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Australian Strategic Culture: A Case Study

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Abstract

This paper will examine the relationship between a country's history and its actions on the international stage through the prism of the "strategic culture" theoretical framework created in works by Alistair Ian Johnston, Elizabeth Keir, Jack Snyder, and others. The central question of the study will be whether or not an understanding of a state's past actions, rhetoric, and/or cultural obligations can provide an accurate predictor of future action and the primary thesis is that national "strategic culture" has a causal effect on national policy decisions. Towards this end, I have chosen to conduct a case study to ascertain the impact and validity of the "strategic culture" concept. A case study design will allow for a fine-grained examination of "strategic culture" and its effects in greater detail. The particular case that will be examined is that of Australia. The essay will begin with a literature review, then progress to analysis of various forms of primary evidence such as national security documents, speeches, and historical actions, and finally conclude with the presentation of any conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence examined.

Introduction

In the mind of a lay observer there is often a perceived connection between the "cultural" of a society, the rhetoric of a given country's leadership, and the military actions of that country. Furthermore, there often exists a belief and a wish that the articulated military strategy and doctrine should be consistent with this perceived "culture." The existence of such a phenomenon is often taken for granted among the rank and file of the nation, but does it really exist and does it provide an effective barometer for a given nation's security agenda? This question has been posed in a number of different fields and via a myriad of differing theoretical paradigms. In the field of political science one of the most prominent of these proposed models is that of strategic culture. However, determining exactly what strategic culture is and how to define it is a more difficult question than it would first appear to be. In the the scholastic literature there are a number of different definitions used. These definitions range for strategic culture that range from "modes of thought and action with respect to force" (Gray,1981, 22,), to the "sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior" (Snyder, 1977), an amalgamation of civilian constraints and military doctrine (Kier, 1995, 68), and many other more diverse definitions.

This thesis adheres to the following format. First, I examine the concept of strategic culture, how it has evolved, and some of the advantages of each iteration. Then I examine more closely at the specific definitional paradigm I have chosen to frame my case study of Australia, Ian Johnston's conception of strategic culture. Following this I will apply Ian Johnston's framework to the Australian case. The study of Australia conducted herein has two main objectives. The first is to locate evidence of an Australian Strategic Culture and

then, if one is found to exist, determine what form it has taken. As I described above for the purposes of this study this will take the form of a prevailing attitude among the foreign policy and military elite towards international relations as a whole, but most specifically towards the strategic considerations of military decisions. The second, and perhaps more pressing, issue is whether or not the "strategic culture" model, as outlined above, effectively captures the goals within Australia's national security agenda. This particular case study will only examine material from the last fifty years. Johnston points out it is important that the analysis begins at the "earliest point in history that is accessible" (Johnston, 1995a, p.49), however I believe that the scope of the research conducted for this study will prove sufficient for two reasons.

First, Australia did not become truly independent, especially on matters of foreign policy, from the British Empire until following the adoption of the Westminster Statute in 1941. This means that while a fair amount of of the "cultural baggage" that the ADF must consider when establishing its preferences may come from era's prior to the documents examined for this study there were no singularly Australian views on anything in the foreign policy realm prior to this documents. The second reason is that these documents stretch as far enough back into the past that the reader can see the progression and evolution of any "strategic culture" over time, but is not overwhelmed by a past that may frankly be irrelevant for the purposes of analyzing the contemporary Australian strategic preferences.

Strategic Culture: The Evolution of an Idea

For the purposes of this paper and for the sake of simplicity I borrow from Alastair Johnston's 1995 essay *Thinking About Strategic Culture* and divide the different strategic

culture theorists into three distinct generations of thinkers. The first group, epitomized by the work of Colin Gray and David Jones, created a conception of strategic culture that placed a great deal of emphasis on historical analysis and using that analysis to make determinative judgments of future action. The second group of theorists, led by Bradley Klein, took a slightly softer and less deterministic tone that eschewed much of the historical analysis in favor of an analysis of a given nation's contemporary political discourse. The third and final generation sought to bring together its theoretical precedents. This attempted synthesis created a slightly more jumbled yet more inclusive body of work. The third generation vision of strategic culture led to a model that sees cultural attitudes as a limiter and lens through which possible strategic decisions are evaluated.

The First Generation. This first grouping of theorists began their work in the late 1970's and the early 1980's and includes writings by theorists Jack Snyder, Colin Gray, and others. The thinkers of this group were among the first to begin formalizing the layperson's long held idea that a given nation's military doctrine was the product of the combination of relative military power and shared national values. This group began by postulating the existence of a shared national culture and military attitude that could effectively explain state level actions on the international stage. These early theories are by and large rooted in the principle that different states have different strategies and attitudes towards security and the use of military force that stem from many of the state's earliest experiences (Johnston, A.I., 1995, 34). These early iterations of the strategic culture paradigm make the idea that the actions a given actor has taken and will take can be explained through careful examination of the “formative” moments in its history the foundational element of its structure. These all important moment in a state’s past include such events as extreme

militancy, Germany in the 1930's and 40's, or periods of vast imperial strength, Great Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Much of the earliest work in the strategic culture field is rooted in the postulations of Jack Snyder. Jack Snyder's work served as the theoretical forbearer to the more out and out "strategic culture" work of the later writers, specifically David Jones and Colin Gray. In fact, one of the earliest statements of the existence of such a concept came from Jack Snyder. In a 1977 report written for the RAND Corporation titled *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* Snyder states that "It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique strategic culture." (Snyder J., 1977). While this statement is quite mild in comparison to some of the fuller bodied arguments of later theorists it may very well have been responsible for inserting the term "strategic culture" into the modern political science lexicon. In Snyder's work "strategic culture" is defined as the "sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation" (Snyder, J., 1977). This statement seems to have become the guiding light for many theorists, especially those of Alistair's so called first generation.

The work of Colin Gray and David Jones directly followed and stemmed from Snyder's statements in his RAND paper. To many the combined work of these theorists epitomizes early thought on the subject of strategic culture and served as a prominent theoretical vanguard. The writings of Gray and Jones focused extensively on nuclear strategy, the majority of it was written in the 1980's, and style of national military expression. In his work *National Style and Strategy: The American Example* Gray created

his own definition for strategic culture means. In this work he defined strategic culture as a unique set of cultural experiences that created certain ways of thinking and actions in regards to the role that the use of force should play in the international system (Gray, 1981). It is Gray's assertion that these patterns in thinking established grew from "perceptions of national historical experience" (Gray, 1981, p.22) that in turn went on to create cultural norms that serve as motivations and foundational elements of military policy and doctrinal decisions. Much of Gray's work was focused on the United States and it was his conclusion that the American national historical experience produced a military establishment that relied on a unique set of "dominant national beliefs" with respect to strategic choices. After these postulations regarding the American national strategic doctrine he and other theorists slowly began to apply these ideas more broadly.

These subsequent works included, on the other side of the coin, the writings of David Jones. Jones' work focused much more closely on cultural inputs that served to actually create the strategic culture whose existence was postulated in Gray and Snyder's work. Jones' describes three discreet types of input that serve to shape strategic culture with each of these inputs ascribed to certain role to play in shaping and creating the national strategic cultures that become ingrained in the citizenry and policymaking elite alike. The factors that Jones identified as contributing to the strategic cultures of nations are the large scale environmental factors, the second are the norms and beliefs of the nation's social culture, and the third are the small scale environmental relationships. The first of the inputs that Jones identifies are the "macro-environmental" factors such geography and "ethno-cultural characteristics." These are factors that cannot be changed or manipulated at will and have often been constant for much of a state's history. The second

set of inputs perceived by Jones are what he terms "social inputs." that include economics and social structures. These are the aspects of a given nation that can change over time, but are often slow to do so. The impact that this particular category of input has on the "strategic culture" of a given nation can be seen in some of the more mid-level decisions and constraints placed on decision makers. Jones believes that these middle of the road aspects can have an impact on policy and military decisions, but he does not seem to see them as being as important as the more formative moments of nation's history and the more ironclad restraints created by those moments. The third and final grouping of inputs are the more micro level inputs such as the relationship between civil and military society. These particular inputs are more minute in scale and seem to be, according to Jones, the least important inputs in terms of establishing actual constraints on military policy that can help to delineate what is a viable security policy. This type of input includes such things as the willingness of the public to go to war at a given time, the willingness to submit to military intrusions such as conscription that may affect daily life, and the overall level of trust that exists between the civilians and military classes (Jones, 1985).

For these earliest of "strategic culture" scholars, the founding principal was not, as detractors often state, that individual states are irrational or entirely unique in their reasoning, but merely that the historic past has a strong role in the creation and organization of the ordered preferences that shape a state's military actions (Johnston, A. I. 1995). However, even given this milder interpretation of their theories early "strategic culture" theorists seem to be overly deterministic for this particular case study. I tend to agree with Johnston that many of this early theoretical work had merit it was too limited in its applicability. The next group of theorists sought to resolve some of these issues.

The Second Generation. Following these early writings, and attempting to correct some of its flaws, Johnston postulated that a new groups of theorists began to emerge who sought to bring strategic culture studies back into the mainstream. This consequent generation bore a strong resemblance to their theoretical antecedents, but there are some differences. One of the seminal authors of the new group of strategic culture theorists is Bradley Klein. His paper *Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics* is an early example of the more moderate tact that was been adopted taken by the theorists who followed Gray, Jones, and Snyder (Klein, 1988).

In *Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics* Klein proposes yet another definition for strategic culture. The definition that he proposes is that strategic culture should be defined as a set of cultural attitudes that are "based upon the political ideologies of public discourse that help define occasions as worthy of military involvement" (Klein, 1988, p.136). In Klein's definition the theoretical foundation established by Jones' theory of three inputs is quite evident. In fact, it seems as though in many respects *Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence* is the expansion of Jones' third input, the relationship between military and civil society. Klein's work portrays strategic culture as the method by which the foreign policy elite of the country seek to "legitimize" their "military activities" (Klein, 1988, p. 135). Essentially Klein saw strategic culture as means of giving the realist perspective of international relations more historical backing that would further legitimize its theories. The center piece of Klein's work is the American nuclear deterrence strategy that was used during the Cold War years. Klein saw American nuclear doctrine as the perfect blend of "defensiveness" and "retaliation" for the American public (Klein, 1988, p.136). This represents perfectly

the thrust of this second wave of scholars. These writers saw historical context as far less important than the relationship between the current societal norms of a country and its military doctrine. That is not to say that Klein and his fellow authors wholly disregarded the impact that historic factors can have on the modern decision making process of military strategists. In fact, Klein said that in this updated version of strategic culture, particularly his, the decisions made by the military elite are not and cannot be based solely on a "real world that has an existence out there" and that they must also include considerations from past experiences as well (Klein, 1988, p. 100).

In the first generation of literature much of the focus was on establishing a historical foundation to explain a modern state's actions and then use that information to "predict" how a state's military would respond to the day's security threats. Klein and his fellow scholars, like Stephen Rosen, are far more moderate in their assessments of the powers of the strategic culture paradigm. This group sees strategic culture not as the sole determinant of the actions a nation will take, but merely as a set of restrictions that must be considered before any decisions are made regarding the use of force or when assessing how another nation will react (Rosen, 1994). In *Thinking About Strategic Culture* Johnston effectively captures the spirit of this body of work by saying "widely available orientations to violence and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative enemies." (Johnston, 1995a, p.9).

The Third Generation. The third group of theorists that Johnston creates sought to strike somewhat of a middle ground between the first more predicative generation of theorists and the second more normative grouping of scholars. This body of work includes groundbreaking works such as Elizabeth Keir's *Culture and Military Doctrine: France*

between the Wars (Kier, 1995) and Jeffery Legro's *Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step* (Legro, 1998). This particular cohort of theorists is among the more well regarded strategic culture thinkers as they often avoid many of the pitfalls of earlier works such as being overly deterministic. According to Johnston the definition of strategic culture used by this group fits one of two molds. The scholars contributing to this body of work define strategic culture as either a limiter that "presents decision makers with a limited range of options" or as a "lens that alters appearance and efficacy of different [military] choices" (Johnston, 1995a, p.42).

As Johnston points out that the work of Keir, Klein and others in his "third generation" of theorists seems to be less deterministic and less definitive in their analyses than the first generation yet, on the whole, slightly more applicable than the second. This group of scholars, perhaps even more than the second, emphasizes the effects that contemporary culture can have in determining a set of preferences for a given actor. Additionally, though this particular body of work seems to be more "eclectic", as Johnston put it, (Johnston A.I., 1995a, p.20) than its predecessors overall there does seem to be a slightly lesser value placed on historical context by this cohort. This is true in that much of this work surrounding this particular revision seems to be more focused on the current relationship between the military and the citizens of the given nation. This group, particularly Elizabeth Keir, sees "Strategic Culture" as an ever evolving doctrinal rule of thumb that is shaped by the events both contemporary and historic. This shift in focus can be seen quite clearly in Elizabeth Keir's work on the military philosophies of the French and English in the post World War Two Era. Keir argues that culture is the only way to explain the actions of these two former great powers during this period. In her work Keir

states that "strategic culture" is not just a product of the historical circumstances of a nation it is also shaped by the thoughts and feelings of a country's contemporary citizenry (Keir, 1995). The work of Jeffery Legro mimics many of the more fundamental elements of Keir's work albeit on a much smaller scale, the majority of his work analyzes smaller more specific case studies. Legro, like many of the other strategic culture theorists, states that "there is a need to move beyond static coordination, prisoner's dilemma, or zero-sum games to a richer variety of symmetrical and asymmetrical situations-and most importantly, a consideration of when and why such "games" change" (Legro, 1996, p.133).

Whereas the early proponents were more definitive in their predictions the second, and the later third generations, as Johnston defines them, were less certain. These new groups of theorists saw shared strategic cultures as creating foundations upon which a given state's foreign policy elite based their decision making process, but by no means was it regarded as the sole predictor. This particular avenue of study posits that states' individual strategic cultures generate a range of possible options and actions from different "cultural" factors, that are both historical and more modern in nature (Johnston, A.I., 1995b). It is from these two generations that Johnston draws the majority of the variables and factors examined in his own version of strategic culture. I have chosen to use the framework created by Johnston for this study because I believe that it serves as an excellent middle ground between the almost impossibly predicative elements of the early strategic culture work and the subdued iterations created by the later strategic culture theorists. Beyond this Johnston has already applied his paradigm to the Chinese in his book *Cultural realism: Strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history* from which this case study will borrow heavily.

Methodology and Strategic Culture Analysis

Alastair Iain Johnston created the framework for the paradigm I will apply in this study in his comprehensive analysis of strategic culture, *Thinking About Strategic Culture*, and then applied it in his book, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Johnston pulls from these three “generations” of work to generate his own definitions for what strategic culture is and which factors contribute to its creation. Like almost every other strategic culture theorist Johnston created his own definition for what strategic culture is and estimation of its affective powers. The definition employed in Johnston’s iteration, which serves as the foundational element of the entire paradigm, is that “strategic culture is an integrated "system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs."(Johnston A.I., 1995a, p. 46). Using this definition Johnston hoped to solve many of the issues he saw as detracting from and limiting the effectiveness of strategic culture studies. In addition to this slight definitional modification Johnston also creates a new standard for the affective powers of a strategic culture. In both of the above mentioned works on strategic culture Johnston states that strategic culture is not wholly deterministic, but it does allow the military apparatus of a given state to create a list of "uniquely ordered preferences" based on their internal makeup and history (Johnston, 1995, 45). Johnston uses this modified definitional framework to resolve what he sees as the numerous issues that face the hamper the efforts of the earlier strategic culture thinkers.

The literature on strategic culture and strategic culture-like concepts seems to suggest contradictory conclusions: either a state's historically and culturally rooted notions

about the ends and means of war limit the strategic choices of decision-making elites, as the first and third generations argue, or they do not, as the second generation holds. The research problem for each conclusion differs as well. The first conclusion implies that research ought to focus on how to isolate strategic cultural influences on behavior from the effects of other variables. The latter implies that we need to look at how strategic culture is used to obscure or mask strategic choices that are made in the interests of domestic and international hegemons. Johnston seeks to resolve all of these issues by restricting his analysis to three main variables. In Johnston's paradigm there are three main questions that must be answered in order to make detecting a strategic culture and defining that strategic culture possible. The three variables that Johnston deems essential to any examination of strategic culture are the nations view on the nature of war in the international system, the view that the actor takes on the nature of international relations itself, and the degree of esteem which the actor regards the use of force (Johnston, 1995a)

The first variable that must be examined in Johnston's framework is the view on the nature of war in the international system. In Johnston's view this variable serves as one of the foundational elements of any strategic culture study. This variable can be viewed more broadly as whether the state regards war as an anomaly in the system or an inevitable side effect of interstate friction. Johnston views an understanding of this element as essential if one is to generate a complete understanding of the strategic mindset of any state and this is doubly true for the strategically advanced global states of the contemporary international milieu. How a given actor answers this one simple question can make a world of difference in terms of how the actor will view a given scenario. If a state regards war as an inevitable result of competitive interactions among the world's powers than that particular state

would likely be much more willing to go to war with another and less willing to take steps to mitigate the effects and causes of war. On the other hand, when an actor sees war as only a possibility then it is also likely that that actor will treat war as a symptom that can be cured. The states that view war as more of an aberration, many of the Western democratic powers for example, then become more likely to take steps to foster a more cooperative and multilateral system. This variable has enormous implications for a given state's strategic culture and, by extension, its military actions on the international stage. The effect is so profound due to the fact that this variable is directly related to how an actor perceives the current international structure. If a state views war as an inevitability of a given multistate paradigm, be it regional or global, then it becomes far more likely that the state will seek to create change in that paradigm that often leads to conflict that can quickly devolve into war.

The second variable that Johnston mandates be considered is whether or not the internal cultural attitudes of an actor make it more inclined to view international relations as zero-sum game where all things are relative or as more nuanced system in which another's gain is not automatically their own loss. In essence this variable looks quite closely at the degree of cooperation which a state in essence the value that is placed on cooperation. If an individual state sees the international system as a strict zero sum game in which the gain of another is a loss to oneself, the classic realist power maximizing perspective, the effects on strategic culture can be enormous. This particular aspect of a strategic culture is so important because it has a close relationship with a country's willingness to cooperate with its global counterparts. The willingness to cooperate, or the opposite, can in turn have an extreme impact on strategic culture.

On one hand, if an actor sees a possibility for and a value in mutual cooperation it will likely remove many of the policy options that are available to their zero sum counterparts, but it will also open up different options that the other group may not have. On the other hand, if an actor views international relations as zero sum game it eliminates many of the possible cooperative avenues of diplomacy. In both of these scenarios it can easily see how broad an impact this fundamental strategic decision can have and how extensively this decision can shape strategic culture. Whether an actor views the international system as a strict zero sum game or cooperative system where benefits can be shared it does not matter for determining strategic culture. In either case, or anything in between for that matter, the number of available diplomatic options is greatly restricted by the norms set out by the culture. This restriction then leads to and aides the creation of one of the hallmarks of Johnston's strategic culture paradigm, a list of ordered strategic preferences.

The third dimension of a given state's strategic culture is the value which the foreign policy elite and internal culture of the state assign to the use of violence or military action as a tool of international diplomacy. This particular dimension of study may prove to be the most easily viewed because it has the most direct impact on the international system. If a nation regards force as a cure-all that can be used to resolve a wide variety of issues, which is an obvious departure from current international sentiment, then it quite clearly points to a difference in culture that would seem to indicate that this particular nation does has a much different set of ordered preferences than most and will therefore act in a manner quite different from the others. It is easy to see how this would create a set of ordered preferences for a given country. If the state regards violence as an acceptable and

perhaps even advantageous course of action than it is likely that using force will be placed at or near the top of its given set of preferred actions in a fair number of situations. On the other hand, if a state's foreign policy and internal domestic cultures regard the use of force and violence as an option of last resort, especially in regards to state to state interactions, it is likely that the use of force will be placed at or near the bottom of that states set of ordered preferences.

It is easy to see why Johnston chose these particular variables as the dimensions by which he defines and examines strategic culture. In one sense the manifestation of these variables is easily observable in the international system. If a state has a tendency to use force than that particular proclivity will not take long to appear. The ease of observability that these dimensions provide makes them far more testable than many of the earlier iterations of strategic culture. However, this simplicity belies the versatility provided by this dimensional structure. Though there are only three real areas of examination within this paradigm they allow Johnston to plot and classify an almost endless array of actors. All of this makes it an excellent choice of model to examine the existence and nature of Australian strategic culture.

Strategic Culture: The Case of Australia

The method for determining whether or not a "strategic culture" exists utilized in this case study consisted of an examination various national security papers from various timeframes, the location of strategic goals, and then the determination of the level of congruence over time in regards to the stated goals of the Australian Defense Force (ADF). The search proved to be effective. When analyzing the Australian security documents of the past 50 years an observer can see an apparent pattern of language that emerges over

time. In each of the documents analyzed there were a number of policy objectives and strategic goals that seemed to have become ingrained in the Australian strategic and cultural mindset. These ingrained ideas are the precursors of a full blown strategic culture. There cannot be a strategic culture if there is no consistency in goals or attitudes to be examined. These goals were quite diverse and covered a variety of areas. They ranged from the quite obvious and universal goal of every state, maintain self-reliance and internal sovereignty, to the more abstract, contribute to and maintain the rules based global order of the present. Dating back to 1976 Australian strategic goals seem to have remained quite consistent and would appear to be rooted in the most formative years of the Australian nation-state.

The fundamental goal of every state and its leaders is to maintain the sovereignty of the state and the Australians are no different than the rest of the world in that respect. This prominent strategic goal mentioned at the very beginning of each white paper issued over the last fifty years is exactly what is to be expected of any state. Throughout the literature there are no shortages of statements by the Australian military and foreign policy decision makers regarding the importance of "self-reliance". Ensuring that Australia does not rely on any other country for the defense of its sovereign borders and to maintain the territorial and extra-territorial integrity enjoyed by Australia since the end of World War Two. This comes as no surprise given the fact that independence is a fundamental characteristic of any international actor. However, what is slightly different about these particular statements of individuality is the degree to which Australian "independence" is forced to coexist with their international obligations. These obligations and links appear repeatedly regarding their Western Allies, specifically the United States.

Anyone who studies the current international system, let alone someone who reviews the strategic goals of Australia, knows that the Australian's enjoy an unusually close relationship with the great powers of the west, specifically the United States. The ADF make references to and highlights the importance of maintaining close strategic ties to the United States. Statements such as "Over the last 70 years that peace and stability has been underpinned by a strong United States presence in our region" (Australia, Department of Defence, 2016) can be found in each of the "White Papers" examined despite the forty-year difference between when the first and last were written. This symbiotic relationship has formal aspects such as the "Five Eyes" cooperative, the intelligence sharing collective consisting of the the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and the ubiquitous Australian American Defense Pact mentioned in each of the papers examined. There are also more informal supports provided such as the sale of state of the art US military goods to the Australians (Australia, Department of Defence, 2016). This enduring set of strategic partnerships have been in place since before World War Two and it is much more comprehensive than any other Australian strategic relationship. This long lived relationship with a nation on the other side of the globe in combination with the unusually close nature of the relationship would seem to suggest that there is some deeper level of connection than a pure realist mode of thought would accept.

In addition to its relationship with the United States Australia also places a great deal of emphasis on and prioritizes maintaining amicable relationships with its Pacific neighbors beyond New Zealand. The island nations of Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste are mentioned specifically throughout the literature, specifically in *2013 Defence White Paper* and *2016 Defence White Paper*, as areas of heightened strategic importance to the

Australian Defense Force. Australia's tendency to enter into cooperative relationships extends all the way to the countries of ASEAN and even to China, although this is admittedly a much more limited relationship. Even as far back as 1976, shortly following the US withdrawal from Vietnam, the Australians seem to indicate that they are willing to cooperate and work with their neighbors to ensure tranquility in the region and possibly forestall any armed conflagrations that may arise. This cooperative streak and its seeming inexhaustibility would appear to indicate that at the very least there is a slight inclination on the part of the Australian security apparatus to work with rather than against others. This tendency away from confrontational militaristic action even extends beyond the individual relationship the Australian's seek to utilize to an even broader scale, the global order itself.

In addition to their emphasis on individual cooperation the Australian Defense Force has displayed a complete commitment to the "global rules based" order which it has become a large part of. This vested interest in maintaining the global order that developed over the latter half of the 20th century with a country other than themselves, the United States, at its head would indicate a willingness to take a backseat in the strategic realm that may be indicative of larger cultural attitudes regarding the role Australia should play in the international system. This support of the United States' global primacy and the international system that stems from it order is a common theme in Australian strategic thought which includes the contribution of military forces to the "coalitions" established to protect this system. This commitment to upholding the order and rules based system is a common theme in ADF documents that reflects a lasting cultural belief that rules and institution based conflict resolution are important aspects of any functioning international

paradigm.

Taken together I believe that these statements and goals establish a clear pattern of action and preferences that the Australian Defense Force holds quite closely to. There are numerous strategic goals and statements that remain consistent over the fifty-year time period examined in this case study with the most prominent among them being an independent streak that is only subordinated by an overwhelming desire to to create and uphold an international regime that values cooperation, has rules that govern interaction, and institutions via which conflicts can be resolved prior to any possible armed engagements becoming necessary.

When considering the previously mentioned goals and their continuity over time it becomes readily apparent that there is an undercurrent of cultural norms that support many of the goals the ADF has had over the second half of the 20th century. Now that the question of the existence of Australian strategic culture has been resolved it is time to turn to an examination of its form. This examination will be conducted through the lens of Johnston's three variable framework. As a refresher the dimensions along which the Australian strategic culture will be examine are the perceived inevitability of war, the efficacy of violence as means of resolving issues in the international system, and a given nation's view of the payout structure in international relations. Each of the dimensions will be examined and then synthesized into a comprehensive strategic culture that will in turn be evaluated on evidentiary grounds.

Results: The Inevitability of War. The first dimension of analysis is the view which the Australian's take towards the prospects of war. Within the strategic culture framework this aspect is defined as the extent to which a given nation believes that war can

and should be avoided whenever it is possible to do so. This can have a profound impact on the strategic preferences and likely actions of a nation. For example, if the Australians believe that war was an endemic condition the current international system it is highly likely that there would be war in the region. This is due to the fact that if one country believes that war will inevitably happen that country will seek to strike first to ensure that the best possible war footing. Taking the view that war is an inevitability seems to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the people and decisions makers of a nation go in search of an enemy, it is likely that one will be found. However, having said all of that it does not seem to be the case that the ADF views war in the region or around the globe as an inevitable side effect of international competition.

At no point in the stated goals or methods sections of the ADF's strategic literature does it seem that the Australian "strategic culture" takes the view that war is inevitable. In fact, it seems as though the Australian "strategic culture" takes the exact opposite view of the world and state to state interaction. On the issue of the inevitability of war the Australian's seem to be firmly in the camp that it can be mitigated or even prevented given the proper conditions. In each of the documents reviewed for this work there are statements such as "The conjunction of such conditions [For War] is infrequent among the nations of the world" (Australia, Department of Defence, 1976), "[The Australian ADF] places a high priority on working with others, at both the regional and global level, to further minimize, and if possible to eliminate, the risk of war, " (Australia, Department of Defence, 2000) "there is no more than a remote prospect of a military attack by another country on Australian territory in the foreseeable future" (2016). These statements combined with the above mentioned emphasis on maintaining a "rules based" global order that values conflict

resolution via international institutions and laws seem to indicate a society that believes war to be an aberration in the system of international affairs

The most prominent reason for this attitude and indeed much of the Australian strategic culture's emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution is that the period reviewed in this study had a monumental starting point in the form of World War Two. Each of the documents reviewed for this study were created following World War Two and it is likely that the devastating impact that global war had affected the Australian strategic culture in a profound manner has created, in the Australian people and by extension their policy makers, a view that war should be avoided at all costs. The loss of life and the utter carnage brought about in those few short years of war is unmatched in human history and Australia's participation in it likely serves as the type of "formative" moment cited throughout the "strategic culture" literature. Additionally, the fact that such a momentous event occurred not long after the passage of the Statute of Westminster, the decree that dismantled the formal control exercised by the UK, serves to further indicate how impactful the war truly was on the collective Australian psyche (Australian history citation). In terms of preference creation and ordering this mindset drastically limits the number of options available to the ADF for the resolution of any international conflicts that may arise. A society that sees war as an abnormality is far less willing to tolerate its abominable effects.

Results: The Efficacy of Force. This leads to the second dimension of the strategic culture model, the efficacy of force. The second dimension is the degree to which a given nation views the use of force as an effective and acceptable course of action in the international paradigm (Johnston, 1995a). This dimension of study ties in quite closely

with the first. It is often the case that a nation that views the international system as a zero-sum game will more often view the use of force as an effective option and the opposite is also true. As can likely be inferred from the preceding paragraphs the Australian military establishment almost never views the use of force, especially in nation to nation conflict, as the most effective policy option. This is not to say that the Australian's entirely opposed to force as a tool of international relations. In *Defence 200*, the Australian white paper written in the year 2000, it is stated that "There remains a risk that circumstances may still arise in which these constraints [The rules based global system] are not effective."

(Australia, Department of Defence, 2000) This seems to indicate that even though war is regarded as a last resort by the Australian ADF it can never be ruled out and they foresee a number of scenario's where it will be the most effective and in many cases only available response to a given threat. However, even with the acceptance of this never say never attitude it becomes readily apparent when reviewing the literature that the ADF and the remainder of the Australian military decision making apparatus believe the use of force to be an option of last resort. In all but a very select few instances, responding with military force seems to have been deemed excessive or ineffective by the Australian foreign policy establishment.

The cultural attitudes present in Australian society and the resulting strategic culture of the ADF and the rest of the Australian policy making apparatus clearly create an ordered set of preferences that place as one of the least optimal decisions that can be made in almost any scenario. The set of preferences created by this cultural milieu often means that the ADF and the other members of the Australian security community are restricted in their decision making process. This apparent reluctance on the part of the Australian

people to become involved in armed conflict has, in many ways, determined the actions of the Australian government on the international stage in regards to possible military ventures. In fact, over the last forty years the Australian military has only been involved in one armed conflict of any particular length, this was of course as a member of the United States led coalition to oust Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Australia, Department of Defence 2000). In addition to this it is also quite clear from the literature that the ADF is reluctant to engage in any future combat missions, unless explicitly called upon to do so by the United States or one of their close regional allies, such as Timor Leste or Papua New Guinea (Australia, Department of Defence, 2013)

The attitude of a nation towards violence and its efficacy is an extremely important dimension in regards to determining how that nation will react in a prescribed set of circumstances and this particular dimension of the strategic culture paradigm seems to do an excellent job of encapsulating Australia's strategic view of force. Through this analysis it is quite clear that the Australian strategic worldview and cultural underpinnings have created a set of ordered preferences that do not view force as an effective tool in most situations. From this a number of determinations can be made as to how Australian tacticians will react in a given set of circumstances. When this analysis is applied to a hypothetical scenario in which the Australian's may become involved, such as a territorial dispute between China and one of the nations of ASEAN, (2013 *Defence White Paper*, 2013) it is easy to see how a list detailing the range of possible actions could be generated based on the examined dimensions of Australia's strategic culture.

Results: Are International Relations a Zero Sum Game? The third and final dimension to be considered when evaluating the nature of Australian strategic culture is the

philosophical approach that is taken towards international relations in terms of nature of the payout structure. In other words, does the Australian culture history and contemporary cultural dynamic make the ADF more or less inclined to view the international system as a zero sum game. This question is essential to gaining a full understanding of what the base values of the Australian strategic culture that guide the decision making process. After reviewing the strategic literature, the answer to this question seems to be quite definitely in the negative it is not the case that the Australian strategic apparatus regards international relations as a zero sum game where any improvement or benefit gained by another is in inherently a detriment to oneself.

When reading the various outlines of Australian grand strategy, it becomes readily apparent that the Australian's view alliances and cooperation as inordinately important to their own success. An emphasis on alliance and coalition building does not of course preempt a nation from seeing the world as all or nothing it is possible after all that for whatever reason an alliance with one nation or another is viewed as the most beneficial action possible. However, the actions and stated strategic preferences of the Australian Defense Force seem to point quite strongly towards a belief in the possibility of symbiotic relationships that would be quite difficult to square with a zero sum attitude.

The first and most overt evidence against a zero sum Australian view of the international system is the close relationship they seek to foster and maintain with the United States. At first blush this could easily be perceived as an entirely self serving course of action on the part of the ADF. After all the United States is and has been for the past sixty years the preeminent global military power and a strong relationship with such a state can only be regarded as beneficial. However, that quick assessment would belie a deeper

understanding and level of cooperation that exists between the two countries. The second and perhaps even more persuasive piece of evidence suggesting that international relations are viewed in a more nuanced fashion by the Australians is their strong commitment to global stability, even at a cost to their own personal objectives at times. It has been shown time and time again that the Australian's have a strong and ready commitment to maintaining the international global order and the rules based system that girds it.

These two elements and modes of thought in addition to the other above mentioned intricacies of Australian strategic thought coalesce to give a clear picture of what Australian strategic culture. Australia's strategic culture is typified quite perfectly by the following quote from the Australian government's 1994 white paper ""Australia's strategic stance is, in the broadest possible sense, defensive. " The paper goes on to outline that while the Australian Defense force is "capable" it will not engage in armed conflict other than to defend Australian national interest's, and even in these small number of cases the use of force is a measure of last resort.

Discussion. "Strategic Culture" models of analysis, specifically Johnston's, seem to accomplish what they purport to do quite well. They seek to capture and visualize the thought process a given nation's military elite go through when making decisions in regards to war and grand military strategy. However, this is also the main issue that seems to exist within the strategic culture literature, it only applies to war. In the not too distant past this may have been an issue of negligible importance, but in the contemporary international environment this approach seems to be lacking.

The current international system has drastically reduced the likelihood of armed conflict, specifically interstate conflict. As a result, foreign policy elites and military

planners around the world have brought an ever increasing number of areas under the purview of the military. This can be seen quite clearly with each successive "White Paper" written by the Australian government. Beginning with the statement that "Australia is among the first countries to be called on to assist in international security and humanitarian crises" in their 1994 outline the Australian Defense Force began to discuss alternate uses for their military forces. Following the 1994 White Paper the attention given to "non military threats" continued to rise. In each of the subsequent reports issues such as illegal immigration, organized crime, cyber security, global warming, terrorism, and drug trafficking were all mentioned as issues that were considered in the strategic ideation of what the ADF will be forced to contend with in the coming years and decades.

All of this seems to indicate that over the latter half of the twentieth century, and especially following the conclusion of the Cold War, the "Strategic Culture" model became increasingly limited in its uses. "Strategic Culture" as defined by Johnston, Keir, Snyder, and their fellow scholars fail to properly capture the importance of a number of issues that were in the past considered outside of the military's purview or non-issues all together. In order for any type of "cultural" framework to be effective it must give decision makers a set of ordered preferences or at the very least a method whereby they can determine the palatability of certain actions within a given society (Johnston, A. I. 1995b). These issues cannot be effectively ordered in the "strategic culture" model because this model is almost entirely concerned with evaluating the willingness of a society to accept the use of force in a given set of circumstances. Unfortunately, many of the issues that Australians see as threats to their overarching goal, maintaining the rules based status quo championed by the United States, are not mitigated or solved via the use of force. As such these security

concerns cannot be effectively incorporated into the "Strategic Culture" framework and its emphasis on the use of force in military operations.

Conclusion

I would assess the strategic culture paradigm as useful yet incomplete. The paradigm espoused in the scholarly work by Johnston, Kier, Snyder, Klein, Gray, and the other "cultural" scholars of international relations seems to function well as an excellent heuristic for how a given nation and culture will react in certain circumstances, but only with regards to force and military issues. Restricting the study of a given nation's foreign policy apparatus to strictly military issues may be more acceptable for some of the smaller less globally oriented states in the international system, but even in those few cases it would seem that crucial issues are left if only the military dimension is examined. These issues that could be excluded would include such momentous dilemmas as climate change and international human trafficking. When the set of foreign policy circumstances has issues that have been historically disregarded by scholars of foreign policy such as public health and immigration the usefulness of strategic culture begins to diminish. To remedy this issue there are number of newer theories that have been proposed that seek to create more all encompassing definitions and paradigms.

One such example is the concept of security culture (Kirchner and Sperling, 2010). Security culture can be best defined as the collective attitude and preferences of the foreign policy elite within a given state. This particular analytical framework places each state along a continuum ranging from entirely Westphalian to wholly Post-Westphalian based on certain defining characteristics. These characteristics are the way in which each state views external events, individual national identities, instrumental preferences of each state,

and the interaction preferences held by each state. Security culture uses many of the same attributes as strategic culture, but it tends to take a much broader range of issues and attitudes into account when determining the set of ordered preferences of a given nation. One of the principle distinction is that security culture considers a much broader set of possible actions when analyzing a given nation beyond military power. Security culture also examines the persuasive instruments that are at a state's disposal such as diplomatic negotiation or binding legal agreements among states (Sperling, 2010).

Overall, this case study proved quite informative and allowed for a much deeper understanding of the Australian foreign policy culture, but also revealed the limitations of strategic culture as an organizing concept. I believe it to be far too limited in its scope and cannot account for the greatly expanded range of possible actions that a modern state has at its disposal. I suggest that in any future research strategic culture should be used as a starting point for and as a piece of a larger framework such as that of security culture.

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