. France - [Roussillon](#) 2013.
41. UK - [Woolwich soldier](#) 2013.
42. France - [Paris soldier](#) 2013.
43. UK - [prison officer](#) 2013.
44. USA - [Gay nightclub fire](#) 2013.
45. Belgium - [Jewish Museum](#) 2014.
46. France - [Jewish supermarket](#) 2014.
47. USA - [Ali Muhammad Brown](#) 2014.
48. Australia - [Melbourne](#) 2014.
49. USA - [Oklahoma beheading](#) 2014.
50. Canada - [St-Jean-sur-Richelieu](#) 2014.
51. Canada - [Ottawa](#)

- [Parliament attack](#) 2014.
52. USA - [New York axe attack](#)2014.
53. UK - [Israel stall](#) 2014.
54. France - [Jewish restaurant](#)2014.
55. Australia - [Sydney cafe](#) 2014.
56. France - [Joue-les-Tours](#) 2014.
57. France - [Dijon](#) 2014.
58. France - [Nantes](#) 2014.
59. France - [Charlie Hebdomassacre](#) 2015.
60. France - [Jewish supermarket massacre](#) 2015.
61. France - [Other Paris shootings](#)2015.
62. Germany - [Cartoons arson](#)2015.
63. Belgium - [Verviers](#) 2015.
64. UK - [Mold](#) 2015.
65. France - [Nice](#) 2015.
66. Denmark - [Copenhagen cafe](#)2015.
67. Denmark - [Copenhagen synagogue](#) 2015.
68. South Africa - [Zainub Priya Dala](#) 2015.

Appendix D

These tables identify the specific countries of origin of the 100 individuals researched in the study.

| Country | Number of People |
|----------------------|------------------|
| N/A | 14 |
| Saudi Arabia | 17 |
| United Kingdom | 9 |
| Egypt | 7 |
| Afghanistan | 5 |
| USA | 5 |
| Pakistan | 4 |
| Algeria | 3 |
| Lebanon | 3 |
| Mali | 3 |
| Palestine | 3 |
| Syria | 2 |
| Canada | 2 |
| Yemen | 2 |
| Jamaica | 2 |
| Kuwait | 2 |
| United Arab Emirates | 2 |
| Sudan | 2 |

| Country | Number of People |
|------------|------------------|
| Morocco | 2 |
| Iran | 2 |
| Jordan | 1 |
| Nigeria | 1 |
| Bosnia | 1 |
| Chechnya | 1 |
| Ethiopia | 1 |
| France | 1 |
| Denmark | 1 |
| India | 1 |
| Mauritania | 1 |

Appendix E

This table represents the ethnicities of the 100 individuals researched in this study.

| Ethnicity | Number of People |
|------------------|-------------------------|
| Arab | 60 |
| N/A | 28 |
| Asian | 3 |
| Chechen-Avar | 2 |
| Egyptian | 2 |
| Pashtun | 2 |
| Afghan American | 1 |
| Albanian | 1 |
| Iraqi | 1 |