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Explaining Anti-Americanism in Turkey: A Study of the Patterns of Anti-American Sentiment Among Turkish Citizens

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Abstract

This paper will compare the characteristics among citizens in Turkey who have anti-American views and attitudes. The paper will review of the current literature on what is anti-Americanism, and its consequences, and the chronology of anti-Americanism in Turkey from 2001 to 2013. Next, the paper will explain the political left and right in Turkey, and Turkish Islamic identity, that is, observant Muslims in Turkey. The findings of this paper suggests that Muslim identify has not correlation with levels of anti-Americanism. Rather, there is a correlation between having a leftist political ideology and a higher level of anti-Americanism. The research being presented in this paper will act as a precursor for further studies on explaining anti-American sentiment in Turkish citizens.

Keywords: Anti-Americanism, Turkey, Left-Right Ideology, Islamic identity, U.S.-Turkish relationship

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I. Introduction

Resentment towards the U.S. is not a new occurrence, but since 9/11, it has become more of a concern of how the public of other nations views the U.S. and its policies. Anti-Americanism can be showcased through the behavior of foreign governments, the actions of a single political, religious, or community leaders, in the cultural form of books and films, and in the overall attitude of the ordinary citizens of the country. The best source of this public opinion data on attitudes directed to the U.S. comes from the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys, having been conducted annually since 1999. The most recent public opinion polls of the last decade show a sharp increase in anti-Americanism around the world, specifically in Islamic countries, namely Turkey. Turkey remains a vital actor for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and viable economic policy, especially in the Middle East. The upturn in anti-Americanism in Turkey signals a possible change in the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey that has held relatively stable for the past five decades, which could be detrimental to American relationships with Turkey as a strategic partner in the Middle East.

This paper is a study of data gathered from Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2013 in order to determine patterns of anti-American bias, Islamic identity, left-right political leanings, as characteristics for determining groups of Turkish citizens most likely to hold an anti-American bias. By determining the patterns of anti-Americanism in Turkey, the U.S. government can be proactive in policies that can help to curb the anti-American bias, and begin to mend the troubled relationship between the U.S. and Turkey that has developed since 9/11.

II. Literature Review

What is Anti-Americanism, and why is it a Problem?

Since September 11th, there has been an increase in the amount of scholarly research, journalistic coverage and political debate concerning anti-Americanism. " In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, anti-Americanism…has become a central feature of public discourse in the United States and the world over," (Chiozza, 2007, Pg.93) Anti-Americanism is a complex topic, encompassing strong bias against the United States, the United States Government, American citizens, or a psychological bias against any US linked operation, message or product. Anti-Americanism, as defined by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007), two authors who have given one of the most complete academic reports on the definition and implications anti-Americanism, define anti-Americanism as "…A psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general." Katzenstein and Keohane continue this explanation of anti-Americanism in saying that "… There is a widespread feeling that anti-Americanism is more than simply opposition to what the United State does, but extends to what the United States is …" The most efficient way to observe anti-Americanism is as a set of attitudes, measured by public opinion polls (such as the Pew Global Attitudes Survey) or content analysis of dialogues (such as discourse by the media). Speulda (2006) defines anti-Americanism in several ways, "…being "against" America means disagreement with American policies, for others America is inextricably entwined with "globalization" and the spreading of specific cultural products; for others it is being against American leadership and for some it signifies opposition to American military power." Anti-Americanism is not seen in one form of

protest or negative discourse, but rather, it is immensely diverse (Lacorne and Judt, 2005). Anti-Americanism can be perceived through protest, such as banners of hatred and anger toward the U.S. and its support for Israel, and burning of the U.S. flag illustrates some of the examples of negative bias towards the U.S. (Goldbrenner and Robichaud, 2005). According to Katzenstein and Keohane (2007), the societies most hostile to the U.S. are located in the Islamic Middle East, and that the views of the U.S. from these countries is multidimensional, that is, Middle East countries evaluate their hostility towards the U.S. in different ways.

Within anti-Americanism, there are different levels of anti-Americanism: a negative opinion and a deeply held bias. " Bias is the most fundamental form of anti-Americanism, which can be seen as a form of prejudice," (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007, Pg.12). Opinions are more transient than biases, meaning opinions depend on current situations and policies at that time. Opinions often reflect the issue of the day, that is, what people are most concerned about at the time of a survey. Biases surrounding anti-Americanism are more ingrained in the society as a whole, embedded as an attitude, and are long lasting. Biases are a symptom of distrust, and people with a strong bias will process information differently than someone presented the same information that is unbiased (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007, Pg. 20). Negative opinions can become negative biases, which are more permanent and long lasting than negative opinions. "In general, biased people are also more likely to attribute bad policies to essential features of the United States, rather than merely specific situations …The more predisposed someone is against the United States the less information is required to view U.S. policies negatively. The strongest predisposition-bias-implies attributing negative actions and motives to the United States as an entity, rather than to the situation in which it finds itself, " (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007, Pg.

21). Biases against the U.S. are far more difficult to repair, suggesting a fundamental distrust of the U.S. that is beyond its current policies, and has implications for longer lasting anti-Americanism in the biased country. " If opinion hardens into distrust as appears to have happened in recent years in…secular strata of the Arab Middle East, the political consequences for the medium and long term could be severe," (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007, Pg. 11). The long period of anti-Americanism in Turkey for example, remaining above 50% of the population reporting distrust of the U.S. from 2002-2013, suggests that the negative opinion of the U.S. in Turkey could result in a deep-seated bias.

Though the definition of anti-Americanism is broad, that it impacts foreign policy and economic decisions is a matter of general consensus (Sadik, 2009). There are several consequences of anti-Americanism that are of the highest concern, "…anti-Americanism can feed terrorism and violence toward the United States; anti-Americanism can harm U.S. commercial interests abroad; and anti-Americanism can harm U.S. political interests by



Graph 1: Data from PEW Global Attitudes Survey, 2002-2013

making it more difficult to rally support for specific U.S. policy objectives," (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006). Businesses argue that anti-Americanism threatens to undermine the U.S.'s longstanding dominance in the economic realm by "…inspiring the destruction of property owned by American businesses, forcing companies to focus on security, fueling boycotts, and eroding the pull of traditionally powerful American brands," (Choudhury, 2006). The U.S. stands to lose its competitive advantage, and well as the overall reputation of the United States (Choudhury, 2006).

Anti-Americanism is also linked to increased violence against the U.S. and U.S. interests, particularly in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. According to Lindberg and Nossel (2006), the chairs of Princeton Project on National Security, report that anti-Americanism is thought to potentially fuel violence in three ways, "…by motivating terrorist recruits, by producing populations more amenable to harboring and abetting terrorists through shelter, political support, and funds; and by undermining global cooperation to counter terrorism." The greatest example of the widespread violence linked to anti-Americanism in the Middle East is the propagation of Islamist terrorist networks. "Anti-Americanism is virtually always a factor in contemporary jihadism and the historical link between the two is strong," (Lindberg and Nossel, 2006).

One of the most pertinent ways that anti-Americanism impacts the U.S. is in the manner that anti-Americanism affects that way that the U.S. is able to conduct foreign policy with other countries, as well as the U.S. ability to cooperate with foreign political leaders who use anti-Americanism to mobilize support for their political interests. "By periodically using our status as superpower to flex our military might…we have triggered a

backlash that increases extreme anti-Americanism, discourages key actors from fully cooperating with us, and weakens out global authority…the result undermines our hard power… and destroys our soft power," (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006).

This increasing anti-Americanism makes it difficult for the U.S. to use its hard power towards foreign countries, meaning that, because the U.S. image has been hurt globally by anti-Americanism, a country may not perceive a U.S. threat as an eminent one. An equally alarming measure is the threat of anti-Americanism against the U.S.'s ability to use soft power, or persuasive abilities, to convince countries to agree to U.S. policy towards their country. There are examples of foreign political leaders mobilizing anti-American sentiment to harness it for political gain, and to use anti-Americanism to gain base to blame for their countries problem that will lead them into political office (Berman, 2006). Political figures are using anti-Americanism as a base of support makes it difficult for the U.S. to have diplomatic relations with because this leader will have difficulty in agreeing to U.S. policies and still be seen as a viable, truthful leader to the citizens who elected them. Anti-Americanism is a problem with wide reaching implications, especially for politically strategic countries such as Turkey, a country reporting that 49% of its population views the U.S. as an enemy (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, Spring 2013).

American and Turkish Relations Since the Iraq Invasion in 2003

Strategic relations between the U.S. and Turkey date to the beginning of the Cold War. The dynamics of the American policy of containment against the Communist threat strengthened Turkey's strategic position in regards to U.S. foreign policy. Though the U.S. relationship with Turkey has also been one of strategic importance, there have been

difficulties in the partnership of the two countries. The difficulties between the two countries were exacerbated with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well as the Turkish parliament's denial of American troops to use Turkish territory to attack Iraq. The denial of U.S. troops in March 2003 to use Turkish soil to attack Iraq exposed the cracks in the U.S. Turkish relations between the two countries. A further fissure developed between the U.S. and Turkey when Turkey decided to send Turkish troops into northern Iraq, in order to protect its national interest, though it became clear that Turkish troops in Iraq could lead to clashes between Turkish troops and the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq (Guney, 2008).

The growing problem between the U.S. and Turkey was again showcased on July 4, 2003, termed the Sulaymaniyya incident in Turkey, and the Hood Incident in the U.S. On this day, U.S. troops, reportedly acting on and intelligence tip, raided the homes of Iraq's Turkman Front political group and Turkish special forces stationed in the Kurdish held northern city of al-Sulaymaniyya. Eleven members of Turkey's special forces were arrested, cuffed, and hooded, and detained by U.S. forces, each of the special force members accused of plotting a political assassination. This marked the beginning of a new and vociferous type of anti-Americanism in Turkey that found supporters across the board, including nationalists, leftists, and radical Islamists (Turkmen, 2009). This new relationship following the Hood Incident was exemplified in Serdar Akar's film *Valley of the Wolves: Iraq*, released in 2006. The film clearly demonstrated that the Turks viewed the Americans as the bad guy, and the Turks as an innocent, and good group that had been attacked.

Another equally important event to the rift between the two countries is the U.S.'s lack of effort to stake steps against the PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party), who are using northern Iraq as a safe haven to attack Turkey, and these strains in the U.S.-Turkey

relations are reflected in the Turkish media, further contributing to the growing anti-Americanism in Turkey since the Iraq invasion in 2003 (Sadik, 2009). The PKK in recent years have continued to conduct attacks within Turkey, and find refuge in northern Iraq, a problem that the Turks see as one that the U.S. should be willing to deal with, alongside Turkey, in order to keep the Turkish border safer. This has been a continuous concern of the Turkish government and people since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Sadik, 2009).

In more recent years, from 2009 to 2013, the greatest strain on the U.S.-Turkish relations has been in the U.S. response to the uprising in Libya, and the disagreement over how to conduct peace talks with Syria. "…Differences over Syria lie at the heart of the current crisis of trust," (Park, 2015). Leaders of Turkey also argue that the Islamic State (IS) has its roots in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the succeeding policies enacted. Park (2015) also claims that the PKK has an offshoot in northern Syria, a threat to Turkish security, one that Turkish leaders have been unable to get the U.S. show great resolve in helping to eliminate this offshoot group of the PKK, another fissure in the relationship in the U.S.-Turkish relationship.

U.S. policies in Libya have also caused great apertures in the U.S.-Turkish relationship. As the U.S. and western allies began to consider their response to the Libyan uprising, in 2011, the Turkish leaders initially opposed any intervention by the West in Libya, a large reason being the "…considerable Turkish economic stake in the country…" (Park, 2015). Though Turkey agreed with Gaddafi's removal, and put forth Turkish facilities to aid in the disposal of the Libyan leader, Turkey suffered a damaged reputation with the U.S. as a consequence of Turkey's reluctance and unhelpful rhetoric.

Why the Rise Anti-Americanism in Turkey Matters

Turkey's role in the Middle East and its strategic role U.S. foreign policy in the region are vital for the advent of a greater stability in the Middle East. Turkey is vital to U.S. policy in the Middle East. Turkey is seen as a long-standing friendly country towards the U.S., and after 9/11, an example that the U.S. can cooperate with a predominantly Islamic government (Taşpınar, 2005). Turkey is a Muslim-majority country that is also a secular democratic state, a member of NATO, a candidate for membership in the European Union, a long-standing U.S. ally, and the host of İncirlik Air Base, a key hub for logistical support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq," (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008).

Turkey's geostrategic location is an important reason for the U.S.'s continued relations with Turkey, even after several events between 2003-2013 that soured the relationship. Turkey is seen as an entrance to the Middle East, and thus an important position for the U.S. military to post troops when and if need be to be able to attack an enemy in the Middle East region (Guney, 2008). In more recent years, since the growth of IS in Iraq, Turkey has been seen as an entrance for foreign fighters who are willing to join IS, and potentially threatens Turkey and U.S. interest abroad. "Throughout 2014, Turkey served as a source and transit country for foreign terrorist fighters wishing to join these and other groups in Syria," (Consulate General of the United States, 2015). Turkey recognizes that keeping foreign fighters from entering Syria and Iraq and weakening ISIL are vital to Turkish security.

Why public opinion matters such a great deal in Turkey, and ultimately the great increase in anti-Americanism among Turkish citizens matters, is that the growing

discrepancy between U.S. and American standpoints resonates with Turkey's political constituents. "American popularity, particularly in the aftermath of the Iraq War, is at an all-time low and the notion that the United States seeks to weaken, even dismember Turkey is commonplace, no matter how far fetched this may seem to Americans," (Wimbush and Menon, 2007). Turkish politicians, due to their growing political base's anti-Americanism, will seek to use this opinion in order to get elected, and stay elected, even if the Turkish's public reason's for anti-Americanism makes little sense (Sadik, 2009). Turkey, while experiencing an increase in anti-Americanism, continues to be an important country in the fight against terrorism, as well as an important democratic country in the Middle East. "Thus, not only its location but the fact that Turkey is a stable Western-style democracy makes a closer relationship between Turkey and the United States attractive for both sides," (Sadik, 2009) If the U.S. fails to turn the image of American in Turkey, a country with a consistently high anti-Americanism since 2003, "…the American image abroad becomes damaged, especially among countries with predominantly Muslim populations," (Sadik, 2009). A more positive opinion toward the U.S. in Turkey is vital to continue to combat terrorism in the Middle East, as well as keep the perception alive that the U.S. can have a strategic relationship with a predominantly Muslim, democratic country. Being able to determine which group within Turkey is most likely to be anti-American is significant to being able to alleviate the anti-Americanism in the Turkish public. It is important to define two predominant groups in Turkey, the right-left political divide which makes up the political system in Turkey, and observant Muslims who hold Islam as central to their

identity, which allows for a better understanding of Turkish citizens, and how they determine their opinion of the U.S.

Islamic Identity in Turkey

The Islamic identity in Turkey is an important topic in regards to how leaders of other countries perceive Turkey's government and it policies. Turkey is a predominantly Islamic country, with most Turkish citizens practicing Sunni Islam. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country, yet regarded as a secular state, without a state religion, with protection for religious freedom. Since 9/11, it is widely regarded that the majority of Muslims hold anti-American sentiment, and that they see the U.S. as an enemy, rather than as a partner. It is of concern to many policy makers in the U.S. government that a majority of the Turkish government are observant Muslims. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist roots, has been the ruling party in Turkey since being elected in 2002, and again in 2007 (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). Islamic identity is important to an individual, and often put before their national identity. In recent times, Turkish citizens who regard their Islamic identity as very important, as well as those who practice political Islam in the government, have begun to rethink their opposition to the U.S., and American values (Dagi, 2005).



Graph 2: Data from PEW Global Attitudes Survey, 2013

Political Ideology in Turkey represented by Parties of the Left and the Right

There is a clear connection within any country that a person votes and supports a party that is close to their belief system, whether religiously, socially, or economically. "Research indicated that partisan affiliation, ideological and economic factors are the main determinants of the voters' party preferences at Turkish elections," (Kalaycioglu, 2013). This means there may be a clear correlation between a group of individuals who hold anti-American sentiment, and the party they vote for. In the Turkish political party system, there is a defined right-left spectrum with a religious-secular divide rather than socio-economic divide more recognizable in the U.S. (Aydogen and Slapin, 2013). On this spectrum, the left is held to be more socialists, and democratic socialists, with a focus on lessening economic inequality and clear, strong secularism. Those of the right of the spectrum are held to be more conservative with their value, more Islamic, less concerned with economic inequality, and more nationalists.

Since 2002, the ruling party of Turkey has been the AK Party (Justice and Development Party), and held to power in 2007 when the party again has a second electoral victory in 2007, and is still in power as of 2013(Toros, 2014). As of 2013, there are four parties within Turkey that have representation within the Turkish parliament: the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), People's Democratic Party (HDP), and the Republican People's Party (CHP) (Kalaycioglu, 2013). The AKP party is on the right of the political spectrum, and is seen as having clear Islamic roots (Taspinar, 2012). The AKP is generally seen as pro-Western, and pro-U.S.; The MHP is the third largest party as of 2013, and is described as an ultra-nationalists party; the CHP is the

second largest party in Parliament and is on the left of the spectrum, described as a social democracy party; the HDP is the smallest party represented in parliament, on the far left of the spectrum, and a supporter of Democratic socialism (Aydogen and Slapin, 2013). The two parties on the right, the AKP and MHP are considered more religious, and more Islamic. The two parties on the left, the CHP and HDP, are both more socialist, concerned with the economic inequality of Turkey, and more secular.

Anti-Americanism appears to be influenced by voters whose economic status has eroded in recent years, that is, they feel that the Turkish economy favors the wealthy. The conservative party, AKP, appears to be the least anti-American among the four parties in the Turkish Parliament (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2009). Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu (2009), in their book *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey,* interpreted their data to conclude that anti-Americanism appears to be more of a political occurrence rather than a social or cultural one, meaning it is more important to which party a Turkish citizen belongs to rather than their social or cultural identity, in determination of their level of anti-American sentiment.

Party Name	**Abbreviation**	**Leaders**	**Ideology**	**Position of Political Spectrum**
Justice and Development Party	AKP	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Conservative democracy	Center right, right-wing, Islamists
Nationalist Movement Party	MHP	Devlet Bahceli	Turkish nationalism	Far-right

People's Democratic Party	HDP	Selahattin Demirtas	Democratic socialism	Left-wing
Republican People's Party	CHP	Kemel Kılıçdaroğlu	Social democracy	Center-left

Table 1: This table summarizes the different parties names, abbreviations, leaders, political ideology, and position on the political spectrum (Carnegie Europe, 2015)



Graph 3: Data from PEW Global Attitudes Survey, 2013

III. Hypotheses and Model

The following research design is focused on the quantitative, statistical analyses of 663 survey results from Turkey collected from Pew Research Global Attitudes survey (2013). The individuals in the survey were eighteen years aged and older at the time of the survey. The survey was done face-to-face, in Turkish, between March 5 and March 24,

2013. The sample design of the survey was a multi-stage cluster stratified by the 26 regions and urbanity. The research will reveal the similarities in order to determine what characteristics are most notable in creating a profile of who is most likely to hold anti-American sentiment in Turkey. While this study cannot be a complete profile of Turkish anti-American sentiment, it will provide an analysis of the significance of the similarities between individuals in Turkey who share an anti-American sentiment. I expect to find similarities among the following control variables: gender, age, education, and income.
I will examine the following hypothesis:

1. **Individual citizens of Turkey on the left of the political spectrum are more likely to view the U.S. an enemy than those on the right of the political spectrum.**
2. **Individual citizens of Turkey who are more observant Muslims, with a strong Islamic identity, are less likely to view the U.S as an enemy.**

For this study, the dependent variable will be the individuals who view the United States as an enemy, not a friend, which is held to be the level of anti-American sentiment a person holds. This is asked in the Pew Survey question as " Overall, do you think of the U.S. as more of a partner of Turkey, more of an enemy of Turkey?" Answering an enemy assumes the person holds anti-American sentiment. Answering that the U.S. is a friend accepts that the person holds a more friendly view of the U.S. The first independent variable is if the person is an observant Muslims, and holds their Islamic identity as important. This question in the Pew survey is asked as " How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only on Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, every day at least once, or every day five times?" The

answer to this question is meant to imply how important their Islamic identity is to them. The second independent variable is if the individual holds a left or a right ideology. This question in the Pew survey is asked as, " Do you think Turkey's economic system generally favors the wealthy, or is it fair to most people of Turkey?" This question is meant to represent the political affiliation that a person holds. Answering that the person feels the economic system generally favors the wealthy assume they are more left on the spectrum, while answer that it is fair to most people assumes the person is more right on the political spectrum. The control variables fall into the following categories: age at last birthday, level of education, level of income, and gender. It is assumed that the independent variables of political affiliation or the Islamic identity that a person may hold will have a significant variance on the dependent variable, viewing the U.S. as an enemy or a friend.

IV. Research Design

The three questions stated above and the answers to these questions within the survey are the dependent and independent variables. Focusing on these two characteristics, Muslim identity and right-left political ideology, allow for narrower category of who holds anti-American sentiment in Turkey. It should be noted that because of Pew's limitations on the number of surveyors who responded to the survey, the results could only be theorized to properly represent the population of Turkey.

The study will look at the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes survey results, looking specifically at: answers to questions of view of the U.S. as an enemy or friend, how many times the individual Muslim prayers in a day, the individual's view on if the Turkish economy favors the wealthy or not, age, gender, income, and level of education. Each of the

variables will be measured according to the data available. The independent variable measuring left or right political ideology will be accessed by the individual's response to the question, "Do you think the Turkish economic system generally favors the wealthy or is it fair to most Turkish people?" The individual's response is recorded as either "1, favors the wealthy" or "2, fair to most". This variable is used a proxy for whether the individual is on the left or right of the spectrum because if they answer that their economy favors the wealthy, they are more likely to be on the left of the political spectrum, while if they answer that the economy is fair to most than they are more likely to be on the right of the political spectrum.

The independent variable measuring the importance of Islamic identity to the individual will be accessed by the individual's response to the question, " How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only on Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, every day at least once, or every day five times?" The individual's response is recorded as "1, hardly ever", " 2, only during religious holidays", "3, only on Fridays", "4, only on Fridays and religious holidays", "5, more than once a week" or "6, every day at least once". The dependent variable measuring the degree of anti-Americanism sentiment held by the individual will be accessed by the individual's response to the question, "Overall, do you think of the U.S. as more of a partner of Turkey, more of an enemy of Turkey or neither? " The individual's response is recorded as "1, more of a partner", "2, neither" or "3, more of an enemy". This variable is held as a proxy to an individual's Islamic identity. It is assumed the more regularly an individual prays, the more likely they are to have a strong Islamic identity.

In order to create a model of who is most likely to hold anti-American sentiment, the data was run through the STATA program to create an ordered probit regression model. The ordered probit model estimates the aggregate likelihood of being in one category versus all other categories. Ordered probit is used to predict an ordinal variable, that is, a variable that exists on an ordinal scale i.e. a scale of agreement from1-3: agree, neutral, disagree. The ordered probit is specifically used for modeling preference, and particularly for this paper, modeling levels of anti-American sentiment based on Islamic identity, and political identity by answering the survey questions using numbers on a scale. This study will involve collecting data from Pew Global Attitudes survey 2013. The data is from 663 individuals who answered the survey questions from Pew. The 663 individual's survey results were entered into SPSS, and the data was then cleaned of repeated data, or survey answers that did not relate to the hypothesis of this paper. Cleaning the data took the number of respondents to the survey from 1,000 to 663. Once the data was cleaned in SPSS, the data was run through STATA.

There are clear limitations to this study. The data gathered is from Pew Global Attitudes survey, and therefore the questions and answers are limited to the survey Pew gives annually, as this research project does not have the ability to ask each 663 individuals surveyed further questions regarding their political or religious identity, as well as if they have a positive or negative opinion of the U.S. Because of this, the questions and answers in this survey can act only as representations of the religious and political identities of Turkish citizens, as well as their overall sentiment towards the U.S. When looking through the data from Pew, any data that was duplication, or an answer of "Don't know" or

"Refused" were deleted from the data set. The list of full questions and their corresponding answers are found in appendix A.

V. Results

The results of this study are organized into sections by independent variables: independent variable 1, political right-left ideology, and independent variable 2, Islamic identity. Each section explains what program the data was run through, the statistical results, and conclusions that can be drawn from the data. The full data set can be found in appendix B, with an amended data table at the end of the results section.

Independent Variable 1: Right-Left Political Ideology

The data from for this independent variable were collected from Pew Global Attitudes survey, 2013. The data was run through the statistical analysis program STATA in order to create an ordered probit regression. For this study, the Z score for independent variable 1, right-left political ideology, is -2.79, meaning that the independent variable is significant and has significant influence on the dependent variable. The z score of -2.79 also confirms that the more left politically a person is, the more influence this has on the probability that they will hold anti-American sentiment. In other words, the Z score suggests that the independent variable of believing that Turkey's economic system favors the wealthy has a significant influence on the dependent variable, viewing the U.S. as an enemy and thus harboring anti-American sentiment. My two-tail p-value test is .005 for the independent variable 1, right-left political ideology. The p-value needed to be less than or equal of .005. My two-tail p-value is at .005, meaning that independent variable 1, right-left political ideology has a significant influence on the dependent variable of viewing the U.S. as an enemy, and therefore harboring anti-American sentiment. With the results of this

study means is that I can accept my hypothesis that Turkish citizens who hold a leftist political ideology are more likely to be anti-American than Turkish citizens who have a political ideology on the right.

Independent Variable 2: Islamic Identity

The data for this independent variable were collected from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2013. The data was run through the statistical analysis program STATA in order to generate an ordered probit regression. For this study, the Z score for the independent variable 2 is -0.33. This score means that the independent variable of Islamic identity has little influence on the dependent variable, viewing the U.S. an enemy. Overall, this Z score suggests that independent variable 2, Islamic identity, and thus being an observant Muslim, has little influence on the dependent variable, and therefore, being an observant Muslim will have little influence on whether you hold anti-American sentiment or not. The two-tail p-value for the independent variable 2 is .742, which is much higher than .005, meaning this independent variable has little effect on the dependent variable. With the results of this study, the hypothesis that observant Muslims are less likely to view the U.S. as enemy, and thus hold high levels anti-American sentiment can be accepted.

Dependent Variable: U.S. Viewed as Enemy or Friend

Number of Observations = 663

Independent Variables	Z	P > |Z|
Independent Variable 1: Left-Right Political Ideology	-2.79	0.005
Independent Variable	-0.33	0.742

2: Islamic Identity, Number of times pray per day		

Table 2 U.S. Favorability Ordered Probit Model Results

VI. Conclusion and Discussion

With the results from this study, the hypothesis that citizens of Turkey who views the U.S. as an enemy are more likely to be on the left political spectrum in Turkey. I can reject that individual citizens of Turkey who are more observant Muslims, with a strong Islamic identity, are less likely to view the U.S as an enemy. There are several conclusions that I can draw from the findings of this research, all which have implications of how the U.S. should view anti-Americanism in Turkey, and if there are any solutions to this problem of steady anti-Americanism in Turkey.

An important implication of this study is that there is not strong correlation between viewing the U.S. as an enemy, and thus anti-Americanism, and being an observant Muslims in Turkey. Because of the growing number of terrorist organizations who justify their violent actions with Islam, people have begun to assume that more observant Muslims dislike America. In the case of Turkey, this does not appear to be the case. Rather, observant Muslims are less likely to hold anti-American sentiment in Turkey. High levels of anti-Americanism in Turkey do not appear to be a result of Islamic identity. These implications should change the way the U.S. makes policy to confront anti-Americanism in Turkey, and mend its relationship with Turkey, because the results of this study give information on who the groups of Turkish citizens most likely to hold anti-American

sentiment. This study predicts the pattern that Turkish citizens who are on the left of the political spectrum hold the most anti-American sentiment, and thus view the U.S. as an enemy rather than a friend. The characteristics of a leftist political ideology, such as seeing the Turkish economy as favoring the rich, as well as secularism, are factors more likely to predict anti-American sentiment than Islamic identity in Turkey.

There are objections that could be raised toward this study. The main objection that could be raised is that, though my conclusions from the results hold for the 663 individuals surveyed, the results may not hold true and be generalized for the entire population of Turkey because my sample size was small and the population of Turkey is large. Another objection to this study is that, because the survey is done each year, the results of this study could change year to year. This study's results are for the year 2013 only, and do not include data from other years the Pew Global Attitudes Survey was done.

To counter these objections, I would suggest further research be done with this study. To make a more broad study that could better represent Turkey's population, a larger study could be done that includes a larger portion of the Turkish population, both in urban areas and in rural areas. Another suggestion for further research that may mend the possible second objection to this research is to include all Pew Global Attitude data sets from 2001 up until 2015, meaning there would be clearer results overtime who held anti-Americanism, and if the results from this study, that those with leftist political ideologies, held strong anti-American sentiment compared to observant Muslims over the 14 year period. If this were to be done, this would give a clear pattern overtime of who is the most anti-American. Along with this, explanation of why there is such strong anti-Americanism

overtime in Turkey can be better explained because, with this study the model predicts that Turkish citizens on the left of the political spectrum hold the most anti-American sentiment, and therefore, explanations for the consistent high anti-Americanism in Turkey can be explained by the reactions of Turkish citizens on the left to American policies. If there is a more concentrated explanation for why Turkish citizens on the left are more anti-American, then it is more possible for the U.S. government to create viable policies that could lower the amount of anti-Americanism in Turkey, and begin to mend the strained relationship with Turkey and the U.S. If the relationship with the U.S. and Turkey were mended, and there was more trust between in Turkey rather than anti-Americanism, there could be more constructive dialogue between the two countries, and problems such as Islamic militants traveling through Turkey to join Islamic militant groups could begin to be solved through a closer partnership with the U.S. and Turkey.

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Appendix A

Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project

Spring 2013 Questionnaire

Final Questionnaire

Ask All Except China

Q56 Do you think the **(survey country)** economic system generally favors the wealthy or is it fair to most **(people of survey country)?**

1 Favors the wealthy

2 Fair too most

8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)

9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Ask All Except China And The United States

Q120 Overall, do you think of the U.S. as more of a partner of **(survey country)**, more of an enemy of **(survey country)**, or neither?

1 More of a partner

2 More of an enemy

3 Neither

8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)

9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Ask Muslims in Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian territories, Senegal, Tunisia, and turkey only

Q175 How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only on Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, every day at least once, or every day five times?

1 Hardly ever

2 Only during religious holidays

3 Only on Fridays

4 Only on Fridays and religious holidays

5 More than once a week

6 Every day at least once

7 Every day five times

8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)

9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Q164 *Gender (Record By Observation)*

1 Male

2 Female

Q165 How old were you at your last birthday?

_____ Years (RECORD AGE IN YEARS)

97 97 or older

98 Don't know (DO NOT READ)

99 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Q180 *Education—Question Wording And Response Categories Vary By Country*

Q183 *Income— Question Wording And Response Categories Vary By Country*

Methods in Detail

About the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on telephone and face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Survey results are based on national samples.

The descriptions below show the margin of sampling error based on all interviews conducted in that country. For results based on the full sample in a given country, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus the margin of error. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or sentiment into the findings of opinion polls.

Country: **Turkey**

Sample design: Multi-stage cluster sample stratified by the 26 regions (based on geographical location and level of development (NUTS 2)) and urbanity

Mode: Face-to-face adults 18 plus

Languages: Turkish

Fieldwork dates: March 5 – March 24, 2013

Sample size: 1,000

Margin of Error: ±7.7 percentage points

Representative: Adult population

Appendix B

```
2 . oprobit Dependent_Variable_US Independent_Variable_Right_Left Control_Gender
  > ontrol_Age Independent_Variable_Islamic_Ide Control_Education Control_Income

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -648.29466
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -642.00418
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -642.00319
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -642.00319

Ordered probit regression                       Number of obs   =        663
                                                LR chi2(6)      =      12.58
                                                Prob > chi2     =     0.0502
Log likelihood = -642.00319                     Pseudo R2       =     0.0097
```

Dependent_V~S	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Independent~t	-.2951402	.1058478	-2.79	0.005	-.5025981	-.0876823
Control_Gen~r	-.0022586	.0936793	-0.02	0.981	-.1858666	.1813494
Control_Age	.0004783	.0036482	0.13	0.896	-.0066721	.0076286
Independent~e	-.0075815	.0230372	-0.33	0.742	-.0527335	.0375705
Control_Edu~n	.0329397	.0331654	0.99	0.321	-.0320633	.0979426
Control_Inc~e	.0578675	.0375579	1.54	0.123	-.0157447	.1314796
/cut1	-.9455889	.3493046			-1.630213	-.2609645
/cut2	-.1867309	.3481051			-.8690043	.4955424

Figure 1: Full Data Set created from STATA, data from Pew Global Attitudes 2013

Appendix C



Figure 2: Map demonstrating showing that, among the countries of the world, it demonstrates one of the lowest favorable views of the U.S. in the world. Map from Pew Global Attitudes, 2013. http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/global-image-of-the-united-states-and-china/